

The Chinese and Opium under the Republic



WORSE THAN FLOODS AND WILD BEASTS

Alan Baumler

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Alan Baumler

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For my wife, Shari
G.T.F

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Contents

List of Figures and Tables	ix	
Acknowledgments	xi	
Introduction	Worse than Floods and Wild Beasts: Opium, Politics, and Society in Republican China	1
Chapter 1	Establishing a Meaning for Opium	9
Chapter 2	The Narrative of Addiction in China and the West	35
Chapter 3	The International Campaign against Opium	57
Chapter 4	Warloads and Opium	89
Chapter 5	Opium, the Nation, and the Revolution	111
Chapter 6	Hankou, the Anti-Opium Inspectorate, and Control of the Opium Trade	151
Chapter 7	Purifying the People and Defending the State: The Six Year Plan to Eliminate Opium	177
Chapter 8	Defining Drugs	195
Chapter 9	War, Poppies, and the Completion of the Plan	215
Conclusion		231
Notes		239
Bibliography		277
Index		294

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List of Figures and Tables

FIGURES

Fig. 1.1	Opium <i>likin</i> revenue	32
Fig. 2.1	Conspicuous Consumption	37
Fig. 6.1	Cover of <i>Opium: An avoidable evil</i>	174
Fig. 8.1	Zilin and Ahmei	203
Fig. 8.2	Put down your pipe	207

TABLES

Table 1.1	Agrarian and Commercial revenues as a percent of total	31
Table 8.1	Registered <i>yan min</i>	206
Table 9.1	Opium shipped by <i>jianyunsuo</i>	217

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Introduction

Worse Than Floods and Wild Beasts Opium, Politics, and Society in Republican China

On January 7, 1919, Zhang Yipeng, a special representative from Duan Qirui's government in Beijing assembled fifty notables at the New Happiness and Contentment Warehouse on Sichuan road in Shanghai. The assorted government officials, educators, bankers, merchants, and social reformers were to assist Zhang in destroying 1,207 chests of Indian opium. Zhang opened the first chest to find forty balls of opium, which were removed, chemically tested and returned to the chest, which was then weighed and its registration number was checked off. They got through eighteen chests that morning, took two hours for lunch, and then managed twenty-four chests in the afternoon. At this rate, the process would take a month, and as the days went by the number of notables attending dropped, and the journalist who dutifully reported on each day's events for the *Shenbao* began to fill his articles with the names of the chemicals used to test the opium and even the numbers of the chests.¹ On January 17, the first batches of opium were shipped under heavy security across the Huangpu River to Pudong and the process of burning began. It was witnessed by over two hundred people, including many Chinese and foreign reporters. The entire process was finally completed on February 3, 1919.

What was destroyed at Pudong were the last stocks of Indian opium to be legally imported into China. In 1906, China launched a national and international campaign against the opium trade. The destruction of the Pudong opium was the culmination of this campaign, and could be considered the end of the India-China opium trade, a trade English reformers and Chinese statesmen had campaigned against for decades. The burning of opium could be ascribed to the Chinese government's growing ability to control its people, denying them access to opium and convincing them that opium-smoking was not proper behavior for

citizens of a modern nation. The burning could also be ascribed to the Chinese state's growing ability to manipulate the international system. The burning was the outcome of a bilateral Anglo-Chinese opium reduction agreement, a signal victory for China's New Policies diplomacy.

The atmosphere at Pudong was not festive, however. The Pudong burning could also be connected to China's corruption, weakness, and neocolonial status. The Beijing government had not seized this opium, they had bought it, and they had bought it to sell it. The opium had been in the hands of a consortium of foreign merchants in Shanghai, who had been unable to sell it because of the strictness of Chinese anti-opium regulations.²

The central government purchased the opium from the foreign merchants as the beginning of a state opium monopoly—a complete betrayal of the professed aims of the anti-opium movement. As this plan gradually became known it was attacked by “public opinion,” and the 1919 opium burnings were the result.³ At least for a time, the burnings ended the possibility of a formal state opium monopoly, but opium production and use was reappearing all over China in 1919, making a mockery of the anti-opium campaigns.

The recrudescence of opium after 1919 was shocking to many, but it was also unsurprising. The Late Qing anti-opium campaigns were an attempt to create a new China by purifying her people and government, or, to put it another way, to replace an older discourse on opium with a new one. Later scholars pointed to the campaigns as “The largest and most vigorous effort in world history to stamp out an established evil.”⁴ This characterization fits well with the self-image of the reformers. They had come to the realization that a certain social habit was a bad one and that a systematic, organized and uncontroversial campaign to eliminate it was necessary. Opium suppression was no different than the campaigns against footbinding or in favor of establishing modern schools. The anti-opium campaigns were an attempt by a social and political elite to discipline the masses, with all the implications of coercion that implies.

There were many opium burnings both before and after 1919. Symbolically, they consisted of not only putting opium in a box, but putting China's opium problem in a box, and then burning it. However, opium was not an inert substance. It took its meaning from a host of economic, social, and political meanings attached to it by Chinese and by foreigners.⁵ Although an important part of the story of opium in China was the attempt to impose a new understanding of opium on the Chinese people and the international community, the story is considerably more complex.

Until at least the 1950s, opium and related drugs continued to be seen in a variety of contexts. Heroin sold by a Korean smuggler traveling on a Japanese passport was an entirely different thing from opium produced by poor peasants in Yunnan and smoked by one's grandfather. The state, and Chinese and foreign reformers, attempted to simplify opium down into a handful of meanings—all

socially and legally unacceptable—and use the power of the state to eliminate the trade entirely. The purpose in this study is both to uncover the meanings of opium and to explain the process by which it was simplified. Simplification, understanding, controlling, and manipulating the chaotic society of China was the fundamental task of the revolutionary project that China launched after 1900. The process of opium suppression was parallel to the process of nation-building, and many commentators claimed that a true modern China was impossible if opium was not eliminated.

Opium suppression was uncharted territory for all states in the early twentieth century. As a random example, China needed railways and thus it needed money to build them. If China could come up with the money, technology could be imported, labor mobilized and railways built. Controlling drug use was not simple. In 1900, there was no state in the world that controlled its subjects' behavior as closely as China wished to control opium smoking. China was at the forefront of what would become a worldwide war on drugs, and was developing methods of social control that were as advanced as those used in the West, Japan, and the colonial empires. China was part of a developing international consensus on the meanings of drugs, citizenship, and the power of the state.

Opium suppression also encountered active resistance. There were no important political constituencies that opposed railway construction by 1919, and anyone who did could be dismissed as backwards or self-interested. Those who defended opium could be dismissed if they claimed China was better off smoking opium than not, but nobody said this. What did happen was that individuals did not behave as they should if they fully accepted the new understanding of opium. Some of these were evil people like opium smugglers or opium dealers, whose resistance could be assumed to come from the fact that they were more interested in their own benefit than the good of the nation. Some were foreigners or warlords, and this fit well with the general May Fourth interpretation of China's problems: China was controlled by those who did not have China's best interests at heart, be they imperialists, warlords, or feudal remnants. Many of those associated with opium could not be as easily dismissed. Were peasants who raised poppies enemies of China? Were Chinese governments that profited from opium revenue traitorous? Was an opium smoker a victim of imperialism, a compatriot in need of help, a degenerate pleasure-seeker, human refuse?

How could the state understand a complex social phenomenon, regulate it and eliminate it? This involved several related problems, among them were the complex matters of controlling the flow of a very slippery substance across China and controlling the private behavior of millions all over the country. These were comparatively simple problems of social control, and China borrowed methods for dealing with them from other states. More difficult was the problem of winning and maintaining public acceptance and support for these

measures. No one wanted to die of bubonic plague, and so plague prevention measures were not resisted. Nobody profited from the plague; no political forces favored it, and no foreign governments encouraged it. But the drug trade was connected to extraterritoriality, imperialism, and eventually to an international drug control system. It was connected to problems of political decentralization and rural backwardness. Above all, it was connected to the tendency of ordinary Chinese to behave in ways that were not in the best interest of the nation. The state would have to deal with various forms of resistance, and transform both the Chinese political system and the behavior of the Chinese people.

The state usually presented this as an entirely technocratic problem. There were those who resisted opium suppression in various ways, but they were bad people; backwards peasants, degenerate rickshaw pullers, warlords, and Japanese drug smugglers. The state would reform or eliminate them. Most important, national figures gave their support to this great national crusade of purifying the Chinese race and nation, and making them truly modern. Yuan Shikai hoped that "the people and the officials of the whole nation should regard opium as a great disgrace and shame." Guo Zhenjun called opium suppression a Third Revolution whose success was the duty of all citizens. Sun Yatsen said the opium trade was incompatible with a government based on the will of the people. Chiang Kai-shek pledged that his government would get "not one cent" from opium.⁶ All of these pledges were typical of twentieth century antidrug rhetoric around the world. Drugs were evil beyond measure, and no legitimate government should compromise with them in any way. By taking this position China became a modern nation.

The rhetoric of drug suppression tied China to a new, Western, medical discourse that viewed opium smoking as a uniquely dangerous vice that would destroy the individual and the race if it was not eliminated. This discourse was tremendously valuable for the state. It collected a series of beliefs about opium into a single narrative, both giving coherence to and increasing the importance of opium suppression.

Although opium smoking had always been seen as a vice, prior to the late nineteenth century it had been one vice among many. It was also a mainstay of state finance for national and colonial states all over Asia. Traditional views of the dangers of opium-smoking for the individual were complex, but it was seen, like other drugs, as having a series of beneficial attributes. These benefits would be over-ridden by excessive use, but smoking opium, in and of itself, was not necessarily bad. The new discourse of addiction was complex, but it shared a trait not found in traditional views: opium use as dragging the user and society into a narrative of inevitable destruction. Although the cause of the danger (physical or psychological) might change within the context of different theories, and the nature of the user (weak- or strong-willed) have some effect on the course of the narrative, in each individual case the end of the story was always

the same. The narrative was based on the metaphor of infectious disease, although opium smoking was not a microorganism.

The narrative of addiction served a number of purposes. It was capable of including all the ways in which opium was used. Opium smoking does not work very well as a disease in the classic sense: It not caused by a micro-organism, and it does not have a vector of transmission or a typical progression. By positing a narrative with many paths to a final end, the theory neatly dealt with the fact that many individual lives did not fit the pattern of decline and destruction.

Addiction theory also applied to societies. Once addiction had established itself in society it would spread and eventually destroy its host. Drug addiction was thus a more threatening problem than petty theft, prostitution, or cholera. Opium was now “worse than floods and wild beasts.” This was a standard Confucian phrase to describe any unimaginable calamity. The phrase was often used to refer to opium in the twentieth century. Opium and drug use were no longer one of several problems facing the Chinese state. They were an overwhelming threat that could destroy the nation.

The new theory of addiction was helpful to any who accepted it, explaining behavior and placing opium suppression in the pantheon of tasks needed to create a new China. However, it was not accepted in its entirety. Peasants continued to behave as if poppies were just a profitable crop; opium smokers behaved as if smoking were a personal peccadillo. The friends, relatives, and neighbors of opium smokers, which included almost everyone in China, often disapproved, but did not equate opium-smoking with treason. Governments denounced the opium trade, but continued to profit from it. This presented problems in carrying out a Western-style war on drugs. Addiction theory in the West posited that drug users were a handful of victims or criminals who could be reformed or controlled by the power of the unpolluted state or the example of the mass of good citizens. This was how drug use was managed in the West, although the model floundered in the case of alcohol prohibition in the United States, the one drug which has wide social acceptance and economic importance. Although the Chinese borrowed the rhetoric of prohibition, in practice, the technocratic vision of public health could not be applied in China. There was no pure state apparatus to view, categorize, and control opium. Those involved in opium did not constitute a small group of deviants to be cut out of the body politic, but the Chinese people as a whole. Anti-opium crusaders had a vision of a new China, but no clear way to get there.

The contradictions between the imported vision of the drug problem, the situation in China, and the nature and capacity of the Chinese state, created problems for reformers and also for later scholars. A typical position, especially among Chinese scholars, is to accept the dichotomy between good and evil and place republican governments on the side of evil, and dismiss attempts at reform as cynical window-dressing on a policy that exploited people. Western scholars

tend to favor interpretations based on contradiction. Wakeman denounces the 1935 anti-opium campaign as a cynical conspiracy to cover an opium monopoly that “fooled no-one.” But he also says that the sincerity of the state in announcing the plan “cannot be doubted.”⁷ Mayer and Parssinan find this conspiracy theory unconvincing, and prefer to explain contradictory state behavior as “bureaucratic schizophrenia,” which acknowledges a certain seriousness of reform efforts without explaining the contradiction.⁸ Slack diagnoses the cause of this schizophrenia by pointing out the tremendous financial needs that drove the Nationalists to a policy “at once morally abhorrent and fiscally imperative.”⁹

What all of these approaches share is a tendency to anthropomorphize. Hypocrisy and schizophrenia are best left as descriptions of individual behavior, as they are not particularly good metaphors for opium policy or the opium trade in China. Chiang Kai-shek may well have been hypocritical in some (or all) of his public statements about opium, but this does not get us very far in understanding opium policy.

This emphasis on the personal morality of leaders is not surprising, as protestations of moral worth and sincerity are common in the sources. States constantly protested their sincerity as a way of justifying opium policy. Individuals can have psychological states, governments cannot. What Chiang Kai-shek tried to convey with this metaphor of sincerity was that his government’s policies of opium control were an integral part of an eventual policy of opium suppression. Stressing the moral purity of the state and its leaders linked current opium policies to a glorious opium-free future, rather than the grubby reality of state opium sales. Rhetorical statements about the sincerity of government intentions were more than just hypocrisy, they were also a way to legitimize current policy by linking it to an imagined future.

Policy was also linked to the current reality of opium control. Opium control was the process of states learning about, controlling, and profiting from the opium trade. This process was central to all of the colonial opium monopolies that China borrowed methods from, but in Chinese propaganda, opium control was antithetical to opium suppression. Although most of the colonial monopolies had a minor goal of limiting the spread of opium use—and all claimed to be aimed at the eventual suppression of the trade—they were mostly concerned with revenue, and this was impossible to conceal.¹⁰ In metropolitan states the problem of drug abuse was small enough for the state to attempt a policy of absolute suppression. Neither of these options were open to Chinese governments. The scale of opium production and use, and its intimate connection with the existing state apparatus, made prohibition impossible. After the adaptation of the new discourse of addiction, however, it was impossible for China as a national state to establish a revenue-oriented opium monopoly that would exploit its own citizens.

In order to control the opium trade, for whatever purpose, the state had to make it legible, and in practice this meant state involvement in the trade.¹¹ By establishing a degree of control over the trade the state could co-opt opium merchants, poppy growers, and opium smokers, bringing them into a system that would benefit them while also putting their activities in a context that would lead to the end of the opium trade. As a side benefit, according to the state, the system would yield more than enough revenue to pay for itself. It was here that sincerity came into play. Eliminating opium was impossible without first establishing control over the trade. Control over the trade was ideologically impossible without the justification of eventual suppression. The only thing that could tie the two sides together was the good faith of national leaders and the revolutionary party. Chinese writings on opium usually divided the trade into four parts: (1) growing, (2) shipping, (3) sales and (4) smoking (*zhong, yun, ji, xi.*) After 1900, it was generally assumed that a successful anti-opium policy had to address all four parts at once. In the same fashion I will argue that a successful anti-opium policy had to combine elements of a revenue-oriented system of state control; a public health campaign to suppress a social evil; and a moral crusade to reform the Chinese people.

In this study I analyze the process by which a series of Chinese governments managed to free China from the plague of opium. This does not mean that China became opium-free, or even that the campaigns were a good idea, but rather than the intimate relationship between opium and China's social and political life was broken, and drug abuse became a social problem like any other.

Chapter 1 analyzes the meanings that were attached to opium when it first came to the attention of the court. It was these meaning that led to the first anti-opium campaigns and the First Opium War. In later anti-opium propaganda this was the beginning of China's hundred-year struggle against opium. In fact, opium became an issue of secondary importance for the next sixty years, a fact explained by examining why opium was no longer connected to the main concerns of reformers after 1840.

Chapter 2 explains the development of the narrative of addiction in China and the West. The development and transmission of the new theories of addiction and its dangers to the individual and the race were essential to the reinsertion of opium suppression into Chinese politics.

Chapter 3 examines the international context of China's anti-opium efforts. International developments were important because the trade in drugs was international, and because China would end up borrowing many techniques of opium control from the colonial states. China was also signatory to the first international anti-drug agreements, and her efforts to define and deal with opium were closely linked to the developing international system.

Chapters 4 and 5 explain the role of opium in the Chinese political economy and the revolutionary understanding of China's problems. While revolutionaries

rejected the opium-sodden politics of the warlord era, they also discovered that the state and the people lacked the ability to simply eliminate the opium trade.

Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 deal both thematically and chronologically with the 1935 Six-Year Plan to Eliminate Opium, which was the culmination of Nationalist attempts to deal with opium. Chapter 6 analyzes the origins of the plan in state attempts to control the wholesale trade in opium, mostly prior to 1935. Chapter 7 argues that public acceptance of the plan was founded on its expansion (after 1935) into dealing with and curing opium smokers. The first part of the plan, controlling the trade, was profitable for the state, and it was generally assumed that the goal of controlling opium and its profits was antithetical to the goal of purifying China and its people. It explains how the Nationalist state managed to combine these two approaches into a plan both practical and ideologically acceptable.

Chapter 9 deals with the war and the position of opium suppression in the new priorities of wartime. Although it was initially assumed war would put opium suppression on the back burner, it was quickly decided that it would be a central part of the war effort. Controlling the productivity of West China peasants, as well as purifying the people, became crucial goals for the wartime state and the plan was accelerated. In 1940, the plan was declared a success, the relationship between opium, the Chinese state, and the Chinese nation had been changed to the point that it was no longer a major concern.

Chapter 1

Establishing a Meaning for Opium

The Pudong opium burning was a political ritual that harked back to Commissioner Lin Zexu's destruction of British opium at Humen in 1839, and looked forward to contemporary ideas about public health and public relations. Even today in Taiwan, June 3rd, the date of Lin's event, is celebrated as anti-smoking day and always involves a public burning of illicit drugs.¹ Public destruction of drugs is thus a political ritual which claims to link all opium burnings between 1839 and the present, making them all part of a common narrative of national salvation. Opium burnings were common through the first half of the twentieth century, but the meanings were not the same as those of the single case of destroying opium in 1839 or the modern Taiwanese War on Drugs. The ritual and rhetorical similarities between these events obscure the tremendous differences in opium suppression over the last two hundred years and unify the complex motivations for these campaigns into a single narrative.

There were four central aspects to anti-opium campaigns: (1) control of the opium itself; (2) control of the people; (3) control of the state; and (4) control of the understanding of opium. The first was actual control over opium itself, a notoriously slippery commodity. No premodern state controlled any commodity as closely as the Chinese state attempted to control opium. Opium required close control of the people. The traditional Chinese state had asked very little of most of its subjects, but the new, modernizing state required a new level of commitment from its citizens. The Qing state had tried to eliminate criminal behavior, but this was a fairly small target. Salt smuggling, banditry, and heterodox cults involved smugglers, bandits, and sectarians.² Opium involved everyone who grew, sold, or smoked it, and everyone who tolerated those who grew it, sold it

or smoked it, in other words, the entire nation. The state also had to change. Opium suppression would have to be carried out by state employees, who would have to abjure their desire for personal profit from the opium trade. Officials would prove to have a stronger attraction to opium money than to almost any other type of corruption. The problem was not only with individual officials, but from the state itself, considered collectively.³ Opium became an important part of state budgets and could not be easily removed.

The state had to create and control new ideas about opium both in China and outside. Despite the rhetoric of reformers, concepts of addiction and theories about the dangers opium posed to the people were not self-evident, and if the campaigns were to have popular support, they had to be legitimated through ties to narratives of national salvation and international order. Reformers had to create new explanations of what opium was, how it fit into Chinese society, and persuade or coerce people at home and abroad to accept them. These new discourses could be powerful tools for the Chinese state, as when they convinced the British to end the Indian opium trade, or as tools used against the Chinese state by domestic rivals.

In anti-opium propaganda, progress on these fronts was presented as a secular trend towards light and away from darkness. Lin Zexu had seen the need to control opium, create a new people and government, and convince the Chinese and foreigners to set themselves against the trade. The traditional view of the century that followed 1839 is of years of progress and retreat as more or less honest and enlightened officials encouraged or neglected opium suppression. In practice, the process was not so linear.

On a practical level, controlling opium itself, reality fit the model of steady progress reasonably well. The Chinese state had almost no knowledge about or control over the trade in opium in 1830, but by 1950, this problem had been largely overcome. Even here, however, the traditional narrative conceals important changes in the nature of the opium trade. First, the nature of the trade was becoming more complex. Burning all the opium in China was much easier in 1839 than in 1919. Lin was able to collect “all” the opium in China because Guangdong was the center of the Chinese opium trade in 1839, and the bulk of the opium passed through a handful of foreigners in that province.⁴ After 1840, both imports and domestic production expanded and diversified. The state’s task of collecting all the opium in China had become far more difficult—in fact, impossible. While the ability of the state to control the flow of opium had not kept pace with the changing opium trade, this should not obscure the fact that the state had not lagged too far behind. Pudong was a testament to the success of the Beiyang government in coming to grips with the practical problems of controlling opium, a success later governments would build on.

This success, however, was built on a new relationship between the state and opium. Lin Zexu wanted to collect information about opium to eliminate it. From about 1860 to 1906, state interest in the opium trade was driven by a desire to control and tax it. From 1906 to 1919, the state (at least at the national level) returned to the goal of suppression, although much of the knowledge obtained, and the bureaucracy set up to tax opium, was also be used for suppression. From 1919 to 1940, both of these goals, revenue and suppression, were pursued simultaneously.

The state's attempts to get a handle on the opium problem were complex enough when examined at the level of state policy; they become considerably more complex when looked at from the perspective of local government and day-to-day administration. Neither the Qing nor the Republic was a fully Weberian state, with national policy carried out swiftly by a professional and disinterested bureaucracy. Nowhere was this more evident than in opium control. Disputes over opium revenues were one of the most common sources of conflict between different levels of government. Joseph Stillwell claimed that opium lay at the root of the independence of the warlords, calling it "the chief prop of all power in China, both civil and military."⁵ He may have exaggerated, but not by much, and the problem stretched well back into the Qing.

The problem also included attempts to control individual bureaucrats. State employees, who used their positions for personal gain rather than for the good of the state; i.e. corruption, was a common, if hard to define, problem for all Chinese governments. Again, the case of opium was more severe than any other. Given the value of opium, the bribes those who dealt in it were willing to pay were enormous. Especially in rural areas, those involved in opium threatened officials physically as well as enticed them financially. Salt had been the traditional commodity most linked to corruption, but it paled in comparison to opium. Zeng Junchen was a salt merchant for thirty years, but in 1935, he left that trade to go into opium, lured by the 800 percent profit he could make. The skills in manipulating officials, that Zeng had learned as a salt merchant, proved useful in his new trade, but he reported that the opium trade required even more outlay on prostitutes, liquor and bribes for officials than salt.⁶ Opium, even more so than salt, generated enough profits to blur the line between public and private, corruption and ordinary state action. This was true in remote areas like Sichuan, as well as Shanghai, the center of Chinese modernity, where Du Yuesheng's power as a chief client of the Nationalist state and his position as a public figure were not in conflict with his role as the city's chief opium merchant—in fact, his roles complimented each other. Here again, the secular trend from corruption to purity is not entirely misleading. Individual corruption and malfeasance remained a problem until 1949 and after, but the process of weaning the state off opium revenues had been largely completed by 1940. Although

individual officials would still collect bribes to ignore the opium trade, opium would no longer be central to state finances.

On an ideological level, the Chinese state had mixed success in convincing others (and itself) that opium suppression was a worthwhile goal and that the Chinese state was in fact pursuing it. In 1919, the Pudong burning was possible because the Chinese state had convinced the British state, the Chinese people, and itself of the desirability of ending the opium trade. Internationally, they had been successful by 1919. China had been able to manipulate emerging ideas about the dangers of drugs and value of international cooperation to convince the British to stop defending the India-China opium trade and eventually to participate in its dissolution. The Chinese would have less success using the same weapons against the Japanese for a number of reasons, not least of which was China's inability to live up to its image as a modern state.

The domestic popularity of opium proved to be more intractable. Opium had put down deep roots in China's economy and society. It was smoked by people of all social classes, and as millions of Chinese profited from the opium trade they had an interest in seeing it continue. For Lin Zexu, opium was safely other; by 1919, there were millions who would have called the burning a waste of good opium. Countless peasants raised poppies, merchants sold it, banks financed it, and governments taxed it. Besides the financial profits, millions of Chinese enjoyed smoking opium and enjoyed socializing around an opium pipe.

The process of defining opium as a thing to be eliminated was much more complex in 1919 than in 1839, but it was carried out with some success. By 1919, almost all politically active Chinese were opposed to the opium trade, at least in the abstract. The rapid recrudescence of opium after 1919 was blamed on a handful of ignorant, greedy, corrupt individuals, who either did not understand the meaning of being a citizen of the new nation, or were too self-interested to behave properly. This view was appropriate in any of the Western nations from which the reformers borrowed ideas about opium; drug abuse was the work of deviants; its control was a technical matter of law enforcement and public health.

Although formal commitment to opium suppression was easy enough to win, commitment to act was problematic. From the beginning of the twentieth century, the Chinese state called on popular enthusiasm to make up for the deficiencies of state power, most notably in the railway recovery movement and the various boycott movements. Each of these called on citizens to comprehend and act against an abstract threat to the nation. The railway recovery movement was relatively successful because the things asked of the Chinese people were well-adjusted to the level of national consciousness. In order for the railways to be repurchased, money had to be donated, an act which could be done in a moment and had no impact on the giver's life other than a loss of money. The fact that the movement was more popular among wealthy members of the elite than with (poor) commoners, was probably more help than hindrance.

With the boycott movements the nation eventually asked more of its citizens and had trouble getting results. The basic concept was the same: the state used the economic power of its citizens to compensate for its own lack of power. In the case of the early anti-American boycotts, this was relatively successful.⁷ American goods were not ubiquitous in most Chinese markets, and boycott supporters were elite merchants who controlled wholesale purchasing and, in some cases, stood to profit from excluding foreigners. The later, anti-Japanese boycotts were less successful. Japanese goods were everywhere, and for a boycott to be politically effective, millions of ordinary Chinese had to commit themselves to the many inconveniences that came with abjuring Japanese products. In other words, separating Japan out of the Chinese economy of the 1930s was not easy. In the case of the anti-Japanese boycotts, the Chinese state also faced a powerful and active foreign state that opposed the boycott. The opium campaigns proved to be more similar to the complexities of the anti-Japanese boycotts than the simple and effective railway recovery movement. In order to bridge this gap, the state had to find ways of convincing new groups of Chinese that they should accept a new view of their duties to the nation—and to act on it.

Reformers were more complicit in the opium trade than they liked to admit. A great deal of anti-opium rhetoric was generated in China during this period, but those who generated it—in their roles as government officials, revolutionary leaders, journalists and reformers—found themselves financially and morally tied to opium. Building a new China cost a lot of money and required a lot of political power; opium was a seductively easy source of both. Reformers were also tied to opium in a more personal way. Opium smoking was defined as a sinful activity. Using opium even once would eventually lead to the destruction of the individual, but that single use also changed the nature of the individual. Under the new dispensation, there was no such thing as innocent opium-smoking. Smoking opium connected one to the entire narrative of individual and national decay that reformers were working against. Many of these who observed the Pudong opium burning had themselves at one point or another smoked opium. All of them had grown up in a society where opium-smoking was common and the handful of those who had not smoked opium had relatives and friends who had (and still did). Opium-smoking could be defined as other only through hypocrisy (quite common) or a careful rethinking of the nature of the Chinese nation and its citizens.

OPIMUM COMES TO CHINA

Twentieth-century nationalists spoke of China as being invaded by opium in the nineteenth century. This metaphor of invasion fit well with the obsessions of the nineteenth century. Invasion suggested imperialism—the invasion of

China by outsiders. It also suggested disease in the modern medical sense, an invasion of the body politic by an agent that caused illness. Neither of these metaphors entirely fit the Qing approach to opium. Qing officials' view of the opium problem, and the methods at their disposal to deal with it, were fundamentally different than those of their twentieth century counterparts.

Physicians in the ancient Mediterranean were aware of the poppy's use as a medicinal, but attempts to trace the origin of the poppy have proven unsuccessful.⁸ Poppy heads had been used as medicine in China as far back as the Tang (609–906 CE). By the Ming dynasty (1368–1644 CE), Chinese physicians knew how to extract the sap of the poppy from the head, producing a more powerful drug. Opium poppies were grown in China both as a medicinal and ornamental plant, but opium was also imported from India. The Ming court recognized opium as a taxable import in 1589.⁹

Opium only became a problem after it was used "recreationally." This probably began in Java in the mid-seventeenth century. Tobacco leaves were soaked in boiled opium to make *madak*, which was then smoked. This habit may have begun among ethnic Chinese on the island, but in any case, it spread rapidly to Taiwan. Smokers experimented with other leaves and eventually began smoking pure opium.¹⁰

We know nothing about the motivations of these opium pioneers or their theories of personal leisure. Opium smoking was later seen as an example of recreational drug use, that is, use of a drug that is properly medicinal for purposes of pleasure. This was not possible anywhere in the world in 1650, as there was no medical practice in the modern, professional sense. There were no drugs in 1650. A drug in the modern sense is a powerful chemical that should be used under professional supervision to treat a specific disease.¹¹ None of these things were possible in 1650. While we cannot recover the medical ideas of seventeenth-century Taiwanese, it is worthwhile to try and understand how they and their actions would have been perceived.

The Javanese who first began to smoke opium were only one of many groups of people who began to experiment with new substances in the seventeenth century. Tobacco, sugar, coffee, and tea all spread widely during this period.¹² These substances are sometimes referred to as drug foods, a term that highlights their most important characteristics. Some of them actually contained chemicals that today are called drugs. All were intended to alter mood. They also came to be used like foods, that is, as necessities of daily life. The drug foods blurred the distinction between food and drugs, or rather did not fit well into the separate categories of foods and drugs that would be created in the nineteenth century.

Worldwide use of drug foods grew in the seventeenth century, a fact which does much to explain the rise of commercial capitalism during this period.¹³ Different parts of the world were more in contact with each other after 1492 than they had ever been before, but for the first two centuries the most important impact of this was that people started to take each other's drugs and pro-

duce drugs for export. China was less affected by the rise of the drug foods than many other places. China was exporting a great deal of tea by the mid-Qing, but China had long exported tea and foreign powers were not yet changing China into an economic colony, as in the Caribbean.¹⁴ Consumption rather than production was the issue that mattered in China.

Why did people use drug foods? Part of it was the effect they had on the central nervous system, but this was not the whole story. Consumption of these substances was a social act which had social meaning, initially usually a bad one. Each of these drugs was introduced into different societies in different ways, but in every case they were viewed with suspicion. Attacks were made on substances and their users on a number of grounds, which can be divided into the properties of the substances and the associations of the substances. The attacks on properties were mostly what we would now call medical discourses, focusing on damage to the body. These drugs were also held to weaken the moral character of the user which shades into modern categories of psychological damage. More important, these properties were the associations of the substances.

For English coffee drinkers, coffee gave one an association with the wider world, London commercial society, and the values of the new commercial class. These associations were an anathema to some. Hattox, in his study of coffee-drinking in the Islamic world, was at first puzzled by the vehemence of the opponents of coffee and the weakness of their arguments. Although the arguments he looked at were presented in terms of Islamic law, he concluded that the formal arguments were attempts to give substance to a more generalized dissatisfaction with the newness of this form of behavior and its social associations. The same is true of most other drug foods.¹⁵ The users of these new substances were likely to be young men, and young men, congregating for purposes of pleasure, were likely to arouse suspicion. These drugs also became associated with more specific problems, such as prostitution. This charge was not without foundation. Wherever young men congregated in seventeenth century England, one was likely to find illicit sex. Sedition, both political and social, was also found in the coffee shops. London coffee shops were implicitly places for political discussion, but any place where non-elite people met to talk could become a place for political discussion outside accepted spheres. Socially, any place which offered a position to anyone with money was by definition subversive of the old social order. These drugs were also thought to waste time and drain the nation of specie. As these drugs were the most obvious sign of the new commercial world that was being created it is not surprising that those who found the changes in society either frightening or exhilarating would focus on the drug foods as the symbols of the new life.

It is worth remembering that traditional society usually had few close parallels to the forms of behavior that surrounded the drug foods. Places of consumption where classes mingled, consumption of imported luxuries by the lower classes, people with smoke coming out of their mouths, all of these were unusual and

bizarre. While the medical charges which were made against these drugs were not always without merit, it is this suspicious otherness that holds them all together. Medical arguments may take pride of place in twentieth-century discussions of drugs, but they were only one of several agreements in the early modern period.

In non-Islamic societies, there was one substance which offered some parallels to the drug foods: alcohol. It was a drug food, often consumed in special places, and often associated with improper behavior and crime. Alcohol also had chemical properties that made it fit well with all but the most dangerous of the drug foods; yet in spite this, alcohol was acculturated into most societies as an acceptable substance. While alcohol could be abused, this was obviously the fault of the individual rather than the substance. All drinkers of alcohol could not be deviants, since everyone drank alcohol.

For most of the drug foods this acculturation was the eventual destination.¹⁶ Coffee, tea, and chocolate all became fully acculturated in European societies, but the fact that this happened had more to do with changes in the types of social behavior they were associated with than with new discoveries about their physical effects. Coffee was not very dangerous as a chemical, but it fit well into new discourses about diligence and productivity, and it was hard to fit into the developing discourse of dangerous drugs.¹⁷ It was these discursive connections, rather than the chemical properties of the drink, that led to its acceptance. The history of a drug in any society is not a story of a fixed set of chemical properties being discovered, but of substances caught up the creation of new medical and social discourses that linked them to unacceptable behavior. Usually these were new substances, but not always. The temperance movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was an attempt to apply new medical ideas to a long-established custom, and the surprising success that temperance activists had in passing laws intended to restrict or ban alcohol consumption is a testimony to the power of these new discourses. The failure of American prohibition, however, is an example of how complex the process of changing popular understanding of these discourses was. The political and social developments connected to the successes and failures of the movement had little to do with the chemical properties of alcohol.

OPIMUM COMES TO CHINA: SEARCH FOR PRECEDENTS

Opium-smoking came to the attention of the Qing court at about the same time as tobacco-smoking. Unsurprisingly, the two substances were regarded as similar and the first edicts against opium, decreed in 1729, were modeled on those against tobacco. Tobacco use was first banned by the Ming court in 1637, and was banned repeatedly thereafter. In 1639, the Manchu court in Shenyang banned it as well. In the 1639 declaration, the Manchu emperor protested that

tobacco had already been banned several times, but he again forbade the eating (*chi*), growing, and selling of tobacco. Two years later, he admitted the prohibitions could not be enforced because the princes continued to smoke in private, but warned that archery practice must not be neglected in favor of tobacco.¹⁸ The strictness of the Chinese/Manchu prohibitions against tobacco are as surprising as the Islamic prohibitions against coffee. Paul Howard speculates that tobacco was disfavored because it was a habit that spread from the lower level of society to the upper, in contradiction to Confucian norms, because it was a valuable good not taxed by the state, or because of the Ming concern with cultural decline, or the Manchu concern with cultural purity.¹⁹ All these factors were involved, but to understand what was happening one needs to look more closely at what Chinese emperors expected from their subjects.

Tobacco eventually became a drug food in China, an ordinary item of consumption. Eventually, opium would become a dangerous drug. China was already familiar with one drug food, tea, and one dangerous drug, alcohol. Tea consumption was completely unregulated, as one would expect for a substance as commonplace and innocuous as tea, although the state did take an interest in tea as a taxable good. We must therefore look to alcohol for precedents for the tobacco and opium prohibitions.

China had a long history of attempts to limit the production and use of alcohol. In the *Classic of History*, the Duke of Zhou himself condemns excessive wine drinking, but clearly distinguishes between drinking wine during rites (which was of course acceptable), and drinking outside of them, which was not. Even during the rites drunkenness was to be avoided, drunkenness in this case apparently referring to disorderly behavior.²⁰ There were at least two reasons why drinking was dangerous. The first was that drinking had caused the Shang to lose their virtue and thus lose the mandate heaven. Alcohol was connected with loss of virtue, which had led to the destruction of the Shang. Alcohol was also connected with deviant behavior. The Emperor charged: "If you are told that there are companies who drink together, do not fail to apprehend them all, and send them here to Zhou, where I may [will] put them to death."²¹

That these people were to be put to death may seem rather harsh punishment, but they were executed for their social deviance. The officers of the previous Shang dynasty, who had become addicted to wine, were to be educated not to repeat these errors, so these people who drank in groups were presumably commoners. As with other drug foods in other places, the mere sight of commoners congregating for any purpose was suspicious. Alcohol would retain these connections to lack of virtue and lower-class disorder throughout Chinese history, but it also retained its association with proper ritual behavior.

The other connection between alcohol and the concerns of the traditional state was frugality. *Min sheng* (the people's livelihood) was one of the key goals of the Chinese state, and ensuring adequate food supplies was one of the most

important parts of this.²² Alcohol did not provide any economic benefit, as understood by the court. That is to say some did benefit economically from producing it, but only at the expense of wasting grain that could have been eaten. Alcohol production also wasted time, as did its consumption. All of these were strictly economic agreements, but there was also a strong moral case to be made against alcohol use. William Rowe claims that the model official Chen Hong-mu's crusades against wine and tobacco were "prompted no less by a distrust of the relaxed enjoyment they might bring the consumer than by more strictly economic concerns." While Chen was unusually strict, his obsession with frugality and self-control was typical of Cheng-Zhu Confucians in general and several currents of Qing thought in particular.²³ This mistrust of alcohol would lead to a major campaign against its production during the Qianlong era (1736–1796). This campaign is important for understanding official attitudes towards popular behavior and the ability of the state to control this behavior.

In the early Qianlong period, a ban on yeast production had been suggested as a way of freeing up more grain. The debate on this issue, like the later debate on opium, reflected the state's attitude towards popular behavior and the state's attitude towards its ability to control this behavior. The prohibitions were motivated, not by a huge upsurge in drinking, but by the desire of a new emperor to demonstrate his virtue and a strong classicism on the part of some of his advisors. The prohibitions were not motivated by a concern with lower-class drunkenness, but with wasting grain on the production of alcohol. Food security was a key duty of the state, preventing the waste of grain through liquor production was good policy. Fang Bao, the scholar who, in 1720, proposed a ban on liquor production in North China, had specifically exempted the yellow wine used in sacrifices. Alcohol had an acceptable, even canonical use as an offering to the ancestors. By tying proper use (in sacrifices), to one type of alcohol, Fang could, at least on paper, neatly divide proper and improper use. The fact that yellow wine was the drink of the elite, and burnt liquor was the drink of poor commoners, probably helped to make this distinction. Fang also showed a deep distrust for the ability of commoners to manage their affairs. These measures were needed to prevent people from unwise actions.

Those who opposed the bans shared Fang's concerns with morality and food security, but had a much more favorable view of commoner economic abilities and a much less favorable view of the state's ability to control behavior. Sun Jiagan, as president of the Board of Justice, proposed lifting the ban in 1737, pointing out that it would be all but impossible to prevent people from producing liquor because liquor production was the most profitable way for peasants to turn excess grain into cash. Fang Bao's peasants had no need for money, but for Sun "the tendency of the petty populace to pursue profit is like that of water to flow downwards."²⁴ Sun was also aware that restricting supply would raise prices and thus encourage production regardless of risk. Sun also had a

more realistic view of the state's ability to control peasant behavior. Eliminating liquor production and sales was impossible, and provided endless opportunities for *yamen* runners to harass the people. These two problems were related. Sun, like most officials, understood that the Qing state had little power to change local society, and that power was exerted by *yamen* runners, a proverbially unreliable tool.²⁵

These two sides were somewhat reconciled by the decision to focus on restricting production of yeast. Controlling the relative handful of commercial yeast producers was easier than controlling every still in North China. It was also more ideologically palatable, as those being coerced were wealthy merchants selling a useless luxury rather than common peasants trying to turn grain into cash.²⁶ The liquor prohibitions themselves were never successful, and became a dead letter once the Qianlong emperor lost interest in them. However, even in the years they were being carried out, the prohibitions created problems. What was the state to do with all the liquor that was being seized? Destroying it seemed wasteful, but selling it was "not consonant with proper dignity."²⁷ This dilemma is not unlike that posed by opium: what is this good? Smuggled salt was just salt, if seized it could be sold by the state for a profit, it was only in the context of smuggling that made it contraband. Seditious literature was seditious, if seized it could only be destroyed; no context could change its meaning.²⁸ The Qing court was lucky in the lack of success its restrictions on yeast had. Greater success would have made the problem of defining illegality much more severe, as happened later with opium.

The liquor prohibitions reveal a number of things about the Qing state and social control. Members of the bureaucracy were aware of the limits of state power to exert control over local society, and also of the limits on its ability to understand what was going on at the local level. That state regulation of individual behavior was theoretically appropriate was never in doubt, but barring a major push from above a successful campaign against any social ill was not likely. Only when this social ill drew the attention of the throne might a campaign arise. The opium prohibitions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are best understood in this context, connected to traditional concerns about disorder and frugality rather than as yet unknown ideas of addiction. The attempts to limit alcohol production were also an example of a bureaucratic campaign, a model that would be of great importance in dealing with opium.

CAMPAIGNS IN THEORY

Chinese states were and are fond of campaigns that focused the efforts of the entire state and the enthusiasm of the people on a particular goal. The establishment of the Qing granary system, Chiang Kai-shek's New Life Movement,

and Mao's Great Leap were all examples of campaigns. Although campaigns were not properly modern in the Weberian sense, they had the advantage of focusing the limited resources of the state on a single task.²⁹ More importantly, they relied for their success on the enthusiastic response of officials and commoners. From a Confucian point of view, enthusiasm for imperial commands was caused by the virtue of the emperor, naturally the most solid foundation that any policy could have. Campaigns were an effective way to accomplish a great deal in a very short time, but they also had administrative peculiarities that were important for understanding the anti-opium campaigns both in the Qing and after. All campaigns were started from above, and were likely to peter out after the emperor or other sponsor lost interest. The late imperial state was not a Weberian system with set laws that were enforced at all times, but a series of moral and legal rules that were enforced where appropriate. When it was appropriate, enforcement was largely left up to local officials. Foreign observers in the nineteenth century liked to claim there was no Chinese government at all, which was not the case, but the enforcement of various decrees was a matter of considerable flexibility.³⁰ Phillip Huang divides the legal duties of local magistrates into moral and practical sides, dividing what would today be considered the practical duties of government and the magistrate's generalized responsibility for moral guidance.³¹ Practical matters like tax collection called for taking action, moral leadership was more nebulous, and more important it was not one of the official categories on which local officials were assessed. Some projects eventually graduated from campaign status and became part of the regular work of the government. Once the national granary system had been established, maintaining them became part of the duties of local officials. Other causes did not make this transition. As laws about the insane were being revised in the mid-Qing, it was suggested that control of the insane be made one of the official categories local officials were judged on, but this was never carried out.³² As a result, while the laws remained on the books, enforcement was a matter of individual whim.

Beyond the official bureaucracy campaigns also implicated the local elite, who might or might not be called upon, by the state or by themselves, to act in a given case. It is apparent that the need to control yeast never reached the minds of nonofficial people, whether gentry members or ordinary commoners. The new initiatives regarding yeast, madness, and sex were confined to the state itself, and were carried out without much enthusiasm even there. In 1738, the Qianlong emperor expressed his dismay that the regulations against yeast were not being properly enforced. "When the regional high officials and local authorities received Our rescript they regarded it as a mere piece of paper and made no solid effort to observe it."³³ Although in this case officials did not respond to imperial desires, some campaigns called on the elite—even the lowest of commoners—to take action. When the Yongzheng emperor eliminated certain base statuses in 1727, he explained that:

Those who have [bad] customs and mores that are long transmitted, and have not been able to shake them off, ought all be given a route toward self-renewal (*zi xin zhi lu*) . . . in order to promote purity and a sense of shame (*li lian chi*) and to extend the transformation of values (*guang feng hua*).³⁴

The emperor expected even commoners to take action to reform themselves, and saw it as the duty of the state to provide them with a framework in which to do so by establishing a “route to self-renewal.”

When the state began to act against opium, therefore, it was drawing on a long, if somewhat problematic, history of social reform. There was a general, perhaps growing feeling, among the elite, that the reform of commoner behavior was one of the key duties of the state. There was a clear understanding of the limits of state power to directly coerce behavior, as demonstrated by the reluctance to directly prohibit alcohol. On the other hand, the campaign model provided a way to bring the full resources of the state to bear on social problems. At least in theory, these campaigns were to be actively assisted by both members of the elite and the common people.

REASONS FOR THE STATE TO DISLIKE OPIUM

In the 1830s, opium became the target of a state campaign of suppression. In the twentieth century this campaign was presented as the Chinese people's acceptance of modern ideas about addiction and the beginning of a national campaign against opium that would continue for the next century. While there was a campaign in the 1830s, it did not connect well to the concerns of the twentieth century, and it did not mark the beginning of a sustained interest in opium suppression. Rather, the campaign combined fears about opium's danger to frugality, fear of lower-class disorder, and fear of foreign intrusion. All of these would be part of the later anti-opium campaigns, but in later campaigns opium suppression would become a national goal in and of itself. In the 1830s these disparate fears were held together by a bureaucratic campaign and would dissipate with the conclusion of the campaign.

Like burnt liquor, opium was a threat to elite concepts of economic productivity. Obviously, drug foods were unnecessary luxuries that wasted the productive capacity of the land. This was an immediate problem with tobacco, which was produced in China almost as soon as it was introduced. Opium was not produced in China on a large scale until after 1858. It was opium, however, not tobacco, cotton, or tea, which came to be associated with famine. On the face of it this was an economically irrational claim. Peasants could not eat opium, but that was true of all cash crops. Given that a successful opium crop brought in far more than the cost of the grain that could have been produced,

poppies were a rational economic choice. While there was no conflict between poppies and food in the economic decision making of peasants, the two conflicted in the minds of the elite, as did production of all nonfood crops. Fiber crops could be defended on the grounds that they were connected to weaving, the canonical occupation of women, or were otherwise attached to worthwhile productive activity. Drug foods were connected only to pleasure. Tobacco was of “no benefit to the common people’s livelihood,” in other words, it did not fit the elite’s concept of proper peasant employment, a claim that could also be made about opium.³⁵ Although the state’s economic ideas would change considerably over the next two hundred years, limiting unproductive use of land remained important. From the point of view of a peasant, of course, opium was quite productive, but the state defined productivity differently. Besides wasting land, drug foods wasted time and money. The state saw it as its duty to prevent commoners from wasting their time. In 1729, the Yongzheng emperor did not condemn the smokers of opium, but rather the sellers, and they were condemned not for destroying the morals of their customers, but for tricking people into wasting their money.³⁶

ASSOCIATIONS OF OPIUM

The first edicts against opium and tobacco were based on these economic and moral considerations, but eventually, it was only opium that was rejected. This was partially due to the drug’s social associations. As with most drug foods, opium was associated with those who consumed it. There is almost no data on who used opium in China during this period, although as an imported commodity, it was not used by the poorest classes. Descriptions of the drug constantly associate it with marginals and (understandably) foreigners. The first memorials against opium associated smoking it with Taiwanese. It was also associated with *liu mang* or hoodlums, the blanket term for troublemaking semi-criminal young men. It appealed to them because:

... the power which this substance communicated to those who partake of it, of not closing their eyes for entire nights, and spending them in the gratification of impure and sensual desires.³⁷

These accusations are somewhat odd if connected to opium, which is not a stimulant but a narcotic. As with many other claims about drugs, these accusations have less to do with the chemical properties of opium than with its social context. Official reports on Chinese sectarians usually contained the same litany of complaints: they assembled by night and dispersed by day; the members had no fixed profession; their rites were covers for orgies; and they made

bloody sacrifices. It is usually not clear if these acts were actually occurring or if the authors of the reports were just repeating stock accusations. To some extent it does not matter, these accusations were part of the standard rhetoric identifying sectarians as other.

Like sectarians, opium smokers were linked to disorder. As with sectarians, this link was not entirely based on fact. Most heterodox groups were peaceable all of the time, all of them were peaceable most of the time; the same was true of opium smokers. Opium is a narcotic and did not lead to the type of violent behavior caused by alcohol. Still, opium smoking and violent lower-class behavior were linked in official rhetoric. In 1810, the Jiaqing emperor ordered a commoner who had been caught selling opium in the capital to be punished.

Opium has a very violent effect. When an addict smokes it, [the drug] rapidly makes him extremely excited and capable of doing anything he pleases. But before long it kills him. Opium is a poison, undermining our good customs and morality. Its use is prohibited by law. Now the commoner [named] Yang dares to bring it into the [capital]. Indeed he flouts the law! He should be turned over to the Board of Punishments to be tried and severely sentenced.³⁸

As Paul Howard observes, a drug that made a commoner capable of doing anything he pleased was a bad drug. It is worth pointing out, however, that the emperor did not see Yang's behavior as symptomatic of a plague destroying the nation and the race. Although he mentions that opium undermines good customs and morality there is nothing in his statement (or more importantly in his actions) to indicate that he saw the opium problem in the same way it was seen in the twentieth century. Opium encouraged individuals to transgress their appointed social roles, but it did not threaten to sweep away the entire society. The appropriate response was for the regular law enforcement apparatus to do its job, rather than turning the entire power of the state and the elite against it.

OPIUM AND CRIME

Foreign, especially English, shipments of opium into China began to grow in the late 1700s and grew rapidly after 1820.³⁹ Eighteen-sixteen was the year of the Amherst mission and as good a date as any for the beginning of serious problems controlling foreigners on the southern coast. Opium was obviously associated with this problem, as the ban on opium imports was one of the chief reasons the British were unhappy with the Canton system. The British response to the ban was to smuggle opium into China, first in the Canton region and then all along the coast. English ships anchored at a safe distance and delivered opium to local Chinese

smugglers who then took it inland.⁴⁰ Opium was and remained an eminently smugglable good, since its high profit margins allowed the purchase of fast and powerful boats and hefty bribes for local troops and officials.⁴¹ Foreigners were thus helping to create and finance an entire class of Chinese criminals, and the anti-opium campaigns would be deeply concerned with control of the coasts.

At least in some forms, opium consumption was also seen as a threat, and this was connected to the emergence of the opium den as the center of the state's perception of opium.⁴² Opium smokers presumably did something—work, sleep, and study—while they were not smoking opium, but this was not part of their popular perception. Part of the reason for this was that opium use was not yet common. Tobacco smoking was domesticated to the point that it was impossible to refer to tobacco smokers as an abstract type. Instead they were, for example, Manchu princes who smoked tobacco. The anonymous evil of the opium smoker was abetted by the opium den. Unlike tobacco, which was assumed to be smoked everywhere but not in any special place, opium was associated with particular establishments. Again, this was not an accurate view; opium could and was used in many places. Smoking in an opium den stripped smokers of any social identity other than that of people who gathered together to commit a crime.

These concerns, foreigners and smuggling, and the concern with improper use of opium, were enough to lead to a campaign against the trade. But they were not enough to maintain state concern with opium after the campaign ended. Later accounts portrayed this as a period in which China awoke to the dangers of opium and imperialism and began to resist them.⁴³ In Chinese textbooks to this day, 1840 is the beginning of modern history a period that is dominated by imperialism and Chinese resistance to it. The metaphor of awakening is not particularly apt here, first, because it implies that the meanings of imperialism and opium were self-evident rather than constructed, and second, because it begs the question of why China promptly fell asleep again after 1842 and remained asleep, at least as far as opium was concerned, until 1905. This is not to argue that the campaign was of no importance. The state collected information about the state of the opium trade to develop a fuller understanding of how it worked and how it could be controlled. China's defeat in the Opium War permanently established the opium trade as the most visible form of foreign imperialism, and Lin Zexu became available as a model for the ideal anti-imperialist official, although he would not be used as such for years.

THE FIRST CRUSADE

The First Opium War (1839–1842) was a war about opium.⁴⁴ Although other factors were involved, the war that actually happened would have been unthinkable if the commodity at the center of the dispute had been molasses. This was

partly because opium, unlike molasses, was a dangerous substance; it was also economically unique. Like all the drug foods, it generated enormous profits and created interests that no other commodity did. Opium was of immense importance to the British Empire, and the war of 1839 cannot be understood without realizing that the British crown was willing to go to great lengths to protect the trade.⁴⁵ The British claimed the war was the fault of the Chinese, and this was partly true. The war came about, in part, because of more aggressive British attempts to sell opium after 1834, but mainly because of a change of policy on the part of the Chinese government. From 1830, there was increasing debate about opium at the Chinese court, a debate that eventually led to a major change in policy and to Lin Zexu being sent to Canton to end the trade.

THE DEBATE ON LEGALIZATION

Although the opium prohibitions of 1729 had been repeated occasionally, they had no effect on the gradual growth of the opium trade. Paul Howard points out that in part the law did not make a clear distinction between medicinal and smoking opium, the former still being legal. Also, the court, and therefore local officials, did not regard the prohibitions as important. It was only after 1796 that officials and troops were formally rewarded for capturing opium.⁴⁶ It was also not until the late 1700s that the trade began to grow rapidly. From 1780 on, the British East India Company began to expand exports rapidly, and this accelerated after the company lost its monopoly in 1834. It may also have been about this time that the production of smoking opium began in China; by the 1830s it was produced in several provinces. It was in this context that the opium issue became increasingly important to the court.

The first problem the Qing faced was information. What was *ya pian*, who was using it, and where did it come from? Who was buying and selling it, and how could the state control or regulate this trade? As Huang Shaoxiong later put it, opium was like liquid silver, flowing into any channel along the path of least resistance.⁴⁷ Chinese states and nonstate actors spent a great deal of time trying to discover what opium was before they could do anything with it and the act of observing usually disturbed the observed. State involvement was one of the key things determining where opium was planted and how it was moved to market; as the state gained knowledge and attempted to act on it these things would change. Opium users moved around less, but locating, controlling, and curing them was also a challenge. The act of gathering and organizing information about opium was crucial.⁴⁸

Early in 1831, provincial officials were ordered to report on the state of the opium trade in their areas, and over the course of the year reports were received from most of the viceroys and some other officials.⁴⁹ The emperor was

particularly interested in local growing and production of opium. Most provinces reported that the drug was used, and many reported that it was produced locally. Ruan Yuan, the viceroy of Yunnan and Guizhou reported that opium was imported from Vietnam as well as grown by minorities inside China. It was also grown by Chinese peasants, a practice he tried to discourage by reminding peasants their land might be confiscated if they planted poppies. He also encouraged denunciations of poppy growers. Many provinces reported that opium was being smuggled. Foreigners were no longer content to simply sell opium in Guangdong, and were now moving up the coast. Muslim merchants from the northwest, under the guise of jade merchants, were selling opium paste.⁵⁰ Opium dens were opened, which enticed youths from good families to smoke it. Opium was apparently more widely smoked than had been thought, being used by people in many provinces, and particularly by soldiers. According to the censor, Ma Zanzun: "When the people eat it the result is wasting their *shen* (body) *jia* (family) and *shi ye* (loss of employment), when soldiers eat it their muscles grow soft, discipline becomes slack, and drill is not carried out."⁵¹

THE POLICY DEBATE

As the opium trade grew, the issue began to attract more attention from the court, and opium began to be associated with other maladies of the state. As opium use was growing and spreading, silver was supposedly flowing out of the country to pay for it.⁵² Smugglers were violating China's borders and corrupting her officials. Troops were failing to put down rebellions because of their use of opium. Traditional policy had called for interdicting the supply of foreign opium, but this policy had been completely ineffective, and the drug was also starting to be produced domestically. The growth of the trade led to a court debate on opium policy in the mid 1830's.⁵³ Although the outcome of this debate was an anti-opium campaign which would serve as a model for twentieth-century campaigns its motivations were quite different.

The most logical option for many officials was legalization of the trade.⁵⁴ Legalization would encourage import substitution, prevent corruption in the military, and lower import prices, thus reducing the silver drain. It would also bring in a good deal of revenue to the state rather than wasting money on a program of prohibition that the state could not possibly carry out. It would probably also lead to more opium smoking, a fact which would have made this policy unthinkable sixty years later. For these officials, however, the opium plague was not understood as a plague, but as a typical problem of statecraft. If the economic, military, and political problems that

came with opium could be eliminated that would be an effective solution to the problem.⁵⁵

Legalization found many influential backers, and James Polachek concludes that by 1836, “there was . . . no longer and significant constituency for the trade-control sanction—at least within the bureaucracy itself.”⁵⁶ There was a party that opposed legalization, but the reasons they gave were quite different from those of the twentieth century. To some extent, opium was just a convenient political issue. Polachek shows that Lin Zexu and the Spring Purification group pushed for a strict policy because they felt that a campaign against opium would give them a chance to show the effectiveness of their politics of gentry activism and because Lin was convinced that a show of moral resolve would make the British back down. Lin himself saw his appointment to Canton as a springboard to the coveted position of Liangjiang governor-general, where he could at last carry out his plans to reform the grain transport system.

When Lin and his party looked at opium they also saw something different from the race-destroying plague that haunted the Republic. Polachek says that “The awesomely destructive impact of the opium trade—socially, economically, even militarily—simply had not supplied a motive sufficient to force the Qing government into a war-risking embargo.” I would suggest that Qing officials simply did not see opium use as being as awesomely destructive as twentieth-century ideas suggest. It is hard to believe that Lin saw opium as a threat to destroy the nation and the race (a common twentieth-century phrase) as he did not see China as a nation or a race in the modern sense. Despite some heated rhetoric, it is hard to believe that in 1836, many officials thought China was in danger of racial extinction. The anti-opium forces emphasized the silver drain, opium’s corruption of soldiers and officials, and the increasing problems of controlling China’s coasts. The threat to the health of the people was mentioned, but not particularly emphasized. As one antilegalizer put it “The people are the foundation of the state, [and] wealth is produced by the people. If the people become poor, that can be changed, but if they become weak they cannot be cured.”⁵⁷ This is fairly typical of much of the rhetoric in this debate.⁵⁸ Mentions of the people and the danger to their health are general and fairly vague, unless they are connected to a concrete issue the court could be expected to care about. People who were soldiers or officials were often mentioned, as they were a direct concern of the court. Ordinary people had to be connected to taxes or disorder for them to matter.⁵⁹ Nor are the people considered to be a unitary group affected in the same way. Opium was seen as a threat to the minds of the intelligent, but not to the minds of the common people.⁶⁰ The Qing court, unsurprisingly, did not see the health of its citizens as the foundation of national power, as it did not understand citizenship, health or national power in the way they would be seen in the twentieth century.

AFTER THE WAR: WHY WERE THERE NO OPIUM CAMPAIGNS FOR SIXTY YEARS?

China was defeated in the Opium War and was forced to surrender Hong Kong, grant extraterritoriality, and tolerate opium imports. The ultimate reason for the defeat of the anti-opium campaign was the military defeat of China by Great Britain, which guaranteed the continued importation of Indian opium. It is unlikely that Lin Zexu or anyone else could have done anything to eliminate the trade in the face of continued massive opium imports, but the abandonment of the anti-opium campaigns after Lin's failure is significant. Opium consumption and sale remained illegal, but there would be no state actions comparable to Lin's until 1906. In many accounts, this lack of active prohibition is attributed to the fecklessness of the Qing government.⁶¹ Indeed, this is the only position that makes any sense if one assumes that Lin Zexu had developed modern ideas of opium and addiction and that it was shared by most Chinese. If the danger of opium to the Chinese nation was what caused the anti-opium campaigns, then defeat in the war was no reason to end them, but in reality the war changed everything. Lin had been sent to Canton because opium smuggling was threatening the security of China's coasts; foreign merchants were flouting the law; silver was leaving the country; and the pernicious habit was spreading across China. After 1842, foreign warships, not smugglers threatened China's coast and foreign recalcitrance had grown far beyond Canton. Only the threat of opium to China's moral order remained, and this was apparently not seen as sufficient to lead to major campaigns. Wei Yuan suggested a national system of opium control in 1842, but nothing seems to have come of it.⁶² The lack of support for Wei's proposal is not surprising. What he suggested was establishing a national anti-opium bureaucracy, that is, institutionalizing the anti-opium campaigns rather than slipping back into the status of an inactive campaign. This would certainly have been done in the twentieth century, but in the second half of the nineteenth century opium was not seen as a serious enough problem to merit this treatment.

The anti-opium edicts were enforced occasionally over the sixty years following the First Opium War, but enforcement was sporadic, motivated by desire for official promotion rather than a vision of opium suppression as crucial to China's survival. Individual officials might choose to enforce the anti-opium edicts out of personal conviction or to impress superiors with their exemplary zeal. One example is Tan Zhunpei, who rose to the position of Acting Governor of Jiangsu, in part because of his strictness about opium. In 1874, he assumed the post of Prefect of Changzhou and began a campaign to close down the opium dens in his district. This may have been what brought him to the attention of Shen Baochen, who became Viceroy of Liangjiang in 1876. Shen condemned the opium trade upon coming to office, but most of his subordinates

treated these decrees as “one of those solemn enunciations of moral platitudes with which provincial officials of whatever rank usually commence their career.” While stationed in Xuzhou, Tan was one of the few officials to act strongly against opium, closing down opium dens and ordering poppies uprooted.

Tan’s rise in the bureaucracy was rapid, and while he was probably quite efficient at the other parts of his job, opium suppression gave him an opportunity to stand out.⁶³ Tax collection, keeping the peace, and enforcing justice were the main duties of local officials, but to go beyond this demonstrated a zeal and moral drive that might lead to promotion. Individual conviction might also lead an official to act against opium, but neither of these things could lead to a sustained national or regional campaign against opium.

THE CHANGING OPIUM TRADE

Not only was the Qing state less concerned with opium than it had been during the campaign, the opium trade was expanding rapidly. Opium production, sales, and smoking were all becoming more common, creating groups of people with a vested interest in the opium trade. As opium became more common it became less “other,” and more part of everyday ordinary social and economic life. Between 1840 and 1940, millions of Chinese smoked opium daily, regularly, or occasionally. Patterns of opium smoking in the twentieth century are discussed later, but given the limited data available for the Qing period it is possible to draw some conclusions about opium use. The first is, obviously, that many Chinese people smoked opium. Opium smoking spread throughout China both geographically and socially after 1840. The most significant change was the move from a luxury good to a mass commodity. Lin Manhong estimates total domestic production, in 1906, of 146,068 *dan*. Total (legal) imports in 1906 were 54,177 *dan*.⁶⁴ Assuming consumption of two ounces a month for a regular user this supports a smoking population of about 13.3 million. Dividing total production by two ounces a month assumes that all opium smokers were addicts who smoked a particular amount, which was of course not the case.⁶⁵ Later medical ideas held that there was only one pattern of opium use. R. K. Newman estimates that in 1906, 12 percent of Chinese men and 2 percent of Chinese women were “regular moderate” users of opium, with much higher levels of “occasional” and “ceremonial” use.⁶⁶ What Newman does with these labels is categorize a diverse series of behaviors in a more helpful way than dividing people into addicts, medicinal users, and nonusers. In the early nineteenth century nonmedical opium smoking was supposedly confined to the elite and the marginal. This was likely true—given the high price of the imported drug. In the late nineteenth century, as production expanded, distribution improved and prices dropped. Consumption expanded and changed, thus encouraging more production and more distribution.⁶⁷

TRADE AND MONEY

In addition to being smoked by millions of Chinese, opium was also becoming a source of profit, a holder of value and form of capital. As early as the 1850s, foreign merchants were sending opium directly upcountry to be exchanged for tea or silk, a process eventually labeled the Suzhou System. Opium was one of the few holders of value that was lightweight, durable, and found buyers or barter opportunities almost anywhere in China. It was used to pay traveling expenses by both Qing scholars going to the capital for exams and by Republican students traveling to university.⁶⁸ Opium was not the most important part of the great monetary expansion of the late Qing, but it was significant.⁶⁹

In addition to its use as money, opium was a fine way to make money. That the foreign merchant community in China was closely tied to the opium trade is of course not news. The major British merchant houses were not able to compete in the trade after the 1860s (having been replaced by Jewish and Armenian merchants), but the trade in foreign opium remained an important part of the costal economy.⁷⁰ Foreign opium was increasingly limited to the luxury end of the market, with the bulk of opium supplied by domestic growers; here too, enormous profits were made. Opium not only made merchants and peasants rich, it altered trade flows and economic relations between the regions of China. Lin Manhong credits the opium trade for a new level of integration among different macro-regions and thus a qualitative change in the nature of the Chinese economy.⁷¹

OPIUM AND TAXES

With all this money flowing, it was inevitable that the state would try to get its share. Many senior officials made pronouncements against opium. Li Hongzhang denounced it, as did Zhang Zhidong. However, both of them saw opium as a source of revenue. This began in earnest with the Taiping and associated rebellions in the middle of the nineteenth century. Local and provincial officials began collecting transit taxes, called *likin*, on goods moving through their districts. This, and commercial taxes in general, gradually became a very important part of state finance. In part, this was because opium was an important new trade that could yield new revenues; it was also because the Chinese state was shifting away from land taxes and towards commercial taxes to finance itself.⁷²

This table reveals a fundamental change in the Chinese state. Both the Ming and the Qing had relied heavily on agrarian taxes, and thus collecting these taxes, and promoting stability in rural China, were key goals. Now harnessing commercial activities took precedence, and the most important of the commercial taxes was that on opium. Connected with this new focus on urban commerce was a new project. Responding to the West was the overriding duty

TABLE 1.1
Agrarian and Commercial Revenues as a Percent of Total

	<i>Agrarian</i>	<i>Commercial</i>
1849	77	23
1885	40	51
1911	16	69

of the state, and this meant draining money from remote areas and spending it on modernizing projects mostly located on the coast, as opposed to the more traditional pattern where more prosperous areas subsidized maintenance of order in poorer ones.⁷³ Control over rural China was no longer as ideologically or economically important as it had been. Remote areas were now important only to the extent that they could provide revenue, and one way that they could provide revenue was through opium. Opium was one of the most valuable goods being shipped, and thus it generated much of the income from the *likin* tax. In the Late Qing Yunnan province received two-hundred thousand to three-hundred thousand taels a year from opium *likin*, which was 60 percent or so of total *likin*.⁷⁴ Yunnan was one of the leading opium-producing provinces, but all provinces took in substantial revenue from opium.

Given the financial problems of the Late Qing state, an uncommitted source of revenue was a godsend for local and provincial officials. As a new form of revenue, opium money was unassigned and could, therefore, be used for pet projects, a category that would include most of the Late Qing modernization efforts. Zhang Zhidong's Hubei Arsenal got 30 percent of its revenue from opium between 1895 and 1906.⁷⁵ Given these facts, there was no systematic attempt to eliminate the opium trade. The 1858 Treaty of Tianjin tacitly legalized opium imports and domestic production, and in 1891 peasants were formally allowed to grow poppies, and the trade was effectively legalized.⁷⁶

Thus, the state was deeply concerned with opium in the late nineteenth century, but its concern was mostly with taxation. Although opium revenue was substantial, much of it did not end up in the hands of the central government. The court had traditionally tried to prevent local officials from collecting and spending tax money without central government involvement, but during the mid-century, rebellions provincial officials gained considerable freedom to handle tax money. Even after the rebellions had been put down the court never fully regained control of local taxation. In 1906, it was estimated that less than 1/6 of total opium revenue ever reached the central government.⁷⁷ At least some of this money (20 percent in Yunnan) was retained at the sub-provincial level. In 1903, the Sichuan provincial government made three-hundred thousand *taels* from opium transit taxes, about the same as a single prefecture, Xuzhou, in the same province.⁷⁸ Local governments also imposed countless surcharges and local officials demanded and received bribes for protecting the trade.

In this situation, policy focused on centralizing opium tax collection to guarantee that as much of this revenue as possible ended up in the hands of the central government—or at least the provinces. In 1881, Zuo Zongtang suggested collecting the entire opium *likin* tax at the ports, a proposal seconded by Li Hongzhang.⁷⁹ In 1883, opium *likin* receipts jumped to a new level, and then rose again after 1885, when the British agreed to allow all *likin* on imported opium to be collected at the ports.⁸⁰

This new system was attacked by Zhang Zhidong, but by 1895, Zhang was consulting with the French about setting up a national opium monopoly. The French doubtless pointed out that opium monopolies were universal and highly profitable in colonial Asia.⁸¹ A monopoly would bring in revenue, deny revenue to criminals and lower-level governments, and reduce opium use by increasing prices. This last point was something of a throw-in. None of these reformers were deeply concerned with opium smoking as a social problem. They saw it as a problem, but not the disastrous problem the new concept of addiction made it. Li Hongzhang was fond of telling foreigners that “China views the whole question from a moral standpoint; England from a fiscal.” and he assured the anti-opium movement that if they could stop production in India, he would stop production in China.⁸² Guo Songdao, however, claimed, in an 1877 letter to Li, that nobody in government was taking opium seriously, meaning in the same way that foreign reformers saw it. He appears to have been correct.⁸³

In later Chinese anti-opium propaganda, all these taxes were taken as proof of the weakness and degeneracy of the Qing court. It is better seen, however as a sign that the prohibitory discourse on opium was not yet fully




FIG. 1.1. Opium *Likin* Revenue
From Wang Hongbin p. 267. In Haiguan Tael.

formed. Opium control was at least as important as opium suppression. Opium was already a suspicious substance in the early nineteenth century, but so was the yeast that was used to make wine.

Although total prohibition on opium remained state policy and was occasionally enforced, the state taxed the trade, with a level of success not unlike other state-building measures. Taxing opium was increasingly lucrative and increasingly difficult as the trade spread throughout China—especially as it was produced in China. Had opium been tobacco, the process of taxing and regulating the trade would have been part of Late Qing state-building. Opium was not similar to tobacco, however, and it became less so as new ideas began to be imported into China in the late nineteenth century.

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Chapter 2

The Narrative of Addiction in China and the West

How opium was perceived changed in the mid-nineteenth century. This was the beginning of the prohibitionary discourse that motivated twentieth century anti-opium campaigns. Anti-opium crusaders in the first part of the twentieth century, and scholars in the second part, assumed that the opium problem and how it was understood remained the same from the 1840s to the 1940s. I argue that the discourse of opium changed in several ways. Understanding the nature of these changes is important, not only to understand the official justifications for later opium campaigns but also because older discourses were not entirely replaced by the new ideas of disease and public health that were created in the West and imported into China. Instead, various strands of ideas overlaid each other and were applied in different contexts: one's grandfather smoking opium was not the same thing as the Japanese army smuggling heroin.

This chapter examines some of the ways opium use was understood in China before about 1850—concluding that there were a series of meanings to opium use, including giving it no meaning at all. This chapter also examines the discourse of addiction as it evolved in the West, concluding that, although its proponents claim to be creating a logically consistent medical theory, they never resolved the many contradictions between different views of addiction. Instead, they combined them into what I call a narrative of addiction. This narrative had certain policy implications; and I examine how this discourse and its associated public health policies were imported to China by missionaries, and how they were adopted into Chinese politics.

OPIUM AS MEDICINE

In modern conceptions, drug abuse is always contrasted with medical use of drugs. China has a long tradition of the use of opiates as medicine, even after the importation of modern models of medicine and drug abuse use inside traditional medical contexts remained acceptable. As late as the 1930s the state continued to allow medicinal opium use while conducting large-scale campaigns against nonmedicinal use.

Opium and its many preparations from it had been a common part of the Chinese pharmacopoeia from the Tang. It was frequently mentioned in the *Hui hui yao fang* (Islamic Formulary), an important early medical text, and was prescribed by many Qing physicians. Opium was also used for self-medication by increasing numbers of lay people.¹ Like most other medicinal substances, opium could be overused. The later word for this was *yan*, translated as addiction, although the original meaning is closer to craving and the word has entered English directly as *yen*, a strong craving. This term appeared as early as 1801.²

Qing physicians recognized the dangers of opium poisoning, but also recognized the possibility of a continual craving for opium. In 1833, the noted physician, He Shuntien, published a series of opium cures, usually involving pumpkin juice and flowers. He distinguished between light and heavy addiction and strong and weak constitutions.³ Later reformers and scholars were able to draw a clear genealogy from these early conceptions of opium to twentieth-century ideas in part because there were considerable similarities. Opium was seen as a powerful drug, dangerous both as a poison and as a cause of addiction. Addiction was a sickness to be cured, as He Shuntien's publications show, and this view was shared by many. There was a thriving market in opium cures in Fuzhou by 1865.⁴

Although He and others saw opium as a dangerous substance, their views lacked many of the elements that would come in with the later narrative of addiction. Opium was not yet a threat to destroy the nation and the race. There were those, threatened by destruction via opium, who needed to buy one of He Shuntien's cures. There were also large categories of people who were not in danger from their opium use, something that would not be possible under later medical theories. Perhaps most important, strictly medical use of pure opium was still possible, and the descent into regular use was not inevitable.

OPIUM AND REFINED CONSUMPTION

In addition to medical discourses, opium had a role as an item of conspicuous consumption. In the twentieth century, the image of the opium user was that of a derelict who smoked opium in a decrepit opium den that harbored prostitutes and criminals. Another deviant was the young man in search of a good time.



FIG. 2.1. Conspicuous Consumption

This illustration, from *Dianshizhai huabao*, shows a place in Hong Kong where men in search of opportunities for conspicuous consumption could measure their manhood by smoking from a pipe that held five ounces of opium, ten times a normal dose.⁵ In other words, opium provided opportunities for male display.

There were also more refined places where opium was used by very different people for very different reasons. By the late nineteenth century, we have descriptions of some of these places. Bao Tianxiao described his first view of commercial opium sales:

The first time I went to Shanghai I was nine *sui*. (1884). . . We took a carriage to the entertainment district, which was a place to go at night, not in the daytime. There was a large, three-story teahouse called the Blue Lotus. On the second floor they sold tea in front by opium in the back. (At that time opium smoking was open.) They had rows of red wooden opium couches. They also had female attendants. They had clerks who sold opium like in an opium den, and also sold a river of snacks and small dishes. It was a very vibrant place. . .

One day my father took me to an opium den. At that time opium smoking was open and was not prohibited. He did not smoke, but many of his friends did, and a lot of business was conducted there. I also remember one place in Suzhou, the Wu Wan teahouse. I walked past it one hot summer's day when they were doing a good business. None of the smokers seemed at all hot, but I was not interested in the opium, as I had seen my relatives become opium addicts.⁶

Bao Tianxiao seems to have been taken to an upper-middle class opium den. According to Alexander Des Forges, upper-class establishments in Shanghai were far more elegant than Bao's version, and served as places to consume culture as much as opium.⁷ Some users reported that they came as much to admire the sophisticated decor and enjoy the refined ambiance as to smoke. All of these places served a number of purposes. The most important of course was to smoke opium, an experience that many people enjoyed. Opium dens were also part of the public sphere, places where men went to socialize, conduct business, and to consume culture. All of these things tended to remove opium from its limited associations with deviance and make it a more acceptable substance. Nine-year-olds are not usually brought to dens of iniquity.⁸

Upper-class opium use can be linked to obsession, one of the cultural and literary tropes of the late Ming and after.⁹ Literati wrote endlessly about those who had lost their balance and sometimes their lives by too great an interest in chess, jade, or scenic rocks. The term for this sort of obsession was *pi*, which connotes an illness. This was not a term used to refer to opium addiction, but the ideas are not entirely separate. Stories of obsession always ended in the death of the subject or worse (otherwise they would not be obsessions) but the narrator does not condemn the subject. To destroy oneself in the pursuit of truth is admirable; it separates the true chess lover from the mere dilettante.

One could obsess about anything. Zetlin mentions a story of a man obsessed with wooden clogs. In the late Ming, obsessions were standardized into culturally appropriate channels; books, calligraphy, tea, or wine etcetera. The object of the obsession was less important, however. As Zetlin says, "the virtue of an obsession lay not in the object of devotion, not even in the act of devotion, but in self-realization." In other words, the educated man becomes fully realized through his obsession.¹⁰

Opium fit well into this pattern. Like other obsessions, it lent itself to connoisseurship, and could be associated with other culturally appropriate forms of obsession such as prostitutes or painting. Like other forms of obsession, it inspired the subject to superhuman or subhuman behavior, and like other obsessions it lent itself to stories about the destruction of the user. Although the Qing cult of obsession would not survive into the twentieth century, opium did maintain at least some of its ability to mark out the user as a superior individual. Once

opium smoking had been rejected by the bourgeois mores of the new Chinese bourgeois, opium smoking could be used as a way of rejecting bourgeois values.¹¹

OPIUM AS NOTHING

Opium might also be nothing, an ordinary substance of no great importance. This is not to say that opium did not have any meaning at all, but rather than in some contexts it was a quotidian substance of no great importance. This was the final step in the acculturation of new substances in most societies, and while opium never became as innocuous as tobacco it reached a point where it was common enough to arouse little comment. What this meant was that it was possible for a person to smoke opium but not *be* opium. A good example is an illustrated story from *Dianshizhai huabao*.¹² It tells the story of Mr. B., a Bannerman who has used opium for a long time. One day, while he was smoking some opium, a child climbed on his couch just as he is using his long opium pin to scratch his ear. The child leapt up and accidentally rammed the pin into Mr. B.'s ear, killing him. Here is a case of someone suffering, and opium is involved, but the story does not fit later ideas about opium very well. Mr. B. seems healthy despite his long use of opium, and his well-furnished house shows no sign that he has damaged himself economically. His well-stocked bookshelf hints that his mind has not been damaged by opium. He is not called an opium devil (*yan gui*) but rather has "long been in the rosy smoke." The moral of this story is not "Don't smoke opium" but "Shut yourself up inside your house and disaster will strike from Heaven" and "Storms may break in a clear blue sky; men are eternally subject to the workings of fate." Mr. B. is more a failed Daoist recluse than a contemptible addict. Opium is associated with bad things, and may even be a bad thing, but it is not, yet, an evil substance that will inevitably destroy the user.

ZHANG CHANGJIA'S *OPIUM TALK*

Many strands of opium discourse are compiled in Zhang Changjia's *Opium Talk*, written in 1878, and translated by Keith McMahon.¹³ Zhang's work is of great interest to anyone studying opium in China. It is the first known work to discuss opium at any length. Despite this, it is a very obscure work, probably unknown to almost all later Chinese writers on opium. However, the obscurity of this work is revealing; *Opium Talk* cannot be fit into later discourses on opium, and was therefore of little use to later writers.

Zhang's book is clearly part of the literature of obsession rather than the later literature linking opium use to national decline, a topic he only mentions occasionally. Instead his topic is the relationship between the individual educated man

and opium. This is not a medical or sociological text, as so many of its later counterparts will be. Zhang is not trying to prove what the role of opium in society is, nor to demonstrate how the chemical properties of the drug lead to certain results. Rather, he is cataloguing and reflecting on various ways of understanding opium. This method will not lead him to ironclad scientific proofs that can be used to guide public policy, but it is hard to imagine that he would be much troubled by that.

For Zhang Changjia, opium is in many respects a wonderful drug, both as a medicine to cure specific ills and as a general tonic:

Truly, opium is something that the world cannot do without. Its ability to rouse the spirit, stir energy, solidify seminal essence, and cure dysentery, plus all its other swift and marvelous effects—absolutely none of the herbal drugs can outdo it.¹⁴

Opium is intellectually stimulating, giving the user powers they would not otherwise have. Like all tonics, however, it can be over used.¹⁵ Some, at least, can avoid over use; Zhang meets a young-looking 70-year-old who attributes his health to regular, but not excessive opium-smoking and sex. He is adept at nourishing life (*yangsheng*), a Daoist term.¹⁶ This is what distinguishes opium in Zhang's text from later ideas of addiction: opium is a potentially dangerous substance, but a sufficiently refined person can resist it and gain from its benefits while avoiding the problems it causes. In later discourse this would be impossible, because the characteristics of the individual only delayed, not defied, the progress of addiction.¹⁷

Opium is dangerous and Zhang says much about the dangers of opium. Opium will grant energy, but it is a perverse energy.¹⁸ Over use will lead to a host of problems, although Zhang does not go in much for the details of physical collapse that were a staple of later writings. Zhang is closer to the discourse of obsession than of addiction. Later critics of opium point out how opium would draw the user away from his proper functions as a member of a modern family or nation. For Zhang, these were not relevant. He does not tie opium addiction to national destruction, a linkage that drove much of later opium policy.¹⁹ He also does not have much else to do besides smoke opium, and so cannot neglect his job. Although his younger brother chastises him for his opium use, he does not suggest Zhang should straighten himself out and get a job or study for the civil service exams, but rather suggests that he transfer his attachment to flowers or beautiful women.²⁰ For later writers, opium could only be a source of hedonistic pleasure and a distraction from more important tasks like productivity and citizenship. For Zhang, as a Chinese literatus, there is nothing more important than a culturally appropriate obsession. It is significant that the text does not end with Zhang's redemption or death. In part, this is because

Opium Talk does not share the novelistic format of most twentieth-century anti-opium accounts. It does not need to. In later discourse, an opium user either dies or somehow escapes from the narrative of addiction. Zhang has no need to do either.

ADDICTION IN THE WEST

The great change in opium came with the importation of Western concepts of addiction. The development of these ideas was complex, and many of the contradictions within them were never resolved, but by the middle of the nineteenth century there was a fairly coherent set of ideas ready for import to China.

In Europe, as in China, opiates have a long history as medicines. The classic studies of opium addiction focus on the evolution of medical and nonmedical use out of earlier categories of opium consumption.²¹ Medical use, in the modern sense, could only appear once medicine had been professionalized and drugs identified as things to be used under professional supervision to treat a defined disease. Perhaps the most important aspect of this is the acceptance of the germ theory of disease.²² Instead of illnesses caused by an imbalance of humors disease was caused by invasion of the body by specific microorganisms. These caused specific symptoms, which only a trained professional could interpret, and which could be cured by a specific chemical agent. Opiates did not fit this new dispensation particularly well. They had a long history of self-administered use for many things that would not be considered diseases, such as boredom, discomfort, or crying babies. Under humeral medicine, the use of drugs to treat these sorts of problems had been acceptable enough; now it no longer was. The cause célèbre of the new medical discourse was the practice dosing children with laudanum to calm them.²³ This was a perfect example of what was wrong with the old dispensation. Crying babies obviously did not have a disease, and laudanum was not going to cure them. The drug was also administered in unknown doses (via patent medicines) by untrained people. Thus, doses could not possibly be linked to a therapeutic program based on an understanding of the pathology of the disease. The fact that the practice was most common among the lower classes also told against it. Opium began to fall out of favor as a medical drug by the late nineteenth century, in part because of its long association with premodern medical practice but primarily because it could not cure any specific disease.²⁴

A new problem emerged as opiates were medicalized. Many people continued to use opiates as before. What was wrong with them? Thus the first form that the question of drug abuse took was historical; why were people continuing to behave in a way that was acceptable under an old set of ideas but not acceptable (or safe) under a new one?

With improper opium use, as with any other illnesses, the medical profession attempted to find the cause of the disease, identify a set of symptoms and the pathology of the disease, find cures for individuals, and institute public health measures to prevent the spread of the disease. Eventually, this problem was lumped under the name of addiction. Although this idea became commonplace for modern people, it conceals some serious conceptual problems. In the West, these problems centered around the question of whether the drug user should be considered a criminal or the victim of a disease. Each of these approaches led to very different policy outcomes, but the tension between them was never entirely resolved. Instead, aspects of both were subsumed into a narrative of addiction.

The first step in the creation of the narrative was to identify the patient. At the very least, addicts were opium wrecks or drunkards who showed up in hospital wards. Addicts also included those who used drugs without medical approval and continued to do so despite the threat, and sometimes the reality, of legal punishment. One possibility was that people behaved this way because they had a disease. Physicians like Norman Kerr attempted to create a disease of inebriety. This tended to be combined with, rather than replacing earlier views based on sin, and it had conceptual problems of its own.²⁵

What caused people to become victims of inebriety? Although no one claimed opium addiction was spread by an individual microorganism, this was the heyday of the germ theory of disease and many elements of this model found their way into addiction theory. Like a germ established in the body, addiction had to be cured or it would destroy the victim. Like cholera, addiction spread from user to user. In public policy terms, this led to efforts to restrict access to opium, the demon flower, whose power could not be resisted by individuals or societies.²⁶ In this view, opium addiction was a disease, and the vector was opium itself.

The emphasis on opium as the source of addiction remained important, but it shared the stage with an emphasis on the weakness or deviance of the user. This understanding of addiction was colored by its connection to excessive alcohol use. There was of course a long tradition of denunciations of excessive drinking as a moral fault, and opiate use shared these condemnations. It was both a disease and a vice.²⁷ Understanding alcohol abuse eventually tended to concentrate on the weaknesses of the user. If there were large numbers of people who used alcohol without becoming drunkards, (which of course there were), then the source of the problem was not that people could not resist alcohol, that there was something specifically wrong with those who could not.

Various different ways of looking at opium users had very different implications. There were at least three possibilities: (1) that the user was either physically or (2) psychologically dependent on drugs, or (3) that they were criminals. The criminals were the "pleasure users," those who were aware that

opiate use was wrong and illegal, but did not care because they enjoyed it.²⁸ The cure for this problem was to put these people in jail, which was a law enforcement rather than a medical concern. Physical addiction held that the body had become dependent on opiates, (as demonstrated by withdrawal symptoms) and could be cured by removing the opiates, usually gradually. Psychological addiction was held to be caused by the inability of the user to control their own desires. Rehabilitation required strengthening the character of the user.²⁹ In practice, the distinction between the criminal and medical discourses was not clear, and there was an especially clear overlap between theories of psychological addiction and moral condemnation of the weak-willed or degenerate addict. Were addiction an ordinary disease, research would have established one of these approaches as the correct one. What actually happened is that each of them was attached in different ways to a narrative of addiction.

THE NARRATIVE OF ADDICTION

Although there were, and still are, countless debates about the exact nature of the disease of addiction, for my purposes these are less important than the policy consensus that grew out of them. Early Western accounts of drug users and their cure followed a narrative of fall and redemption that was familiar to anyone familiar with Christianity.³⁰ Although there was a good deal of debate about the causes of this fall, moral weakness, physical dependence, psychological weakness, the overall narrative remained remarkably similar. Someone might become addicted in any number of ways, and the progression would vary from case to case, but dosages and frequency would inevitably increase, in the end physical, mental, and moral collapse (in any order) were inevitable.³¹ The story was always the same, although the pattern of events and stages followed by an individual might vary tremendously. The narrative of addiction has become one of the foundational ideas of Western concepts of selfhood.

From a public policy point of view, the narrative of addiction was a way of getting around the indeterminacies of the disease model of addiction. The behavior of drug users could vary tremendously, with many showing no signs of ill effects for years, if ever. The various, different ways of understanding the problem might lead to very different policies to control it. All of this complexity was important, but it was also contained within the narrative of addiction.

An English example of the narrative was published in the *Graphic*, in 1883. A series of pictures, "from fac-similes of native Chinese drawings," illustrate the decline of a Chinese opium smoker. In the initial illustration, the doomed man is smoking opium while a friend smokes tobacco. The following scenes depict his decline in a series of contexts. He eventually grows weaker and more emaciated, and then dies. But serious physical deterioration only comes towards the

end, after the social and economic collapse. He ignores the expostulations of his father and the attempts of his mother to lure him with tea. He bankrupts his family and beats his wife when she attempts to destroy his opium pipe. Physical, social, and economic decline are jumbled in this narrative, as they often were in narratives of drug addiction.³²

Many aspects of this narrative are not valid. Opiate use does not cause physical decline, although lack of food may do so. Certainly a member of the elite like the one pictured in this narrative could not spend any significant amount of his income on opium for personal consumption. Nor could he really neglect his business affairs, as presumably he did not have any. Even those who might do so could often use opium for years with no ill effects.

The first witness called by the 1909 Penang Opium Commission was a substantial lumber merchant, who was asked by his inquisitor, Wu Liende, if his forty-year opium habit had damaged his business or personal life. The merchant said that it had not, and Wu declined to question him further, because, as he explained later, he knew the merchant was telling the truth, and in any case, it would have been inappropriate for him to have cross-examined his own uncle.³³

Both the *Graphic* narrative and the Penang narrative were accounts of the effects of opium on the individual. The *Graphic* presented what would become the classic narrative of addiction. The narrative begins with the user taking up opium use and ends with their death. There are a series of different forms of decline that the user can go thorough; economic, social, psychological, and moral. Whatever reasons users had for starting to use opium, the progression of the addiction made them all the same in the end. Pleasure users might begin use for thrills, but eventually they would become psychologically and then physically addicted. Respectable addicts, who were members of the middle class and had become addicted through medical use, might not start off as morally degenerate as lower-class users, but they would become so. Wealthy men, who might be able to bear the expense of opium, would find a way to destroy themselves financially. This single narrative of addiction, with many starting points and branches, but only one ending, became the standard model for understanding all addictive behavior, regardless of the nature of the individual drug or the nature of the user.

The Penang case is an instructive example of the failure of this narrative. The interrogator, Wu Liende, was trained in modern medicine and was using the Penang inquiries to demonstrate that the opium-smoking of the Chinese of Penang fit into the emerging medical discourse of addiction. He was successful in most cases, and the final report of the Commission was against the continuation of the opium trade. In the case of his uncle, however, he is unable to do so. This is because of his social connection to the witness and his uncle's wealth, social standing, and ability to verbally defend his own behavior. In theory, the new,

supposedly medical model of the narrative of addiction, was to encompass and replace stories like that of the lumber merchant. Wu should have interrogated him and demonstrated that, while he had not yet physically collapsed, the effects of forty years of opium use were about to catch up with him. He did not do so because he was willing, in this context, to accept the older discourse of opium as an acceptable diversion for a member of the elite.

The contrast between the two narratives might have led to a more complex way of understanding addiction, but given the flexibility of the narrative, this was not really necessary. First, the narrative fit the actual patterns of most of the addicts who turned up for treatment; gradual increases in use until the patient died. Second, it made it possible to explain the enormous variations in individual cases; if someone was using opiates but not yet suffering any consequences it was only a matter of time before they did. Third, it helped to contain all the different possible causes of addiction into a single narrative. The narrative of addiction was a good guide to public policy, whatever its failures as science.

ADDICTION AND SOCIETY

The dangers of addiction to the health of the individual were serious enough to make it a public health concern, but it was assumed that just as an addiction would spread through the life of an individual and destroy them, so too would addictive behavior spread through society.³⁴ As with much of the disease model of addiction, this was an invalid assumption. Diseases like cholera did spread, and identifying the vectors they used and eliminating them was one of the main duties of the new public health bureaucracy.³⁵

The idea of opium use as a plague that would destroy society was borrowed from the temperance movement, and as with alcohol, it was a model that had only a limited connection to reality. Nobody seems to have believed addiction was a germ-borne disease in the most literal sense, but public policy was formed as if it was. If one took a moral or criminal view of addiction, the individual user became the vector of disease; if one took a more physical view it was the opium itself. Regardless of the exact vector, opium was a threat. It was eventually discovered that opium was smoked in London by the handful of Chinese who lived there. This evolved into the myth of the ubiquitous opium den, which in fiction could be found all over England, waiting to suck the unsuspecting Victorian into a Chinese hell of vice and degradation.³⁶ This was clearly an outgrowth of the narrative of addiction; opium addiction would spread through society like a microbe-borne disease spread through an individual body if allowed to establish itself. It called for powerful measures to control it.

POLICY OPTIONS IN THE WEST

The narrative of addiction made opium control imperative, but the exact nature of control mechanisms depended on how one explained the nature of addiction. In practice, different models tended to be applied to different groups of users. The most optimistic view was that opiate abuse was caused by ignorance and could be cured by education, a view which was attached to poor users who usually deserved pity.

The mothers in the Cambridgeshire fens who continued to dose their children with laudanum were outside the flow of progress and could be saved by bringing them in. While education continued to be an important part of antidrug efforts, there were those who were clearly not simply ignorant. Chinese peasants and Fenland women might have been ignorant, but there were plenty of urban types who were educated enough to be responsible for themselves. They rejected the new dispensation even after they had been informed of it and threatened with punishment. Here, users were clearly criminals or deviants, who needed to be jailed and/or reformed. If one took the view that the drug would act on any that came into contact with it, the obvious approach was to restrict supply. In the West, this was done by restricting opium imports and distribution, and in the colonial states by raising prices.

Courtwright points out that the model applied by a state depended the current view of the typical addict. The construction of the typical addict depended on the genealogy of the particular drug in a given society.³⁷ In the case of the United States, treatment of addicts changed drastically as the image of the typical addict changed from a wounded Civil War veteran to a thrill-seeking young man. Although there were broad changes in opium policy, individual addicts were treated based on competing discourses on opiates and their meaning rather than a single discourse. Given that the narrative of addiction encompassed a *mélange* of different explanations for and signs of opium addiction, it is not surprising that the cures, both for individuals and societies, were equally jumbled. Multiple genealogies for opiates were constructed, and applied to different groups of users. What held them together was that they were all part of a narrative of addiction and decline. Despite the many disputes about the nature of addiction, the nature of addicts, and their proper cure, there was agreement in the West that opiate use would lead to the destruction of the individual and society and that finding measures to deal with this problem was of the first importance for the state.

MISSIONARIES BRING ADDICTION TO CHINA

Christian missionaries were responsible for importing the new ideas of addiction to China, but their role was more complex than one than simply bringing

in new ideas. The testimony they brought back from China was instrumental in creating metropolitan anti-opium movements, and it was they who did most to package new ideas about opium in a way that made them applicable to China. Although missionaries were active in the earliest phases of the anti-opium movement in China and Chinese Christians were vital to the movement in the twentieth century, the missionaries (and their approach) were far less influential than they or some later historians would claim.³⁸

For missionaries, opium was both a problem and an opportunity. All missionaries were drawn to China by a desire to evangelize, but for devotees of the social gospel there was more to evangelism than mere Christianity. Missionaries saw themselves as spreading the gospel of science and modernity along with Christianity. There was considerable debate among the missionary community, and no doubt in the minds of individual missionaries about the proper relationship of evangelism and modernization. Opium was important from either perspective.

For an evangelical opium was a hindrance to Christianity because it created distrust towards the religion among the Chinese and because opium addicts were deemed unfit for membership in Christian congregations. The association between Christians and opium also provided an opportunity to attract Chinese attention, however.³⁹ As foreigners were associated with opium it was often assumed that they knew how to cure opium addiction. Missionaries were treating individual addicts, publishing anti-opium tracts and setting up opium refuges in China from as early as 1835.⁴⁰ In their writings, missionaries tried to explain the relationship between China, Christianity, and opium. In the refuges, missionaries attempted to understand and change the relationship between the individual and opium. In 1865, Justus Doolittle explained the difficulties in breaking off the habit.

There seems to be a bewitching influence connected with opium-smoking which renders it almost impracticable to break away from the habit when once formed. The peculiar pains and sensations which accompany attempts to desist from smoking it also have, doubtless, a great influence in discouraging such attempts. Some missionaries and physicians in other parts of China seem to think that many victims have been reclaimed from this vice by the aid of certain medicines, but benevolent efforts to overcome the power of the habit in individual cases have not here been attended with very encouraging success. Few have the fortitude to bear up against the fascination of the pipe and the agonies induced by efforts at reformation, even with the aid of foreign medicines, long enough to become thoroughly cured. They usually, after a short trial of abstaining from the drug, have recourse to it again, although, they know that every indulgence with the opium-pipe but rivets the chains of their bondage the tighter.⁴¹

Quitting opium was a life-transforming event and few could make this transition unassisted. Medical and spiritual assistance could be provided in an opium clinic. One essential part of the clinic stay was the painful process of withdrawal, which has become part of the worldwide understanding of drug addiction. In the clinics however, the suffering associated with withdrawal was actively encouraged. As one missionary put it:

. . . my plan has been to make each [opium smoker] suffer for, in order to repent of, his sin. Voluntary endurance of a few days' misery was the evidence that men were sincere in their wish to abjure their evil habit.⁴²

The opium refuges in China were modeled on similar institutions in the West which were intended to isolate the patient so that a therapeutic program could be administered.⁴³ In Britain, it was the establishment of refuges for inebriety that helped to create the disease of alcoholism, by extracting a normal behavior from its normal social context and placing it in a medical context. Opium clinics in China served the same purpose. The clinics thus tended to push opium use into certain contexts that fit well with the narrative of addiction. They isolated opium use and opium users from any other social context, and they supported the position that opium use was a defining trait that could be left behind only by a drastic change in the user.

As in the West these clinics tended to be as much experimental as therapeutic; there was no generally accepted way of treating or even defining addiction, and so each clinic's treatments were an eclectic mix of models selected by the individual who ran the place.⁴⁴ One universal element was, of course, isolating the patient from opium and also (although this was not explicitly stated) from the social context in which they had used opium. In all of the clinics quitting opium was regarded as a stressful and potentially fatal thing, and most gave patients gradually decreasing doses of opiates, often combined with other drugs to help deal with the side effects. This approach was based on the concept that opium was a poison that would be naturally flushed out of the body given time. Unlike other poisons, however, this was not enough. There was presumably something wrong with the user that had made them susceptible to this malady. This is of course the willpower argument, although somewhat changed. For the missionaries what was lacking in the patient was more likely to be an acceptance of Christ than willpower. Twentieth-century Chinese clinics focused on reform through labor or nationalistic education to provide what the patient lacked. In any case, something had to be done to the patient to make them a better person for the cure to be entirely effective. Clinics thus tended to combine a purely physical approach with moral reform. In any case, the basic model of the clinics was the same. Individuals were to be identified as addicts and removed from society. In the clinic they would be kept away from opium,

given drugs to help deal with any physical addiction, and remade into people better able to resist the lure of opium.

This re-creation of the individual would be the crucial duty of the clinics for the one hundred years from 1850 to 1950 because regardless of the medical or moral theories that backed the treatment plan at a given clinic they fit into the narrative of addiction. For whatever reasons people started to abuse opium, and whatever course their addiction took, eventually they were supposed to reach the bottom. They would then attempt to cure themselves, be forced into the attempt by their families, or, in the twentieth century, be sent to a clinic by the state. How they got there was not relevant. What mattered was that now they could be wrenched out of their previous life and into a new one. For the missionaries, this tied in well with the narrative of conversion, for Chinese nationalists it tied in well with the narrative of national awakening.

Missionaries also linked opium use to China's general crisis. William Lockhart explained:

The most common cause of the Chinese resorting to the use of the opium-pipe is their not knowing how to employ their leisure hours. When the business of the day is over, there is no periodical literature to engage their attention, their families do not present sufficient attractions to keep them at home; and sauntering about of an evening with nothing to employ the mind, they are easily tempted into the opium shops, where one acquaintance or another is sure to be found who invites to the use of the drug.⁴⁵

In other words, China had a problem with opium because China was not a modern country. The solution to opium was to make China a modern country, with a periodical literature, modern bourgeois family life, and of course, Christianity. Others would point out that opium was also a cause of this failure. China's failure to be like the West was a matter of continuing puzzlement for foreign writers, and opium was usually involved in their descriptions of China's decadence and decline.⁴⁶ The narrative of individual destruction from opium addiction was tied to a narrative of national destruction from opium addiction. As Justus Doolittle explained:

The vice of opium smoking has long since become a giant obstacle to the welfare and the prosperity of this people. The consumption of opium is rapidly on the increase in this city as well as in other parts of the empire, and its ravages are becoming more manifest and more awful. Shops where the drug is offered for sale are becoming more and more common. Its unhappy victims are becoming more and more numerous. The nation is becoming poorer and poorer.⁴⁷

For missionaries, the cure to the problem was Jesus. This would not be a popular solution for later Chinese nationalists, but the linkage between opium's danger to the individual and the danger to the nation would become commonplace.

GUO SONGDAO AND OPIUM'S RETURN TO POLITICS

When opium suppression returned to Chinese politics in the late nineteenth century, it did so in a new way. Wei Yuan's concern with opium suppression as a vehicle for elite activism was no longer important. Instead, new anti-opium campaigns would be driven by the new ideas of addiction. Inserting opium into Chinese politics would be difficult for missionaries to do directly, and even converts found it difficult to have much effect on policy in the Qing.

One of the most prominent Chinese Christians to get involved in the opium crusade was Tang Tingshu (1832–1892), a chief comprador for Jardine Matheson, who was also involved in both the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company and the Kaiping Mines. Tang was also a member of the Anglo-Oriental Anti-Opium Society and distributed their publications in China.⁴⁸ As a comprador of the most notorious of the English opium dealing houses, Tang was not an ideal spokesman for the anti-opium cause, and his distribution of anti-opium propaganda was probably no different from other charitable actions that he undertook. In twentieth-century Chinese Christians like Tang's nephew Tang Shaoyi would be very important in the growing anti-opium movement, but before that could happen, anti-opium ideas had to be domesticated for the Chinese elite.

The first influential Chinese to promote these new ideas was Guo Songdao. Guo, a *jinsbi* of 1847, was appointed in 1876 as China's first ambassador to Great Britain. The unpopularity of the decision to send an ambassador made him unemployable on his return in 1878, and he lived in retirement until his death in 1891. In England, Guo met with members of the British anti-opium movement and attended their rallies. He promptly memorialized on the subject, suggesting that opium was a serious threat to China. "The West's threat to China began with opium and this is the cause of this great and painful wound."⁴⁹

Guo pointed out that Japan did not allow opium-smoking and suggested a state-led campaign against the habit. Suppression could not be achieved by issuing orders, however. First, the gentry had to be inculcated with a sense of shame, and the entire suppression campaign would have to be closely monitored by the central government. These statements echo Lin Zexu's, but both in form and content are somewhat different. Lin had not proposed a national campaign, and had not thought that suppression would take three years. Causing the gentry to have a sense of shame was a phrase that Lin might have used, but Guo's idea is quite different. Guo stresses that in the Western countries the

people and the officials were one, a situation which was not the case in China.⁵⁰ This explicit emphasis on conflict with the West was new, as was the unfavorable comparison to Japan.⁵¹ Guo still stressed the greater importance of officials, however, as he focused on reforming school regulations as the best way to eliminate the problem, as raising a generation of drug-free scholars would lead to a generation of drug-free officials.⁵² After sending this memorial, Guo attended a number of meetings of the British Anti-Opium society and then memorialized again on opium suppression. He began by complaining that the emperor had not responded to his earlier memorial. This was more than a bit presumptuous, but it helped to establish the urgency he felt on the matter.⁵³ Guo may or may not have been aware that his position had already been criticized by Liu Shenyi. Liu pointed out that in Guangdong alone opium taxes brought in at least a million taels a year. Guo's assertion that the problem was growing deeper and broader was dismissed as empty words. For Liu and many other practical reformers the hypothetical problem caused by opium-smoking could not be compared to the reality of tax revenue. For Liu opium is still one of many social problems and eliminating it is not worth the money. For Guo opium has become attached to the danger of national destruction, and eliminating it is worth any price.

Even had Guo won this debate, an effective anti-opium campaign would probably not have resulted. The emperor eventually replied to Guo's original memorial, and professed hope that British anti-opium movement would result in the end of foreign opium being sent to China, after which eliminating domestic production would be simple. While the Emperor may not have heeded Guo's warning that opium suppression would be a complex task, Guo himself did not forget, and on his return home in 1879 he organized an anti-opium society, the *Zun Xing Hui* (Respectful Action Association). It originally had twelve members and was intended to meet four times a year. Association members found out which members of their own clans smoked and distributed guides to curing addiction and anti-opium medicine to them. All this was quite in keeping with the tradition of local gentry activism, but Guo and his friends also spent a good deal of time debating the purposes of the society. Everyone knew why the gentry repaired bridges and supported orphans, why (and how) did they suppress opium? It was agreed that opium use weakened the state, and thus suppression was part of the duty of the gentry to the state. It was the gentry as the leaders of society who should be expected to improve the people, and it was this improvement that would lead to the elimination of opium. Decrees and laws were not enough, as the peasants were much attached to their profits. Member Li Jupao claimed that it would take ten years of training the people for this cause to succeed.⁵⁴ This was quite in keeping with the self-image of the gentry as reformers of popular morals, and the methods used, focusing on the families was also typical. The family was the foundation of the state, and ordering his own family was one of the key

duties of the gentleman. The society's conception of the problem was also fairly traditional. On the consumption side they were primarily concerned with the elite (especially students) and the army, groups whose moral and physical strength were the foundation of the state. They were also concerned with the lower classes, but primarily as producers. Opium profits were luring peasants away from their traditional role of producing food, thus weakening themselves and society.⁵⁵ This was also in keeping with traditional ideas, which emphasized the importance of keeping peasants in their traditional productive roles.

Guo's attacks on opium and the ideas of the *Zun Xing Hui* are important milestones in the return of opium to politics. Guo's memorials were an attempt to revive the anti-opium campaigns of Lin Zexu. Liu Shenyi dismissed this, as did most serving officials, as a near-lunatic attempt to revive policies that had been proven failures decades ago. Guo, however, seems to at least partially accept the western concept of the narrative of addiction, which explains the urgency in his appeals to the emperor. His definitions of society and his remedies for curing the problem remained traditional, however. For Guo, the new ideas of addiction merely authorized another bout of gentry reformism, and a campaign that would have been familiar to Lin Zexu. He was apparently not aware that these concepts were tied to an entirely un-Confucian way of understanding citizenship and the relationship between the ruler, the nation and the individual. Once these things were tied together, a new form of suppression campaigns would begin.

ON STRENGTH: YAN FU AND LOWER-CLASS ENLIGHTENMENT

A much more radical reformism began to emerge after China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War and the signing of the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. This was encouraged by the apparent immanence of national disaster, but also by the much closer contact between Chinese intellectuals and foreign concepts. Yan Fu was one of the first to link China's crisis to a failure to create proper citizens, and of course opium was involved.⁵⁶ In his seminal 1895 essay, *Yuan qiang* (*On Strength*), Yan, influenced by Herbert Spencer, suggested that "the quality of the social 'aggregate' counts on the quality of each constituent individual, just as the function of the human body counts on the development of each part of the body."⁵⁷ This metaphor of the state as a body was familiar enough, but Yan did not make a clear distinction between different classes of citizens, as had been common before. All Chinese had to improve their strength, intelligence, and morality (*minli*, *minzhi*, *minde*).⁵⁸ These are not qualities associated with any particular class, nor are they uniquely Chinese, being required for all nations. The process of creating these traits is apparently different in different places,

however, as he mentions the British temperance movement and the Swedish ban on marriages by poor people as attempts to create a better people.⁵⁹ The goal of a modern nation might be universal, but the flaws of the individual races were unique.

The greatest threats to the strength of the Chinese people were opium-smoking and footbinding. It is probably not a coincidence that these were the two most distinctive forms of decadent Chinese behavior that most foreigners would mention, although neither was central to traditional Confucian diagnoses of China's problems. With opium, Yan begins at the top, discussing the importance of curing officials, gentry, and the military, stressing that opium addiction should be a disqualification for office. Once these classes have been cured it would become apparent to the lower classes that this was a bad habit, and they would follow the example of their betters. After perhaps thirty years the habit would be reduced to the point that it could be abolished.

Although Yan Fu was developing a new theory of citizenship, his ideas about opium were still quite traditional. In this context at least, he still expected the upper classes to lead the lower by moral example. He was also willing, for whatever reason, to allow the opium trade to go on for another thirty years.⁶⁰ Although in many respects quite radical, Yan's view of the opium problem tied in well with elite reformers like Li Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong. Although Yan's understanding of the opium problem and its threat to the nation was new, his solution to the problem was the typical gentry/state reformism.

KANG YOUWEI AND LIANG QICHAO

Guo Songdao and Yan Fu married the new opium discourse to traditional gentry reformism. Kang Youwei would link it to radical reformism. The key problem for Kang was not silver or revenue, but the fact that opium-smoking would "weaken the race, impoverish the state and weaken the army." Kang, like Yan, always drew a link between opium smoking and footbinding. Each were backwards customs that weakened the nation and made it an international laughingstock.⁶¹ Kang's goal in eliminating opium was to make China ready for its role in the world utopia he envisioned. His student Liang Qichao's goals were more typical, creating a strong race and state capable of succeeding in international competition. This was not a unique goal in the era after the Sino-Japanese War, but Liang was one of the most influential voices explaining what this would entail. From 1899, when he began publishing the *Qing yi bao* from Tokyo, Liang was one of the most influential voices in the Chinese reformist community. Although he remained connected to his mentor Kang until 1911, his political goals became increasingly republican, and his vision of social reform increasingly drastic.

Liang demanded a thoroughgoing reform of China's entire society, not simply the purchase of Western ships and guns. Liang complained at one point that it was hard to get Chinese intellectuals to take emancipation of women seriously, since it was far from the things like ships and guns that they attributed the success of Western nations to. In fact, according to Liang it was the strength of Western women that was the source of Western power.⁶² Everyone in China, even women and the poor, would have to be reformed. In 1898, the reformists established an anti-opium society in Tokyo. In some respects, it was not much different from the gentry reformist association set up by Guo Songdao. Members were to abjure opium, and were warned that they would be expelled from the association if they were arrested for opium crimes. They were to banish opium-smoking utensils from their homes and shops and encourage family members and friends to give up the habit.⁶³ None of this was very revolutionary, save for the suggestion that members might own shops. What was unprecedented was the scale of the organization. Branches were established in Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Macao, Shanghai, and Guilin, and the plan was for associations to be established for every one thousand people, creating a sort of anti-opium *bao jia* system. Although this project was as short-lived as the rest of the 1898 reforms, these new reformists were including opium as part of their sweeping overhaul of Chinese society.

SUN YAT-SEN

Although the reformers favored abolition of the opium trade, absolute opposition to the trade had not yet become part of the standard repertoire of all nationalists and reformers. It was in this same period that the Self-Strengtheners were trying to improve collection of the opium tax to finance their various projects. This could coexist with denunciations of the trade, and these schemes were usually justified in part by their supposed help in reducing the opium trade. Zuo Zongtang claimed that his opium taxes would drive up prices and thus reduce demand, Li Hongzhang claimed that import substitution would replace dangerous foreign opium with less potent domestic opium. Sun Yat-sen also showed this same apparent contradiction. Sun's first words on opium came in a letter to his friend Zheng Zaoru. He condemned the trade, and claimed that the Qing government's proclamations against it were mere hypocrisy, since they made a great deal of money from the trade. He expressed hope in the international anti-opium movement, and encouraged his friend to establish a clinic to cure opium users in their home county.⁶⁴ In his 1894 memorial to Li Hongzhang, however, he supported import substitution as a temporary measure. He informed Li that the opium he had persuaded farmers in Xiangshan to grow "[had a] bouquet . . . even better than that of Indian opium, and far superior to that of Szechwan and Yunnan."⁶⁵

Presumably he was familiar with the flavors of these varieties of opium because he had smoked them. Although some of Sun's later statements about opium were quoted repeatedly this memorial is not, for obvious reasons. Wang Jinxiang suggests that Sun's support for import substitution was merely an attempt to curry favor with Li Hongzhang.⁶⁶ Sun Xiufu suggests that Sun's thought had not yet fully developed.⁶⁷ Both of these are probably true, but they are also attempts to rationalize Sun's behavior by twentieth-century standards. His willingness to tolerate and even encourage opium growing and his familiarity with different flavors of opium would be completely unacceptable for a national political figure after about 1906.

At the time that he wrote to Li Hongzhang, however, Sun's positions were acceptable. The narrative of addiction was being introduced to China and reformist thinkers were giving more emphasis to opium suppression but at the same time many of the same reformists were imposing better organized and more lucrative systems for taxing opium. This was denounced as hypocrisy later, but made perfect sense in the context of the time. China was not unique in this juxtaposition of control and suppression. Similar things were happening all over Asia.

NEW POLICIES AND NEW DISCOURSES

Opium suppression was important to the New Policies reforms, as will be discussed in the next chapter, but the justifications for these policies were quite different from those of Lin Zexu. As discussed above, the position of opium in China and Chinese ideas about the dangers of opium had changed considerably as the trade matured and broadened and as new discourses about the dangers of opium were imported and domesticated. Two examples of the rhetoric of the New Policies period will demonstrate this change. The first is an editorial from the *Shenbao* and the second the Imperial Edict declaring the start of the anti-opium campaigns. The *Shenbao* gave two reasons for supporting the anti-opium campaign. One was that opium weakened state finances. Although a concern with state finances was of course not new the focus was. The editorialist mentioned the outflow of silver to pay for opium and the threat of famine, but focused on the weakening of the productive capacity of the people and thus the ability of China to finance reform. More significantly, the editorial stressed the damage done by opium to the physical health of the people.

In constitutional countries the people are all practically soldiers. Not one does not pay attention to hygiene . . . In the event of war they will not disperse but will blunt the thrust of an invading force. Opium smokers are like so many dull axes from constantly taking this medicine that weakens their bones.⁶⁸

Focusing on the dangers of opium to military power was not new, but earlier the focus had been specifically on the army as one of the elite groups of society. The New Policies reformers would continue to see special groups such as officials, students and soldiers as elites to be especially concerned with, but they also saw a new role for the entire people as constituent parts of the nation in arms.

Many of these same themes can be found in the Imperial Edict issued in November of 1906 to regulate the anti-opium campaigns. In part the edict reflects the growing complexity of the opium trade. All parts of the opium complex: imports, poppy growing, sales and smoking were to be attacked at the same time. In each case prohibition was to be gradual, with licenses being issued and growing, smoking, or sales gradually reduced over a period of nine years. In 1840, the state could contemplate simply abolishing the trade, but by 1906, it was clear that it had grown to such an extent that state power would have to adopt itself to the social and economic realities of opium in China. The edict also reflected new conceptions of citizenship. Although the role of officials as moral exemplars was stressed, the edict also stressed the importance of mass propaganda, praising the local anti-opium societies which were springing up around China and doing propaganda work. The regulations on opium smoking also reflected this new view of the people. Opium smokers were to be required to register themselves and, if under sixty-years of age, to gradually reduce their consumption. Those over sixty found themselves left out of all the licensing schemes of the next fifty years. As they were no longer productive members of society they did not matter, although traditionally, they would have been looked on as exemplars like the officials. Those under sixty were to gradually cure themselves, and were they to fail their names would be posted and they were "not allowed to be reckoned as equals of the general public."⁶⁹ The traditional category of mean people (*jian min*) who were unable to sit for the exams had been gradually abolished from the time of the Yongzheng emperor, but the opium laws were (potentially) creating a new category of people who would be left out of the modern concept of citizenship.

The Late Qing anti-opium campaigns were specifically linked to the legacy of Lin Zexu. Parades with his image, copies of his writings and invocations of his example would be common throughout the rest of the century. This use of Lin to create a genealogy for the movement was understandable, but both the trade he dealt with and the way he understood it were quite different from those of 1906. The anti-opium campaigns of the twentieth century were inspired by the new narrative of addiction and also by the changed nature of the opium trade both domestically and internationally.

Chapter 3

The International Campaign against Opium

As the Chinese state began asserting more control over the opium trade in the late nineteenth century, it did so as part of a general trend all over East Asia and the world. In the early part of the century, Asian colonial and national states tried to increase their control over opium primarily as a revenue measure. This trend continued into the later part of the century, both out of a continuing desire to increase revenue and, because it was ideologically less acceptable for states to allow the trade to be controlled by private actors. Opium consumption was also becoming problematic. As new concepts of addiction emerged, national states in the West tried to control the trade in opiates for reasons of public health. China, as one of the only national states that relied on selling opium to its own people, borrowed both motivations: public health and state-building. In addition to providing models, the international community also created a series of international agreements that regulated the international trade in drugs and proscribed proper domestic drug policies. Although China was signatory to only some of these agreements, they provided a framework used by both foreigners and Chinese to judge the progress of Chinese opium policy and thus the progress of China in general. In this chapter I analyze the metropolitan and colonial models of drug control and their lessons for China, and briefly explain the development of the international drug control system and its implications for China.¹

DRUGS AND MONEY IN COLONIAL ASIA

Although opium eventually created a moral hierarchy in Asia it was initially a financial hierarchy. When Asian states began to limit the opium trade for public

health reasons in the late-nineteenth century they did so on top of a good two centuries of attempts to regulate the trade for reasons of revenue. Although in theory public health goals replaced revenue goals by 1900, in practice the two overlapped each other for quite some time. All of the colonial states of Asia produced or sold opium and got a significant percentage of state revenue from the trade.²

Opium had been important to the Dutch and English East India Companies from the seventeenth century.³ Prior to 1850, opium policy in both producing and consuming areas focused on increasing state control over opium marketing. The Dutch had set up a monopoly opium farms to sell opium to Javanese and Chinese users by 1809, and the British monopolized production in India from 1763.⁴ Although these systems would later be criticized as immoral and inefficient they fit the limited needs and capacities of the pre-1850 colonial states quite well. Each system attempted to tax opium at the point where it would require the least social penetration to do so: in the ports where it was imported or exported. The Dutch system, in particular, relied on local merchants to serve as tax farmers and regulate opium sales. This not only limited state control of the trade, according to Carl Trocki, but also limited state investment. These farms were common throughout colonial Asia. "Whether in Penang or Singapore under the British, Batavia or Medan under the Dutch, Saigon under the French, Bangkok under the Chakkri kings, Manila under the Spanish, or even Hong Kong under yet another British colonial government, by the 1870's virtually all of the opium farms of colonial Asia were operated in quite the same fashion."⁵ As the nineteenth-century colonial state extended its power, the farm system became increasingly anomalous. Although with minimal state investment, farms were easy to set up, they put a tremendous amount of economic and political power in the hands of private merchants. Opium farmers were, in theory, state contractors, but in practice they were difficult to dismiss, as they were likely to be the only ones in the district with the connections and capital to run the farm, and could always revert to smuggling if stripped of their state powers. Opium was the key to this entire system: all these employees and connections cost money, and in order to pay for this, control of the opium trade was essential. The opium farm supported a class of Chinese merchants who held considerable amounts of state power and extracted and kept revenue (i.e. state involution was occurring). If the farms were abolished, there would no longer be an intermediary between the Dutch state and the Javanese peasant.

Chinese revenue farmers were also becoming increasingly sophisticated and difficult to control. In theory, selling a tax farm, for opium or anything else, was a deal that committed a local merchant's capital to the service of the state. In practice the merchant consortiums were difficult to control and often more aware of and closely connected to the international opium trade than the government. Carl Trocki analyzed the Man Wo Fung syndicate's attempts to take over the Hong Kong farm in 1880 and concluded that the syndicate involved

opium merchants from throughout Southeast Asia, and that their chief motivation was not simply taking over the small Hong Kong farm, but getting control of the three *chaps* (trademarks) used by the previous Hong Kong farmer. These trademarks were popular not only in Hong Kong, but also in Australia and California, and control of them might have led to the creation of a truly global opium syndicate.

Although in the Man Wo Fung case, the state managed to overcome the opium merchants and “the cunning and chicanery of . . . the Celestial nature,” it was increasingly obvious that opium farms were no longer an effective way to manage the trade.⁶ In 1896, the farms on Java were abolished and replaced by the Opium Regie, a state-controlled opium marketing system.⁷ The Dutch system was modeled on the system established in Cochin China by the French in 1883, and was the model for the system established by the Japanese on Taiwan.⁸ All these systems were motivated by the same set of economic, political, and moral concerns, and they would serve, directly and indirectly, as models for China.

BOILING OPIUM

One of the key technical aspects of the opium trade that the Javenese Regie took over was the process of boiling opium. Opium was (usually) shipped in the form of raw opium, a hard black mass (in the form of balls if shipped from India) that could be smoked or eaten, but users across Asia, especially the Chinese, preferred prepared opium which had been boiled down into a paste. Boiling opium down reduced its weight by as much as half and offered the opportunity to mix in different types of opium, opium ashes (popular in China to give proper consistency) and adulterants of various sorts. It was control over the boiling process that gave the farmer his dominating position in the system. Large-scale opium boiling was expensive and not easy to conceal. This made it difficult for competitors to get into the business, especially in Java where nonfarm boiling was illegal. The boiling stage was also the perfect time to mix smuggled opium into the stream of official opium. Thus for practical reasons, the boiling stage was one of the key choke points in opium distribution and the best place for the state or others to profit from the trade with minimal investment.

French Indochina, Taiwan, and China all ended up taking control of boiling. The Dutch on Java went the farthest, designing modern opium-boiling machinery, packing the opium into standardized metal tubes, and marking the opium with chemical markers so it could be identified by the state (and only by the state) as official opium.⁹ The goal was to create a seamless system of opium control from the ports where the opium was brought into Java to the end user. While this was a way of guaranteeing the control and revenue that the state wanted, it brought the government into closer contact with the opium

trade. Even before the development of new ideas about addiction, states had been reluctant to have too much direct contact with opium; the British East India Company's reliance on country merchants to sell opium in China is the most obvious example. The state monopoly systems were under attack almost as soon as they were formed as they were tying the state more closely to the opium trade at exactly the time this was becoming less acceptable.

DRUGS AND RACE IN COLONIAL ASIA

Drug problems were being discovered all over the world in the late-nineteenth century as the narrative of addiction was developed. This did not immediately lead to attempts at worldwide prohibition. Rather, in the metropolises attempts were made to restrict the flow of drugs to newly created medical channels. In the colonies, a clear racial hierarchy was established with one set of controls for the colonizing race and one or more for various colonized groups, depending on how drugs were seen to affect their productivity and how valuable their productivity was to the colonial project. In the long run, drugs would be tied to a biological universalism: eventually it would be assumed that everyone was affected by them in the same way. In the short run they were tied to the racial and social hierarchies of colonialism.

Although colonial states did not stop selling opium to their Asian subjects until after World War Two, selling opium became controversial in the imperializing nations much earlier. The British Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade was founded in 1874. Opposition to the opium trade was a major issue in Dutch politics from the 1880s on.¹⁰ The abolition of opium farms and establishment of state monopolies was part of the response to these prohibitionists although they were not satisfied with the new policy. When the United States became an Asian colonial power (after 1898) these forces were powerful enough to see to it that the opium system in the Philippines was abolished entirely. All of these reformers drew a clear line between the old, evil, exploitative opium systems they wanted to eliminate and the modern, virtuous, and benevolent policies they favored. For the reformers, the key distinction between the two types of systems was that the former was intended to provide revenue and the latter to eliminate a social evil. In practice, the distinction between the two sides was not always clear, and opium control and opium suppression developed in tandem in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. State monopolies favored closer controls for revenue reasons and also to limit the damage an unrestrained opium trade could do to colonial productivity. While reformers wanted an eventual end to the opium trade, even they saw this as a gradual process. Eventually, users would be herded into some sort of licensing system and gradually weaned off the drug. It was almost universally agreed that quit-

ting opium was physically and mentally difficult for the individual user. It was also generally agreed that purging Asian political and economic systems of opium would be a slow task. Although the rhetoric of the two sides could be heated, there was usually a consensus position in favor of increasing control and gradual elimination, beginning from the late-nineteenth century reforms and running through the treaty system of the twentieth century.

Reformers favored limiting access to opium by setting up tight systems to control international and domestic distribution, something monopolists would of course favor. Eventually, the reformers wanted to limit the amount of opium going into the system by cutting production, but this conflict did not become clear until the 1920s. Reformers favored licensing systems that would restrict opium use to the truly addicted, a measure which would also make smuggling more difficult and thus benefit revenue. Reformers wanted to eventually eliminate the trade entirely by reforming opium smokers, a process the state increasingly came to favor as it became more worried about the effect of opium on productivity. The process of moral reform could be carried out in part through mass propaganda aimed at the entire populace. Medical treatment and intensive propaganda could be carried out during a brief stay in an anti-opium clinic. The original missionary refugees aimed at curing users as part of an evangelizing mission. Western anti-opium reformers wanted to do it in the name of a more general modernization and civilization. Later Chinese nationalists would do it in the name of the nation. Whatever the goal, methods used to achieve it looked remarkably similar. Reformers needed state power to create the nationwide opium clinic, and they needed the revenue opium sales could produce to pay for it. State revenue monopolies increasingly needed the goal of eventual suppression to legitimate their activities. Although critics of existing systems tried to draw a bright line between good and bad opium control systems, the distinction was based on motivations and what might happen in the future rather than observable facts. All opium control systems looked the same, what distinguished them were the motivations of those running them and their plans for the future. All of them were at least initially based on a system of racial hierarchy. Anti-opium crusaders wanted to bring the metropolitan model of complete suppression to the colonies, but in the short run this was applied only to the colonizing races.

PROTECTING THE ELITE IN THE COLONIES

In the colonies, rather than attempting to isolate opium in particular channels (leaving society pure), colonial policy aimed at keeping the colonial elite separate from the drug-addled people they ruled over. Whites in most of colonial Asia were expected to not use opium, and for the most part they did not. This was a

sign of their superior nature. There was concern, however, that opium use and other social pathologies would spread from the colonized to the colonizer. In 1893, the French physician Paul Michaut denounced the linked vices of "syphilis, opiomania, and pederasty . . . this sort of morbid triple alliance that saps the health of our colonists."¹¹ Concerns like these would lead to regulation of prostitutes and other public health measures aimed at protecting the colonizing races.¹² Butel attributes the spread of opium smoking to France to "Naval officers returned from campaigns in China or Indochina, merchants, former colonial officials, sailors, and the prostitutes of Toulon and Brest." From there it spread to the artists districts of Montparnasse and Montmartre, and the fashionable quarters of the Left Bank.¹³ In France, the goal was to limit opium use to a group of deviants, and in the colonies it was to isolate the colonized from opium. In each case, however, opium had a tendency to leap out of assigned boundaries.

THE DANGER OF OPIUM FOR ASIANS

Where did the nondominant races fit in this system? Could opium use continue among the colonized, or did they also have to be reformed? The most common view in the early nineteenth century was that Asians were biologically different from Europeans, and thus were less susceptible to the dangers of opium. Reasons why Europeans might be less susceptible to opium ranged from biological and social differences to the discomfort of lying on an opium couch in tight trousers.¹⁴ This racial distinction could and was attacked as self-interested or ignorant, but it was the conclusion the Royal Commission on Opium came to in 1895.¹⁵

The debate on Asians and opium took place in all the colonies, but also internationally. It had long been understood that opium was easily smuggled, and opium policy in one state usually influenced the trade in others. If one viewed opium as a plague, failure to stop it in any one place would lead to its spread to other places.

As opium use came to be associated with other pathologies, it was also feared that its use might lead to a drop-off in productivity. The solution was a series of controls based on where different ethnic groups fit into the hierarchy of empire. Colonizers, seen as the most productive and important group, were not to use opium at all. Ethnic Chinese, who were difficult to control and whose smoking habits could yield considerable revenue were allowed and encouraged to use opium. Use among other colonized races was often discouraged.

Burma provides a good example of most of the main themes. The government announced its intention to eventually end the use of opium in Burma, and was praised for this by the anti-opium forces.¹⁶ The ultimate goal of total suppression was important in legitimizing policy, but in practice, what happened was a system of licensing and regulation that fit well with older ideas of racial

hierarchy. Registration of Burman opium-eaters began in 1893. As not all users were registered the process was repeated in 1900 and 1903. No new licenses were to be issued, so the population of opium-eaters would eventually die out. More than six thousand of the original users were still alive in 1918, and over sixty-five hundred more were registered under an experimental program in 1924. All of these users had to pass a medical exam to prove they were addicted, and they could purchase only limited amounts of opium from an assigned government run local shop. As an ordinary part of social intercourse, opium use was not acceptable under the licensing system: only those who could be considered addicts were licensed, thus considerably simplifying the problem. In most licensing systems different ethnic groups were treated differently.

The original system in Burma applied only to ethnic Burmese. Chinese and Indians, whose well-being was less a concern of the state and who were more likely to protest were not registered until 1924 for smokers (17,419 Chinese and 141 Indians) and 1928 for opium eaters (15,693 Chinese and 16,138 Indians). 1,301 Burmese opium smokers were registered in 1924, but most of them turned out to be Shans and were stricken from the lists.

These statistics reveal that opium was used differently in different ethnic communities but also that the state viewed opium use among them differently. The primary concern of the Burmese system was to prevent the spread of opium use among the main ethnic population, a common concern in many areas. The Shan, whose health and productivity were not important concerns for the imperial state, were ignored, and in 1928, opium farms were still operating in the remote areas of Burma.¹⁷

The Chinese were the most distinctive group. Colonial officials claimed that opium use was overwhelmingly a Chinese phenomenon but this was not entirely true. In 1928, Chinese made up only 19,552 of the 101,048 licensed opium smokers in the Dutch East Indies. However, they consumed about half of the opium and many Chinese users were unregistered.¹⁸ In French Indo-China it was estimated that 40 percent of ethnic Chinese smoked opium as opposed to only 2.5 percent of Vietnamese, and again Chinese consumed far more opium per capita.¹⁹ In most of the other colonies, users were overwhelmingly Chinese. Chinese smoked in far greater numbers overseas than they did at home due to several factors: Greater wealth allowed them to buy luxury goods and in predominantly male societies family expenses were low. Opium was also issued or sold to the predominantly Chinese laborers who worked in extractive industries, providing them with recreation and solace at remote worksites and/or enslaving them and recapturing their wages for their employers.²⁰ Opium was thus vital to role of the Chinese in Asia, and the Chinese were vital to the colonial economies. The League of Nations was officially concerned that effective limitations on the opium trade would lead to limitations on the availability of Chinese labor.²¹

Proper management of opium and proper management of the Chinese were linked topics for most colonial administrators. An unrestricted opium trade was clearly not the answer; it would encourage smuggling, spread the trade, and cost the state revenue. Total prohibition would also lead to smuggling, might lead to protests or unrest, and in some cases would lead to increased use of other opiates.²² The best solution was a flexible monopoly system which would allow opium use among the Chinese to an extent that would gratify them and provide profit for the state. In theory, these monopoly schemes were supposed to lead to the eventual end of the trade. In Burma, Siam, and Taiwan no new licenses were to be issued, thus leading to the eventual end of the trade. In all states, prices were to be kept deliberately high to discourage use and states were to carry out anti-opium propaganda to educate the people about the dangers of opium. In theory opium policy was supposed to become gradually more strict as part of a gradual effort to eliminate it. In practice, state monopolies varied their rates and systems of control primarily to retain market share in competition with smuggled opium.²³ The Dutch set up much looser systems of control in areas where they faced strong competition from smuggled drugs (mostly smuggled by Chinese), and the Siamese monopoly set much lower rates in areas near the Shan states and their smuggled opium. This was a realistic enough policy that limited the spread of the trade without attempting the impossible task of civilizing the Chinese.

DUELING CONFERENCES

Although colonial governments seem to have been generally happy with the evolving system of controls, reformists at home and eventually the Chinese found it unacceptable. In the twentieth century a position of biological universalism gradually became accepted. All bodies, Asian and European, were subject to the same attacks, and there could be only one moral opium policy, that of prohibition. A dispute arose between reformers, who wanted a quick end to an immoral trade, and those, often colonial officials, who, while formally committed to ending the trade, saw little reason to hurry. Both sides attempted to give their positions a veneer of science through a series of reports and conferences. Each claimed that particular opium policies were not only appropriate for individual colonies, but were the proper scientific method for running any colony, and thus the proper relationship between the colonizers and the colonized.²⁴

The British Government called the Royal Commission on Opium in 1895. The purpose of this commission was to determine the appropriate direction of Imperial policy towards opium. Opponents of the trade hailed appointment of

the commission as “the greatest and most solid forward step that the movement for the suppression of the opium trade has made.”²⁵ For the anti-opium forces, it was obvious that a scientific inquiry would find against continuation of the trade. In fact, the Commission rejected the medical and moral arguments against the trade on the grounds that opium was important in the finances of the colonial state and there was considerable medical evidence that opium was not particularly harmful to Asians. Sir William Roberts, one of the chief medical experts to testify, concluded that opium use was far less dangerous to Asians, probably because of their racial background, diet and climate. For Roberts, and for the Commission, the medical dangers of opium did not transfer to Asians. Most interestingly, the Indian elite were either hostile or indifferent to opium suppression. For many of them opium use was a part of Indian life and British attempts to eliminate it were part of a general denegation of Indian culture. T. N. Mukherji, who gave evidence to the Commission, suggested that the British should give up alcohol and take up opium, rather than the other way round.²⁶ John Richards quite correctly points out the irony of this situation, but it was more than ironic. The anti-opium forces were asking the British government to make a drastic change in the running of the empire. For the Society for the Elimination of the Opium Trade, opium policy was a moral decision, and they were encouraging the state to make a moral choice. The Commissioners seem to have been quite correct in pointing out that the Society had no understanding of the economic and fiscal implications of this supposedly simple moral decision.

The anti-opium forces claimed to have science on their side, but testimony showed this was not true even in a purely medical sense. In a broader sense, they were asking for moralism to trump rational administration. Also, the Society did not really understand the political implications of prohibition. There was opposition to the trade in Britain and continuing the trade damaged the government, but this was no more of a problem in 1895 than it had been in 1874. More importantly, the Royal Commission was not presented with much evidence that the trade was unpopular with Asians. The success of the monopoly forces was made possible by the lack of support from the supposedly oppressed masses. On later occasions it proved to be impossible to maintain an opium monopoly in the face of articulate opposition from the colonized. In 1895, Indian elites had not yet come to see themselves as part of the international narrative of drug addiction and saw it as either irrelevant or insulting.

Although the Royal Commission killed opium suppression as an active political issue for the next fifteen years, the anti-opium crusaders continued their campaign, denouncing the commission as a whitewash and attempting to counter it with data of their own. Park's *Opinions of Over 100 Physicians on the Use of Opium in China*, which denounced the trade, was published in 1899 as a response to an 1893 survey of one hundred British physicians in India, which had concluded that it was largely harmless.²⁷ These two surveys each attempted

to recruit modern medical science, in the form of doctors, on either side of the debate on opium. The two sides also held additional conferences. An anti-opium conference was convened by various Chinese anti-opium groups in Ipoh in the Straits Settlements in 1907. After doctors and reformers testified, the conference called on the government to abolish the opium farms. The British were forced to convene an official Opium Commission for the Federated Malay States in 1908. The English community in Malaya disliked the Commission, regarding it as "a concession granted by the Colonial Office to the anti-opium movement and to party politics in Britain, at the expense of the Straits opium revenue." The papers also concluded that the Commission would be unwilling to defy the "great mass of carefully manufactured public opinion."²⁸ Both of these points were important. Opium provided about half of the revenue of the Settlement in the early twentieth century, and if it were eliminated new taxes would have to be imposed.²⁹ While white colonists condemned the opinions of the Chinese elite as manufactured, the opinions were there, and on this issue at least the colonial government would have to take notice of them. The Commission concluded that moderate opium use was not a threat to either the individual or society, but they nevertheless recommended abolition of the opium farm and establishment of a government monopoly. The Penang conference demonstrated the ability of the colonized to take over the discourse of public health from the state and force the state into actions it would have preferred not to take, in this case the calling of the Straits commission and abolition of the farms. The more the colonized spoke out against the opium trade the more difficult it became to maintain it.

PHILIPPINES AND THE MOVE TOWARDS ABOLITION

When the Americans took over the Philippines, they inherited an opium farm which had been established by the Spanish in 1843 with the goals of raising revenue and limiting smoking to the Chinese population. In 1903, the Philippine Commission appointed an Opium Investigation Committee, whose charge was to decide on an appropriate opium policy for the new colony. The force behind it was Bishop C. H. Brent, who would continue to crusade against opium for the next decade. For him, the Philippine Committee was about more than opium policy in the American colony, it would provide the intellectual underpinning for the end of the Asian opium trade.

The commissioners, Major E. C. Carter, Commissioner of Public Health for the Philippines, Dr. Jose Albert, a Filipino physician, and Bishop Brent, visited Japan, Taiwan, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Saigon, Singapore, Burma and Java, interviewing missionaries, doctors, insurance agents, opium merchants and government officials on the nature of the opium trade and how it could best be dealt with. Three basic options were considered: continuing the current system, establishing

a tight monopoly modeled on that of Formosa, or complete abolition of the trade. Prior to the appointment of the Committee the new government had proposed to continue the farming system, missionary related protests in the United States led to the cancellation of this plan and the appointment of the Committee.

The Philippine Committee was not particularly interested in the issues of control and revenue which concerned earlier empires. It was committed from the beginning to eliminating opium in the Philippines, and saw its inquiries as a model for all states. They outlined the various possibilities for opium control, including:

- Local Option: Leaving the opium question alone. The committee dismissed this option out of hand. It might be appropriate in remote areas in Burma or China, but no modern state, colonial or national, could countenance it. States had been largely indifferent to opium use among remote peoples of little value to the state, now all areas had to be modernized.
- High License: Reducing opium consumption by imposing high taxes and license fees and thus driving up the price. This was a common policy (in China it was called *yu jin yu zheng*) This had the drawback that it did not seem to reduce opium use, it encouraged smuggling, and it would lay the state open to “misapprehension and detraction” since such policies were usually aimed at revenue.
- Farming: The farmer would of course try to increase rather than decrease sales, and the system did little to discourage smuggling. The committee also pointed out that “it is hardly moral to delegate to an individual, not a representative of the people, such authority in the way of supervision, detecting and policing as the farmer usually exercises. To exercise such authority is a function of government only.”
- Prohibition: Immediate prohibition was assumed to be impossible because of the suffering it would cause among users. The committee could also have mentioned the economic and financial problems that would come with immediate suppression of such an important trade.
- Government monopoly: The committee concluded that this was the best option. Opium would be sold by state agents paid a salary rather than a commission, thus transforming them into proper Weberian bureaucrats. Revenue would be limited to the amount needed to pay for the system “in order to demonstrate that this method aims solely at control . . . and is not a revenue method.” In the case of the Philippines, monopoly would lead to complete prohibition within three years. Although the state would be selling opium this was acceptable because the trade would be ended within a defined period of time, and because revenue from opium sales would not go into the general budget.

The Committee presented these as different options for the future, but they were also a reading of the history of opium control in Asia and its possible future. The position of a state on this list was also their level of development. In practice the first three steps had been taken in the name of revenue, but the control they created could easily be used for suppression. For the Americans, prohibition became the favored policy by 1900.³⁰

THE INTERNATIONAL TREND TOWARDS PROHIBITION

After the report of the Philippine Commission the United States committed itself to suppression both in the Philippines and throughout Asia.³¹ Bishop Brent proposed to President Roosevelt that a conference of all the Asian powers be held to carry out an "investigation of existing conditions by all the states involved that would lead, as a matter of course, to the others copying U.S. policy."³² A conference was held in Shanghai in 1909, and although it did not turn out as the Americans had planned, it did begin the process of creating an international drug control system. These struggles would continue at the Hague conference of 1911–1912, the Geneva conferences of 1924–1925 and the Bangkok conference of 1931. For the Americans, the purpose of the system was to gradually move all of Asia away from state involvement in the opium trade. This was part of the American attempt to improve the world. The British government also supported this trend away from state involvement, most notably with the 1908 Anglo-Chinese opium treaty. The British also supported the establishment of the Geneva system, although they tended to favor a slower pace than the Americans. Opposition to suppression of the trade came from the European powers, particularly from their colonial governments. Metropolitan governments participated in these conferences and agreed to the gradual elimination of the trade, in part both because the new discourse of addiction was making the trade indefensible and because the control system set up by the conferences helped to regularize the flow of opium across Asia.

The colonial governments were more skeptical about the possibility and desirability of ending the drug trade. All received revenue from opium sales and, while opium revenue was generally declining in the twenties and thirties this revenue still mattered. It mattered in particular to colonial governments like that of Taiwan or the Straits Settlements, governments that London and Tokyo knew had considerable autonomy. The colonial governments were also familiar with the problem of controlling drug smuggling, a problem that would be made much worse by prohibition and especially by uncoordinated prohibition. These governments came to the international conferences because they were impelled by domestic opinion and because they wanted to create an orderly system of opium and drug production. In time, these systems would prob-

ably lead to the end of state opium monopolies, but in the short term they would make managing opium monopolies easier.

The contrast between American moralizers and practical monopolists is noted by most authors who study opium control. However, this tone mattered more than most scholars have assumed.³³ Moralism was the principle that legitimized state opium control systems. How were British opium sales in Malaya different from the activities of white slavers in London? The first was part of a state plan that would lead to the eventual end of the trade. It was the state's sincere commitment to the gradual elimination of opium sales that legitimized what states were doing in the present.³⁴ Sincerity is a hard thing to quantify, especially when referring to a bureaucratic organization, but loud public statements were part of it. An active public opinion and press were also part of it. Truly moral opium policy could come only from a modern state with modern citizens. While the moral righteousness of the state legitimized policy, this righteousness meant nothing without a state capable of imposing controls. Powerless warlord governments in Beijing could denounce the trade, but only governments like Britain or Japan were capable of pursuing a real policy of suppression. Control was necessary for the opium trade to be suppressed, and in Asia, control meant monopoly. As contradictory as the two sides were, they needed each other.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND OPIUM

The powers were impressed enough with the success of opium control that the provisions of the Hague treaty were put into the Treaty of Versailles and all signatories were required to abide by them. The international opium system was governed not only by a series of treaties, but also by a set of attitudes. The treaty system evolved because of flaws in the initial system of controls and because public attitudes were becoming more strict. The Hague Opium Convention of 1912 legitimated opium sales by placing them in a system that promised eventual elimination of the trade. Unfortunately, the Hague agreement lacked any enforcement or data collection mechanisms. In 1919, the League of Nations created an Opium Advisory Committee to provide a data collecting mechanism. Although some members of this committee favored a stronger opium control system, this did not become a reality until the 1924–1925 Geneva Conferences. Although the Americans did not participate in the League, they sent Rupert Blue to the OAC meeting in 1923. He pushed for the committee to define all nonmedical use as “not legitimate,” a position that would require the rapid end of all the Asian opium monopolies.³⁵ The Americans were pleased to take up the role of crusaders for virtue and to become the diplomatic voice of those who favored elimination of the opium trade. The actual Geneva meetings were contentious, with continual

debates between the Americans, who wanted to establish a schedule for the eventual elimination of opium sales, and the colonial powers, who wanted sales to continue indefinitely. Eventually, the two sides compromised by agreeing that opium sales would be ended ten years after illicit production (mainly in China) was eliminated. This had the advantage of delaying implementation to the distant future, but it also established the principle that the international treaty system was aimed at the elimination of the opium trade. The Geneva treaties also beefed up the League's abilities to collect data and regulate the existing opium trade. Exporting states (which mostly meant India) were to export opium only to consuming states that could demonstrate they had a distribution system that would prevent smuggling. Geneva attempted to gather data on the successes of the various opium systems. If China's opium policy was under the gaze of the international community, that gaze had now been regularized and institutionalized.

This would seem to have been a good opportunity for China to use the power of the growing international system to its advantage, and this is exactly what happened with the 1908 Anglo-Chinese treaty. As the Chinese state grew weaker after 1916, however, the international system became more and more of a problem for China. The root cause of these problems was that China was failing its responsibilities towards the international system. As the country slipped into warlordism, the central government was no longer able to prevent opium production, sales and smoking, or limit distribution of refined drugs. Indeed, many of these things were being actively encouraged by subordinate units of the Chinese government. China could not generate statistics on the state of the opium trade in the country, and it was increasingly questionable as to whether or not Chinese representatives in Geneva were representatives of a real state. Beijing did not have the power to force its will on the provinces and the anti-opium public opinion that seemed so evident earlier, had disappeared.

All of this was, of course, deeply embarrassing and threatening to China. The claim that China was not a real state with control over its own borders had been used to justify imperialism in the past, and would be used in the future by Japan. International meetings where China was effectively held up for ridicule were very troubling. Most importantly, China was no longer able to use the international system to protect its interests. China was not in a position to push the League of Nations to end opium sales to overseas Chinese, to limit extraterritoriality, or to mobilize international opinion against its enemies, notably Japan.

For some of the foreign powers, China's failure was an opportunity, for others, it was a threat. Pressure to eliminate colonial opium monopolies became easier to resist because the Chinese were demonstrating their backwardness and for the practical reason that, with the opium trade unchecked in China, suppression in the colonies would simply lead to more smuggling. Furthermore, the

possibility of opium leaking out of China might bring the drug problem to the imperialist nations and to hurt the profitability of colonial opium monopolies.

Almost immediately, the Opium Advisory Committee began to take steps to deal with China. In 1920, the Committee suggested sending League commissioners to China to inspect the opium situation there.³⁶ Inspections were a repeated issue in China's relationship with the League, for the League inspections were not just for China. A Commission of Inquiry was proposed for Persia, and one was duly appointed in 1925 and presented its report in 1927. The commissioners (who included Frederic A. Delano, uncle of Franklin Delano Roosevelt) visited Persia and accepted many of the Persian government's claims about the trade. The Commission agreed that very little Persian opium was used to produce narcotic drugs whose use by their own nationals so worried the imperialist nations. Most Persian opium was exported, legally or not, to Asia. The Commission also agreed that total elimination of opium production would create real hardships for Persia. The Persians agreed to a three-year trial period of opium reduction, but the Commission agreed that the continuation of this trial would be linked to Persia being given some of the trade in opium as a raw material for legitimate medical use and other concessions, most notably tariff autonomy. Persia's activities were also to be pegged to reductions by other producing nations.³⁷ This agreement did not work out exactly as planned, but unlike China Persia was still able to use the international drug control system to its advantage.³⁸ Persia had its opium trade under control and advanced evidence that its actions were not a serious threat to the great powers. And, although this was never mentioned, Persia was willing to humble itself before the League.

This model of inspections would be a popular one. As the Commissioners put it in their report:

The experiment which has been made in sending the Commission of Enquiry to Persia is of so great value that the League should not lose sight of the further development of the policy which has thus been inaugurated.³⁹

Eventually, this trend towards inspections would lead to the 1929 Commission of Enquiry Into the Control of Opium-Smoking in the Far East, a general inquiry into opium smoking and its control throughout Asia. This inquiry was welcomed, or at least accepted, by the colonizing states. It gave them a chance to publicly demonstrate the effectiveness of their opium control systems. When the Philippine Commission had come to Taiwan they had been presented with a complete description and statistical breakdown of the Japanese monopoly, intended to display Japanese mastery of the science of colonialism. Inspections also offered a chance to trade expertise. There was no great shame in admitting that

the government of Malaya found the behaviors of Chinese tin miners inscrutable and would welcome advice from other technocrats in dealing with them. The Commission of Inquiry was explicitly comparative, requiring all states to answer the same questions in the same format, thus forcing all opium systems into a similar pattern, making Asian society legible to both the colonial states and to the international community.⁴⁰ Inspections were also a way for states to prove the sincerity of their motives to the home country and world opinion.

CHINA AGAINST THE LEAGUE

Of course China did not welcome the idea of inspections, did not like the model of the Persian inspections, and did not accept the 1929 Commission of Enquiry, which ended up not visiting China at all. There were several reasons for this. Inspections were, to an extent, insulting to Chinese sovereignty, as they were intended in part to provide statistics and knowledge that a state should be able to provide but that China could not. Japan was suspicious of the international system for the same reasons of national prestige.⁴¹ For China, inspections would be a disaster, since they would provide concrete proof that China was not restraining the growth of the opium trade, undercutting China's international standing.

The foreigners were of course correct in saying that foreign inspectors would have had a good effect. While negotiating to kill the idea of inspections in 1920, the Chinese foreign office was also frantically calling on the provincial military governors and the Ministry of the Interior to send out inspectors to quickly get the problem under control.⁴² The possibility of outside inspections was intended to increase activity at lower levels of the bureaucracy. Unfortunately, China was too disorganized at this point for this mechanism to function. Inspectors were sent out from Peking in 1922 and 1923, but they were sent in the wrong season and were not accompanied by foreign observers. The British ambassador pointed out that many of these reports were "obviously insincere and worthless," as they contradicted reports he had received from British consuls in the provinces and the Chinese delegation was forced to admit as much at the meeting of the Opium Advisory committee.⁴³ Later Chinese inspections were carried out at the wrong season (poppies are easiest to spot when blooming) and in any case were not accompanied by foreign observers.⁴⁴

Perhaps even more worrisome were the foreign proposals for fixing this problem. The Japanese representative suggested the establishment of a national opium monopoly, pointing out that this was a method used in Hong Kong, Taiwan and the South Seas and that in addition to being easier than an outright ban it would generate revenue. The interior ministry was interested in the idea, but the suggestion was dropped once the Americans and their British made it clear they would not support a new monopoly.⁴⁵ Monopoly plans would be

floated in China in the future, but they were not often successfully carried out, since they would require a public admission of the inferiority of the Chinese race. Taiwan and Hong Kong sold opium to ethnic Chinese because they were seen as subordinate in the racial hierarchy of the colony. By 1920, it would be very difficult for any Chinese government to publicly adopt a policy of open opium sales.⁴⁶ Unfortunately, the Japanese suggestion made perfect sense from an international perspective. An effective opium monopoly in China would reduce the chances of opium being smuggled into the imperial nations, reduce smuggling into the colonies, and presumably make it possible for China to participate in the growing international technocratic system of opium control. There was a place for China in the international system, but given the weaknesses of the Chinese state and its people, China could not take it. There was another position available as a semicolonial state, but China did not want it.

China's response to this foreign criticism was angry denunciations of the foreigners and their motives. This of course only made the foreigners angry. Anger and ill will were important parts of the opium negotiations. Accusations by Chinese delegations had a tendency to be insulting as what China was accusing the foreign powers of was conducting a *duhua zhengci* (policy of poisoning), that is, selling opium to ethnic Chinese either for revenue or even worse as a deliberate attempt to weaken the Chinese race. On the foreign side, ugly accusations were also unavoidable. The foreign position was that China was not a real state and that opium sales to ethnic Chinese were acceptable since the Chinese race had proven itself to be inferior. This contempt for China and the Chinese was only heightened by the antics of the Chinese delegations to Geneva. In an article discussing China's possible resignation from the League, American journalist Hallett Abend suggested that China's chief motivation was to avoid paying its dues but that in any case China would be little loss:

Whatever Chinese delegate there has been at Geneva, whether he represented a government the authority of which did not extend beyond the walls of old Peking or whether he represented a government pretending to rule the whole country, China has seemed to regard the League as an organization to be used for bluff and intrigue.

These delegates in succession have not only refused to give facts concerning the growing amount of opium cultivation and opium smoking in China, but by distortion of facts have sought to place upon Great Britain and Japan the blame for the great quantities of narcotics now consumed in China.

The League has sought to keep China as a satisfied member because the Chinese delegate, after all, was the sole representative of an enormous and thickly populated part of Asia, but it has been farcical to pretend that under present conditions China could participate

seriously on questions like opium, disarmament, labor legislation or child welfare.⁴⁷

Although the substantive issues between the various nations explain much of what happened at Geneva, this tone of moral indignation also had an impact. In order to be able to use the international system to their advantage, the Chinese had to demonstrate their sincerity. Inspections served to demonstrate sincerity for the colonial state, but did the opposite for China.

INTERNATIONAL TREATY SYSTEM

By 1931, the international community had concluded that the opium trade should be gradually eliminated, and had established a system of treaties and institutions intended to manage the trade on the international level, encourage progress among civilized states, and force the views of the international community on the uncivilized. The international system did not brand nations uncivilized because they sold opium to their citizens or subjects. Quite the contrary, the British government was the most influential force in the treaty system and they favored very slow progress towards elimination of the trade.⁴⁸ What did matter was the ability of the state to account for and control the trade, and to make at least a plausible commitment to its eventual elimination.

THE LATE QING ANTI-OPIMUM CAMPAIGNS

The late Qing and early Republican anti-opium campaigns demonstrate the ways in which the Chinese case paralleled international developments, and also how the international system was both a threat and an opportunity for China. As in other states, opium suppression grew out of opium control. China began to rationalize opium tax collection in the late nineteenth century. In 1890 the state made a first, unsuccessful, attempt at a central opium tax.⁴⁹ In 1904, Zhang Zhidong led four provinces to centralize their opium taxes, with opium being taxed only once and then allowed to circulate freely. By 1906 this system was extended to the entire country.⁵⁰ This was expected to bring in up to sixty million taels a year, and estimated actual revenue came to fifty-two million, with thirty-one million being returned to the provinces. Had the good involved not been opium this would have been a fairly normal part of New Policies state building.⁵¹ The good was opium, however, and even the initial tax plan was presented as a plan for the elimination of opium. This deceived few, however. The *Shenbao* carried an article denouncing state involvement in the trade. A week later, however, the newspaper praised the system as being one that would

kill two birds with one stone, raising revenue while discouraging opium use. The opium tax system was explicitly contrasted to the salt tax, which was, admittedly, a good source of revenue, but also oppressed the common people by making a necessity more expensive. Opium, as a luxury good (*rao wu*) was an appropriate thing to tax.⁵² The protax writer was expressing an old-fashioned “suppression through taxation” viewpoint; that opium was probably best eliminated, but that this was most efficiently done through higher taxes. State connection to the opium trade was perhaps undesirable, but it could be tolerated. The antitax writer at first sounds more modern, lamenting how opium has drained the national essence (*yuan qi ri shuai*) and made China stand out among the nations of the world. Even this writer, however, focuses on the officials and students as the only important classes, just like the protax writer, who was concerned with the plight of the commoners but did not see them as active participants in politics. The initial impulse for the Late Qing anti-opium campaigns owed much to these old views, but in the course of the campaign, which lasted until at least 1917, the goals, methods, and even the ideological basis of the state, its policies, and its people, changed completely. What began as a rerun of Lin Zexu’s anti-opium campaigns became a modern movement. The two greatest changes were the international nature of the new campaign and its eventual reliance on new forms of citizen activism.

CHINA’S BENEFITS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The late Qing/early Republican anticampaign was built around the 1908 opium treaty with Great Britain. Although the domestic campaign was initiated by a 1906 edict, the initial impulse had come from Tang Shaoyi’s 1905 visit to India. Tang informed the court that the British might be willing to reduce and eliminate imports of Indian opium to China, as long as China was able to reduce domestic production and consumption at the same time.⁵³ Negotiations ensued and an agreement was signed by China and Britain in January 1908. The India-China opium trade was to be gradually wound down in conjunction with the gradual elimination of opium production and consumption in China. During the ten years that the agreement was to run, Indian opium imports were to be gradually reduced, but legally imported Indian opium was to continue to circulate in China. In theory, gradual reductions in the opium sales in India would keep pace with the gradual closing of Chinese provinces as they were inspected by British inspectors and certified to be opium-free.

Although it was a bilateral agreement, the treaty was based on some of the same concepts as the later international treaties. The government of India had been opposed to ending the trade, but it was getting harder to justify the trade without linking it to a system designed to eliminate it, which this treaty did. Most

importantly, the Chinese had agreed to end domestic production at the same rate India eliminated exports. The British were willing to give up the trade if it were being eliminated, but not if they were just handing the profits over to the Chinese. The argument, that by ending the trade a state would simply be handing its profits over to others, was a common defense of opium monopolies. As long as any other state was not suppressing opium, it could be smuggled easily enough, and profits would simply flow to the offending states and the smugglers. The chief offenders here were Persia and China. Japan eventually came to produce enough opium to supply its own colonies. India provided opium for all of the Southeast Asian colonies, and the British were willing to reduce this production, but only in the context of a controlled limitation of the opium trade. As long as Persia, and above all China, continued unchecked production and unregulated sales, there was no point in limiting Indian production, a point that was stressed by the British at the Geneva conferences in 1924–1925. Likewise for China, domestic suppression was pointless if not tied to the end of Indian imports.

Another mandate of the 1908 treaty were inspections. The agreement was officially temporary until three years after it was first signed, and became permanent only after inspections proved that China was keeping its side of the bargain. Individual Chinese provinces were to be closed to Indian opium only if British inspectors certified them to be opium-free. These inspections obviously had to be carried out by a reliable witness, which in this case was Sir Alexander Hosie. Sir Alexander spent most of the years from 1907 to 1917 touring the various provinces looking for, and not finding, signs of opium production.⁵⁴

On the face of it, Hosie's inspections were absurd. His method was to consult with local missionaries about the situation in various areas and then to tour the main roads of a province while poppies should be blooming, looking for the telltale red blossoms. A single man could not inspect an entire province in the matter of a month or so, and this point was made repeatedly by the foreign opium merchants of Shanghai. Hosie was also proceeded and accompanied by Chinese troops and officials, who would sometimes hastily uproot poppies before his arrival. Inspections provided evidence of the state's sincerity, data to inform future efforts, and encouraged action at lower levels of government.

Chinese willingness to accept these inspections is somewhat surprising given how strongly China would oppose similar inspections later. To some extent, the inspections were an insult to Chinese sovereignty, but this was counterbalanced somewhat by China's right to inspect Indian opium exports. China had wanted the right to send teams to inspect the poppy districts of India, but in the end settled for a single official at Calcutta. More importantly, China, as much as Britain, was interested in reliable information about levels of opium production and consumption in China, and like the British, they thought inspections would encourage activity at lower levels.⁵⁵ Inspections also served to demonstrate the sincerity of China's commitment to opium suppression.

Indeed, Hoisie's reports were intended more to demonstrate Chinese sincerity than achievement, stressing as they did the enthusiasm of Chinese officials and people for drug suppression.

ELITES AND MASSES

Elite activism was important to many of the New Policies reforms. It was the reform period, not the 1911 Revolution, that created the political and intellectual foundations of the Chinese Republic with its modern schools, newspapers, and provincial assemblies. Most of these initiatives were only partially controlled and funded by the central government. Provincial and local governments, as well as private citizens, were expected to take the initiative, and they did. In education, provincial governments sent students overseas, local elites built schools and individual members of the elite sent their children to learn the new knowledge. Opium was similar in that there was a national call for opium suppression, provincial governments took actions without direction from Beijing, and local elites founded anti-opium societies that were not funded or controlled by the state. Opium was different in that it required a change in the behavior of the common people. Most of the New Policies simply meant higher taxes for commoners, and thus were resisted. Opium required activating the masses.

Mass enthusiasm for opium suppression was vital both for legitimating state actions and for creating free state capacity, that is, encouraging the people to carry out state policy without being paid for it. The Anglo-Chinese opium agreements were based on the good faith of China in carrying out opium suppression.⁵⁶ In this case, "China" meant the central government and its acts, but it also meant the Chinese people. Sir John Jordan, the British Ambassador to China, repeatedly stressed that popular support for opium suppression made it impossible to abrogate the agreement.

The provincial authorities in their campaign against opium have the support of the whole both of the Chinese people, so far as its opinion is articulate, and of a considerable majority of the foreign residents. Rightly or wrongly it is considered that the anti-opium movement is sincere.⁵⁷

Jordan consistently held that it was impossible for British policy to flout Chinese public opinion on this issue. It was a recurring theme among foreign commentators that China did not have a government in any sense that foreigners would understand the word: a body capable of enforcing its will on the people and representing them on the world stage. Here China demonstrated that it not only had a government, she had a citizenry who could not be thwarted by either Chinese or foreign governments.

ACTIVISM IN FUJIAN

Joyce Manadcy's study of the anti-opium campaigns in Fujian reveals the continuities and changes in mass enthusiasm for opium suppression.⁵⁸ The structure of the campaign was set up by the state. Songshou, the Governor-General of Fujian and Zhejiang appointed a supervisory office (*jinyan diaocha ju*) in 1909. Opium suppression became one of the duties of the modern police force, but the supervisory office was run by the existing Commissioner of Education, salt intendant, grain intendant, and the departments of the Provincial Judge and Civil Administration.⁵⁹ This was more typical of an old-style campaign, with authority being added on to existing officials rather than being given to an entirely new bureaucracy. Attempts to mobilize the people were also a mixture of old and new methods. An elite-led Anti-Opium Society (*Qu du she*) was established and took on considerable state power. In addition to publishing propaganda and holding meetings, the Society also conducted investigations and raids. Mandancy points out that the membership of the Society included members of the traditional exam elite, graduates of modern schools and Chinese Christians, and was thus part of the transition of elite status that was happening throughout China in the last years of the Qing. The functioning of the Society was more traditional, however. The Society strictly regulated the behavior of its members in service of its "mission to mould upright, committed reformers and to build public confidence and respect."⁶⁰ This view of the elite as moral exemplars clearly distinct from society and the lack of a clear distinction between state and elite would have been quite understandable to Guo Songdao a generation before. The anti-opium campaigns, did, however, come to embody a very different role for the common people and the elite.

As Joan Judge shows, this was a time of radical change in elite conceptions of the role of the people. Ordinary Chinese had been the *tianmin* (Heaven's people), presumed to be ignorant, apathetic, and unconcerned with the fate of the empire. In fact, even these terms of abuse were inappropriate, as there was no sin in a peasant being apathetic or indifferent. Politics and the survival of the dynasty were the duty of their betters.⁶¹ The care of peasants was heaven's charge to the elite, just as the care of God's poor had been in Christian Europe. In the early twentieth century this began to change, and the common people were to become *guomin* (citizens), informed, intelligent and active in the affairs of the nation. As one editorialist put it:

The process of forming a nation must begin with improving the quality of the people. Boiled sand cannot become rice, assorted shrubs cannot become a forest, and cowardly masses cannot become heroes.⁶²

Abjuration of opium was part of this. Mass enthusiasm also greatly increased the reach of the state and its capacity. Opium suppression required both control of poppy growing and control of opium smoking, both things that went far beyond the ordinary reach of the state. Spontaneous popular action was encouraged and added to the reach of the emerging professional police force. Anti-opium societies closed down opium dens, punish opium smokers, and in some cases uproot poppies.⁶³ Mass enthusiasm also created the public disapproval of opium smoking essential to end the habit. This enthusiasm was expressed by gentry anti-opium groups like Guo Songdao's in the 1870s, the elite-led semistate organization of the *Qu du shi* in the New Policies period and student demonstrations in Japanese-occupied Nanjing, but in all cases an active citizenry was an important part of any anti-opium movement.

Both the Qing state and private actors realized the importance of mass enthusiasm, and worked to encourage it. Li Hsiao-t'i has studied a range of ways of reaching the people for the purposes of "lower class enlightenment," and includes opium suppression as one of the goals of the movement. Many of these methods of reforming the people were very old. Rhymed couplets denouncing the trade, official exhortations and Buddhist denunciations were all traditional.⁶⁴ Newer elements included theatrical performances, publications of various sorts, and public speeches. Eventually, movies and radio broadcasts would be added. Reformist content would also be added to textbooks and students were encouraged to participate in anti-opium essay and speaking contests. To a certain extent this need to speak to the people was met by the state, but public organizations also took a hand. Li discusses the creation of public speaking associations like the Suzhou *Xuexi yanshuo hui* which were to allow young members of the elite to learn how to communicate with and transform the people.⁶⁵ Anti-opium associations of one sort or another were common throughout the republican period, and although the associations were usually not terribly successful at eliminating the scourge of opium, almost all of them could manage to publish a journal or a report and give a few speeches. They always linked opium addiction to the destruction of China and denounced as treason any possible connection between the state and opium, a view that was radical in 1906, reformist in 1912 and clichéd enough to be the subject of parody by the 1930s, and this transformation was in part due to their influence. Although the anti-opium campaigns would eventually peter out, opium suppression became the background noise of Chinese politics. Denunciations of the trade became a standard part of nationalist rhetoric. Shen Dingyi mentioned peasant's abjuration of opium as one of the signs of their superiority to landlords. Huang Shaoxiong mentioned his quitting opium as a sign of his joining the revolution.⁶⁶ As Edward Slack points out, Chinese Christians used the opium issue to prove their Chineseness in the anti-Christian atmosphere of the 1920s.⁶⁷

By 1916, talking about opium suppression was one of the things that marked a person or a government as part of modern China. Even the warlords most involved in the trade denounced it and it is hard to imagine them making some of the open statements about opium that were made by Li Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong. The great mass of anti-opium publications, plays, songs, and speeches put out by reformists in the Late Qing and after were not just changing the people to make them more amenable to government policy. They were also creating an extension of the state that would act for it and, if need be, against it. In practice, this mass enthusiasm was vital to successful anti-opium campaigns. No Chinese state had the totalitarian power to force the level of economic and social change that banning opium would have required without popular support. None of the elite dispensers of public opinion were powerful enough to keep Chinese states to a policy of opium suppression without a general public distaste for the trade.

This public enthusiasm did not amount to mass mobilization, in the sense of a controlled and focused application of popular power to political goals. Even in the New Policies period, the state was not able to entirely control the elite organization. In the original edict calling for the establishment of anti-opium societies the Empress Dowager had specifically ordered that they not engage in political discussions.⁶⁸ This did not turn out to be the case, and this marriage of traditional gentry activism to modern mass enthusiasm proved to be hard for the state to control.

THE *FLORA* AND CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OPIUM

The enthusiasm of the Chinese people for opium suppression took both London and Beijing by surprise and the process of closing the provinces went quicker than anyone had expected. By 1914 only three important provinces, Jiangxi, Jiangsu and Guangdong were still open to foreign opium. Certificated Indian opium promptly became quite valuable, as many assumed that it would continue to be legal ever after the final ban on opium. Prices for this opium soared as wealthy smokers looked to buy up a lifetime supply of opium and speculators looked to make a killing. A chest that went for five hundred taels outside of China could go as high as fifty thousand in some remote areas, although ten thousand was a more common price.⁶⁹ At these inflated prices the opium moved slower than it might have. Finally, local Chinese governments were unwilling, especially after 1911, to allow this opium to circulate under any circumstances. For all these reasons Indian opium began collecting in the warehouses of Shanghai and Hong Kong, creating a considerable headache for the

British government and the opium merchants. Just as Britain was on the verge of extracting itself from an increasingly embarrassing trade, the issue of the stocks was forcing them to get involved again.

Almost immediately after the 1908 agreement was signed, local Chinese governments began refusing to allow foreign opium to circulate. The opium merchants demanded action and it was forthcoming for several reasons. First was the fact that the opium merchants had borrowed enough money to buy the opium that their default would cause a collapse of the British banking system in East Asia, or at least that was the claim that was made by a group of banks in their 1912 petition to the government. Second the right to sell opium was a treaty right, and defending these was the key goal of British policy, especially in the immediate aftermath of the 1911 Revolution. The British ambassador made repeated representations to the Chinese, demanding that opium be allowed to circulate, and in 1912 sent the gunboat *Flora* to Anqing to try and force the local government to release a seized shipment of opium.⁷⁰ After the revolution it was made clear to the new government that British recognition would hinge on Beijing's willingness to uphold the treaties. The interests of the opium merchants were defended by the state, because state interests and private interests were compatible.

The state had interests other than those of the opium merchants, however, and London's interests increasingly diverged from those of the Opium Combine. The 1908 agreement had been negotiated in the first place because the opium merchants had powerful allies in the Imperial government, most notably the government of India. The acceptability of the trade was defended by the government of India on the grounds that the dangers of opium were overestimated and in any case opium exports were a major part of the Indian revenue. The 1908 agreement was a compromise between the desire for an end to the trade and the need for revenue. The Opium Combine used Chinese recalcitrance to argue for renunciation of the treaty and a resumption of the old, open opium trade. But they got little support from New Delhi. London desired, and was formally committed to, an eventual end to the India-China opium trade, especially after signing the Hague Anti-Opium Treaty. The government of India was no longer willing to expend bureaucratic capital to defend the China trade, and the opium merchants found themselves representing only their own self-interest rather than the good of India and the Empire. On top of this, while the merchants of the Opium Combine were British subjects they were mostly Jews and Armenians and equating their financial well-being with that of the Empire was more difficult than it would have been if they were from Leeds.⁷¹

Although the British state had favored elimination of the stocks initially, its interests and those of the merchants had gradually grown apart. As the

number of chests dwindled (and the banks presumably made allowances for bad debts), the threat to the British financial system declined. The Indian government lost interest after sales in Bombay ended. Merchants increasingly represented their own interests rather than significant factions in the British government or significant parts of the British economic system.

Perhaps most importantly, in 1913 Britain signed the Hague anti-opium treaty, committing itself to the eventual elimination of the worldwide opium trade. The Hague treaties tied Great Britain to a new vision of cooperative internationalism, the opium stocks and the merchants and their money tied the crown to its old role in Asia. The treaty made it impossible for opium merchants to align their good with the good of the empire, but it made it possible for other groups to align their interests with the universal civilizing mission.

Sir John Jordan, the British Ambassador to China had long been a staunch opponent of the opium trade, and in his personal views aligned himself with the anti-opium forces. After the signing of the 1908 agreement, he was in charge of certifying Chinese provinces as closed to opium, and he was quite prompt in doing so, often on very little evidence. The opium merchants repeatedly complained that he allowed his personal desire for opium suppression to interfere with the proper functioning of the treaty and the economic good of the Empire. In fact, this was exactly what he was doing. The new treaties gave him a way of tying his personal desires to the power of the empire, and he, and the anti-opium movement more generally, did exactly that. The first calls for opium suppression had been dismissed as an inappropriate valorization of individual moral values over the public good. With the signing of the 1908 treaties the two came into alignment and Jordan took full advantage of this.

Jordan's position is illustrated by two acts. He was a representative of the British government, and as such had to both protect the interests of the Crown and be seen as doing so, regardless of his personal desires. His sending the *Flora* upriver was a demonstration to the Chinese and to London that he would act to protect treaty rights, although he probably knew that this bit of theater would have little effect. He also turned a blind eye to opium smuggling out of Shanghai. Even when legally introducing opium into China was difficult, or impossible, the stocks still declined. At the end of 1912, total stocks stood at about twenty thousand chests, but were being worked off at the rate of two thousand chests a month, dwindling to some eight thousand chests by March 1914.⁷² Officially the opium was being sold in the International Settlement; in fact Jordan was perfectly well aware that it was being smuggled into China, and he was quite willing to allow this to continue. From the point of view of the British government this was a fine solution to the problem: just stall long enough and it would go away. It must have irked Jordan to allow opium to slip into China, but it was a boon to the British state, and to him, in his role as the representative of the state.

Jordan also attacked the opium merchants and the government of India as self-interested. Given that opium was moving out of Shanghai at a steady rate, the Opium Combine represented the last few merchants who had been unwilling to sell out at a price that would let them recoup their losses and were instead holding out for a state-sponsored bonanza.⁷³ Jordan emphasized this point by encouraging the Indian government to offer to buy back the stocks at a price of three thousand rupees a chest, enough to let the Combine recoup their initial investment but without much profit. Their unwillingness to accept this was, for him, proof that they were self-interested and unworthy of government support.⁷⁴ New Delhi was not entirely in the clear either. Jordan had suggested ending opium sales in India as early as 1912.

In June of 1917, while Jordan was in London, the charge d' affaires offered to intervene in the negotiations for Chinese purchase of the stocks in hopes of settling the matter and making it possible for Feng Guozhang to assume the Presidency.⁷⁵ On Jordan's return in October he vetoed this proposal, and informed the Combine and the Chinese government of this verbally. In a statement to the Americans, the British claimed:

His Majesty's Government have neither participated in nor given their countenance to the negotiations between the Opium Combine and the Chinese Government for the requisition by the latter of the stocks of Indian opium remaining in bond in Shanghai after the expiration of the 1911 opium agreement. On the contrary, His Majesty's government highly disapprove of the whole transaction and hope that the Chinese government may yet be persuaded to abandon it.⁷⁶

This statement was true. The British government had intervened repeatedly in the matter before the expiry of the agreement, but they hadn't formally negotiated or approved of negotiations to deal with the stocks after that date. It was also false, in that it elided the considerable role the British had in the whole arrangement, and ignored the late date at which the government had been able to separate themselves from the self-interest of the Opium Combine and began acting in a way harmonious with enlightened national international self-interest. Jordan dismissed the whole matter as "a transaction which originated in fraud and ended in smoke."⁷⁷ In fact, the matter was much more than one of simple fraud and bribery. At one point, the interests of the opium merchants and the British government had been nearly identical and state power had been used to advance private interests. Jordan had managed to break this connection through his own efforts in convincing London that the Opium Combine were not worthy of support. He was helped in this by a changing international context (The Hague treaties), financial context (the declining importance of the Shanghai stocks to the British banks and Indian revenues), and moral context (the identification of

opium with a particular group of people, and that group's refusal to accept a fair but not profitable price). Jordan claimed that as a purely Weberian and disinterested bureaucracy, the British state would not get involved in sordid matters like this, but in fact this case was a new pattern for British relations with private interests and, above all, with opium. The British still sold opium, but only in the context of a system aimed at suppression. As Britain was cutting its links to the opium economy of the past, China was slipping backwards.

THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN

Although the Late Qing and early Republican anti-opium campaigns were successful in the short run, in the longer run success against opium was predicated on success of the partnership between the state and the local elite. As the Chinese state disintegrated after 1916, opium suppression was one of the first casualties, not only because the state was no longer enforcing suppression, but also because warlord regimes were actively encouraging poppy growing. Although imports from India stopped, domestic production expanded rapidly. By 1919, opium was ten times cheaper in Fujian than it had been only two years before.⁷⁸ In terms of altering the opium trade the state campaign had little long-term impact. It did, however, have a drastic effect on the politics of opium in China. At least for the articulate public, state involvement in the opium trade was no longer acceptable. This was made clear by the protests that met Feng Guozhang's attempts to use the (Opium Combine) opium he had purchased to set up a national opium monopoly. British and American diplomats criticized the deal at the same time as the Chinese public. Jordan said:

How far public opinion in a matter of this kind is likely to affect the Government is a question that is difficult to determine . . . On the other hand, not even an outgoing Chinese Cabinet can afford to ignore two such formidable documents as the British and American notes of protest.⁷⁹

In other words, he had less faith in a modern relationship between the Chinese state and the Chinese people than he did in a modern relationship between the Chinese state and its treaty obligations. He turned out to be wrong.

In the streets and in the newspapers, the proposed monopoly was widely criticized. My chief sources here are various newspaper clippings and Zhu Bowei's *Wang guo yu yan an*, a brief pamphlet that attacked Feng and the others involved in the case. In a June 15 piece, the *Shenbao* not only linked the money directly to attempts to buy the presidency, it also printed various rumors linking the deal to Feng's Japanese backers. *Shenbao* also attacked the deal as innately

corrupting to the Chinese people. As the bonds used to purchase the opium were public bonds (*gong zhai piao*) the purchasers of the opium, and thus the criminals, were the Chinese people themselves.⁸⁰ Money thus tied the individual citizen to this crime.

This theme of pollution of the nation through opium and money was one of the many critiques in Zhu Bowei's *Wang guo yu yan an*.⁸¹ Zhu's pamphlet was published by the Sichuan Native-Place Association in Shanghai (*Sichuan lu hu tongxianghui*). Although he denies any factional intent, Zhu is clearly allied with Feng's opponents.

The most traditional was the attack on Feng's character. Just as a gentleman could not afford even an instant of impure thought, so too a vice-president. Feng's single (proven) failure was enough to permanently bar him from receiving a government salary.⁸² He was not a *junzi*, and his lack of character degraded the people. Just as a single illness could destroy the liver, lungs, heart, and gallbladder, so too the nation could not exist for long while matters like this festered. It is worth noting that, in this case, receiving money in proper context was a sign of virtue. To draw a government salary is a sign of virtue, as Feng was not virtuous he should not draw one.

Zhu also includes two, rather different elements. While in traditional Confucian thought, it is the gentleman who influences the common people, he suggests the possibility that it is the people who are at fault. If Feng is a representative of the people then his misbehavior is caused by the people's failings. Zhu laments the inability of the Chinese people to behave like proper citizens, comparing them unfavorably to the Japanese, who in the case of a recent naval scandal had forced the government to act. Here Zhu sounds more like a May Fourth, lamenting the corrupt nature of the Chinese people and their inappropriateness for modern government.

Zhu, like Sir John Jordan, took an internationalist view of the affair. This scandal will make it impossible for China to prove its virtue to the world, and thus make it impossible for China to arouse the world's sympathy (*shijie liangxin*).⁸³ This was a major issue, because given China's lack of power, it would need this sympathy. Zhu mentions the example of the Netherlands, which was maintaining its neutrality in the Great War due to the general feeling that to attack it would be immoral. International morality was a weak reed compared to national power, but it was available and China should take advantage of it. Although the form is quite different, correct individual behavior was still being tied to universal order, just as the Hague treaties did on the British side.

This line of criticism was more effective than the attempts to come up with a chargeable offense. Feng and his associates were denounced repeatedly from many quarters, and while he briefly held the presidency he was unable to hold it for long. Feng took up his duties as acting president on August 1, 1917. Although this office should have been a major benefit to Feng in his struggles

with Duan Qirui and the Anfu Clique, on October 10, 1918, Feng handed power over to Duan's protégé Xu Shucheng. The Opium Combine case was only one part of a very complex struggle between the two men and the two factions, a struggle with also included debates on the roles of the president and the cabinet, proper responses to the Canton separatists and China's entry into the Great War. All of these were policy debates, however, and none necessarily brought Feng's moral fitness for office into question the way the Opium Combine case did.

BURNING THE OPIUM

Although there was much public opposition to the purchase of the opium, the deal did in fact take place, and the Chinese government took delivery of the opium. This presented the new question of what to do with all this opium. Clearly it could not be used to set up an opium monopoly, but it was suggested that some five million dollars could be realized by selling it. The new Duan Qirui government decided instead to destroy it, which was finally done in 1919, at Pudong. In some respects this was an irrational decision. Buying the opium may have been a moral failing, but that crime had been associated with Feng Guochang. Selling the opium for use in producing medicine or donating it to the allied war effort would have earned some money or at least some diplomatic credit, but they also would have linked China to a crime that had been previously tied only to Feng personally. Burning the opium and thus publicly renouncing the profit would clearly show that the Chinese state and people were not corrupt. Feng had been personally connected to Duan Qirui, but this did not associate Duan or his government with Feng's moral failings. Money would, and so the money had to be thrown away.⁸⁴ Demonstrating one's sincerity with regard to opium had become one of the requirements for success in Chinese politics.

By the 1920s China's status in the international system was that of a semi-colonial and semifeudal state.⁸⁵ China fit into the category of semicolonial in that China's opium trade was colonial. In Europe and American nonmedicinal use of opiates had been banned. It was in colonial or partially colonial states like British India, Persia, and the Dutch East Indies where opium sales were a mainstay of colonial finance. Although states sold opium in the colonies they did not sell it to the colonizers. China not only sold opium to its own people, ethnic Chinese purchased much of the opium sold in the colonies.

On the other hand, China was not entirely colonial. The growing international consensus on drug control had yielded real benefits to the Chinese state, including the 1908 Anglo-Chinese opium treaty, which had eventually ended the Indo-Chinese opium trade and the Hague agreements which had at least

promised to end the sale of opium to ethnic Chinese in the colonial states. China could not only use the international system to its advantage, China was essential to the system. Drug control was inherently international because it was assumed that only if all states controlled illegal drugs could these easily smuggled substances be controlled.

China was a feudal (or at least not modern) state in that it had only a very limited ability to control the opium trade in the way that the treaties required a state to do. Even very modern states could not entirely control the drug trade, but China's state apparatus was too weak to provide even the most basic aspects of state control. The Chinese state could not compile even rudimentary statistics, there was nothing that could be called a national public health infrastructure and the national government could not prevent lower-level governments from engaging in the opium trade. China did, however, have at least one of the attributes of a modern state which was that there Chinese public opinion was actively against the opium trade. Although opium monopolies continued to exist in most of colonial Asia until after the war, this became increasingly difficult to do in the face of anti-opium attitudes among the colonized, if these attitudes existed.

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Chapter 4

Warlords and Opium

China's problems with the international system were created by the fact that it was moving backwards in history. All the states of Asia were imposing tighter controls on the opium trade while the Chinese central government was losing control. As elsewhere Chinese government organs were inserting themselves into opium planting and distribution, controlling boiling and opium dens and even moving into refined drugs such as morphine and heroin. Most of these changes were being controlled by local and regional governments, however, and their goal was not suppression but revenue. This was the warlord period, and opium was at the center of the brutal and exploitative states of the era.¹ Warlords forced peasants to grow opium, seized opium from peasants as the easiest way to extract wealth and issued it to their own troops to keep them under control. All of these were fairly simple ways of profiting from opium, but the more successful regional militarists came up with much more sophisticated ways of controlling and profiting from the trade. After the Nationalists unified China in 1927–1928, they found themselves faced not only with the brutal and somewhat random violence represented by warlord-bandits extorting opium from the peasants but also fairly sophisticated regional opium economies that local power holders relied on for their financial support. During the warlord decade of 1916–1926, China was seen as hitting bottom in terms of control of opium and everything else. In terms of the practical control of the opium trade, however, various warlord states made considerable progress during this period.

WARLORDS

Edward McCord describes warlordism as “a situation where a number of individual military commanders exercise autonomous political power by virtue of the actual or threatened use of military force under their personal control.”² In the most concrete sense, a warlord was someone who controlled an army. In a broader sense, warlordism was a highly decentralized political system where military power was only one aspect of decentralization. Warlord factions were held together by personal ties between individual military commanders, but armies were tied together by the ability of the warlords to provide pay and supplies. Opium was vital to this decentralized system. Many of the military struggles between warlords were struggles over the opium trade, which is not surprising, given the importance of opium in financing warlord armies.³ Just as warlords did not obey orders from the central government, they received no money from it; most supported their forces by exploiting a territory. Warlord armies could exist for a time without a territory to exploit, but if this condition lasted too long the army would disintegrate, with subcommanders either finding a new patron or finding a territory of their own to exploit and thus becoming warlords themselves. Opium was one of the easiest ways for warlords to exploit a territory. Opium was the most valuable and fungible substance that could be collected from peasants, and it was easily exchanged for guns, the other warlord currency. It was an acceptable way to pay troops and a source of financial independence. As Joseph Stillwell put it “No local government can exist without a share of the opium revenues. If the central government can control the opium supply of a province, that province can never hope to revolt successfully.”⁴

Warlordism and opium were also connected ideologically. May Fourth intellectuals identified warlordism as one of the three great problems facing China, along with feudalism and imperialism and by warlordism they meant more than just the problems of militarization and civil war, but the general lack of a competent and active state.⁵ Opium provided the money that financed decentralization, and the presence of opium further weakened China. The Anti-Opium Association denounced opium as the life’s blood of warlordism.⁶ One frequently mentioned warlord outrage was their fondness for collecting the “laziness tax,” a tax on those peasants who did not grow opium and thus were not subject to the opium tax.⁷ This was a particularly outrageous tax because peasants were being punished for being good Chinese. Although this tax was denounced as the ultimate in political primitivism, in fact the laziness tax was a comparatively sophisticated policy. Encouraging poppy production meant that warlord troops were planning to be around at harvest time and might have plans for marketing the opium. Using tax policy to change peasant behavior was also rather subtle by warlord standards. The laziness tax was part of the development of a series of methods of controlling and exploiting peasants and poppies. Intel-

lectuals denounced warlords as enemies of China, but in fact, few of them ended up being killed by the aroused, patriotic masses. Most were absorbed, along with their military and economic systems, into the centralizing Nationalist state, which did not eliminate their systems of opium control but rather built on them.

WARLORDS AND OPIUM

Opium was as an easily collectable form of money. Opium was money in much of rural China, and opium would almost always represent the largest amount of portable wealth in any village. Wang Hongbin lists thirty-one different names for opium taxes that were used in various regions and there were no doubt many more.⁸ It was also the easiest form of money for warlord commanders to spend in this time of chaotic currencies. Opium was easy to convert into silver or guns, and it allowed warlords to move into the more formal economy, as it was the basis of the banking system in much of western China. Huang Shaoxiong, later a key member of the Guangxi clique remembered a low point in his career saying “we were down to our last few thousand ounces of opium.”⁹ When Yunnan troops invaded Guangdong in 1924, they took opium with them to cover their expenses. Napoleon’s army may have traveled on its belly, but warlord armies traveled on opium.

Warlord troops also smoked opium. Opium was a common medicinal, and probably the only medicine easily available to ordinary soldiers. Troops smoked for all the normal reasons anyone else would, only more so. Given copious free time and at least occasional disposable income, warlord troops were legendary for their opium consumption. Supposedly, the personal guard of at least one governor of Yunnan kept a row of opium pipes stacked beneath their rifles.¹⁰ Shen Congwen’s stories of life in West Hunan are filled with opium, and for him opium smoking and being a soldier seem to be almost synonymous.¹¹ This was no doubt one of the appeals of warlordism, or banditry, for many common soldiers, living, quite literally, the life of a man of leisure.¹² In Hong Shaoxiong’s account of his early years as a warlord-bandit in Guangxi, the two constants are the search for opium and the search for guns, two things that allowed his little band to survive and if possible grow.

The image of opium-sodden warlord troops was based on facts, but these stories circulated so freely because warlordism and opium were both signs of national collapse. Troops smoked opium because they were degenerate and they were degenerate because they smoked opium. Warlord commanders were aware of this image and the damage it did to their legitimacy, but they were also aware of the damage it did to military efficiency. In combat, there was a clear difference between well-drilled and disciplined troops and the assortment of opium smokers that most warlords put into the field. Again Huang Shaoxiong provides an

example. After his troops seized the town of Fengnan those of them who had been opium smugglers began looting and committed “countless outrages.” His disciplined troops apparently remained under control, and he resolved to purge the ranks of opium smugglers and “old style” troops.¹³ He was accused of “catching the fish and discarding the net,” but in fact he discarded a net for small fish and picked up a net for big fish. Although opium consumption was part of the culture of warlordism, it was not part of the culture of successful warlordism. The most successful regional militarists were those who could build a professional army and make at least some claim to nationalist or regionalist legitimacy. Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang were both solidly opposed to opium use by their own troops, as was Chiang Kai-shek. Huang Shaoxiong saw opium as one of a series of things that had to be eliminated to create worthwhile soldiers.¹⁴ Opium suppression, or at least its rhetoric, was also necessary if a local militarist wanted to expand his position as a national political figure. Although lower-level figures and bandits remained tied to opium consumption, success as a militarist meant transcending this and finding more effective ways to profit from opium. As the Guangxi warlord Li Zongren put it in a conversation with one of his new opium tax officials “If we want to achieve great things, building up Guangxi and restoring China, we first need money . . . to get money we must rectify our finances . . . to rectify finances we must first get hold of opium suppression (*jinyan*). As opium suppression makes up almost half of our revenue, once it is controlled the rest will follow.”¹⁵

The following sections analyze the different relationships local governments had with the opium trade. These were partially constrained by geography, time, and state power. A regime could tax poppy growing only if poppies would grow in their area. Transit taxes were only available to those on major transit routes. Taxing urban opium dens could be lucrative, but also invited more public comment than whatever might be done in rural areas. Forms of exploitation were dependent on the existing power of the state. Registering and taxing poppy land took more state power than collecting protection money from opium dealers, but it also offered the potential for greater profits. Finally, local regimes had to integrate what they were doing with opium into extra-regional systems of control, especially those of the Guomindang and the Japanese. Everyone was interested in opium profits, and state formations had to create opium systems that fit into the context of the opium trade in their region.

OPIUM AS WEALTH

The easiest way to get hold of opium was simply to confiscate it. Opium was a very concentrated form of wealth and was likely to be available for confiscation in many parts of China. The Communist armies on the Long March were

largely financed by confiscating the property of landlords and in west China this meant opium. The Sichuan-Shaanxi Farmers and Workers Bank listed two-hundred thousand *jin* of opium (at three yuan a *jin*) as the bulk of its capital, and the same could probably be said of many of the communist banks.¹⁶ If others (landlords, or rival warlords) had not collected the opium for easy confiscation the warlord would have to do it themselves, and opium served as the easiest way to extort “money” from peasants. It was also one of the few forms of money that became more valuable as it moved from backward rural areas into the cities. Opium confiscation would remain a common form of exploitation as long as there were warlords in China, but it was a method that was most suited to regimes with little power and legitimacy.

TRIBUTE, PROTECTION, AND TAXES ON OPIUM SHIPMENTS

The next easiest method of collecting money from opium was to tax shipments of raw opium. While this was little more than extortion if done on a fairly informal basis, the more successful groups could protect shippers from rival claimants. Eventually, this evolved into a full system of opium taxation. This was a particularly popular way of exploiting opium because it was cheap, profitable, and presented few problems. Opium shipping had a natural tendency to centralize on particular routes, shippers were willing to pay at least some taxes, and had less ability to evade taxes or revolt than poppy growers or opium smokers. Taxing opium shipments was an easy way to conceal involvement from public view. Thus, control of shipping routes was worth fighting over. Yichang and Hankou, the major taxing places on the Yangzi river, were bones of contention both for warlords and for Guomindang factions. Baise in Guangxi, and Wanxian in Sichuan, were centers on provincial level. Controlling individual points was a good way to make money, but more profitable control would demand a comprehensive monopoly of opium shipments that were connected to producers and consumers. Guangxi was the province that went farthest in this direction.

GUANGXI AND TRANSPORT MONOPOLY

The military challenge that Guangxi posed to the center was based on opium.¹⁷ The Guangxi clique was able to make considerable profits from opium despite controlling a province that did not produce poppies. In 1933, the province got eighteen million *yuan*, 35 percent of its total revenue of fifty million, from opium transit taxes. The bulk of this, ten million *yuan*, was collected in the major interprovincial shipping centers of Nanning and Wuzhou.¹⁸ This was by far the

largest item in the budget, and nearly matched military expenditures, which came to twenty-one million. Taxes on opium consumption in the province were only four to five million *yuan*. This was possible not only because of geography, but also because the Guangxi government went to great lengths to regulate shipments. From the 1920s it was clear to the provincial government that access to opium was a crucial source of political power, and they tried to put units considered most loyal in the places most valuable for the control of the opium trade.¹⁹ Opium shipments were regularized, and agreements reached with the governments of Yunnan and Guangdong to ensure that the Guangxi system was properly integrated with its suppliers and customers. In the Guangdong case, an agreement was reached in 1934, which set up unified taxation, with Guangdong getting 45 percent of the proceeds on monthly shipments of a million ounces of opium. Guangdong was sufficiently happy with this arrangement that they provided Guangxi with guns and equipment to aid their antimuggling forces.²⁰ Although Guangxi's involvement began with extorting money from opium shippers it evolved into a thoroughly rationalized system of shipping and profiting from opium. Regional militarists might still quarrel over opium money, but as they became more sophisticated in their management of the trade, cooperation became more attractive. This system would prove easy for the central government to integrate into a national opium monopoly, and also into a national system of opium suppression, if that was desired. As in the colonies, opium control could be used in the service of opium suppression.

YUNNAN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE MONOPOLY OF OPIUM EXPORTS

Yunnan was similar to Guangxi in that it was a remote province whose ability to influence national politics was tied to opium money. Unlike Guangxi, Yunnan also produced a great deal of opium, and consumed a great deal. Both poppy taxes and consumption taxes were possible and both were tried. Yunnan experimented with poppy, consumption, and transit taxes, finally settling on a tax system based on the province's opium exports as the most efficient way to control and profit from the opium trade.

Yunnan was blessed by its opium geography. The province had much more flexibility than most opium areas, with the options of shipping overland through Guizhou to Hankou via Sichuan, or through French Indo-China. All of these routes were used at one point or another. Whichever route was taken, Yunnan opium was sure to find buyers at its final destination. Although it did not command the immense premium of Persian or Indian opium, Yunnan opium was universally considered to be the best grown in China, and it would fetch twice the price of ordinary opium.²¹

Although Yunnan had produced opium as early as the 1830s, this trade was suppressed by the Qing state, and large-scale production only resumed in the late nineteenth century.²² The soil and climate were both well suited to poppy cultivation, and poor communications made opium one of the few goods that was profitable to export. Poppies became a regular crop, not something grown furtively for a few seasons when government control was lax, and the opium trade and opium use became a well-entrenched part of Yunnanese society.

One opium producing area was Xiaguan, near Dali. Raw opium was grown all over, and then after harvest brought to *yan hui* (opium meeting) where the merchants would buy it up and then have it packed. The inhabitants of Dali and Jinhua were known as particularly skilled opium packers. The opium would then be sent on to a larger center and wrapped in the red paper that identified it as Yunnan opium. Opium from particularly famous districts would be labeled as such. Many of the largest merchant houses dealt in opium, and it seems to have been an ordinary, if highly profitable and sometimes risky, item of trade. A lot of the opium was smoked locally, of course, and opium dens were common, serving as places to talk business or socialize. Dens offered different types of opium, and had special mixtures. One of the most popular blends combined fresh mountain opium, aged opium, and a special pungent variety.²³

All these developments were part of a long-established legal trade. Opium was commonly grown, and openly traded. Packing opium had evolved into a sideline employment like any other, and some areas specialized in it. Opium was traded by the major trading houses as a regular item. Different localities produced different opium, each with its own market niche, and customers could and did have individual preferences.²⁴ Opium smoking was socially acceptable and in many cases a part of everyday life. Given the deep penetration of opium into every aspect of life, neither a hasty campaign of suppression nor a simple effort at control were likely to succeed. In Guangxi opium was a substance that was shipped through the province along a handful of routes. In Yunnan opium was everywhere.

The various governments of Yunnan were usually deeply interested in the opium trade, in part in response to growing national and international pressure to suppress it and in part out of desire to profit from it. In 1906 Yunnan produced 78,000 *dan* of opium, or 13.34 percent of total national production.²⁵ Much of this was exported, and opium *likin* earned the province 43,997 *taels* in 1897.²⁶ Qin Heping speculates that, given the huge costs of putting down the Muslim rebellions in the province, the government may have actually encouraged the trade. Certainly, Qing officials were aware of the difficulties that came with active suppression. Much of the opium was grown in areas hard enough to control to begin with; the state would directly attack the economic interests of many of its subjects. In particular it would mean attacking the interests of the larger peasant families, since as a labor-intensive crop poppies

were more likely to be raised by families that could deploy more labor.²⁷ There was not much of a modern-educated class to support suppression, and thus what was done was done primarily by energetic officials like the reformist governor Xi Liang, who came to the province in 1907.²⁸ Although Xi Liang prosecuted the campaign strongly, it petered out after he was replaced, as often happened with anti-opium campaigns earlier. In 1913, the Republican administration began sending out anti-opium inspectors every year, but this seems to have had little effect. There was still no substantial constituency for opium suppression in Yunnan. There was a big push just before the province was inspected by the British in 1917. There was propaganda denouncing opium planting, but there was little hope that Yunnanese peasants were going to stop growing opium in order to save the nation. The main thrust of the campaign was military. The point was not to transform the nature of the people of Yunnan, or eliminate the role of opium in the provincial economy, but to see to it that in February of 1917 there were no large fields of poppy to embarrass the provincial government in the eyes of Beijing or London. Proclamations were issued, troops were sent out, and poppy was uprooted. The campaign was successful in that the province was declared opium-free. The campaign reduced production and drove up prices. By 1917, opium was selling for five silver dollars a *liang* in Kunming.²⁹ In the absence of serious bureaucratic commitment, however, the active campaign against poppy growing petered out. Little action was taken against opium-smoking. Thus, demand changed little. As there was no control over the aboriginal areas, production continued and opium came in from Burma.³⁰ None of the requirements for a successful campaign were present, and the rapid recrudescence of the trade after 1917 is not surprising.

As opium production returned and grew after 1917, it rapidly grew and became more organized. Armed *yan bang* (opium gangs) would go into the hills and buy up the opium and then bring it back for sale. Most *yan bang* were run by local bullies and supported by local warlords.³¹ As in Guangxi, the distinction between bandits, opium smugglers, and soldiers was not very clear. In Yunnan however, the centralization and organization of the trade was far more rapid than in Guangxi. Once the opium had been brought out of the hills, merchants prepared to ship it out to Sichuan or Guangdong. Many ordinary trading companies were involved, with capital ranging from one thousand to ten thousand *liang*. Although there were many companies, they cooperated in shipping opium out of the province.³² In the early twenties an association of opium merchants, the *te zhong shang bang* (Special Goods Merchant's Association) was formed to handle these joint shipments. They would send as much as a million *liang*, half to a third of annual exports in a single shipment. This cooperation was encouraged by the method of opium shipments from Yunnan. Given the awful roads the only way to ship large amounts of opium was by mule train, and the Yun-

nanese shipments could involve two hundred animals and two thousand men.³³ Besides the mules, armed guards had to be provided against bandits, and some sort of accommodation made with the warlords whose territory the opium would move through. All of this made a shipment quite difficult, and economies of scale encouraged large shipments. It also encouraged cooperation with the government, the legitimate source of military protection. The negotiations with the various warlords in particular called for a person of some substance, and it was natural for small merchants to look to the larger ones to carry out these negotiations.³⁴ The export trade thus had a natural tendency towards concentration, which was not the case in some other areas.

Economic forces may have been encouraging the concentration of the trade, but the state did so as well. The province had begun collecting opium taxes again even before the 1917 inspections. In 1913, Chen Jie, the provincial minister of finance, set up a semiofficial company to ship opium into French Indo-China, with the government of Yunnan getting three to five *yuan* per one hundred *liang*.³⁵ In 1913, provincial strongman Tang Jiyao began to collect the abolished opium *likin* tax, although he did not formally repromulgate the law. Collection was thus haphazard, and revenue was not great.³⁶ Tang also traded opium on his own account, and made efforts to stop others from trading in opium, because it was cutting into his own opium profits. In a typical affair in 1918, provincial troops caught a *yan bang* coming down from the hills and besieged it for several days. Finally the smugglers agreed to give up half the opium they had collected to the government and were allowed to leave. This was an inconvenience to the smugglers, some of whom began buying their opium in Sichuan or Guizhou, since it was less difficult to buy it there.³⁷ It was not in Tang's interest, however, to drive the trade out of the province, and chasing people around in the hills was expensive and inefficient. In 1920 Tang's forces were driven out of Sichuan. This reduced his revenues and left him with more troops to support than ever before. The solution was more control over opium. In 1920, the government decreed a policy of suppression through taxation, governed by the *Yunnan jinyan chufa zanxing zhangcheng* (Temporary Regulations for the Yunnan Opium Suppression Fine Office).³⁸ An anti-opium bureau was established under Li Zonghuang, which divided the province into four opium suppression districts and assessed a tax of two Yunnan dollars a mou on all land planted in poppy. This was expected to bring in seven-hundred thousand *yuan* a year in the first district alone.³⁹

It was obvious to everyone that this office was not suppressing opium, it was taxing it, and in a new and more intrusive way. Taxes on production required the state to get right down to the level of the peasant but this often resulted in resistance. Lucian Bianco has catalogued hundreds of cases, and there were doubtless many more. This was a common problem, first because the state

tended to demand more and more of the peasants, and second because the state was not able to limit extra-legal extraction. Tao San, a Miao farmer from Guangnan, was typical of the opium growers who found themselves under pressure. He started with one *mou* of opium land, but in 1928 he was required to plant three *mou*, bringing his total tax to nine *yuan*. By 1929 his tax burden was twenty-five *yuan*, more than his total income. He was not allowed to stop growing opium, and he tried, unsuccessfully, to find someone to buy his opium land. In 1929, he sold fifteen *yuan* of silver jewelry to pay the opium tax and in 1931 he sold a daughter. Tao San also lost his house and was forced to live in a cave. Some were even worse off, and some in the district were shot for resisting the opium tax.⁴⁰

More intrusive forms of tax collection were also opportunities for corruption. Bianco describes a series of six inspections were made by four classes of *jinyan weiyuan* in Anhui. Each of these would of course require special fees and bribes, over and above the regular tax.⁴¹ This led to revolt in Anhui, and similar exactions caused trouble elsewhere. State attempts to regulate and tax opium sales and smoking also created opportunities for graft.⁴² This was true of all forms of state power, and had been true since the Qing. Opium under the Republic particularly encouraged graft. As opium was illegal, it was even harder than otherwise to resist illegal extractions, and the state had very little interest in publicly chastising their subordinates for involvement in the opium trade. This was a classic case of state involution: from the point of view of the populace the power and extractions of the state were increasing, from the point of view of the provincial government revenue was stagnant or decreasing and the center had no control over its opium taxes.

State involution was also a policy choice. Yunnan, like many other provinces, financed its opium control policies and much else through sales of seized opium. Various antismuggling units were organized, and they and more regular police were rewarded for capturing opium shipments. Usually the captured opium would be sold, and a substantial amount of the price realized would go to the unit involved. This was a cheap way to finance law enforcement and ensure that police would carry out their duties enthusiastically. It was also a fine way to blur the distinction between public and private interests and between opium control and opium suppression. This method would become common all over China.

State involution also happened in a more formal way. Money that was collected often ended up in the hands of local officials rather than the central government. Most of the money went to the provincial government, and was vital for military expenses. In 1929, Guangnan county officially collected \$197,140 Yunnan dollars in opium taxes: \$113,426 went to pay for the invasion of Guangxi, \$48,000 to pay for the local airfield, \$1,971 to the provincial anti-opium office, and \$1,774 for local expenses. Quite possibly more than this was collected but never reported.⁴³

The provincial government did make money from opium. Kunming collected four million Yunnan dollars in opium fines in 1931 out of a total income of eleven million.⁴⁴ Much of the opium money collected was ending up in the hands of local figures, however, and making them all the harder to control. Involvement also competed with the state, as there was a limit to how high taxes could be raised before noncompliance or unrest resulted. At the same time, the provincial government could provide unique services such as access to capital and help in opening outside markets. Yunnan's provincial government increasingly focused on controlling and taxing extraprovincial trade.

Under Tang Jiyao's system, once the opium had been grown and taxes and fines collected it was not under government control. Private merchants, many with connections to the military, bought up the opium and shipped it out. Dali was a major center, shipping millions *liang* to Guangdong and Sichuan each year. Of the six hundred or seven hundred trading firms in West Yunnan, two hundred to three hundred dealt in opium. These firms were fairly well-organized and financed. While most of them relied on loans at up to 4 percent a month to finance the trade, this made them vulnerable to default if conditions were poor (many firms folded in 1923). Yet this financing bespoke a fairly high level of sophistication.⁴⁵ The actual opium shippers who took mule trains of opium to Guangxi were less sophisticated and even harder to control. Most of them were *liu mang*, and the opium caravans included their private opium ventures and a number of private peddlers in addition to official opium, which had been taxed.⁴⁶ The government thus had little control over the merchants who exported the opium and the merchants in turn had little control over the people who actually exported it.

The government's first moves towards commercial taxes were not very successful. In 1926 the new provincial government suggested that the acreage tax be abolished.⁴⁷ This would prevent unrest and reduce the power of the local elite. The acreage tax was replaced by a stamp tax of ten cents per *liang* on all opium sold in the province.⁴⁸ This was not a success, since the province simply did not have the control over the trade necessary to collect it. In 1925, Tang Jiyao had made three million *yuan*, 31 percent of total provincial income, from the opium acreage tax. Under the stamp tax the revenue fell to four-hundred fifty thousand dollars. Most opium was simply not put on the open market to be taxed, and the government could not begin to prevent massive black marketing. In 1928, the old land tax was reimposed, but at a higher rate. After 1929, both the land tax and the acreage tax were to be collected in silver, which effectively tripled the tax.⁴⁹ After this the province was more successful in collecting both of the taxes. In 1931 and 1932, the Yunnan government made twenty-one and thirty-seven million *yuan* from opium, making up one-third or more of total receipts.⁵⁰ The province's currency was supported by opium, and the political independence of the regime was based firmly on opium income.

The great increase in opium income between 1925 and 1934 was due to inflation but also in part due to more systematic management. Tang Jiyao had seen opium as a source of extraordinary revenue available to meet extraordinary (military) expenditures. The various new tax systems after 1926 were intended to put the opium trade on a more regular footing, and in particular to focus on exports, which were the most profitable and easy to control part of the trade. The original stamp tax had applied to all opium, but after 1929 the government concentrated on exports. Although taxes on poppy growers continued, they were not aimed as much at revenue as at funneling opium into the official system. When Yunnan began poppy inspections in 1927, the province was divided into three areas.⁵¹ In aborigine areas, where any government control would be too expensive, nothing was done. In more accessible areas the state licensed and encouraged growing in some areas while banning it in others, pushing the trade into acceptable and controllable channels. The Yunnan registration system gave peasants the legal right to grow opium as long as it was sold to the state for use as "medicine." Peasants were allowed to keep a certain amount of opium for personal use, and various mechanisms were used to ensure that they got what they would consider a fair price.

All opium intended for export was to pass through the Opium Suppression Bureau in Kunming and pay an export tax of sixteen dollars per one hundred *liang*. Opium from border areas could pay twenty dollars and avoid the trip to Kunming. By 1933, this system was bringing in six million dollars a year.⁵² In that year the Bureau reported that one million *mu* of poppy was planted, but a Yunnan magazine estimated that one and a half to two million was more likely. At thirty to eighty *liang* per *mu* this came to sixty to eighty million *liang*. About half of this was smoked in the province, with most of the exports going through Guizhou with significant amounts going through Sichuan and Guangxi and a small amount going to Vietnam.⁵³ The provincial government was thus abandoning the revenue from the half of the province's total production that was smoked locally, but making more money with fewer problems.⁵⁴ By 1933, Yunnan had put its opium trade on a solid and relatively easily controlled basis. Although Yunnan was one of the most important opium-producing provinces, it had a very low level opium-related violence.⁵⁵

In 1935, the trade was fully monopolized. A Special Goods Monopoly Transportation Office (*Tebuō tongyun chu*) was set up on May 1, 1935. The original plan had been to make the entire system government run, but this proved too difficult to organize and three major opium dealers were brought in to form a *guandu shangban* (joint official-merchant management) company. The company had a capital of fifty million dollars, 70 percent of which was provided by the government and the rest by the merchants.⁵⁶ The merchants' networks of opium buyers and transport systems were taken over by the gov-

ernment, saving the considerable difficulty of setting up such a system from scratch. Gradually the three merchants were pushed out and the company became entirely state-owned. The Transportation Office experimented with various routes to get the opium to market, varying route according to the level of transit tax imposed by other local governments. They had representatives along all the major opium shipment routes, one of whom was Shi Cilu. Shi was the agency's representative in Nanning, Guangxi throughout this period, and competed with other representatives in Hankou and Chongqing to try and ship out as much opium as possible. As eager as Shi was to ship opium, his hosts were even more eager to receive it. When he was first arrived in Nanning the provincial chairman Huang Xu sent a car to meet him and had a banquet in his honor. The more opium Shi brought through Nanning, the more transit tax money the province would make. Shi was offered, and accepted, a bounty on any opium in excess of the regular quota he was able to get Kunming to ship. Guangxi, like all the other provinces that opium was shipped through, had an agent in Kunming whose job was presumably to use the same methods to convince the main office of the Transportation Office to move its shipments.⁵⁷

The focus on exports was successful first because exports were simply easier to control, and second because the Long Yun government abolished the garrison system in 1931 and thus had much better control of the province. Long was able to avoid the garrison system because he could pay his troops himself with his opium profits and he was able to control the opium trade because he did not have to contend with semi-independent garrisons. The government's success was thus self-reinforcing. The merchants were willing to go along with Long first because they had no choice and second because he saw it as in his interest to support them and help them find markets. The government organized an opium export firm, the Nan Seng company, financed by the government's Fu Dian Xin bank. The firm had branches in Hong Kong, Shanghai, Hankou, Canton, Chengdu, and Guilin, and did its best to encourage exports.⁵⁸ The Yunnan government also did its best to negotiate or fight for lower tax rates on Yunnan opium as it moved through Guangxi.

Long Yun was one of Chiang Kai-shek's more formidable provincial rivals and opium money was a major reason for this. Long was not simply a highly successful bandit collecting opium, however. He eventually developed a reasonably sophisticated system of opium control which could be compared to those run by the colonial states. This helped him establish his power base. No warlord was ever able to control the opium trade in Sichuan, and no warlord ever controlled the entire province of Sichuan. Controlling opium in Yunnan made Long a threat to the central government while at the same time creating an opium system that could eventually be integrated into a national system of control.

JIANGSU AND SHANGHAI, THE BEGINNING OF A DISTRIBUTION MONOPOLY

Provinces that produced opium or were on major transit routes had opportunities that others did not, but all provinces attempted to profit from opium. Yunnan had abandoned its attempts to tax opium distribution and smoking, but other provinces would have no choice but to attempt to grasp this nettle. An enormous amount of opium was consumed in cities like Shanghai and Canton and the relatively wealthy coastal provinces. These were also the places where the 1908–1919 anti-opium campaigns had been most active and most successful, both in reducing the trade and in changing popular attitudes.

The Late Qing anti-opium campaigns in Jiangsu and Fujian have been thoroughly studied by Joyce Mandancy, Li Hsiao-t'i, and Wang Shugui.⁵⁹ Besides their effectiveness in reducing the trade, these campaigns are also important for developing many of the concepts and practices that would be used in later anti-opium campaigns. In particular it was these areas that had to deal most directly with opium smoking and the opium den. Most importantly, it was here that the goals of opium control and opium suppression first came into direct conflict. In Jiangnan in particular, anti-opium campaigns were driven as much by popular desire to create a new China as by central government orders. The rulers of the coastal provinces were just as interested in opium profits as any other, but given the fact that they were operating in an area where open connections to the opium trade were unacceptable and also where they only possible form of opium control was a very publicly obvious involvement in retail sales and licensing of smokers they found this more problematic.⁶⁰

SHANGHAI AND JIANGSU

Shanghai was China's most important opium market, both because of its large consumption and its domination of the lucrative Jiangnan market. It was also the most difficult to control. Shanghai could and did draw opium from several provinces as well as overseas, making it less dependent on any one supplier. Shanghai also had a foreign concession and its extraterritoriality could be useful to those seeking to avoid the control of the Chinese state. The evolution of opium control in the Shanghai area is the topic of next chapter, but I would like first to look at Shanghai as an example of a typical distribution monopoly.

Huang Jinrong, Du Yuesheng and the Green Gang were the first to establish control over the opium market.⁶¹ This process has been thoroughly documented by Brian Martin, who explains the process the Gang used to take control of the opium trade and much else in Shanghai. Elsewhere criminal groups were involved in the trade, but in Guangxi and Yunnan they were

removed or co-opted. It was only on the coast that modern-style criminal gangs were significant in the trade. Paul Yip (Ye Qinghe) in Fujian provides another example.⁶² Du Yuesheng in particular was sometimes referred to as China's Al Capone, a comparison worth considering. Similar to American gangsters, Du was a creature of the modern cities, and while his Green Gang had elements of traditional Chinese criminal organizations, he had more in common with Capone than with the Gowned Brothers of Sichuan. Opium was only one part of his operation, which also included labor racketeering and kidnapping. His financial dealings were sophisticated enough to require their own bank. While his relationship with the Guomindang regime was sometimes difficult he provided Nanjing with valuable political services. Above all, he was a public figure, invited to social occasions, mentioned in the newspapers and appointed to government office, most notably as Opium Suppression Commissioner for Shanghai. His public persona was not just an individual idiosyncrasy, however, it was part of his power. The state needed control over the retail opium trade in the city. Shanghai was a city very much in the public eye, whether the public was Chinese or foreign, and it was no longer possible for a Chinese state to be directly and publicly involved in profiting from the sale of opium to Chinese. The retail opium trade was also extended into the International Settlement and the French Concession, putting parts of the trade outside the control of the Chinese state. Opium dealers needed protection from the state and reliable supplies of opium. All of these things could be provided by someone like Du Yuesheng. As a nongovernment figure he could operate on all sides of Shanghai's international boundaries and could be more directly involved in the opium trade than any Chinese or foreign government could. At the same time he offered state protection and access to capital to opium dealers and retailers.

The situation in Shanghai is examined in more detail in the next chapter, but the city is important not only for itself but also as a model for other urban areas where the Chinese state had to try to control opium retailing indirectly through semicriminal figures. The common image of the Shanghai underworld as a chaotic and uncontrollable cauldron of vice is exaggerated. The Nationalists would find themselves faced with a reasonably well-organized system of opium control when they arrived in Shanghai.

CHAOS IN FUJIAN

In some provinces no authority was ever able to fully control the opium trade or anything else. Fujian and Anhui were good examples of this. In terms of suitability for opium growing the two provinces were quite similar. Neither produced particularly good opium, but both Northern Anhui and Southern Fujian produced it and were close enough to Shanghai to make smuggling the opium

to market quite easy. Fujian was a conduit for foreign drugs smuggled from Taiwan, often by Taiwanese with extraterritorial protection. Both were close enough to the Yangzi delta that whatever happened there was likely to make news in Shanghai and possibly embarrass the government. In both places, both the local and national governments found the trade difficult to control.

Fujian had been a minor producer of opium for a long time, and had a tradition of elite opposition to the trade. During the early Republic, the provincial gentry had organized an Anti-Drug Society (*qu du she*.) This organization was active in all parts of the anti-opium movement, and either continued to exist until the 1930s or was revived then.⁶³ Pre-1919 opium suppression in Fujian was thus not a quick uprooting of poppies right before the inspectors arrived (as in Yunnan), but more similar to the gentry activist model of Jiangsu or Zhejiang. After 1920, Fujian local elites were less powerful. There was little elite activism in Fujian in the 1930s, and suppression would be carried out by the provincial government, relying heavily on military force. Although Fujian never became a big producer, small-scale production was almost impossible to get rid of using this method, and the government made little progress in dealing with opium-smoking and sales until it adopted a new approach after 1933.

As elsewhere, poppy growing had been greatly reduced under the Late Qing reforms, but opium cultivation returned to Fujian around 1920, encouraged by warlord troops who sometimes provided the peasants with seeds.⁶⁴ The Northern Expedition does not seem to have had much effect on opium in the province, but real growth in the trade began sometime after 1929, as the local garrisons and military units slipped out of the province's control and became deeply involved in opium. The provincial government opposed this for two reasons, first because the provincial government was controlled by Nanjing and Fujian opium could compete with the Hankou opium Nanjing was selling in Shanghai, and second because opium revenue gave the garrisons financial independence. Fujian's provincial government had given up taxing opium in 1928, accepting the financial gap that this created, so the counties and garrisons could certainly do the same.⁶⁵

The involvement of the garrisons in the opium trade could take any number of forms. Some encouraged peasants to grow poppies, although peasants would often soon quit due to high taxes unless forced to grow it.⁶⁶ Most also tried to monopolize retail opium sales. In Yongchun city in 1928 the local garrison set up an Opium Suppression Bureau to collect taxes on all parts of the trade. Like many of the other local monopolies this was entirely open. Its rules were published in the local newspaper and no attempt was made to conceal what was happening.⁶⁷ The opium might come from Shanghai or Hankou, but much of it was brought from Taiwan by Formosan gangs which used their extraterritoriality to cover smuggling of opium and later morphine and heroin.⁶⁸

On November 11, 1931, the Funing Fujian Chamber of Commerce complained to Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters that the marine detachment in the city was taxing opium dens in the city. Chiang (or his office) was particularly incensed that opium was being sold under the national flag, and he promptly ordered the province to investigate and send out a party representative. Investigation showed that the problem went far deeper. The marines were working with the Second Fujian police detachment to collect poppy taxes and market opium in at least three counties, bringing in tens of thousands of dollars. On May 4th, 1931, a group of one hundred peasants went to complain about the high opium tax and were fired on, killing two. The marines then occupied the telegraph office and post office to prevent any complaints. During the Fujian Anti-Opium Committee's 1930 campaign, the marine detachment had reported the area free of poppy and claimed to be organizing propaganda teams and carrying out suppression.⁶⁹ As Executive Yuan pointed out, the navy had a long history of involvement with opium in Fujian before the Northern Expedition, and opium was one of the things the navy used to oppress the people. Beside shooting people and collecting taxes, the marines had also forced the local tea merchants to purchase large amounts of worthless paper money, and were in general acting like they had during the warlord period. Despite all this evidence, the navy was able to stall things, claiming that the only fault of the Marine detachment was that it suppressed opium too vigorously, and that this was the cause of the shooting.⁷⁰ In July 1932, continuing problems in Fujian hit the Shanghai papers and the Anti-Opium Association claimed: "three million people of Fujian who had been on the verge of change, are now suffering under the *dubua zhengci* of the local garrisons . . . we call on the myriad citizens to unite in opposing the loathsome garrisons, their endangering of the party-state and their poisoning of the [national] spirit."⁷¹ The phrase *dubua zhengci* (policies to empoison) was the same used to refer to the plots of the English and the Japanese to destroy China.

Fujian was also a center for opium smuggling. Opium and other drugs came from Taiwan, and were carried by Japanese subjects. Much of it was also handled by Chinese gangsters like Paul Yip (Ye Qinghe). Yip had been involved in the opium trade since at least 1910, and was involved in a number of shady deals. Yet he was not really a criminal; he often had state authority for his actions. He was connected to Du Yuesheng's Green Gang, but he was also connected to the Japanese, various Fujian governments, and the 19th Route Army.⁷²

Fujian thus presented anyone trying to control its opium trade with a series of problems. While some parts of the trade were protected by extraterritoriality, other parts were protected by local garrisons. The whole trade was protected by the inability of the central government to know what was happening at any given point. Guangxi could focus on taxing large shipments.

Yunnan eventually decided on the same approach. Shanghai system relied on (criminal) tax farmers. In Fujian, the state would have to rely on the slow process of creating bureaucratic structures to control the trade.

Fujian was one of the few provinces that actually set up a working Anti-Opium Commission after the National Anti-Opium conference of 1928, and the Commission remained in existence throughout the Nanjing decade. The chief focus of the commission was on poppy growing, and to deal with this it employed both education and force. Many of the proclamations prohibiting poppy planting and listing the punishments for planting it are in verse, presumably to make them easier for peasants to remember.⁷³ Besides repeatedly asking the military authorities to carry out suppression, the Fujian Commission also sent out representatives of its own. These representatives would each have a designated area of authority, and in late 1930 they toured most of the province, concentrating on the coastal regions where most of the opium was grown. The representatives would get in touch with local officials and military officers and then plan a route for their assigned region that would bring them through the major poppy growing areas. In most cases, they seem to have relied more on threats and propaganda than force. Once the representative had arrived in an area he would send out propaganda teams to tell the peasants that poppy growing was prohibited. Local magistrates would also spread this message. If reports were received that a given village had voluntarily uprooted its poppies, troops might not visit it, but if opium was still produced, the crop would be uprooted, which occasionally led to violence.⁷⁴ This policy was generally effective in the sense that poppies were uprooted and there were no open revolts. Most of the representatives reported good cooperation from local magistrates and at least some military help, but the whole campaign was too sketchy to eliminate growing entirely. Most of the villages caught growing opium had only twenty to eighty *mu*, so it was not a matter of whole districts given over to poppy cultivation, which would be easier to detect. The actual representatives never got too far from the main roads, and relied on reports to tell them if poppies were growing in more remote villages.⁷⁵ Most representatives estimated that they had uprooted 60 percent–90 percent of the poppies in their districts, but some estimates were as low as 50 percent. The real level of success was probably even lower. Representatives had to rely on local troops to destroy poppy fields, so without local cooperation, they could do nothing. While the representatives were at least some help in gathering information they alone were not enough to deal with the problem of poppy growing.

Eventually Chiang's Anti-Communist Headquarters in Nanchang tried to deal with the issue of information by encouraging the formation of local *jianli juanshui weiyuanhui* (Tax Supervision Commissions) which were to report to the Anti-Communist Headquarters if local garrisons were collecting illegal

taxes, especially opium taxes.⁷⁶ In practice most of their information seems to have come from concerned citizens, such as a school superintendent and a representative of *ge jie daibiao* (various groups of people).⁷⁷ Through official channels Nanchang was hearing nothing, but the informal reports described a virtual reign of terror, with troops imposing countless taxes, including those on opium, on the local peasants. Although these were labeled opium taxes they were too informal to merit that designation. In one case troops arrived in a village and announced that they would not leave until they had collected \$40,000 in opium taxes. It was of course annoying that the central government had heard nothing about this, but it was still more ominous that the troops carrying out this extortion were the loyal 19th Route Army.

In 1932, Fujian received new help in opium suppression with the arrival of the 19th Route Army.⁷⁸ The 19th Route Army, as a good revolutionary army, promptly began exhorting the people to boycott Japanese goods and avoid opium and gambling. The 19th Route Army provided the provincial anti-opium commission with enthusiastic troops who were willing to take action against poppy growing and smoking, and they probably had some effect. The 19th Route Army was quite different from the troops already in Fujian. Zhang Zhen's troops were attempting to use opium profits to rectify their awful financial situation, but even the vaunted 19th Route Army could quickly be corrupted by opium money.⁷⁹ Neither better information nor better troops were enough to redeem the fundamentally flawed strategy of direct military suppression of opium.

In theory, Fujian was Nationalist territory. It had been taken during the Northern Expedition, and it could be considered controlled because of the influx of loyal troops (like the 19th Route Army) or the inclusion of existing units into the Nationalist command structure, like the Marine detachment in Funing. What actually happened was that many of these troops began to revert to warlordism as the revolution lost steam. As one observer sent to Fujian explained it "After 1927, the provinces absorbed many evil warlords, with the intention of using those like Yang Shuzhang as puppets of the party. Their selfish government, however, has weakened the people's faith in the revolution and led to the rise of bandits and communists and the official troops are too weak to suppress them."⁸⁰

The case of Fujian was not unlike that in many other places. Yunnanese warlords used opium money to hold their provinces together, in part because of clever management and in part because of where Yunnan fit in the economic geography of opium. Fujian lacked a strong government and fit into a confusing place in the economy of opium, two things that are somewhat related. In Fujian, opium financed decentralization rather than a single provincial regime, and even after 1927 this dynamic continued.

THE ANTI-OPIMUM ASSOCIATION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE WITHOUT A STATE

Warlords were rationalizing parts of the opium trade, and after central government was reimposed in 1927 the new state would find these regional systems to be both dangerous rivals and potential building blocks for a national opium system. Just as warlords were functioning as provincial governments without a national government, the warlord period also saw the emergence of public organizations aimed at helping the state suppress opium, although there was at this point no state to help. The need for opium suppression was a commonplace of political rhetoric, and public-minded groups and figures would toss off denunciations of the trade on a regular basis. In the early 1920s educational groups, Chambers of Commerce, native place associations and Overseas Chinese organizations issued calls for an end to the opium trade and especially state involvement in it.⁸¹ The warlords Wu Peifu and Yan Xishan, also announced their desire to end the trade.⁸² Although the anti-opium agreement with the British had expired in 1917, *arwanguo juduhui* (International Anti-Opium Association) continued to exist in Beijing, and various local anti-opium organizations still existed in some cities, although they like the Beijing organization became less active by the early twenties. The goal of opium suppression was still part of public discourse, but it lacked an institutional form. It also lacked a state to enforce prohibition. The *Minguo ribao* pointed out that China was currently governed by corrupt bureaucrats, who were all opium smokers, and warlords, who actively protected the trade. In this situation opium suppression was impossible. "All of China's reforms wait on peace and unification. After unification and establishment of a good government everything can be achieved. Everyone must strive to follow this road!"⁸³

This was quite good advice, because the residual anti-opium organizations were trying to function as part of civil society without a state, an impossible situation. The usefulness of the concept of a public sphere or civil society is one that has been much debated in the field. In most respects, the warlord period would seem an ideal place to find civil society. The state was both weak and fragmented, and many nonstate organizations found it possible to exist and thrive in this period. Bergere called the years between 1919 and 1927 the golden age of the Chinese bourgeoisie, since it was in this period that the economic power of China's urban elite was most readily converted into political power. A civil society means more than simple independence from state control, however. Independence from state control was made somewhat less valuable by the fact that there was often no state for these organizations to relate to and influence. Public sphere organizations thus found themselves taking on some of the roles of the state.

The greatest impetus for this was the League of Nations and the Geneva Anti-Opium Conferences of 1924–1925. China had to be represented, and its representatives had to be armed with statistics and facts about the drug situation in China. Given Beijing's inability to either collect the statistics or put a good face on its own opium policy the *Zhonghua minguo judu hui* (in English the Chinese Anti-Opium Association) was established in 1924. It was at first a predominantly Protestant organization, and it grew out of the declining International Anti-Opium Association in Beijing and the concerns of various Christian groups in China.⁸⁴ These international and foreign connections would serve the new association well. Its data collection would at least at first be based on missionary reports.⁸⁵ Its League of Nations connections made the Association immune to the cruder types of persuasion Nanjing sometimes used against its domestic critics.⁸⁶ The Association got at least some of its funds from overseas, and its leaders were used to running public-minded organizations with little help from the state.

The Association was fully committed to the modern narrative of addiction as it had developed in the West. They saw the opium problem as a moral one. It was moral weakness that led people to opium, and the drug further degraded their moral character. As befitted their Christian background the anti-opium crusaders felt that salvation was always possible. Salvation would come from self-realization, so education and propaganda were the keys to their approach. At the same time the anti-opiumists also favored a disease view of drugs. Opium was a bacillus, seeking out and infecting innocent people, aided by the corrupt and unscrupulous who were willing to exploit their fellow citizens in this horrible way.

Given this view of the opium problem, their financial independence and political untouchability the Association quickly became a powerful lobbying group, although one with nobody to lobby. Despite the lack of a state to influence, the Association functioned as a civil society group anyway. In 1925, the Association mobilized public opinion to kill a proposed central government opium monopoly.⁸⁷ They represented China at the Geneva meetings. Soon after its founding the Association began to spread into the provinces, using existing Christian and educational networks.⁸⁸ The Association also took on some of the roles of the state. From the beginning it had seen its responsibilities as including serving as a watchdog for opium policy and protecting China's international reputation.⁸⁹ It was a question from an Association member that led Sun Yat-sen to make the brief remarks that the association hailed as his Anti-Opium Will, thus giving the movement its sacred text.⁹⁰ They began collecting data on the state of the opium trade and publishing propaganda. When the Nationalists came north they would find themselves faced with a strong and well-financed public sphere organization looking for a state to attach itself

to. The Association would also have to deal with the Guomindang. Although they were not willing to leave opium suppression go until after unification, they stressed that only a unified government could finally end the opium problem. Chinese states had to make some credible effort to suppress opium and this would mean creating and mobilizing public opinion. To some extent nothing had to be done to create this opinion; there probably would have been a good deal of anti-opium rhetoric floating around even had the Anti-Opium Association never been founded. The Association however did encourage anti-opium opinions through its propaganda, provided a focus for other organizations and even took on some of the roles of the state by collecting statistics and even representing China at Geneva.

CHINA DECENTRALIZED

Warlordism was not a problem of rouge military commanders establishing satrapies in defiance of the public interest but, as Edward McCord has pointed out, a problem of the general failure of civil government.⁹¹ All of the more successful warlords could claim with some plausibility to be patriotic individuals serving the interests of the Chinese people, and many of them were absorbed into the Nationalist and some later into the Communist power structures, their opium control systems coming with them. Most warlords oscillated along a continuum of greater or lesser loyalty as their power and Chiang's changed. Power could mean military power, that is, guns bought with opium money, or the silver bullets of financial power which could also be connected to opium. The governments of Guangxi and Yunnan were able to defeat local rivals and challenge for national power because of their ability to control the opium trade. Power could also relate to the ability of a state to connect itself to the narratives of national awakening and salvation that obsessed educated Chinese after May fourth. Here connection to the opium trade was a source of weakness. A successful state would have to find a way to reconcile the practical and discursive demands of the opium trade.

Chapter 5

Opium, the Nation, and the Revolution

All state formations of the warlord period faced the same problems in dealing with opium. All needed and wanted opium profits, and to some extent, all had to reconcile this with opium suppression. Each also had to adapt their opium programs to the specific conditions of the opium trade in the area they operated in. Some warlord regimes made considerable progress in adapting to the economic realities of the opium trade, but most made little progress on the matter of legitimizing their behavior. The Guomindang regime that came to power in 1927, would build on these practical successes and go much further in terms of legitimating their behavior.

In this chapter I focus on the first major attempt made by the new government to reconcile their opium policies with its professed goals of nation-building. This first attempt was a failure in most respects. The Guomindang government established its power on the basis of military force and on the basis of its promise to create a new China. The early part of the Nanjing decade was profoundly disappointing for both the regime and its supporters. Nanjing was unable to establish the level of control it felt necessary to carry out its tasks, and its supporters were disappointed with the reality of the new China they had sacrificed for.¹ Although the intellectuals and urbanites who saw their opinions as the expression of national public opinion were not often able to influence the government's policies, Nanjing was not able to entirely ignore their claims that the government was deviating from the principles of Sun Yat-sen. The issue which had the most potential for conflict between the two, and the most potential to cause a disastrous loss of legitimacy for the regime was opium. Although Nanjing claimed to be creating a new nation, at first the new government struggled to grow beyond its origins as a warlord regime. In 1927–1929 the Nationalists attempted to create a

national opium monopoly. Although there were able to take advantage of a number of innovations in opium control it proved to be impossible to legitimize this new system.

THE GUOMINDANG AND OPIUM IN THE CANTON PERIOD

The Nationalists' plan in 1927 was to expand their Canton opium system to the entire nation, thus making profits and denying them to rivals. The Nationalists controlled the city of Canton and its environs from 1922, and in this period they laid the groundwork for the 1927 Northern Expedition. It was here that Sun Yat-sen finalized the *Three Principles of the People* and *Plan for National Reconstruction*, and here that Soviet advisors helped Chiang Kai-shek to establish the Whampoa Military Academy and Mao Zedong to establish the Propaganda Bureau. It was also here that the Nationalists first began to deal with opium both as a financial boon and as an ideological threat. In practical terms, the Canton government was a warlord regime and opium money was one of its financial supports. Being at the end of the Yunnan-Guangxi opium route the Canton regime had the opportunity to profit from controlling distribution and sales. In the early 20s the trade was fairly disorganized as individual garrisons taxed opium as they saw fit and kept the money for themselves. To the extent the trade was controlled it was done by Sun's erstwhile Yunnanese allies, but when they were ousted in 1925 and a more centralized system was set up.² Rather than leave the trade in the hands of local garrisons, the government set up a province-wide monopoly tax system, where anti-opium medicine (pure opium)³ was transported and sold by private merchants licensed by the government.⁴ The announced goal of this plan was to end the trade gradually over five years, starting in 1926. Smokers over the age of twenty-five, who were medically unable to quit, would be licensed to purchase decreasing amounts of opium from the licensed opium shops. In practice, licenses were not necessary, and the gradual reduction of the total of opium smoked was the responsibility of the opium farmers, whose financial interests called for the opposite.

The use of a tax farming system was typical of opium monopolies in this period, and only the lack of a charismatic figure like Du Yuesheng kept it from being an exact copy of the Shanghai model. The farm provided immediate cash, like all tax farms, but (in the case of opium) it also created distance between the government and the opium trade.

In some cases, opium farmers provided handy scapegoats when the pressure for suppression grew. In some cases, merchants may have been members of the government, who established a tax farming system that enabled them to profit personally. The farm system also made it easier to impose a new opium

monopoly on an existing system. The Canton regulations gave existing dealers ten days to pay the stamp tax on their existing stocks and agree to terms with the new monopoly company. The military also got a cut, being promised 50 percent of the proceeds from any illegal opium they seized.⁵ The government seems to have been successful in superimposing itself on the existing system of local opium retailing. At first, however, most of the profits went to the merchants, and the government only cleared 300,000 to 400,000 *yuan* a month. Government opium cost up to three times as much as smuggled opium, and even many of the official merchants sold illegal opium.⁶

As elsewhere in the world, the state soon moved to rationalize this system. T. V. Soong wanted to bring the whole system under direct government control.⁷ In the winter of 1926 Song's protégé Li Chengyi was put in charge of the *jinyan zong chu* (Opium Suppression Office) to tighten things up and increase profits. He set up two teams of roving smuggling inspectors and bought some boats so they could run river patrols. Li also beefed up inspection teams in the counties outside of Canton, where most of the smuggled opium was sold. He also cracked down on unlicensed smoking outside of official opium dens, and this forced smokers into government dens. Li Chengyi's measures were very successful, and revenue went as high as a million *yuan* a month. Still, Li was not satisfied and experimented with hiring women to serve opium in the official dens as a way of attracting more customers.⁸ Soong suggested increasing profits by selling special licenses to women or those who had been addicted while overseas. One recurring difficulty with licensing was that to buy a license was to admit one was addicted, and to be given one proved it.

Claiming to have been addicted while overseas put the onus of addiction on foreign imperialists, who profited from addicting overseas Chinese. Thus, one was a victim of imperialism rather than of low moral character. These special licenses would not have a photograph, which was regarded as low-class, and would permit the owner to smoke anywhere rather than just in official opium dens in their home district. For these luxuries the addict was to pay a heavy fee of up to one thousand *yuan*.⁹ Thus wealthier smokers could opt out of the more troublesome parts of the system.

The system of opium control that developed in Canton had a series of purposes and would have been understandable to those who ran opium systems for warlord or colonial governments. Its first purpose was to produce revenue by superimposing government control over the existing system of opium distribution; this was the cheapest possible way to get control. In addition to producing revenue, this denied revenue to rivals trying to do the same things the Nationalists were. The opium control system kept revenue away from other parts of the Nationalist government. Just as opium revenues were denied to outsiders, T. V. Soong wanted to ensure that benefits of this trade flowed to his own faction. This internecine combat would remain an important part of

opium policy. The Opium Suppression Office, and its antismuggling teams, provided Soong with the muscle needed for all sorts of things. The ability to apply physical force continued to be valuable in Nanjing-era politics.

The licensing system served two purposes. The first was a veneer of suppression to what was primarily a revenue scheme. The second was to sort smokers into categories. As with the colonial monopolies, the state had different levels of interest in different people. The luxury licenses offered to overseas Chinese merchants are a good example of this. These merchants were not dangerous lower-class people whose behavior needed to be controlled. Their willingness to pay made them even more valuable to the state. The active attempt to increase sales by adding female attendants was a bit more problematic. This was clearly an attempt to increase revenue, and would link opium sales to prostitution rather than public health. It would be much easier to associate government opium sales with national purification if it was being handed out by doctors rather than demi-prostitutes.

For some in the government, most notably T. V. Soong, opium was a useful if undesirable source of money. The British estimated Canton's opium revenue at six-hundred seventy thousand *yuan* a month in October of 1927.¹⁰ If opium could provide revenue needed in the short run, and revenue was desperately needed in 1927, then it should be used. Opium taxes were similar to the *likin* tax for Soong. Both were an undesirable part of China's old financial system that had no place in his long-term plans for China, but in the short run it would be insane to pass up a source of revenue as rich as opium. This was not an unusual position. As the years went by, however, Soong was one of those who began to look at ways to rationalize government control over the trade. He studied the Japanese opium monopoly in Taiwan, and was behind at least one attempt at a national opium monopoly. This was a very practical position. As long as the government was unable to suppress the trade someone was going to profit from it, it might as well be Nanjing.¹¹ This was clearly a cogent argument, but it was one the more moralistic Chiang Kai-shek was never entirely comfortable with. Still, Soong remained an influential spokesman for a more progressive opium policy, and a group of officials, who specialized in opium, gained power inside the government.

The chief supporter of a revolutionary policy was Chiang Kai-shek himself. As many observed at the time, all important decisions in the Nationalist government were made by him.¹² Unfortunately, determining what Chiang actually thought about a problem is quite difficult; he preferred to remain a mystery, even to his closest advisors. To the extent his thoughts about China's needs can be deduced from his actions, however, he was no technocrat. He returns again and again to the moral character of the Chinese people as the key to national reconstruction. He could thus be argued into a strict policy against opium fairly easily. This was more than a conflict between personali-

ties or a technical issue of statecraft, however. In order to present itself to the League of Nations as a modern state China would have to have some sort of opium suppression policy, and in order to present themselves to Chinese opinion as the creators of a new China the Nationalists would have to present some sort of program for opium suppression. The Nanjing government would thus have to balance their need to create national and international legitimacy with the need to control the opium trade's profits to support the building of a revolutionary state.

1927: NANJING'S FIRST ATTEMPT AT AN OPIUM MONOPOLY

The conflict between revolutionary and revenue opium policy became apparent even before the Northern Expedition ended. Although Guomindang propaganda did not emphasize the opium problem, many felt that Nationalist forces would take immediate steps against opium, as this seemed to go along with their promise of creating a modern China.¹³ During the Northern Expedition, the mere approach of Nationalist troops was enough to send some opium dealers scurrying for cover.¹⁴ The Anti-Opium Association was also enthusiastic and was willing to meet the GMD more than half-way. When Nationalist troops arrived in Fujian they were given by a petition from the Anti-Opium Association's Fuzhou branch that called for strict opium suppression. When the Wuhan government was established, Garfield Huang (Huang Jiahui) and Zhong Ketao of the Association went to Wuhan and petitioned for rapid suppression. They were told that the new government took the problem seriously, but action would have to await military re-unification. When the GMD split, Huang attempted to present a similar petition in Nanjing, but was not received. The Anti-Opium Association did manage to get a sympathetic hearing from some lower-level party officials, particularly in the Shanghai area, and it tried to put public pressure on the Central Committee by issuing a manifesto calling on the government to formulate a policy in keeping with Sun Yat-sen's total opposition to the trade. The manifesto stressed, however, that these demands were non-political in nature, and that despite what critics had said, the Anti-Opium Association was an apolitical organization.¹⁵

At the same time that Nanjing was publicly moving closer to the position of the Anti-Opium Association, some members of the government were trying to maintain the revenue base that opium provided. Among the laws passed in March there were rules for the establishment of *jiancha yanmiao ju* (Provincial Poppy Inspection Departments), which were intended to tax poppy production. Although the Nationalists had long been involved in the opium route running through Guangxi, now it became possible to get involved in the Yangzi

river trade, currently dominated by the *Lianghu teshui chu* (Hunan-Hubei Special Tax Office) in Hankou.¹⁶ After the Northern expedition the Hankou office was in the hands of the Guangxi clique, who would retain it until 1929.¹⁷ The wholesale trade in Hankou was the source of most of the opium sold in Shanghai, and it was not only very profitable, it was also less public than retail sales and therefore less likely to attract criticism.

On July 24, 1927, the official Guomin News Agency announced that the Ministry of Finance was establishing a *jinyan ju* (Opium Suppression Bureau), headed by Political Study clique member Li Jihong.¹⁸ This was to be a nationwide organization which would absorb all existing provincial and local anti-opium organizations. The bureau would appoint representatives to serve in Fujian, Anhui, and Guangdong, but the main effort would be in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, two provinces where opium was to be monopolized and smokers licensed. Opium sales and taxes would be handled by a private company for the first year and handed over to the government in 1929. On August 11, 1927, a progressively higher opium tax, reaching 200 percent over three years, was announced with the stated goal of reducing demand so that smoking could be completely eliminated in three years. This was a typical *yujin yuzheng* (suppression through taxation) plan. The new regulations also called for the immediate end of poppy cultivation in all areas controlled by the National government, but since Zhejiang and Jiangsu produced very little opium this was hardly relevant.¹⁹ Nanjing seems to have expected opposition to its opium plans, since the new laws were never officially promulgated and never appeared in the *Government Gazette*.

This plan was the beginning of a long process of institutionalization of the opium trade. Whatever the ups and downs of Nanjing's opium policy, there was a secular trend towards increased regularization and greater government control. What the Guomindang did in 1927 was no different from what any warlord would do in a new territory. Right from the beginning, however, the Nationalists envisioned a comprehensive system of opium control beyond anything the warlords had attempted.

The Opium Suppression Bureau would, in theory, control opium from the grower to the consumer. Offices were to be set up in the areas where opium was grown and forward it to urban markets. Under the Canton system, merchants were encouraged to buy government opium, but even if they managed to acquire it through other channels, they could pay the tax and have it legalized. Under the new system, transport was to be centralized, and while local merchants could purchase outside opium, shipping would be handled by the bureau. A special opium police and detective force was to be set up to protect shipments and detect illegal traffic. Each province was to have from one to three of these detachments, with three hundred men in each detachment.²⁰ Opium retailing was to be handled by licensed merchants, but in theory this was turned over to the government after the first year. The only part of this plan

that was carried out was licensing local opium merchants but all of these later steps became part of later opium control plans.

THE MONOPOLY IN JIANGSU AND ZHEJIANG

The opium farm for Zhejiang and Jiangsu was sold to the Yuan Ding company for one and a half million *yuan* (paid in installments) for the year. The company promptly gave up the rights to two subordinate companies, the Xin Yuan company in Jiangsu and the Zhong Xing company in Zhejiang.²¹ These two companies in turn tried to subcontract their rights to local firms. The companies were given the right to set up *jiéyān yào zhuānmai jú* (Opium Medicine Monopoly Sales Offices). These offices had the right to sell tax stamps and opium sales licenses and to sell the “anti-opium medicine” to the actual retail opium merchants. The merchants who bid for the right to open local retail sales offices were expected to be local people willing to give a commitment to sell a given amount of opium per month. They had the right to sell opium smoking licenses, licenses for opium smoking establishments, and temporary smoking licenses to be sold by restaurants and hotels. Smoking licenses were to be sold only to those over twenty-five who declared that they were addicted, and would cost three *yuan* a month for merchants, gentry, and women, and one *yuan* a month for the poorer classes, with temporary permits available for thirty cents a day.²² Local offices also had the right to arrest anyone who violated the opium laws, but punishment was left to the government’s Opium Suppression Bureau.²³ In theory the licenses in Zhejiang were temporary, and the trade was to be gradually eliminated over three years.²⁴

Administration of the law was quite confused. It was often not clear whether the merchant’s Anti-Opium Medicine Monopoly Sales Office or the official Opium Suppression Bureau had authority over a particular area. In important cities like Shanghai both offices were set up. The Opium Suppression Bureau took the lead in publicizing and enforcing the law, while the Monopoly Sales Office quietly sold the opium.²⁵ In smaller towns without a Suppression Bureau, the Monopoly Sales Office would do everything. The system was set up fairly slowly, with many areas not getting offices of any sort until fall. That the goal of the regulations was revenue rather than suppression was fairly obvious. The two qualifications for getting a retail license from the Monopoly Sales Office were familiarity with the district and promising to sell as much opium as possible. Merchants were to commit themselves to a quota which they were required to buy whether they sold the opium or not. Opium in excess of quota would be provided at a five percent discount. Officially, the Monopoly Sales Offices were only to keep 10 percent of license fees and opium sales plus 50 percent of any illegal opium they seized. Given the

high fees that they had paid (the Hangzhou concession for the various taxes was sold separately for a total of three-hundred thousand dollars)²⁶ the merchants were clearly not planning to limit themselves to the amount they could make under the regulations. Most of the retail merchants were willing to sell to anyone, license or not, and there is no evidence that smoking licenses were ever issued.

OPPOSITION TO THE MONOPOLY AND THE THREAT TO NANJING'S LEGITIMACY

The new monopoly was resisted by all the same forces that would resist later plans. The monopoly required co-opting the old semicriminal opium system, but Du Yuesheng and his associates were unwilling to accept the terms of the Nationalist system. Of course, the Anti-Opium Association opposed the plan because it was intended to create a permanent source of revenue, and while the Anti-Opium Association did not have direct power, it could challenge Nanjing's legitimacy both in China and internationally. Local and provincial governments also challenged the system, either (like the Association) because it seemed to be betrayal of revolutionary promises or (like the gangsters) because they wanted the money for themselves.

After the withdrawal of warlord troops, the opium trade in Zhejiang and Jiangsu was quickly been taken over by locals. Having few resources and no connections they could be dealt with easily enough, but Shanghai was another matter. Du Yuesheng and his Green Gang controlled the opium trade in Shanghai, and had no desire to give it up.²⁷ Chiang Kai-shek was willing to grant others rights in Du's territory he was not willing to act to enforce them. Du had originally been connected to the Yuan Ding company, but dropped out of it early on. He intended to maintain his own opium network in the French concession, and did so, relying on the Navy for his supplies of opium. The government proved to be unwilling to enforce the Shanghai monopoly. Even when the companies caught smugglers themselves, the government would not necessarily act against them. On at least one occasion, over five hundred cases of Persian opium were actually returned to the smugglers by Bai Zhongxi, who was then in charge of Shanghai.²⁸ Chiang Kai-shek was unwilling to defy Du to enforce the monopoly he had sold, and so the most lucrative markets in the two provinces were closed to the monopoly. The opium merchants tried to convince the opium shop owners of Shanghai to come out from under Du's protection and set up shops in the Chinese city under the name of the Tah Cheng Company. Some fifteen to twenty shops had prepared to move when the monopoly was canceled in November of 1927.²⁹

Although Du Yuesheng was an important figure in the Shanghai underworld, his importance should not be overemphasized. Opium lends itself to stories, and one of the most popular in China in the 1920s was the saga of China's Al Capone, Du Yuesheng, who had gone from a Pudong fruit seller to controlling every opium den in China. In reality the Green Gang's involvement in the opium trade was limited to the Hankou-Shanghai stretch of the Yangzi, and the government would make a concerted effort to limit Du to Shanghai. Du eventually had almost complete control of the opium trade in Shanghai, but most of his efforts to expand his power were focused on moving up the ladder of legitimate power in Shanghai, not expanding his control of the opium trade outside the city. Even fairly close to Shanghai, Du's control over the opium trade was quite limited.

The key figure in the opium trade of Anqing, Anhui, for example was Wei Jingqi, a protégé of Du's mentor, Huang Jinrong. Wei served primarily as a traditional broker, handling relations between opium shops and dens, the local government and smugglers. The dens were fairly dependent on him, but he never had anything like complete control of shipments or sales.³⁰ He also had relatively little control over the underworld. When Chiang moved against the Communists in Anqing in April of 1927 he used Green Gang hoodlums, but had to send money to hire them individually.³¹ In Shanghai itself, Du Yuesheng and his Three Prosperities Company controlled opium retailing in the French Concession, and thus most of the opium retailing in the city, but they did not entirely control the wholesale shipments of opium down the Yangzi, nor much of the retailing outside of Shanghai.

In 1927, Du's actions showed that he had already begun moving towards his later role—as a key client of the Nanjing government.³² While opium played a role in this transition, it was not a predominant one. Du eventually came to agreements with the government to market the opium brought in from the west via Hankou, in effect becoming the Shanghai opium farmer. Unlike Huang Jinrong, Du realized that too close an association with drugs would make more legitimate sources of power unavailable. Through these arrangements, Du would maintain control of the Shanghai drug market throughout the Nanjing decade regardless of the twists and turns of national opium policy. He would also remain open to brief opium-related ventures outside of the Shanghai area, such as his wartime attempt to move opium through Hong Kong. As long as his hold on Shanghai's opium market was not challenged, however, he was able to concentrate his energies on moving up the social ladder in Shanghai. While Du's limited ambitions may have been reassuring to T. V. Soong and those in the government trying to make opium a reliable source of revenue, it was cold comfort to the merchants who had purchased the Jiangsu-Zhejiang opium monopoly and who were to be denied the most important market in the two provinces.

THE ANTI-OPIMUM ASSOCIATION'S OPPOSITION TO THE MONOPOLY

It was obvious to everyone that the government was focused on tax revenue rather than eliminating opium. Thus, the Anti-Opium Association could not support the new system. The Association denounced opium as the life blood of warlordism and the new monopoly as a betrayal of Sun Yat-sen's anti-opium will.³³ The Association always assumed, correctly, that it would be nearly impossible for the state to maintain an open opium monopoly in the face of public opposition. The Association also took advantage of its position as a public organization. As the monopoly plan was officially aimed at the eventual suppression of opium, the state could not object to a public-minded organization spreading propaganda that would help the cause. In fact, the Association tried to hijack the policies of the national government. Throughout its history, the Association was never particularly confrontational; it focused on creating a climate of public opinion that would force the state to act the way it claimed it wanted to act. Particularly through its data collection and international activities, the Association assumed the powers of the state.

Although the Association appealed directly to the government, it spent most of its effort stirring up public resistance. It sent telegrams to organizations all over China and overseas (including the League of Nations) denouncing the policy and calling for resistance.³⁴ The movement had an impressive list of supporters, including the Shanghai city and county Guomindang party branches, the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, and various women's, youth, and Christian groups. The culmination of the Association's efforts at mass mobilization were the anti-opium week demonstrations of October 2–9, 1927 in Shanghai. The Association had been holding an Anti-Opium Week every year since it was founded, but this event was larger, and aimed at the government's policy. The purpose was to arouse all parts of society to oppose the opium trade. To this end, there were special days of propaganda focused on families, students, workers, and farmers. There was a law day, and an international day that focused on international aspects of the trade. Posters were made up for each day and posted all over the city, streetcars were decorated with appropriate slogans; flyers were handed out all over town. On each day, members of appropriate organizations took to the streets of the Chinese city and the International Settlement and spoke to people about opium. How effective this was is open to question, but at least one citizen was moved by the presentation to confess his addiction and gave witness to the passersby explaining the degradation that opium addiction brought. Each day would end with a mass meeting, or meetings, if a large enough hall was not available, and an evening radio talk about opium and the group of the day.

The mass meetings followed what by then was a typical format for anti-opium meetings. A stage was set up with the national and party flags and a portrait of Sun Yat-sen. The meeting members would bow to Sun, and there would be a reading of an appropriate text, sometimes Sun's will, but usually his opium will. Oaths were sworn, and speeches given, usually interspersed with singing and, particularly for children, workers, or women, dramatic performances. The emotional centerpiece of any anti-opium meeting was the burning of seized opium, or opium pipes, or illegal drugs. In some cases, as after a large seizure, the meeting was adjunct to the burning of a large amount of contraband. In most cases, as with Anti-Opium Week celebrations, the amount burned could be tiny, but it was symbolically important enough that it could not be skipped. Meetings would often end with a public march that confirmed the members' commitment.

While the meetings encouraged support, they could not effect a really wide audience. The radio addresses may have reached a large area, but access to a radio set was limited. Newspapers printed special editions, but these were limited to the literate. It was essential to get the message to the very lowest levels of society, implicitly, the source of the problem. The way to do this was through entertainment. Shanghai's workers and shopkeepers were not going to show up for long lectures on the evils of opium, so the message would be brought to them in a form they could understand. Displays of photographs were common, and like the radio addresses, must have given the movement a cachet of modernity. More traditional methods were also used, including street plays and singing. Movement members were encouraged to lead movie audiences in anti-opium songs during intermissions. There was also a series of official posters, tied to the themes of the individual days of the Anti-Opium Week. The anti-opium message was targeted directly to individual groups, each with their own duties in the struggle, and each with their own day.

Jiating (family) day was focused on women, the mainstay of the family. Women's group members were to go door-to-door talking to women and explaining to them the damage opium did to the family both morally and economically. Women were urged to cure their husbands who smoked, (although they were not told how) and girls were discouraged from marrying opium users.

Xuesheng day (students') was aimed both at college-level students, and middle- and lower-school students. College students were called on to show the spirit of May 4th and intervene in national affairs the way the 1919 students had.³⁵ According to the Anti-Opium Association it "went without saying that leadership in any national movement has to lie ultimately in the student class."³⁶ All students were to participate in essay writing and public speaking contests, and the youngest students were to see plays in which

representatives of the four classes explained the harm of opium. Students at Shanghai Baptist College, on the other hand, endured a two hour lecture on "Opium Scourge from the Standpoint of Sociology."

Worker's and Farmer's Day focused on the overseas Chinese who were being drugged for the profit of the imperialist powers, and on the supposed unwillingness of the Chinese farmer to plant poppy unless forced to do so. Merchants day aimed at convincing the merchant class to avoid the opium trade and those who participated in it. Law day focused on encouraging officials to enforce the laws, and detecting and punishing those who did not. International day focused on the international opium treaties, and especially the public monopolies which sold opium to the overseas Chinese in the foreign colonies.³⁷

The bulk of Anti-Opium Week activities in Shanghai were aimed at public education, but many of the speeches urged the government to abandon the opium monopoly. The Anti-Opium Association was remarkably coy about blaming the government for profiting from opium. Very few representatives of official anti-opium organizations showed up at the various functions, but those who did come were treated well, and there were no outright accusations of bad faith on the part of the government. The three main demands of the demonstrations were for the government (1) to prohibit planting of poppies that fall; (2) to prevent foreign drugs from entering the country; and (3) to use revenue from opium suppression only for further opium suppression. This last demand is crucial to understanding the Association's position. They did not ask Nanjing to eliminate the trade overnight, nor did they ask the state not to make money from it. The state had to convince its critics it was sincere in its desire to eventually end the trade. By dedicating the revenue of opium control to the task of opium suppression, opium money was separated from its evil associations and decoupled from the regular budget.

The official slogans for the week called on the people to support the government's announced goal of eliminating opium within three years, and blamed the problem on corrupt officials and dishonest merchants. The Anti-Opium Association was not attacking the government, but trying to influence it. The Association told merchant organizations to tell their members they could show their support for opium suppression by flying the national and party flags throughout the week. The Association did not entirely oppose the idea of an opium monopoly, as shown in its call for using the profits from the opium tax only for opium suppression. What the Anti-Opium Association wanted was evidence that, despite the current problems the government's intentions were pure. The key to this was to abandon the merchant-managed monopoly. On the other hand, despite the Association's reluctance to openly attack the government, its references to unspecified corrupt officials as traitors to the Chinese people showed the possibility of real trouble if the Association became convinced of the government's bad faith.

How effective any of this education was is open to question. In the short run, the Association was able to make the government's plans for a monopoly unworkable. In the longer run the record is mixed. The Association would continue to publish reams of propaganda throughout the early 1930s, until its tone could be easily parodied. This probably had some effect in changing people's attitudes, but more importantly it probably helped set the terms that opium was debated in.

The national effect of the supposedly national anti-opium campaign was also limited. The Association claimed to have established over four hundred branches around the country. The goal of creating the branches was to put pressure on local and provincial governments to carry out strict suppression, just as the national association was doing in Shanghai. This goal was only partially achieved. There were scattered but sometimes substantial activities all over the country. Anti-Opium week was observed in some form in many places. The association claimed that the movement was taking place in thirty-seven cities in twelve provinces. The model was the multiday extravaganza in Shanghai, which was reproduced in at least Ningbo and Taiyuan.³⁸ In Suzhou, Hangzhou, and Nanjing, large crowds were assembled to hear reports on the activities in Shanghai, but there does not seem to have been a substantial observance in these cities.³⁹ This was probably the more regular pattern. The branches were thus doing the same things the national association, but less effectively. They had managed to place opium on the national ceremonial calendar, and throughout the history of the Republic of China Anti-Opium Day would be set aside for speeches by politicians, essay contests for schoolchildren, public rallies, and pointed editorials criticizing government drug policy. They had far less success, however, in making opium suppression part of the day-to-day policy of government, or in establishing the Association as a watchdog group with oversight over opium policy. As far off as Yunnan and Shanxi the association's branches published journals and participated in policy debates, at least for a while.⁴⁰ However, real influence over local policy was limited. A few governments announced new anti-opium laws, perhaps in response to the Association's efforts, but there was no change in actual opium policy.⁴¹

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND PARTY OPPOSITION TO THE MONOPOLY

The Anti-Opium Association's protests were annoying and potentially embarrassing, but in the short run they were not as threatening as the opposition of Nanjing's own supporters. Local government and party branches as well as local militarists could and did raise the issue of opium suppression to embarrass the government. This could either be an attempt to maintain the

autonomy of their own regional opium systems or a more serious attack on the central government's credentials.

Guangdong province's response to the monopoly is typical of the propaganda options Nanjing's policy opened for rivals. In August 1927, the government of Guangdong province announced an end to its opium monopoly, claiming that the plan for gradual suppression had not worked. The monopoly had been selling six-hundred thousand ounces a month, and remitting two-hundred forty thousand *yuan* a month in taxes to the government, but smoking was not being reduced and it was unacceptable for the government to be simultaneously condemning opium and profiting from it.⁴² A new system was set up (though it was not given the publicity that the cancellation of the old monopoly was given) in which the monopoly was run directly by the government. Taxes increased geometrically—up to 1200 percent after fourteen months—and stiffer penalties, up to death or life imprisonment, were imposed.⁴³ The new taxes were pure propaganda, because they were never imposed. The main purpose of the regulations was to bring the trade under direct government control, just as Nanjing was planning to do. Opium sales went on as before, and the government continued to get revenue out of them.⁴⁴ Despite this, Guangdong's declaring an end to its opium monopoly constituted an attack on Nanjing's legitimacy and the independence of the new system was an attack on its revenue.

The governments of Zhejiang and Jiangsu were more important. These were the only two provinces the central government really controlled, and in both of them local party branches and the government rebelled against Nanjing's opium policy. This was an aspect of a general dissatisfaction with Nanjing's lack of revolutionary fervor, but in part also a specific reaction to the government's opium policy. Nanjing was betraying the revolution, and they were also monopolizing one of the best sources of revenue for the central government. Nanjing had made no real effort to collect the land tax, and would rely on commercial taxes to finance its operations. The opium monopoly was only one of several imposed in 1927. In form, the opium monopoly was not terribly different from tobacco or alcohol monopolies, but it proved far easier to resist.

Resistance came first in Zhejiang. The province produced very little opium, and local elites had always prided themselves on their success in suppressing opium and drug use. Prior to 1927, there was apparently no opium monopoly in Zhejiang and the new system amounted to bringing opium into the province for the first time. The Ministry of Finance reported strong local opposition to sales of anti-opium medicine right from the start.⁴⁵

Local and county level party branches organized the *zhejiang fandui yapien gongmai weiyuanhui* (Zhejiang Committee to Oppose Public Sales of Opium), which petitioned the government to rescind existing laws. The Zhejiang radicals also took legal action against opium monopoly offices. The Monopoly Bureau had an odd legal status. It had been created by a declaration by the

Ministry of Finance, and the authority of the opium licenses it sold came from that ministry. The criminal code, both old and new, forbade any opium smoking. In both Zhejiang and Jiangsu, lawsuits and petitions demanded clarification. Monopoly Office opium shipments were seized by local police, and offices were accused of selling pure opium rather than “anti-opium medicine.”⁴⁶ The army and navy seized official opium shipments, and wrangled with the Opium Suppression Bureau over the disposition of seized shipments.⁴⁷

The behavior of the local Opium Suppression Bureaus encouraged opposition. Many of the local bureau officials were warlord-period officials attracted by the power that the office entailed. Several offices were accused of using their troops and jails to imprison people and demand bribes, and in some cases substantial opposition was organized to combat the exactions of the Opium Suppression Bureau offices.⁴⁸

There were many groups that opposed Nanjing’s opium policies. The policy was a financial threat to many, especially Du Yuesheng. It was a threat to China’s national purity and a betrayal of the revolution, and was also easy to resist the policy, since Nanjing could not really use either force or words against anyone who criticized or interfered with its workings. Despite the weaknesses of Nanjing’s position, its opponents were not able to come up with a clear alternative.

Ma Yinchu of Zhejiang was the most important anti-opium agitator. After 1949, Ma became famous as a critic of Chairman Mao’s population policies, but in 1927, he was already well-known as China’s leading modern economist. Ma would later become completely disgusted with the hypocrisy of the government’s opium policy, which he said led to the “degeneration of the virtue of the Party-state.” But at this point, he tried to reform the system.⁴⁹ During late 1927 and early 1928, Ma spoke out repeatedly on the problem and attempted to encourage resistance to the central government’s opium policy. Although most of his speeches were given in Zhejiang, the Anti-Opium Association journal discussed them, and they received coverage in the Shanghai papers. Ma stressed that he was speaking as a professor of economics, not as a member of the party or government, but he spoke to party audiences and attacked government policy in a way that made his speeches a political matter.

Like most of the critics of Nanjing’s policy, Ma was not totally opposed to the idea of licensing smokers and a government monopoly. He spoke with guarded approval about the monopoly system initiated by the Japanese in Taiwan. The Japanese were not concerned with preserving the moral character of the Chinese people, but their system was aimed at controlling a social evil, rather than revenue. The problem with the system Nanjing had forced on Zhejiang was not that it monopolized opium, but that it did not do so completely. Under the Japanese system, all aspects of the trade—transport, refining, and sales, were totally in the hands of the government.⁵⁰ In Zhejiang, the wholesale monopoly was farmed to the Zhong Xing company. Local dealers were licensed for retail

sale and given minimum sales quotas. The company was obviously trying to sell as much opium as possible to make a profit, but the Finance ministry was also bolstering sales. The opium farm had been sold for only 1.5 million *yuan* a year, and the retail licenses for 400,000 *yuan*, but the ministry estimated that the ad valorem tax of 70% could bring in the total income to 6.4 million.⁵¹ The bulk of Nanjing's profit was based on how much opium was sold, and thus created the motive for both increasing sales and maintaining price. Nanjing decreed that prices could be reduced only under special circumstances, and warned that failing to meet sales quotas would result in the loss of license.⁵² The revenue from opium suppression was supposed to be used to complete the Northern Expedition, with the implication that once the expedition was complete, the tax system would be abolished. Ma found this scenario unlikely, and pointed out that modern economists saw the *likin* tax as one of the major causes of China's economic backwardness. *Likin* had been introduced by Zeng Guofan to pay for suppressing the Taiping, but it had never been abolished. Ironically many opium suppression officials sent to Zhejiang were in fact former *likin* officials.⁵³

While Ma was critical of the central government's opium policy, his own thoughts on the matter were neither very clear nor very encouraging. He was willing to take the Japanese monopoly on Taiwan as at least a partial model. He believed that rapid prohibition of opium would only lead to the increase in the use of other drugs, as had happened in Shanxi.⁵⁴ Eliminating the problem was something that could not be separated from the larger project of rebuilding China. Opium suppression would require economic growth to the extent that poor peasants would no longer be tempted to cultivate poppies, and an improved transport system would sell other goods, besides low bulk/high value opium, on the national market. The government had to be reformed so that there were no more corrupt police, and the educational system had to be reformed because so many current opium smokers had been led astray by the poor example of their parents. At the beginning of his lecture tour, Ma told his audiences that the government's plan could not end opium use in thirty years, much less three years as claimed. By the end of the tour, he had come to the conclusion that suppression might well take thirty years no matter what methods was used. Ma agreed with the system of government controlled sales and gradual suppression, but he had lost faith in the government's claims that the system was temporary. Ironically, Ma's criticism was quite encouraging for the government. He was a member of the urban elite (exactly the group the Nationalists wanted to win over), and he had, in effect, convinced himself that the government's policy was unavoidable.

Chiang Kai-shek's various critics in the central government also failed to serve as the white knights of the anti-opium movement. Chiang was forced to resign in August 1927, and until his return, the government was run by a group centered on Wang Jingwei.

In September 1927, the *Zhejiang gonghui* (Zhejiang Association) petitioned the Wang Jingwei's *Guomindang zhongyuan tebie weiyuanhui* (Guomindang Special Central Committee), the central organ of the attempted new regime in Nanjing, to reform the system and abolish public sales of opium. Wang blamed the current system on the Central Executive Committee, in other words, Chiang Kai-shek, but proved unwilling to undo Chiang's work. The Special Central Committee agreed that the monopoly merchants had behaved shamelessly, in violation of both Sun Yat-sen's opium will and the principles of opium suppression. Indeed "things that even the warlords dared not do are being done under the flag of the white sun and blue field." The committee hoped to be able to supervise the various comrades in firmly and resolutely reforming the government's anti-opium methods.⁵⁵

Given Wang's opposition to Chiang Kai-shek this was remarkably timid. The committee did not condemn the principles of the previous plan, nor the honesty of Chiang's government with regard to opium. The blame lay entirely with the dishonest opium merchants. While Wang had no doubt welcomed the anti-opium movement's criticism of Chiang, now that he was in power he wanted to supervise the movement. What exactly this would mean was not yet clear, but Sun Ke, (Sun Fo) Sun Yat-sen's son and the Minister of Finance, was attracted to the idea of profiting from opium. Although he wanted suppression over a short time period, he was not willing to commit all the earned opium money to opium suppression, suggesting only that most of the revenue from suppression should be used for anti-opium education. Given that the new regime was soon to take over opium sales directly, they were in no position to start a rhetorical attack on Chiang Kai-shek's opium policy.

Without powerful support in the central government, or a clear substitute, the anti-opium movement was unable to force a change in policy—but they were able to make the monopoly unworkable. In November 1927, discontent with Nanjing's opium policy was almost universal, and the government was unable to do anything about it. Nanjing could sell the right to sell opium to merchants, but they could not possibly act against local governments or others who violated the monopoly. In the instructions it gave to the owners of the Zhejiang monopoly, the Ministry of Finance tacitly admitted its inability to protect licensees. If their opium shipments were seized by the army or navy, the Finance Ministry would try to negotiate its return, but that if they were unable to do so, the licensee's sales quota would be reduced accordingly.⁵⁶ The purchasers of the opium monopoly were unhappy when they found out but the government was equally unhappy with the situation, especially since revenue from the monopoly system was unsatisfactory.

It is impossible to determine how much money the government and its members were making from shipping opium and protecting opium shipments, but revenue from opium taxes and licenses was disappointing. The Anti-Opium

Association reported total income from opium for the period of June 1927, to May 1928, amounted to only four million four-hundred thousand *yuan*.⁵⁷ Nanjing had to change its policy or win over the local governments. It tried to do both, but at this point, things were slipping out of Nanjing's control. Some provinces were setting up rival opium suppression bureaus, and in all areas there were disputes between opium suppression and anti-opium medicine monopoly sales offices. The monopoly merchants sold the various rights they had purchased to a dizzying array of subcontractors, which only made matters worse. Corrupt opium officers used the considerable powers of their offices to enrich themselves, and only a trickle of money flowed to Nanjing.

Part of this was to be expected, but the nature of opium made enforcing central control all the more difficult. No other policy had a large and untouchable critic like the Anti-Opium Association, and opium was an issue that could be counted on to attract the attention of the public. It became impossible for Nanjing to move openly against local forces who refused to fall in line with central opium policy. The financial losses from sticky-fingered suppression officers were frustrating, but the political cost of arresting them and bringing them to trial would be intolerable. Thus, Nanjing began moving towards wholesale trade. Most importantly, it had to take control of the discourse on opium and opium suppression. The government realized it needed to control both the definition of the opium problem and appropriate solutions to it. The issue was a powerful tool for opponents and a powerful way to resist central government orders for subordinates in Nanjing to ignore it.

CANCELLATION OF THE MONOPOLY AND GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF THE TRADE

In November 1927, Nanjing announced the abolition of the monopoly. The merchants who had purchased the monopoly were accused of failing to make their payments to the central government; trying to make a profit rather than suppressing opium; of selling opium rather than anti-opium medicine; of attempting to bribe officials to maintain the monopoly; and of making unspecified threats against officials in charge of the system. Their deposit was forfeited, and the opium still in the shops was to be confiscated by the government. The system of licensing and gradual reduction over three years was to continue, but it was administered directly by the Opium Suppression Bureau. However, while the Opium Suppression Bureau gained important new powers, it lost its often-abused right to try and sentence opium offenders. Civilians were tried by the regular courts and military personnel tried by a regular courts-martial. All rules for licenses and opium taxes were decreed directly by the bureau of finance, and only the Bureau would have the power to change the rules or make exceptions.⁵⁸

The merchants of the original monopoly accused the government of dishonesty, and claimed that the real reason the monopoly was being canceled was that a group of Swatow merchants had made a better offer. There may have been some truth to this, since later Chiang's opium affairs would largely be handled by the Swatow opium merchants, who had been pushed out of Shanghai with the rise of Du Yuesheng.⁵⁹ The new system would not be a farmed monopoly, however. It had become apparent that opium farms were ideologically indefensible, at least in major cities like Shanghai.

At almost the same time the government was canceling the monopoly, the governments of Zhejiang and Jiangsu were moving to take over their provincial anti-opium bureaus. In November, the provincial government of Zhejiang appointed its own representative to run the provincial opium suppression bureaus under a new set of rules. On paper at least the Zhejiang system was clearly different. The provincial government recognized that there were currently no effective opium cures on the market; until these could be developed and produced, hard-core addicts would be allowed to purchase opium. This phase was for six months, and was limited to those who could provide medical proof of their addiction. All aspects of this trade were carefully recorded, and the final disposition of all opium was to be reported to the provincial government.⁶⁰ Thus the opium trade in the province would be placed in carefully defined government-controlled channels. Opium prohibition work would be carried out by district magistrates, as advised by a local opium suppression committee containing members of the party and government and local private organizations as well as a representative of the provincial Anti-Opium Bureau. The provincial bureau was to be under the authority of the *min zheng* (Civil Affairs Department), not Finance. All opium suppression revenue was to be used for administering the opium laws and setting up clinics to treat users, with any excess being sent to Nanjing. Special courts were to be set up to deal with officials who violated the law, but otherwise legal matters were to be handled in normal courts.⁶¹ Public opinion in Zhejiang also called for more anti-opium education, a reduction in opium prices so that poor addicts could afford to join the scheme, and subsidies so that they could afford residence in opium clinics.⁶²

Zhejiang set up a new provincial Opium Suppression Bureau, yet the old office continued to operate and the loyalties of most local offices were uncertain. Nanjing clearly could not use force to take control of the system. Persuasion was not impossible because the Zhejiang system was not too different from that of Nanjing. Zhejiang had rejected tax farming, but so had Nanjing. Zhejiang was opposed to opium as a regular source of revenue but it intended to sell opium and expected a net profit from the arrangement. Zhejiang favored much tighter government control over the transit and sale of opium but this did not present a serious problem either. Negotiations between the two sides were concluded in February, when T. V. Soong came to Hangzhou to finalize a deal.⁶³

The agreement was announced by Ma Yinchu on February 21st. A new provincial Opium Suppression Bureau head was appointed by Nanjing. He was Yu Wenxian, a medical man and expert in public health. His office absorbed both opium offices, and would be run under the rules established by Zhejiang. The national Finance Ministry and Zhejiang shared authority to revise the rules. Separate opium courts were set up (not under the authority of the Opium Suppression Bureau), the antismuggling teams were given explicit authority to arrest corrupt policemen.

The model was to be Shanxi, where Yan Xishan had had success with a policy that made examples of a few dealers and users as well as a strong propaganda effort.⁶⁴ While Zhejiang won some concessions, opium suppression was still under the Ministry of Finance, which remained committed to a three-year time period for suppression.

T. V. Soong had managed to prevent outright rebellion, but the tide was clearly running against the government. A month earlier, on January 1, Jiangsu had taken over management of opium suppression in the province.⁶⁵ In February, Jiangxi abolished its monopoly.⁶⁶ Other provinces also moved towards unilateral action. In July, Jiangsu called for the abolition of the Opium Suppression Bureau, and in August, Fujian and Anhui took direct control of opium suppression.⁶⁷ Most threatening on December 2, 1927, the Anti-Opium Association gave a banquet in Shanghai in honor of Madame Feng Yuxiang, and Zhang Zhijiang, who was in charge of Feng Yuxiang's anti-opium efforts in Shaanxi. Zhang gave a speech outlining the great success the Feng's Guominjun had had with a program of strict suppression.⁶⁸ As Feng was one of Chiang Kai-shek's most important warlord rivals, this was an obvious threat. When Chiang Kai-shek returned to power in December, he took action to prevent rivals from establishing a strong position on this crucial issue. Soon after, the Association's journal carried a picture of Feng, along with Association officers, and a short address by Feng. He blamed China's opium problem on the warlords, but pointed out that some *gaoji dangyuan* (high party officials) smoked opium and therefore corrupted the revolutionary spirit.⁶⁹

It was in this atmosphere that the government tried to forge a closer alliance with the Anti-Opium Association and work out a policy acceptable to them and to the local governments. Nanjing had apparently abandoned its plans for a national opium monopoly, but it still hoped to retain its involvement in the Yangzi river opium trade. To do this the government would have to pacify the Anti-Opium Association. This was not because the Association was particularly powerful in itself, but because it was the center of the anti-opium discourse that was legitimating the actions of Nanjing's rivals.

In March Nanjing sent a team of officials to Shanghai to meet with the leaders of the Anti-Opium Association and other popular organizations and to examine the situation at the hub of China's opium industry. The two sides seem

to have gotten along well, and it took very little time for the government to convince the Anti-Opium Association representatives of their good will. Most of the negotiations seem to have been regarding technical matters, the basic thrust of the policy was not a matter of contention. Besides new laws, the government would set up an Anti-Opium Commission to supervise all opium-related affairs. Nanjing also agreed to call a national anti-opium conference which would bring together a broad range of opinion and agree on a national policy.⁷⁰

In March and April, the government decreed a new series of opium regulations that it claimed were modeled on those of Zhejiang and the suggestions of the Anti-Opium Association. The three-year suppression period was retained, but the entire system was still controlled by the Ministry of Finance rather than monopoly merchants. The government was still in the business of selling opium but addicts had to have medical approval to buy anti-opium medicine. The new laws were formally decreed, and carefully spelled out the right of the appropriate organs of the Ministry of Finance to transport, store, and sell opium, thus avoiding the legal problems the earlier system had faced. The Ministry of Finance also issued detailed regulations on the issuing of licenses and the stream of seals and documents that were to accompany all legal shipments of opium. The new rules made it possible to keep closer track of the activities of local anti-opium officials. None of these measures were likely to win the Anti-Opium Association over. The goal was still revenue and the system was still being run by the Ministry of Finance. Still, progress was made. The prospect of a national commission and conference that would finally resolve the issue and which would involve the Anti-Opium Association did a great deal to mute criticism.

On July 24, the government decreed the formation of the *Jinyan weiyuanhui* (Anti-Opium Commission). The Commission was in charge of all anti-opium activities in the country, and all local government and private anti-opium organizations were subordinate to it. Although Chiang Kai-shek and the key militarists Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Li Zongren were all on the Commission, they took no interest in its activities, not even showing up for the ceremonies initiating the Commission in Nanjing on August 20th.⁷¹ The Commission was actually run by Zhang Zhijiang, who besides being an associate of Feng Yuxiang, was a Christian. Both of these factors made him acceptable to the Anti-Opium Association. He had recently retired from active politics and was cultivating his interest in the martial arts when he was called on to serve.⁷² While he was not quite as pliant as Nanjing had hoped, he was not the person to openly defy the government's anti-opium policy. Zhang Zhijiang was set to work drawing up the rules for the Commission and beginning preparations for the National Anti-Opium Conference which it was to hold in November.

The Anti-Opium Association was pleased that the government was following its suggestions, but did not intend to be entirely absorbed by the new

organization. After a series of negotiations it was agreed that the relationship between Anti-Opium Association and Anti-Opium Commission would be close but not formally defined. The Anti-Opium Association's inspectorate, which was responsible for collecting and compiling statistics on opium use all over China, was moved Nanjing and be put under the Anti-Opium Commission. Its members were to be put on the government payroll.⁷³ The government had thus taken over one of the more dangerous functions of the Anti-Opium Association, but not entirely extinguished the organization.

The new opium laws decreed by the government on September 10th were all that the Anti-Opium Association could have asked for. The laws of April 1928 were voided, and the Opium Suppression Bureau was ordered to wind up their affairs. Local officials were ordered to use force to prevent any planting of poppy that fall, and as of March 1, 1929, growing, transporting, selling, or using opium or its derivatives was illegal. Officials caught violating these laws were to be given the harshest possible punishment.⁷⁴ Although they had waited until only two months before the National Opium Suppression Conference to do so, the government had at last formally repudiated the idea of an opium monopoly.

The new laws paid immediate dividends for Nanjing. In the first week of October, the Anti-Opium Association celebrated Anti-Opium Week, but instead of using it to rally opposition to the government, the Association announced that its goal was "to make known to the masses of the country the absolute sincerity of the National Government in opium suppression."⁷⁵

The structure of the week was the same as before, with days for separate groups, and targeted propaganda. The scope was also the same. Some local and provincial governments did order general participation in Anti-Opium week, but there are no reports of the semispontaneous activities of 1927.⁷⁶ The Anti-Opium Association sent representatives to Yunnan and Anhui to lead a movement there, and it asked the government to order local officials all over China to conduct similar activities. But in the end, Anti-Opium Week was mainly a Shanghai affair. Again, many organizations participated, and the activities of the various days were better organized and financed (the navy loaned them a sea-plane to drop leaflets). But they drew fewer and less enthusiastic participants. Swearing to avoid opium and to encourage others to do the same was considered tantamount to joining the Anti-Opium Association, and the five hundred or so in Shanghai who sent in signed oaths were urged to form anti-opium societies and to keep in touch with the Anti-Opium Association.⁷⁷ The Association was still the leader of the movement, but it shared the task of organizing the campaign with the new Anti-Opium Commission. More importantly, the high political purpose of 1927 was gone and with it much of the enthusiasm.

The themes of the 1928 Anti-Opium Week both shifted attention away from China and shifted the focus inside China to new targets. The most pub-

licized issue was opposition to the international opium inspection team, connected to the League of Nations, which was to tour the Far East. The Association also heavily criticized the foreign opium monopolies that were selling opium to the Overseas Chinese. This line of propaganda was quite appealing to both the government and the Association, but it also served as a red herring, shifting attention and public anger away from those parts of the opium problem where Nanjing might actually be expected to do something.

Besides focusing attention on external problems, the week also shifted the focus inside China away from mass mobilization.⁷⁸ Since mobilization was no longer the goal, *xuesheng* (student) day was renamed *jiaoyu* (education) day and nobody mentioned the spirit of May 4th. Although both college and lower-school students participated in the events, the tone was similar to the more simplistic propaganda that had been addressed to lower-school students in 1927. Since there was, officially, no more opium trade for merchants to not be involved in, merchant day was dropped. Rehabilitation day was added and local governments were urged to set up clinics for the benefit of the many addicts who were compelled to reform. The final day was Oath-taking day where people were urged to take the pledge in the best temperance tradition. This would obviously appeal to the Christian wing of the movement, but it also connected to a position taken by Hu Hanmin in the closing speech of the National Anti-Opium conference a month later. Hu claimed opium suppression would require dedication from both the people and the government. The government had shown its commitment by passing new laws and setting up the Anti-Opium Committee. The movement should now focus on changing the attitudes of the people towards opium. This was in keeping with Hu's view, that the point of mass organizations was not to control and guide the government, but to transmit the government's will to the people.⁷⁹ The government had done its part by decreeing new laws, now it was time for the people to become morally worthy of the government.

THE NATIONAL ANTI-OPIMUM CONFERENCE

The National Anti-Opium Conference was held in Nanjing in the first week November, 1928. In some respects, it was similar to the other national conferences the government held about this time, such as the Finance conferences, and the Education conference. The stated purpose of each of these conferences was to bring together representatives of all relevant groups to discuss the issue in question and provide guidance to the government. They also served to define the public permitted to speak on this question, and hopefully bring it under control. Conferences were places for the government to publicly address the nation, and have the nation formally approve of the actions of the government.

They were also places where dissenters could potentially embarrass the government, if not kept under control. The 1928 conference was the first successful attempt by the Nationalist government to control and harness the public discourse on opium.

Given that the laws passed in September were all the Anti-Opium Association could hope for, and that there had as yet been little opportunity to see how they would be enforced, the possibilities for trouble from the conference were eliminated before it started. Zhang Zhijiang opened the conference by declaring that the government had turned totally against the policy of monopoly and gradual suppression, and the government was renouncing any attempts to get revenue from opium. The purpose of the conference was to help the government draw up plans to carry out this policy.

The members of the conference were thus called on to assume the government's sincerity regarding opium. The conference spent most of its time debating and passing resolutions, which were intended to become laws, but it was not a legislative body. The conference was representing the people, but the member's only tasks were to collectively ratify the actions of the government and then individually to help carry them out after the conference adjourned. By attending, the members tied themselves to government opium policy.⁸⁰

The statements of Chiang Kai-shek and his representatives at the opening of the conference were an attempt to impose a more favorable reading on the events of the last year which had forced the government to call this conference. In his own speech, Chiang Kai-shek said that the first real hope of opium suppression had come with the establishment of Sun Yat-sen's provisional government in 1912. As evidence of this, Chiang asserted that, outside the foreign concessions, there was no opium in the Southeast or in the lower Yangzi area after the provisional government had been put in place. As warlordism spread across China, so did opium, but in the areas controlled by the GMD the drug was suppressed. Chiang's government was diligent in suppressing opium, and derived no revenue, not a single cash, from opium fines or licenses. Unfortunately for China, many local governments did just the opposite, and the main purpose of this conference was to help Nanjing bring these governments under control.

Rather than dismissing this statement as a pack of lies, it is worthwhile to look at it as a statement of the perception of the opium problem that Nanjing intended to promote. Claiming that suppression had first become possible with the establishment of Sun's government in 1912, it directly associated the issue with the GMD, and echoed the position, of all commentators during the early twenties, that real opium suppression would have to await a strong central government. Asserting that the main sources of the problem were foreigners and recalcitrant local governments, focused attention on Chiang's enemies. Chiang's tone was moralistic, as was usual for anti-opium propaganda (and for Chiang himself). Opium was a moral problem, and those who purveyed it were

morally degenerate and bent on the destruction of the Chinese people. The government, needless to say, was morally pure. This made it easier for the government to involve itself in opium while remaining distinct from its opponents.

As long as the government was not using opium as a source of revenue (which was hard to prove), it could claim to be reluctantly dealing with a social evil in the only way possible. Its essential morality made it different from warlords or foreigners.

In order to condemn Nanjing's opium policy, critics had to deny there was any moral difference between the Guomindang and the warlords, in other words, to throw in the towel on the nationalist revolution, which, in 1928, few members of the urban elite were willing to do. This claim of moral rectitude not enough to legitimate a broader opium monopoly, as the government would discover in 1931. In 1928, however, the government's goal was not a wider monopoly, but burying the issue of opium. The moral interpretation worked well for this.

The general tenor of the conference followed this line. Most of the indignation of the delegates was focused on drugs smuggled in from abroad, extraterritoriality, and foreign concessions, which were said to be the centers of opium distribution in China, and the foreign opium monopolies that sold opium to the overseas Chinese. In an apparent response to the League of Nations inspection team that was due to come to China, the conference called on the government to send its own inspection team to the South Seas to examine the opium situation there. The bulk of the adopted resolutions were technical in nature, suggestions that helped the government carry out its policy. To the extent that the problem lay with the government, it lay with individual, corrupt officials. Two of these in particular, Admiral Yang Shuzhuang of Fujian, and Chen Diaoyuan of Anhui, were singled out, and Yang briefly invaded the conference himself to try, unsuccessfully, to intimidate the delegates.⁸¹

Just as the conference was not going to be intimidated by a lone militarist, the government was not frightened by calls for more anti-opium education, careful registration of druggists, and condemnation of colonial opium monopolies. The government had succeeded in bringing together all the various critics of its opium policy and committing them to a innocuous and harmless position. These actions fooled most people at the time, and misled later scholars as well, but there is considerable evidence that Nanjing never had any intention of honoring its commitments. Soon after the conference was over, the Jiangnan case erupted, revealing that the central government still had connections to the wholesale opium trade. In fact, the government was systematically extending its control over opium suppression organizations and trying to find new sources of opium to supply Shanghai, as well as attempting to find justifications for a return to open monopoly, although none of these things were clear at the time.

THE JIANGAN CASE

The Jiangnan was a steamer belonging to the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company. On the night of November 21, 1928 the Shanghai police received a tip (supposedly from Feng Yuxiang) that the Jiangnan would be landing a cargo of twenty thousand ounces of opium at Nantao. Twenty policemen were dispatched to the pier to intercept the shipment. The Jiangnan and its opium were guarded by forty soldiers armed with rifles, who explained that the opium was under official protection and should not be interfered with. Rather than the police taking the smugglers into custody, they were forced to accompany the smugglers to the French Concession. The police were released soon afterwards, and the opium and the soldiers disappeared into the French Concession.⁸²

The only unusual aspects of the case were the armed confrontation and the subsequent publicity. The shipment and the method of transport were not unusual. At this point, opium shipments had not yet been regularized. The usual method was for a group of investors to purchase the opium upstream, transport it on a steamer either with or without the knowledge of the captain, and then sell it to whoever was going to arrange the retailing in Shanghai.⁸³ The consortium would then break up and another would form. It is therefore impossible to know who was involved in this particular shipment or who in the government was protecting them, but the resolution of the case made it clear that the government was still involved in the wholesale opium trade.

The Shanghai telegraph office held up the story for a few days, but soon it was all over the Chinese press. The Anti-Opium Association called not only for prosecutions in the Jiangnan case, but also for following the trail the opium had taken from Hankou. Who had protected this shipment, who had financed it? Many suspected that T.V. Soong had personally been involved in this shipment, an accusation that was repeated in the Anti-Opium Commission's *Jinyan gongbao* (Anti-Opium Report).⁸⁴ The Association correctly pointed out that unless this trail was followed to the end, the people would lose faith in opium suppression. The government's first act was to suspend the head of the Shanghai police department, Dai Shifu, for revealing the affair. Zhang Zhijiang, head of the new Anti-Opium Commission, was eventually appointed to investigate the case. He announced that he intended to make it a test case of the government's new commitment to opium suppression. The resolution of the case proved to be a good barometer of the government's commitment to opium suppression. After a long wrangle over jurisdiction, a handful of crew members from the *Jiangan* were convicted, but no attempt was made to determine who was behind the shipment. Zhang attempted to resign, but his resignation was not accepted.

The Anti-Opium Association again sent telegrams and organized meetings to demand action on the case. This campaign folded surprisingly quickly, and the failure revealed some of the weaknesses of the Association's position.

From 1928 until the announcement of the Six-Year Plan to eliminate opium and drugs in 1935, the government's involvement in the trade would be clandestine. This did not mean that it was secret. It was an open secret that the government was involved in the trade, and evidence tending to confirm this occasionally came out. These events were of limited use to the Association. In 1927, the government attempted to create a system of opium retailing that was public—undeniable. After 1929, the government's focus shifted to the less public wholesale trade, leaving retailing to the likes of Du Yuesheng. This type of dealing was unlikely to come into the public eye, and if it did it would be very hard for the Anti-Opium Association or anyone else to prove that it was a matter of systemic bad faith on the part of the government.

At the same time the government was using the conference to anesthetize the anti-opium movement, it was using the Anti-Opium Commission to expand its control over the opium trade. Several provinces had *jin yan ju* (Opium Suppression Bureaus) that were not under the control of Nanjing. It is not clear when these were established, or what their exact relationship with Nanjing was, but in late 1928, the Anti-Opium Committee began making moves to extend its control. Jiangxi had a farming system along the lines of pre-November 1927 Zhejiang, but in October 1928, both the Opium Suppression Bureau and the merchants were ordered to turn in their opium for burning and all licenses were canceled. Opium affairs would now be handled by a provincial Anti-Opium Commission, subordinate to the national one.⁸⁵ In January 1929 Zhang Zhi-jiang ordered the Anti-Opium Bureaus of Hubei, Hunan and Hankou combined into one body under his jurisdiction.⁸⁶ It is not clear if Nanjing was able to enforce its will on any of these provinces at this point, but attempts to do so would continue until they were successful.

Besides moving to control more of the opium distribution process, some in the government were also mounting a defense of the monopoly system. In March, H. H. Kung (Kong Xiangxi) gave a major speech pointing to the Japanese opium monopoly on Taiwan as a model method to prevent smuggling and increase revenue. He encouraged the Anti-Opium Association to act as a watchdog group and to educate the public, but saw no contradiction between this role and a permanent opium monopoly.⁸⁷ The National Conference on Government Finance, called by T. V. Soong in July of 1928, made a similar plea for maintaining the three-year plan.⁸⁸ Given the climate of the times, these were remarkable statements; while their attempts had been foiled for the time being, two of the most powerful men in the national government determined to find a way to make opium provide revenue.

While it remained involved in the wholesale trade in opium, the Nanjing government also ignored the resolutions of the National Anti-Opium Conference. The conference had made a large number of recommendations, most of which were never enacted, or even seriously considered. There were some

changes in the opium laws after 1929, and these show a rather different approach than that of the Conference. The Conference had favored a fairly intrusive, active, and expensive system of opium suppression like that of Zhejiang. Basically, Nanjing favored going back to a Qing level of concern with opium. The April 1929 laws had dumped opium suppression on the county magistrates but had given them no new resources to deal with this immense responsibility, effectively sweeping the problem under the rug. . . . In December of 1929, Nanjing issued regulations regarding opium and members of the party, government, and army, as well as students. All members of these classes were to cease opium use at once.⁸⁹ As in the Qing, the quality of the elite classes were the concern of the state, but the masses were not.

Nanjing was also encouraging state involution. On July 23, 1931, Nanjing promulgated a new series of opium-related fines. Opium fines, and those who got the money from them, were a frequent source of friction among anti-opium units, police, and other organizations, and the laws were intended in part to clarify these matters. They were also intended to make opium suppression fully self-financing. Seventy to eighty percent of the total fines were to be split between the accuser in the case, the officials who handled it, and anti-opium work. This would deal with many of the financial problems associated with opium suppression. Rewards would encourage popular and official zeal for suppression, and make it unnecessary for the government to commit regular revenues to opium.

Giving money to anti-opium organizations for propaganda and treatment of addicts was intended to show this was part of a serious attempt to deal with opium, but the Association and the Convention had wanted all the money to go to anti-opium work and none to the government. The 1931 laws were a compromise that at least paid lip service to the idea of opium suppression, and sent the bulk of the revenues somewhere other than the government treasury. Still, the state was effectively abdicating its responsibility to control opium trade, and it left enforcement in the hands of (what were in effect) opium farmers.

From these laws we can deduce a fairly old-fashioned attitude toward opium. Although opium was bad and could not be legalized, as long as it remained within accepted limits, strenuous efforts to suppress it were not called for. Members of the official class should not use opium, and they could and would be inspected to ensure they were not. The lower classes would be encouraged to avoid opium through propaganda and education. But registration of addicts was a dead letter, and there were no attempts to cure them of the habit. Suppression of poppy growing was left to the handful of energetic magistrates who chose to enforce the law. While wholesale opium trading was largely under the thumb of the government, illicit trading was kept within tolerable limits by encouraging informers and officials with rewards. Refined drugs were considered a serious menace, and regardless of expense, active measures would be taken to stop their manufacture, transport, and sale.

In mid-1929 the Nanjing government had succeeded in its opium policy. While the open retail monopoly was beyond reach, opium profits were coming in from the wholesale trade, and this would be expanded. The government had also managed to neutralize the critics of its policy. The Anti-Opium Association was now an official supporter of the government, and for years confined itself to attacking the lack of vigor in opium administration on the part of individual officials. Although the exact terms of the deal with Du Yuesheng are not clear, extragovernmental opium trading continued to be a nuisance, and the main trade on the Yangzi was undisturbed. Nanjing had also managed to defang provincial militarist critics. How this was possible is somewhat problematic. Certainly by 1929 there were plenty of militarists ready to criticize Nanjing on almost any issue. Why was opium not a key part of this? In some cases, like the Guangxi clique, the regional militarists were too deeply compromised to bring the issue up. The warlords with better opium records like Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang were formally in Chiang Kai-shek's camp. Still, the reasons may go deeper than this. The audience for a critique of Nanjing's opium policy could only be the educated and politically active classes of China. So Wai-chor's research has revealed, however, that at least prior to 1931, this class of people was quite unwilling to accept the nationalist credentials of the regional militarists. So sees the alliance with regional militarists as one of the key factors in destroying the once-considerable nationalist support for the Left GMD.⁹⁰ In 1929 at least, nationalist outrage over opium was a tool that could be used only by Nanjing against the regional powers, not vice versa. Yan Xishan was regarded as one of the most vigorous rulers in China when it came to opium, but the political returns on this policy were so small that in 1932 he abandoned strict suppression and set up an opium monopoly.⁹¹ Furthermore, Nanjing represented China internationally: to embarrass Nanjing was to embarrass China.

Despite its advantages over regional rivals, there were limits to what Nanjing could do, and the 1927–1928 period was the beginning of its attempts to balance its opium policy between the need for revenue and the damage opium did to its legitimacy. All the members of the Nanjing government did not agree on the subject of opium. Chiang Kai-shek was quite ambivalent about opium, and strongly opposed to the morphine and heroin trades. Other leaders like H. H. Kung, and especially T. V. Soong, were eagerly greasing the slippery slope that led to an open opium monopoly, but, despite their considerable influence in financial matters, they never came close to fully realizing the financial potential of opium.

Nanjing's policy was not only conditioned by how vital the need for opium revenue was, but also by the evolution of more effective methods of controlling opium and justifying government involvement in the trade. In 1927–1928 the needs of national reunification called for a more revenue oriented opium policy. By 1929, not only had that need been reduced, the government had found that the wholesale trade offered better profits at less risk. The issue was allowed to

sink into the background, with Nanjing keeping the Anti-Opium Association and the Anti-Opium Commission on a short leash while quietly making money from the Yangzi river opium route.

In the 1930s, opium control would again become an important government goal. Nanjing would both need revenue to defeat the Communists, and deny opium revenues to the western warlords whom it wanted to control. International and domestic pressure was also growing. Nanjing would try two more times to establish a national opium control system. On both occasions they were careful to present their policies in acceptable terms—terms that had been established in 1928.

THE FAILURE OF THE ANTI-OPIMUM COMMISSION

The Anti-Opium Commission had been presented as a sign of the government's commitment to a modern policy of strict suppression. Creation of the Commission had been hailed by the Anti-Opium Association. The delegates at the National Anti-Opium Convention had envisioned the Commission as the central organ for opium suppression in the government. This would provide coherence (rather than having bits of opium policy run by different branches of government), and most importantly for the reformers, it was not under the Ministry of Finance, but under the Interior Ministry.

What exactly the Commission was supposed to do was not made clear in 1928, and Nanjing never gave it any real power. The commission served as a clearinghouse for opium cases, compiled statistics and reports, and made suggestions to the Executive Yuan. After 1935, a new Anti-Opium Commission with much the same powers would serve as the center of an active anti-opium movement, but the 1929–1935 version had almost no impact, since it only had the power to make recommendations to other branches of government, most of whom ignored them.

Particularly in its first few years, the Commission received many complaints about opium and drug trafficking from both the Anti-Opium Association and private citizens. Although the opium trade was semiclandestine at this point, people were still arrested for dealing in opium and drugs, either because they did not have proper arrangements with the police, or because they had been betrayed. Some of these cases received considerable publicity, and many were referred to the Commission for action. By about 1931, however, the number of appeals dropped drastically, as it became clear that the Commission would do nothing.

The first perceivable weakness of the Commission was its lack of information. It did not have a way of determining the facts in any case. In some cases they relied on the newspapers for accounts of important drug cases, but usually

they would pass a case on to the appropriate provincial or local government for investigation and action.⁹² Since it was often just this government that was being accused of wrongdoing this was not going to accomplish much.

Given its degree of impotence, the Commission had no hope of succeeding in its mission. Most of its members became aware of this as early as 1929, when the Anti-Opium Association accused the Commission of failing to carry out its duties and turning China back into the international laughingstock it had been before the 1928 Anti-Opium Conference.⁹³ By the end of 1930, many of the remaining opium activists were purged or left the commission voluntarily. In December, Zhang Zhijiang was removed as head of the Commission. He had always been excessively enthusiastic, and the star of his patron, Feng Yuxiang, was fading. He was replaced by Liu Ruiheng. Liu was Minister of Health until that ministry was abolished in 1931. It was replaced by the *wei sheng shu* (National Health Administration), also headed by Liu. This gave him the public health credentials needed for the job, but since he had been a classmate of T. V. Soong at Harvard and remained closely linked to the family he was unlikely to interfere with Soong's desire for revenue.⁹⁴ Early in 1931, Li Jihong, later head of the Hankou Special tax office, was added. Most of the national politicians, Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yuxiang, and Li Zongren, had left in 1929. The Commission was losing all its committed and powerful members and replacing them with nonentities and monopolists. This was probably part of the run-up to the monopoly plan of 1931, which proved abortive, but with these people in charge it was even less likely that the Commission would even carry out its ordinary duties.

In 1932, Liu complained that the job of the Commission was impossible. Much of the poppy land was in areas outside government control, but even in areas under Nanjing's authority the Commission had no power. All provinces were to have stopped collecting opium taxes by this point, but in Hebei, Suiyuan, Shaanxi, Henan, Anhui and Fujian the opium tax had simply been renamed. In Shanxi, Gansu, Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan and Rehe, all provinces which had traditionally relied on opium taxes, suppression had not even been announced.⁹⁵

In November of 1933, Liu received a joint complaint from the Henan party branch and a local doctor active in opium work about the level of opium activity in China. Liu agreed that the situation was bad. The western provinces were still growing poppy, and Hunan, Hubei, and Henan were still openly collecting opium taxes. Unfortunately his role was only advisory, and his advice usually fell on deaf ears. He compared opium to the *likin* tax, which the government had abolished despite the revenue it brought in because of its harm to the nation. Opium was thousands of times worse than *likin*, but the government could not see what was right in front of its face. Liu suggested that this exchange might be made public, putting the failure of the Commission in the public eye, but it apparently never was.⁹⁶

Despite failure and demoralization, the Commission made headway. Unable to gather information on its own, it continually nagged local and provincial governments to provide it with data. It also made efforts to keep abreast of the opium situation in the provinces. These measures met with at least some success. The original plan created a toothless Commission as a means of controlling the issue and deflecting criticism. The Commission managed to make itself somewhat useful as a collector of information, and it would keep this function under the 1935 Six-Year Plan, but it had completely failed as the coordinator of a national opium suppression movement, since there was no such movement to coordinate. From 1929 to 1935, opium policy was made in the provinces.

THE DECLINE OF THE ANTI-OPIMUM ASSOCIATION AFTER 1929

The Association had considerable success in forcing Nanjing to change its policy, but, as early as the Jiangnan case, it had begun to lose faith in the goodwill of the government. In the 1929–1935 period the Association would continue to push for a stricter opium policy, usually with no success. It would also try to encourage the type of mass enthusiasm it had used so effectively in 1927–1928, thus going over the head of the government. This would prove to have no effect, and the Association was faced with a choice between open and hopeless dissent and grudging acceptance of the government and by choosing the latter it accepted the lapdog role that Nanjing found it useful in.

The last national campaign of the Anti-Opium Association was in 1929. The Association organized anti-opium activities in most of the major cities of China in succession during the spring and summer of 1929. Part of the goal was to fulfill the Association's duties under the 1928 plan, that is, to spread the message of opium suppression to the people and encourage them to follow the government's lead. Another motive may have been to create a nationwide climate of opinion like that in Shanghai which had enabled the Association to affect government policy, hopefully dragging Nanjing back to a more activist policy. The campaign had limited success on the first objective, and none at all on the second.

The campaign was intended to spread the enthusiasm that the Association had created in Shanghai in 1927 and 1928 around the country. This would be done by organizing multiday anti-opium shows along the lines of the anti-opium week in Shanghai. If local anti-opium associations lacked the initiative to organize an anti-opium week, the Association would do so for them, and create or revitalize local branches.⁹⁷ The initiative and most of the planning for the shows came from the Shanghai office of the Anti-Opium Association. They were the ones who set the dates for the shows, and they sent out advance

men to organize them. Posters were put up a few days before the group arrived and local newspapers were asked to publicize it. The program could last five to ten days and featured educational displays, dramatic performances, speech and essay contests for the students, opium burnings, and finally a mass rally where the assembled populace would be addressed by Association leaders from Shanghai and an assortment of local dignitaries. The Association visited larger cities throughout the Yangzi delta and in the Southeast and Northeast.

The tour's rhetoric was predominantly educational. There was some criticism of morphine smuggling out of the Kuangtung Leased Territory during the campaigns in Manchuria, but there was little other criticism of government policy. In his announcement of the campaign, Garfield Huang stressed the importance of the displays of photographs and pictures put together at the Association's Shanghai office in bringing the message of opium suppression to the common people in an easily understood visual form. Simple messages aimed at common people were the whole rationale behind the existence of the Association under the 1928 plan. The Association was supposed to be educating the common people to obey, not rousing the educated to dissent. The Shanghai office and Garfield Huang had already been quite critical of the Nanjing government and its opium policies, but in 1929 the Association was still carrying out the role it had agreed to in 1928, educating the people.

The Association also attempted to use the campaign to extend its permanent organization into the provinces. The Association sent representatives to the targeted cities well in advance to recruit local public organizations, sometimes thirty or forty of them, to organize a committee to make preparations for the local campaign. These organizations would then form the membership of a local branch of the Anti-Opium Association. In compiling its annual reports on the opium problem, the Association relied on data from local branches and from correspondents (often missionaries). In 1929, many new branches were either formed or reactivated, the most important being the Zhejiang branch, organized in Hangzhou in December of 1929.⁹⁸ The goal was to give the organization real national reach, but beyond Zhejiang the provincial and local branches vanished almost as quickly as they appeared.

The new campaign also had very limited results in reducing the opium trade. Propaganda had been able to whip up enough support among the literate classes in Shanghai to force changes on the government, but in the provincial cities the level of public awareness and activism was far lower. The Association managed to turn out good crowds, but never to influence provincial policy or to create self-sustaining local movements. It does not seem to have even made an attempt to influence rural people. The Association did not influence provincial or local policy, and the affects of the campaign on the opium smokers themselves were minimal. In most cases, the effects of the campaign faded almost at once. In May 1930, the British consul in Harbin

reported that the sole remaining effect of the previous summer's campaign in Mukden was that the city's opium dealers were a bit less open in posting prices on the streets.⁹⁹

Without government support, the Association simply could not maintain a national anti-opium movement. Although it may not have been a conscious decision, the Association began to specialize in foreign issues, including the overseas Chinese, publishing, collecting statistics, and occasional complaining about opium problems in specific parts of China, usually Anhui and Fujian, the two opium producing provinces closest to Shanghai.

The foreign focus was natural for an organization of Shanghai Christians, and although there would continue to be branches outside Shanghai the Association slipped back into its position as predominantly that.¹⁰⁰ The Association represented China at various international meetings, (usually Christian rather than government meetings), and tried to keep up good relations with the League of Nations. When the Far Eastern Inspection came to Shanghai over the protests of the Nanjing government, the leaders of the Association expressed their private misgivings, but the association did not oppose the visit.¹⁰¹

The Association also took an interest in and got support from Overseas Chinese organizations. As early as 1926, the Association was getting money from a wealthy New York Chinese to make anti-opium films.¹⁰² This relationship continued down to 1928.¹⁰³ The Association kept in contact with anti-opium organizations in the Philippines, Vietnam, and the Dutch East Indies. They sent representatives to various places to report on the opium situation, received Overseas Chinese opium activists, and in 1930 sent an anti-opium tour overseas.¹⁰⁴

These activities gave the Association international connections and stature and protected it from any government attempts to break it up, and also probably provided some money, but they could not revive the anti-opium movement inside China. To do that the Association focused on publishing and information gathering. They published monthly magazines in both Chinese and English, a biweekly opium update, plays, reports, and posters. They also compiled national statistics. All of these would have been useful in conjunction with a government campaign against opium, but were of little use without it. The propaganda materials could only have an effect if they were used. The statistics were based on provincial and local figures, but since most provinces were either passive about suppression or actually involved in the trade their statistics were worthless. The journals and publications kept the issue in the public eye both in China and abroad, but past this they could do nothing.

The Association tried on several occasions to revive its local branches so that they might lead the local campaigns, but with little success. Many of the Association's local branches had been converted into official anti-opium organizations, after which they became useless.¹⁰⁵ Many others simply stopped functioning. Only in Zhejiang, where the government remained actively

involved in opium suppression, was the Association able to keep functioning. The Association also made some efforts to collect its own information, sending out inspectors to collect information and trying to get district magistrates to send opium suppression data directly to them, but they were unable to do much in this regard either. The association was increasingly unhappy with the government's opium suppression policy, but there was very little that they could do other than complain unless they were willing to break with the government entirely. In September of 1929, the Association's Chinese-language magazine published an attack on the government's opium policy. It pointed out the opium was grown and smoked all over China, that officials were either ignoring or participating in the trade, and that none of the resolutions of the national conference had been carried out.¹⁰⁶ Despite this, the Association did not break with the government or accuse it of more than negligence. The Association had been pushed into a powerless situation and was unable to get out. There were no important political rivals to Chiang Kai-shek that the Association could turn to, no way to bring public pressure on the government, and no mass movement that it could organize to bring pressure. In fact, Nanjing brought pressure on the Association, blocking them from receiving Boxer Indemnity money and ordering the Bank of China to drop its advertisements in their journals.¹⁰⁷

The toothlessness of the Anti-Opium Association was revealed in 1933, when Huang Jiamin, a Shanghai lawyer, tried to form a *zhonghua minzong midu she* (Chinese People's Anti-Drug Society). Huang and his respectable, middle-class associates wanted to help the government stop foreigners and warlords from flooding Shanghai and China with opium and drugs, which they planned to do primarily through public education. It would also collect statistics and report to the government on violations of the drug laws. Huang applied to have his organization registered in October 1933, and spent the next year being investigated and harassed.¹⁰⁸ Chiang Kai-shek took considerable interest in the case. Huang was told that the appropriate organization for anti-opium activities was the Anti-Opium Association, and that if he wanted to do something about opium he and his friends should join the Association. Huang replied that the Association's dues were too high, and that in any case there was no reason there could not be two anti-opium organizations, just as there were countless anti-famine groups. Despite this, Huang's petitions were repeatedly rejected and his organization was never officially registered and seems to have folded some time in 1934.¹⁰⁹

Huang's description of what his society was intended to do is almost a carbon copy of the activities of the Anti-Opium Association, and this explains the government's hostility to it. The antigovernment role that the Association had flirted with in 1927–1928 was still open to others, and Nanjing would pay very close attention to any attempt at creating a new anti-opium organization. The original Association had little power, but its position was comfortable enough

that its leaders were unwilling to openly challenge the government. It served as the equivalent of a yellow union. Even the attempted monopoly of 1931 was not enough to force the Association into open opposition. It was thus quite useful to the government, and continued to exist. The Association gradually faded away, and by 1937 having lost most of its support and financing, it wound up its affairs.¹¹⁰

ZHEJIANG AND THE SUCCESS OF ELITE ACTIVISM

Although the Anti-Opium Commission and the Anti-Opium Association were unable to force Nanjing to carry out a national anti-opium campaign Nanjing had only a limited ability to force its own policy on the provinces. Most provinces took advantage of this freedom to profit from the opium trade, but Zhejiang used its freedom to carry out an anti-opium campaign. Zhejiang had always been one of the leaders of the Anti-opium movement. It was near Shanghai but it was not on any of the main opium routes, and it grew very little opium. Opium was not as much of a problem as it was in many other provinces, and an activist gentry were determined to keep it that way. Zhejiang had been the center of resistance to the planned opium monopoly in 1927–1928, and it would be the only province where the model of activist local government involvement in opium suppression would continue.

Zhejiang was the first province visited by the Anti-Opium Association's tour in 1929, and it was the only place where the method of constant touring to set up and encourage local anti-opium groups was kept up. The *Zhejiang judu hui* (Zhejiang Anti-Opium Association) was re-founded in 1929 and would remain an active force until 1937. Even after the national Association had wound up its 1929 anti-opium exhibition touring schedule, the Zhejiang Anti-Opium Association continued it.¹¹¹

In most other provinces the tour only reached the main cities, and lasted only as long as the national representatives were in town. The Zhejiang Association's 1931 instructions to local activists show a more thorough approach. Well before the tour arrived, a local branch of the Association was set up, or existing anti-opium groups were absorbed into the association. This local branch received anti-opium articles to print in local papers, put up posters, and arranged mass meetings. By the end of 1929, there were at least seventeen *judu xuanchuan tuan* (Anti-Opium Propaganda Teams) in the province. They only had about one thousand full-time members, but the 1929 province-wide *xuanchuan dahui* (Propaganda Convention) drew twenty-five thousand.¹¹²

When the actual tour came to town, there was a flurry of activity. The main event was a mass meeting where opium was denounced by various speakers, former addicts would bear witness to the harm opium could do, and there

would be plenty of singing and usually an anti-opium opera. If necessary, translators were used in areas where dialects were spoken. The opera was a major draw for a lot of people, but if it did not attract enough people to make a respectable mass meeting the ranks should be filled out with school children and soldiers. Besides the events in town *xian judu jiaoyu xuanchuan dui* (County Anti-Opium Education Propaganda Teams) were to be sent out into the villages. During 1929, one hundred of these were formed and were sent out to the villages nine times. The Association estimated that over half a million people had been exposed to the anti-opium message.¹¹³ These tours seem to have continued at least through the end of 1931. By 1931, the tours were less interested in setting up organizations and doing propaganda than in checking up on the work that had already been done.

The provincial government was also active. In August 1932, the provincial chairman addressed a province-wide anti-opium meeting to report on the progress of the last two years. Two years ago the province had one million mou of poppy land, but *te pai yuan* (provincial inspectors) had been sent out and with help from local police had eliminated growing entirely. Growing does not seem to have been on a commercial scale, with most plots being only three or four mou, and there does not seem to have been much peasant resistance to the uprooting of poppies, although on one occasion the police had to fire over the heads of a group of peasants. Nobody seems to have been arrested for growing poppy.¹¹⁴ Drug traffickers were not so lucky, and thirty of them had been executed in the last two years. There were two hundred-eight anti-opium offices, clinics and hospitals, and seventeen factories and handicraft centers for reform of addicts through labor. Total membership of these organizations was over twenty-four thousand.¹¹⁵ Statistics for the last twelve months had been received from seventy of seventy-five counties, and they showed more than fifty-five hundred arrests for opium offenses and over forty-six hundred for other drugs, for a total of 10,173 suspects, of whom eighty-eight hundred were male. Three thousand two hundred twenty-eight of those arrested were fined in local courts and sixty-nine hundred were imprisoned. Total fines came to one-hundred seventy thousand *yuan*.¹¹⁶

All the provinces could come up with anti-opium statistics when required, even when they were doing nothing or actively encouraging the trade, but there are good reasons to take these seriously. Zhejiang had the network of organizations necessary to collect this information, and it was consistently cited by most observers as the one province, along with Shanxi, where opium was being successfully suppressed. There was a network of anti-opium groups all over the province, and all parts of the provincial government assisted in the work of suppression. Given this level of penetration, and the fact that opium was not an important crop in Zhejiang the province did not have to worry about gradualism. There was no system of registration for smokers, no gradual program for eliminating poppy growing.¹¹⁷

It is instructive to compare the Zhejiang totals for the twelve months up to August 1932 to the National Anti-Opium Commission's figures for 1931. The national figures are highly questionable, but in most categories Zhejiang was finding and curing as many opium and drug users as the entire rest of the country.¹¹⁸ The anti-opium hospitals were well equipped and were actually curing addicts rather than selling opium.¹¹⁹ Opium propaganda was being distributed, and Zhejiang's schoolchildren competed in anti-opium essay contests every year.¹²⁰ As elsewhere this success in getting rid of opium led to more imports of refined drugs, in this case from Taiwan via Fujian, but the success of the anti-opium movement was undeniable.

This degree of success made it possible to resist Chiang Kai-shek in 1934, when he moved to put opium suppression in Zhejiang under his control. The Zhejiang government and the Zhejiang Anti-Opium Association opposed the 1931 monopoly plan, and often complained about the almost open opium trading in Shanghai and Jiangsu.¹²¹ In 1933, Chiang Kai-shek tried to include Zhejiang in his new opium marketing system, controlled by the *jinyan ducha chu* (Anti-Opium Inspectorate). The Zhejiang Anti-Opium Association protested, pointing out that they had already had considerable success in suppressing opium, and that this could only be a step backwards. Chiang agreed, and Zhejiang was allowed to continue to run an independent opium suppression policy.¹²² Jiang's Anti-Opium Inspectorate did manage to sell some opium in Zhejiang, but very little. Sixty-eight million ounces of opium were shipped out of Hankou from 1934 to 1940, but only 32,384 ounces went to Zhejiang.¹²³ Zhejiang did not have opium dens connected to the official system nor did it have registered smokers listed in official statistics.¹²⁴ Zhejiang could defy Chiang and get away with it because his policy was morally pure, and thus hard for Chiang to attack, and they had a proven track record of success. By 1935, Chiang had such a record himself and was able to force Zhejiang into his new system, but until then Zhejiang was protected by its success.¹²⁵ Chiang himself admitted this. In 1936, an unpublicized speech to the Military Anti-Opium Commission Jiang singled out Zhejiang as special accomplishment that was anomalous among all the provinces of China.¹²⁶

While the activities of the Zhejiang Anti Opium-Association were modeled on the campaigns of the national Association, the provincial Association was largely independent, and certainly self-financed. The fact that it had the support of the provincial government and local elites also made its programs fundamentally different. The methods of the national association were based on encouraging, and hopefully channeling, mass enthusiasm for opium suppression. The failure of the 1929 campaign demonstrated that this could work only with the support of governments and local elites. In 1927–1928 in Shanghai, the Association had created this support, but during the 1929 campaign the Association's campaigns were limited to the major cities, and even there

were enveloped by the swamp of government and popular indifference. Zhejiang was different. Nanjing had crushed the Zhejiang party's challenge to its political predominance, but in opium policy at least the Zhejiang model of elite and party activism and cooperation lived on. While this would lead to successful opium suppression in Zhejiang it could hardly be used as a model for national opium suppression. The preconditions for success in Zhejiang did not exist elsewhere, and Nanjing was not about to encourage them. The model of opium suppression that would be favored by Chiang Kai-shek was more centralized and relied far less on mass or elite enthusiasm.

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Chapter 6

Hankou, the Anti-Opium Inspectorate, and Control of the Opium Trade

The Nationalist government could see the events of 1927–1929 as partial successes. Although they had been unable to establish a national opium monopoly, they were able to maintain their involvement in the Yangzi opium trade, and this would yield considerable profits over the coming years. There were also reasons to be unhappy with the state of affairs. As the 1931 attempt at a new national monopoly showed, extending state control beyond wholesaling and into smoking was ideologically impossible. While the central government, or more accurately, Chiang Kai-shek's Nanchang Anti-Communist Headquarters, presided over the Yangzi river trade much of the control, and thus much of the profit, was in the hands of others. Provinces with substantial involvements in the opium trade like Guangxi and Yunnan continued to refine their operations. While public sphere organizations like the Anti-Opium Association could not be eliminated, they also could not force substantial change on the government. Zhejiang province managed to craft an opium system that was both practically and ideologically independent of Nanjing. In opium, as in so many other things, Nanjing was in a stalemate with regional power holders. The central government controlled the largest single part of the opium trade, but it was at best first among equals in opium revenue. Its system was more ideologically justifiable than that of some rivals, but not by much. In the years after 1929, Chiang Kai-shek would work to break this stalemate and place himself in a dominant position both economically and ideologically. Both of these goals were achieved through the same set of policies, culminating in the 1935 Six-Year Plan.

Pressure for more action on opium began almost at once. At the party meeting in June of 1929, Dai Zhuoanxiang made three proposals. He suggested that the government call on the foreign powers to eliminate drug smuggling

through the concessions and their colonies, holding a second national anti-opium conference, and dividing the nation into producing and nonproducing areas and suppression opium in each area on a different schedule.¹

The first proposal was polite window dressing. Nobody thought the chief cause of China's opium problem was foreign smuggling, and nobody thought that protests to foreign governments were likely to do any good, but by toeing this line, Dai kept his criticism within bounds. The next two suggestions were more interesting. The suggestion for dividing the country into producing and nonproducing areas would be the basis of the 1935 campaign against opium, although nothing happened with it at this point. The suggestion for a conference was rejected on the grounds that the atmosphere was not right for a conference. There had been a number of conferences right after the completion of the Northern Expedition, but now the conference spirit was lacking. The opium suppression conference had been convened by a popular government and intended to let the government benefit from the advice of its supporters and to let them know what was wanted of them. Soon after the opium conference ended, the Jiangnan case had ruined the possibility of this kind of trust and cooperation over opium. Nanjing was no longer capable of demonstrating its sincerity, and this made it impossible to legitimate any sort of control over the opium trade. Opium was not the only issue where the government lacked the support it had had after the Northern Expedition. The unsuccessful disarmament conference of 1929 had showed quite clearly that the era of good feelings was over for Chiang Kai-shek.² Any future conference on any topic would simply be offering government critics a forum.

Although there was no action taken on these suggestions in 1929, in 1931 it was suggested that the current policy of taxation and gradual suppression be abandoned and that Sun Yat-sen's three principles and the recession of the foreign concessions be the basis of a new policy. Chiang Kai-shek announced that he was, generally, in agreement. Chiang again claimed that foreign concessions were the key to the problem and that, as long as they existed, opium could not be eliminated. He also called for a more scientific approach to opium.³

Ke xue (scientific) was a word that would be used often in future debates over opium. Chiang was trying to thread the needle between two policies towards opium. Revolutionaries like the Anti-Opium Association called for a complete elimination of opium in the shortest possible time. This was impractical, but Chiang was head of a revolutionary party, and was not in a position to belittle the power of revolutionary enthusiasm. Using opium strictly as a source of revenue was already becoming difficult for colonial governments, it was impossible for China. The word "scientific" was being used to justify borrowing from the international model, especially Taiwan. This was simple enough in a practical sense, but how was it to be justified ideologically?

Li Jihong, who already had considerable opium experience, was sent to Taiwan to study the system there.⁴ In early 1931, the Anti-Opium Commission was reorganized, and Liu Ruiheng was made chairman with Li Jihong as a member. The actual monopoly proposal was made by Wu Lien-teh (Wu Liande). Unlike previous promoters of monopoly such as T. V. Soong, whose goals were obviously financial, Wu had a solid background in public health. Born in Penang in 1879, Wu was educated in Britain and studied in both France and Germany. He became internationally known for the success of his measures to prevent the spread of bubonic plague in Manchuria in the late Qing, and he headed the Manchurian Plague Prevention Service from 1912 to 1930. In July of 1930, he was named head of the National Quarantine Service, a post he held until 1937. He had honorary degrees from many foreign universities, and represented China at international meetings. He also had a long interest in opium suppression. In 1906, he had organized an Anti-Opium Conference for the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States.⁵ He had been one of China's representatives to the 1912 Hague Convention. His opium suppression plan (first published in English in the *Chinese Nation*) pointed out that the system of immediate suppression had not worked. He therefore recommended a return to registering users, public sales of opium to users, and gradual reduction in growing and consumption, in this case over a period of fifteen years. The system would yield a great deal of revenue, about 10 percent of which would be needed for opium clinics and the administration of the system.⁶

Foreigners seemed to have liked this nascent plan, which is not surprising, as it would have given China a modern opium control system fully in keeping with trends in colonial Asia. F. W. Maze, the Inspector-General of Customs, sent a letter congratulating Liu Ruiheng on his appointment, and giving his support for what he called the "bold national policy of government control." In his letter informing the British consul of this, Maze said that he had also presented a copy of the letter to T. V. Soong, and that Maze believed "that he [Soong] realizes that the policy that I advocated is the only effective way to deal with the matter."⁷

The 1931 monopoly plan had been prepared ideologically about as well as it could have been. The plan was associated with public health through the person of Wu Liande. It followed the best practice of the modern colonial world, and stood every chance of being accepted by the League and the Geneva system. Although the foreign press was cautiously supportive, reaction to the plan in the Chinese press was entirely negative.⁸ While admitting that the existing system or lack thereof was clearly not working, critics pointed out that Wu's plan could easily be turned into a permanent national opium monopoly. Rumors of another opium monopoly surfaced the next year, and the idea of selling opium was compared to selling China's women and children.⁹

Part of the reason for the failure of the plan was active opposition from anti-opium forces. Early in 1930, Garfield Huang of the Anti-Opium Association made a visit to the Dutch East Indies and reported that the monopoly there was a disaster. Forty percent of the Chinese in Eastern Sumatra were smokers, and most had learned to smoke while overseas. The licensing system was completely ineffective, and the whole program was based on the racist assumption that as an inferior race the Chinese were not harmed by opium.¹⁰ Two months later, Edgar Snow published a possibly related piece on the monopoly system in Taiwan. Even the Japanese officials admitted that smoking licenses were used by more than one person, and that smuggling was rampant, although they claimed that the new system would deal with this. Snow reported that he saw no opium clinics or any signs that the monopoly was intended to do anything other than produce revenue.¹¹

Wu Liende's reaction to the attacks on his plan was that he was an honest man seeking a realistic solution to the problem. His motives were sincere, and the goal of his plan was not a permanent source of revenue, but eliminating opium smoking.¹² Wu's emphasis on his honesty and sincerity was a telling comparison to the international importance of sincerity. All opium control campaigns looked the same, it was the sincerity and future plans of the administrators that made a plan acceptable. Wu may have been sincere, but his plan was also associated with the honor and integrity of Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong. The central government was committed to the international model of the opium monopoly, but to make it ideologically palatable they were going to have to come up with a better way of demonstrating their sincerity. This would eventually come out of their success in taking control of the opium trade.

POPPIES IN ANHUI AND FUJIAN

Although Nanjing had yet to find an ideological justification for a wider opium control system, this did not prevent them from carrying on with the practical work of expanding control of the trade. By 1928 they had already begun to take action to secure a supply of opium in Anhui and Fujian. On March 10th of 1928 the government issued regulations for new *jiancha yanmiao ju* (provincial poppy inspection bureaus). Nine days later an office was set up in Anhui and, apparently, Fujian. The Anhui office was under the direction of Hong Rencun, a special representative of the Ministry of Finance, who had his office in Bengbu. Suboffices, each responsible for one or two counties, were to collect taxes, punish illegal growing, and purchase anti-opium medicine directly from the farmers for shipment to Shanghai. The price for the opium was fixed by the government, and was high enough at first to make the proposition attractive. There does not seem to have been any need to coerce farmers into growing

opium. The fees paid for the right to grow opium were not high (1.5 *yuan* per *mu*), but the fines for growing opium on nonregistered land were 10 times the cost of paying the tax.¹³ Various extra fees would eventually be imposed, making the burden on the peasants much heavier, but at first the goal of the office seems to have been obtaining as much opium as possible.¹⁴ Given the profits that the Ministry of Finance could make selling the opium in Shanghai, there was no point antagonizing farmers with high taxes, so taxes and fees proclaimed by the Ministry were light.

Despite its potential, Anhui never became an important producer of opium like Yunnan or Sichuan. Anhui opium was on the Shanghai market at least from 1928 to 1935, but it never caught on among users, like Sichuan or Persian opium did. Presumably, it was lumped in with other domestic opium of poor quality (and low price). Opium had been grown in Anhui before, and there had been trouble with over-collection of fees.¹⁵

Nanjing had only very limited success in taking over the trade, and tax collection remained in the hands of local strongmen whose profits came entirely from whatever they could squeeze from the peasants. Local garrisons were also unhappy at being edged out of the trade. By July the Red Spears were actively opposing the new system, and Anhui fell into a cycle of opium related violence that was to last for years.¹⁶

In a January 1929 report, Bao Shijie, the Ministry of Finance's *caizheng bu wanbei deng chu diaocha yanmiao tepaiyuan* (Poppy Inspection Commissioner for North Anhui), reported on the situation in the province. Although all opium was supposed to be sold and shipped by the government, the armies in Anhui (37th, 40th, and the Provincial Defense Force) had all set up illegal tax offices and were collecting opium taxes themselves. Nanjing had set too low a price for buying raw opium (forty-five *fen* per *liang*), and this was encouraging peasants to sell to independent merchants who came up from Shanghai. The government was not buying opium directly from the farmers, but having monopoly merchants do so for them. The merchants were only marginally under government control, and unless Bao sent a representative with them to Shanghai they would not give any accounting of their expenses or profits. Various garrisons also demanded a cut as the opium was shipped, and even the public warehouses in Shanghai were charging extra fees. Expected profit for the government for the scheme had been two million dollars, but for June and July of 1928 Nanjing had cleared only \$50,026.08 *yuan*.¹⁷ The other aspect of the plan, driving Sichuan opium from the market, was no nearer to realization. Anhui shipments were too small and irregular and the quality presumably too low.¹⁸ Nanjing's first attempt to take control of this source of opium had been energetic, but unsuccessful. Local power holders, recalcitrant peasants, and public opinion all made controlling poppies directly more trouble than it was worth.¹⁹

Fujian province had been taken over during the Northern Expedition but while it remained under Nanjing's *de jure* control after 1928, many of the garrisons became quite independent, often relying on opium revenue to make them so. Fujian was unlike other provinces in that it was close to both the center of the regime's power and close to two of its greatest concerns, the Communists' Jiangxi Soviet and the semi-independent Canton group. The Fujian garrisons themselves were small and disunited and Fujian was thus important and relatively easy to bring under control.

In 1930, the provincial government began to make a concerted effort to reduce poppy cultivation. This was particularly important in Fujian because the province produced a fair amount of opium. Like the Anhui opium, Fujian opium was of low quality and did not have an important position in the national opium market. Most of it was sold locally.

In October and November of 1930, various local governments and garrisons issued proclamations, sometimes in rhyme, telling the peasants that in the ensuing season government inspectors would be coming to look for poppy and would uproot it if found. In later campaigns local officials would be provided with posters, proclamations and other resources, but in 1930 they seem to have improvised. Propaganda was a typical precursor of any anti-poppy campaign. Peasants were the innocents of the opium trade, presumed to be planting poppy under coercion or out of ignorance or poverty. In many cases schemes to enable them to switch to other crops were suggested, and they were usually exposed to propaganda intended to encourage them to give up the poppy voluntarily. In the December of 1930, for example, a *jiao dao tuan* (educational team) of fifty soldiers commanded by one Li Yingchang was sent to Maping prefecture to spread the word. Other teams held mass meetings and lectures, but Li and his men had a rocky reception. When they arrived at Xikang village the villagers fled into the mountains and the team was only able to capture five women. The local schoolmaster brokered a truce, and the peasants professed themselves frightened by this display of force and agreed to pull up their poppies voluntarily. The peasants had good reason to be frightened, because encounters like this sometimes led to bloodshed, especially when the inspection teams came near harvest time when peasants were more likely to resist, rather than before planting.

The government had no desire to provoke a confrontation. Later in the month, a group of frightened peasants fired twenty or thirty shots at an inspection team near Tongan, but since they didn't hit anything the troops did not return fire. The government had no desire to be seen shooting poor peasants, so at least in 1930 they were willing to accept the peasant's agreement to pull up their poppies, although they usually estimated that as much as 70 percent of the poppies had not been uprooted. Given the limited control the government had over the area this was probably the best they could hope for. The troops do not

seem to have received much help from local governments; poppy was always discovered by the troops themselves, not local magistrates. Brief insertions of state power like this could be effective at harvest, since the white or red flowers of the poppy were easily identified even from a great distance, but ordering peasants to pull up a lucrative crop they had tended all season just as it was coming ripe was a recipe for trouble.²⁰

In later years poppy growers were prosecuted, but this was not the center of policy. The province was divided into sections, and inspectors were sent out. If poppy was discovered, it was uprooted. This was not an ineffective policy, but it could not eliminate poppy cultivation entirely. Small-scale local poppy cultivation kept coming back. Given the fragmented nature of poppy cultivation in Fujian, this was not surprising. The plots that were being found were small, and there was little the government could do to entirely eliminate small peasant plots of poppy.²¹ They could and did, however, reduce the problem of poppy growing in Fujian to a minor nuisance.

THE GRASPABLE MIDDLE

Poppy growers were too difficult for the state to categorize and control, and so too at this point were opium smokers. It was the middle part of the trade, wholesale shipments of opium, that gave the Guomindang its first solid grip on the opium trade, and it was from here that state control expanded both upstream to the peasants and downstream to the smokers. On the face of it, opium shipments were no easier to control than poppies. Countless large and small scale traders all over China and outside were moving opium and drugs all over all the time, often under armed guard or using the protection of extraterritoriality. Nanjing's chief interest, however, was really large shipments, like those controlled by the Guangxi clique. In the case of the areas controlled by the Nationalists, the natural concentration points were the Yangzi river and Hankou.

HANKOU

Hankou had long been a major station for taxing Sichuan opium on its way down the Yangzi to Shanghai, and it also saw a good deal of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Hunan opium. In 1896, Hubei province, where Hankou was located, took in 8.7 percent of its revenue from opium taxes.²² Hankou was also a distribution point for Indian opium. The trade disappeared briefly during the suppression campaigns, but revived quickly after 1919. By 1922, Wu Peifu had begun taxing and controlling it through a semiofficial company, the *Ji yi gongsi*, based in Yichang.²³ Management of the trade later shifted downriver to Hankou, and

by 1927, the Hubei provincial government cleared two to three million *yuan* a month in opium transit taxes.²⁴ Besides a center of the national wholesale opium trade, Hankou was the center of the lucrative Hubei retail market, and thus the city was always a bone of contention for the warlords. From 1927 to early 1929, the wholesale and retail trade were controlled by the *Liang Hu teshui chu*, technically in the name of the Ministry of Finance, but actually for the Guangxi clique. In May of 1929, Chiang Kai-shek took control of the city and gave control of the tax office to Huang Zhenxing, a central government loyalist. Thereafter, the revenues of Hankou supported Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang forced as much of the trade as possible through Hankou.²⁵ In this way, Chiang's efforts were bolstered by the economic logic of opium in China. The southwestern provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou had always produced better and cheaper opium than other areas. During the disorder of the warlord period, opium was particularly difficult to ship, and local producers all over China dominated the trade. With the reimposition of order after 1927, cheap, high-quality West China opium tended to drive other opium off the market. Hankou was a logical place for western opium to pass through on its way to the main markets, and was thus the natural center of the opium trade. To realize the potential of this position, Chiang would have to establish control over Hankou and expand the Hankou office's control of the trade. Ultimately this meant controlling every part of the trade from grower to smoker. This was a departure from the existing pattern of opium control in China. Western warlords had begun to monopolize production in their areas, but they had no control over the marketing of their opium downstream. Distribution monopolies were set up downstream, but depended on upstream suppliers. By taking the middle position, Chiang's central government put both suppliers and distributors at its mercy.

ORGANIZATION

The Hankou office's control of the trade was fairly loose at first as was Nanjing's control of the office, many opportunities for corruption were open to Hankou opium officials. Huang Zhenxing, head of the original Special Tax Office, took advantage of most of these opportunities.²⁶ His subsequent dismissal for corruption was the initial impetus for reforming the office, but the reforms went much further than a simple clean-up. The office was thoroughly revamped to put it more closely under Chiang Kai-shek's control and its power began to expand.

In 1933, the Hankou office was reorganized as the *Jinyan ducha chu* (Anti-Opium Inspectorate), with authority over ten provinces.²⁷ The new Inspectorate was deliberately divided into several sections with control of each section

given to members of different government cliques, thus preventing any one clique from dominating the office.²⁸ As the office became more and more powerful keeping it directly under Chiang's control became more and more important, and even many of the day-to-day decisions that it made were referred directly to him.²⁹ Part of the purpose of the Inspectorate was to provide Chiang with at least one source of revenue that was not controlled by T. V. Soong, and both personnel and financial matters were handled accordingly.³⁰ The heads of the Shanghai and Hubei offices, the secretary of the Inspectorate, and many other officials were Swatow men, connected to the old Swatow opium group that controlled the opium trade in Shanghai before Du Yuesheng. They were experienced in the opium trade but had no connections to either Du or T. V. Soong.³¹

CONTROL

Although it would become the centerpiece of Chiang's opium control efforts, the Hankou office started out modestly, with limited control of the wholesale and retail trade in Hankou. The most important task of the office was controlling the wholesale trade. The original office, like the systems in Yunnan and Guangxi, was geared towards taxing opium at a single point. Like the two southwestern provinces, Nanjing would have to find ways to lure and force opium merchants to come through Hankou and pay their taxes. Although both Yangzi opium and Han river opium had to come past the city, opium shippers had no desire to pay taxes if they could be avoided, and many tried to do just that. Opium merchants had countless tricks that could be used to get a few chests of opium past Hankou, and anti-opium officials, police, and smugglers engaged in constant duels.³² Besides these, there were many ways for individuals to smuggle a few dozen ounces of opium. It could be mailed by post, hidden on an airplane or train, put inside a false-bottom bucket or under one's hat. Yunnan opium was sometimes hidden inside the province's other famous product, Yunnan hams. Governments took great pride in announcing arrests in such cases, as they gave the impression that the government was actively attacking the opium trade. These tiny shipments did not matter much, however. In 1935, the Chinese post office seized twenty-three thousand *liang* of opium.³³ This was far less than a single shipment on the Hankou-Shanghai run.

The purpose of the Hankou office was not to prevent minor smuggling, but to make really significant shipments impossible. This involved establishing more inspection offices and more anti-smuggling teams. By 1931, Hankou's Hunan suboffice had thirty men at its main office and more in the six other offices up and down the Han river.³⁴ There were similar offices on the other main opium routes, the goal being to keep the entire shipping route under surveillance and

thus make smuggling much more difficult than just slipping past Hankou.³⁵ The system was far from fully bureaucratized, however. There were few policemen willing to risk their lives to stop opium shipments, but, as was common under the warlords, they were encouraged with money. Forty-five percent of the value of any opium seized was given to the officers as a reward.³⁶ Besides creating endless wrangles over who was entitled to this money, hefty rewards revealed the weakness of Nationalist control. The Nationalist's best method of controlling the heavily armed thugs moving opium down the river was to hire their own heavily armed thugs and turn them loose. These anti-smuggling teams would never be entirely replaced, but their importance decreased as the state worked to force major opium merchants into a state-controlled system that gradually eliminated merchants entirely.

CONTROLLING OPIUM MERCHANTS

At the top of the distribution system were entrepreneurs like Zeng Junchen, a Sichuan salt merchant who became an opium trader. Zeng had been in the salt business for thirty years when in 1935, he decided to switch to opium. He claimed he did this because high taxes made salt unprofitable, and because the government encouraged the opium trade. He knew the trade was risky, but his substantial capital and the close connections to local officials he had cultivated in his salt merchant days, proved invaluable: he made an 800 percent profit on his initial investment of three-hundred thousand *yuan*. Countless other merchants also got involved in the trade, either as full-time opium merchants like Zeng, or as part of larger commercial enterprises. They usually worked closely with the state, since the state needed opium revenue and found the trade difficult to manage. Merchants often managed the government better than the government managed them; Zeng Junchen reported that being an opium merchant required even more outlay on prostitutes, liquor, and bribes for officials than being a salt merchant. He also allowed officials to invest in his companies.³⁷ In return for these opportunities he received the legal right to ship opium, early notification of tax increases, and official assistance when his shipments got into trouble.

FINANCES

Very few opium merchants could afford to finance their operations on their own account and were thus forced to rely on loans. In 1929, the office's financial matters seem to have been run by the Central Bank, but in order to prevent T. V. Soong from having too much control in 1933 Chiang set up the Agricul-

tural Bank of the Four Provinces, later the Farmer's Bank of China, to handle financial matters.³⁸ Now capital would come from Chiang, providing him with both new profits and more control over the opium merchants. By 1934, everything was under the control of Chiang's Farmer's Bank.³⁹ Before opium arrived in Hankou, the merchant bought it in one of the Southwestern provinces and shipped it to Hankou, paying various taxes along the way. The merchants purchased the opium on their own or borrowed money. But to pay the transit taxes of thirteen hundred *yuan* per *dan*, they needed help. Merchants who had a guarantor could mortgage their opium to the Farmer's Bank at 60–80 percent of the market price for up to three months and thus pay their taxes. Those taxes, which were owed to the central government could be paid directly to Farmer's Bank. Once the opium arrived in Hankou, merchants could purchase opium with forty-five-day Farmer's Bank promissory notes. After selling the opium downriver, they could pay off the note at any Farmer's Bank branch, or if there was no branch in the area, a representative would be sent to collect the money.⁴⁰ Although there was some involvement by other banks, the financial side of the trade was firmly in Chiang's hands (rather than T. V. Soong's), and opium merchants had very little reason to leave the system because it provided them with the capital they needed.

The importance of capital was well-illustrated in a communication between Li Jihong and Chiang Kai-shek. Li informed Chiang that, in 1936, Yunnan had produced sixty thousand *dan* of opium; a third was consumed locally, a third was sent along the Hankou route, and a third sent (via Guangxi) to Guangdong. At this point, the Guangxi route yielded profits of four-hundred thousand *yuan* a month. But Li was convinced this could be improved. He recommended shipping opium through Guangxi in trucks; this would make the entire transaction quicker and allow Farmer's Bank to rotate its capital more quickly.⁴¹ The central government was trying to control the trade at all levels, but it was most involved at the level of finance capital.

LICENSING AND CONTROL

In addition to financing, merchants received access to supplies and markets. In 1930, Nanjing dispatched a Special Finance Commissioner, Chen Shaowei, to Sichuan to arrange for a unified tax certification. Opium would pay taxes in Sichuan, then be sealed and shipped on to Hankou, where it would receive a 16.7 percent tax discount for having paid taxes in Sichuan.⁴² Once brought downriver, the opium would be handed over to state-connected distributors like Du Yuesheng. The state helped to arrange financing, coordinate its actions with buyers and sellers at both ends, and, in general, make life as easy as possible for opium merchants. In return, merchants were expected to pay their taxes,

and eventually to move along government-specified routes and store their opium in government warehouses.⁴³ Increasingly, opium was being shipped by the state itself, but private merchants were also allowed to do so. They could purchase a license which would give them one year to purchase a given amount of opium and ship it along an approved route, using government warehouses, to an approved destination where it would be distributed by the Inspectorate.⁴⁴ Increasingly, shipments were handled by the *Tong yun chu* (Unified shipping bureau) under Chiang's direction. Although this organization was intended to eventually take opium shipments entirely out of private hands it worked towards this through cooperation and cooption of private merchants. The *Tong yun chu* was financed by both official and merchant capital, and supervised both private and state shipments. By 1937 the *Tong yun chu* has five million *yuan* in official capital and seven million in merchant capital. The main office was in Chungking, with suboffices in four counties, each of which has ten to twenty licensed companies with capital of four-hundred thousand *yuan*.⁴⁵

By 1934, the Inspectorate was managing the Hankou to Shanghai opium route with a high degree of efficiency. Between June and October of 1934, two ships, the *Chu Ying* and the *Wan Shou*, made the Hankou-Shanghai run nine times. Each stopped at several ports along the way to unload opium. The ships delivered opium to not only relatively large cities like Anqing, Datong, and Wuhu, but also tiny places like Digang, Anhui. Apparently, all of the Yangzi ports were fully integrated into the retailing system. The opium was shipped in chests of about one thousand *liang* each. Smaller towns might only get three chests, whereas Shanghai would usually get about one hundred. Each chest was licensed, and the numbers of the licenses used were checked on arrival. Any discrepancies led to an investigation.⁴⁶ The departure and arrival of each shipment was reported directly to Chiang's office as Military Affairs Commissioner. In Shanghai, probably all of the opium was delivered to Du Yuesheng's Three Prosperities Company.⁴⁷

The state's growing control of the Yangzi opium route served a series of purposes. Most importantly, it generated money. The Hankou system was quite profitable, and during 1929 and 1930, the Hankou Special Tax Office brought in about one million *yuan* a month from the wholesale and retail trades. Between 1934 and 1940, ninety-three million ounces of opium moved through Hankou.⁴⁸ The Hankou office's success made it vital to the financing of the campaigns against the communists, and in 1933 it was put under the authority of Chiang Kai-shek's Anti-Bandit (Communist) Headquarters. A statement made by the Anti-Bandit Headquarters on November 1, 1933, is quite explicit about the importance of opium revenue.

Inasmuch as the income derivable from opium tax has long been the chief source of revenue from which the monthly expenses of Hupeh

Provincial Government, and the Hupeh Dyke Construction and the emergency expenses of the anti-Communist campaign within the three provinces are drawn, it has been designated as proper government revenue as distinguished from illegitimate extortion for selfish purposes so characteristic of the former militarist regime.⁴⁹

Central government budgets were murky but the announced 1937 budget came to a total of one billion *yuan*. In addition to the official budget there was a secret budget of four-hundred million *yuan*, mostly spent on the military.⁵⁰ Presumably much of this was paid for by opium. If we assume the government made a profit of one *yuan* on each *liang* of opium it shipped, the 19.3 million *liang* shipped in 1937 would have made about 5 percent of the secret budget.⁵¹ Slack estimates that opium was the third largest item in the budget between 1934 and 1936, yielding about 10 percent of total revenue.⁵² Opium revenue was not as significant to Chiang as it was to Long Yun in Yunnan, but it was important. These funds were valuable not only as money but also because of where the money fit into the financial situation of Nationalist China. Hankou money was controlled directly by Chiang Kai-shek, and financed those things most important to him. The Hankou office came to be controlled by Chiang's Anti-Communist Headquarters in Nanchang, and it provided much of the money for the encirclement campaigns that eventually destroyed the Jiangxi Soviet, which was Chiang's most important domestic goal.⁵³ Even more important, revenue collected at Hankou was money not collected somewhere else. Denying revenue to rivals was more important than collecting it for the central government, because the western warlords, in particular, had no other reliable source of financial independence.

The system also served to improve the state's position in negotiations with producers and distributors, because the state controlled access to opium and to markets, and agreements with producers and distributors improved the state's position relative to shippers. It was a commonplace of opium suppression rhetoric that all four segments of the trade had to be attacked at once; this was true of opium control as opium suppression. By taking the middle position in the economically natural flow of opium across China, the Nationalists easily situated themselves in a dominant position.

The Hankou system also provided the Nationalist government with a strong bureaucratic position from which to extend their control over the trade. The opium bureaucracy that grew out of Hankou was one of the most professional and rationally organized in China. It was comparable to the railways and the salt administration, but little else.

The opium administration had a cadre of expert officials at the top (Li Jihong was the most ubiquitous), and, apparently, a large cohort of professional managers below. Considerable resources were dedicated to it, and in

1937, the government held a special civil service exam that qualify more statisticians for anti-opium work.⁵⁴

The level of central management that went into registering and curing opium smokers, including management of shipments of raw opium, was quite impressive. The *Tong yun chu*, through its system of warehouses, approved shipping routes, and constantly cross-checked its data, to keep the flow of opium from Ichang to Shanghai and Fujian almost entirely under their control.

The Hankou system was intended to be transparent from the top, preventing subordinates from smuggling opium on their own accounts. This was a perennial problem of opium control systems throughout Asia. Although the Republican state disliked tax farming in general, it continued to be common throughout the period.⁵⁵ In the case of opium, the state made considerable progress both in moving towards complete state control and of regulating extra-bureaucratic actors closely enough to avoid some of the problems associated with tax farming. The arrangements between the state and opium shippers at Hankou moved through the entire gamut of relationships. In 1928, the state was attempting to impose a transit tax on opium shippers, with little knowledge or control over the trade outside or even in the city. Gradually the state increased its connections with the merchants, providing loans, warehouses, and market access. The state also increased its coercive capabilities: extending its reach up and down the river; forcing shippers to use state warehouses and routes; registering individual shipments; and catching smugglers. Parts of this system remained fairly entrepreneurial. The anti-smuggling teams continued to be rewarded for their seizures, and the private opium merchants were never entirely eliminated. Gradually, the merchants were being replaced by official shipments, however, as the state had less and less need for outside entrepreneurs to provide them with knowledge and capital.

BEYOND THE YANGZI-SUPPLIERS AND DISTRIBUTORS

At the same time Nanjing was solidifying control over the center of the opium route, it was also guaranteeing supplies and markets by coming to agreements with producers in Sichuan and distributors like Du Yuesheng in Shanghai. Eventually, this system was expanded to include other producers and distributors: the Sichuan connection was Liu Xiang.

Like most warlords in this divided province, Liu relied on selling opium downstream to finance his activities. From 1928 on, Liu Xiang supplied opium to the Hankou merchants; by the thirties, he had some sort of agreement with Chiang to do this on a regular basis. In 1930, Chen Shaowei was sent to Sichuan to cut a deal with Liu Xiang. Taxes would be collected first in Sichuan,

and those merchants who could show proof of having paid taxes in Sichuan would be given a discount on taxes in Hankou.⁵⁶ This system was beneficial for both sides. Central government officials issued receipts for Sichuan taxes in Sichuan, and thus the central government knew how much opium was being taxed in Sichuan, and knew if it did not pay taxes in Hankou. The system also gave merchants a strong incentive to pay Sichuan taxes. In doing so, each side guaranteed a reliable market and source for opium, as well as a useful political ally. The system continued to function along these lines: in 1936, Liu Xiang agreed to continue current arrangements to send eight hundred *dan* of opium a month to Hankou.⁵⁷

Chiang also entered into an agreement of some sort with Du Yuesheng to market opium in Shanghai.⁵⁸ The financial details of this agreement are not clear, but Du's Three Prosperities company took delivery of a great deal of West China opium, and apparently had exclusive rights to distribute it in Jiangsu province. Martin portrays Du's Green Gang as an example of an intermediate institution between the modernizing state society, providing the state with a degree of control over local society that the state was unable or unwilling to exert for itself while the state provided the Gang with a bit of legitimacy. In the case of opium this is exactly how the Green Gang functioned.

This system was beneficial for Nanjing and for its clients at both ends of the river, and they were willing to fight to defend it. In 1934, Liu Xiang heard rumors that a group from French Indochina was trying to buy up a large amount of Yunnanese opium and ship it to Shanghai. Liu passed this information along to the Anti-Opium Inspectorate, which in turn passed it to Du Yuesheng. With Du's help they investigated the matter from the Shanghai end and found nothing, but Du asked the Inspectorate to investigate further. Soon after, the Inspectorate reported that the whole affair was being arranged by a Guizhou merchant, Ma Shi, who was collaborating with influential people in Yunnan to buy five hundred tons of opium. Ma planned to pay half the value of the opium up front, and then ship it to Shanghai via French Indochina. The Inspectorate had a complete list of taxes and bribes that would have to be paid to get the opium to Shanghai, and estimated that it would retail for about 1.2 *yuan a liang*. Given that the current price in Shanghai was about 1.7 *yuan a liang*, it would easily undercut the government's monopoly. The Inspectorate was, of course, worried about the impact that this would have on collecting opium taxes, and Du Yuesheng was all but frantic. He agreed that tax revenues would fall, but more importantly, this plot would give foreigners the power to poison the nation with opium and destroy the progress that had been made so far in opium suppression.

This statement was an example of Du's boldness, but also an example of how he assumed the government saw the problem of opium. The main point of

opium suppression at this point was to put the trade under the government's control, and this Yunnan gambit threatened to destroy that control.⁵⁹ This case also reflects the considerable power of the Inspectorate. It was capable of launching secret investigations even in places not under Nanjing's control, and gathered excellent data. One of the suggestions for foiling this plot was for the Inspectorate to disrupt the opium harvest in Yunnan, which would suggest at least some capability for covert action.⁶⁰

The system was most beneficial for Liu Xiang, whose government got up to 30 percent of its revenue from opium.⁶¹ He used much of his money to buy weapons, and gradually became the chief warlord of Sichuan because of this.⁶² He also became increasingly tied to the national government as he became more and more dependent on marketing his opium through Hankou. Despite this symbiosis, Nanjing's partners were not reluctant to attempt to escape the system. The Sichuan government tried to find new ways to get the opium to market, as well as new ways to profit from that that went downriver to Hankou. In his attempt to avoid paying taxes in Hankou, Liu became involved in the morphine trade. Sichuan merchants supplied most of the raw opium used by the Wuhan morphine king Jiang Yuhuan, although it is not clear if Liu was personally involved in this.⁶³ Liu was clearly involved in making morphine in Chongqing and Wanxian and sending it to Shanghai.⁶⁴ Chiang Kai-shek was much more strict about refined drugs than he was about opium, and Liu was eventually forced to choose between his close relationship with the increasingly powerful Chiang and his morphine profits, and he chose to abandon morphine, or at least be more circumspect about it. At the same time Chiang was pressuring him, Liu may have been turning against morphine himself. As a drug that was easy to smuggle and could not be openly taxed, morphine was a good way for Liu to make money outside of Chiang's opium system, but it was also a good way for minor Sichuan warlords to avoid Liu's system.⁶⁵

Liu also tried to improve his situation relative to Hankou, with little success. Having failed in his attempt to go around Chiang's control by smuggling morphine, Liu would attempt to increase his control in the existing system, on the one hand through an attempt to become more important in Hankou, and on the other hand by increasing his control inside Sichuan. The attempt to move into Hankou was probably doomed to failure from the beginning. Liu realized that much of Chiang's opium profit came from the fact that he controlled the banks that financed the trade and thus he tried to get involved in this end of the trade. In 1935, Liu set up the *Sichuan xinye yinhang* (Sichuan New Goods Bank,) with a capital of one million *yuan*, to handle Sichuan's opium affairs in Hankou. This challenge to Chiang's power might have led to trouble had the manager of the bank not run off with the money and made the question moot.⁶⁶

BEYOND THE YANGZI-EXPANDING THE SYSTEM

The development of the Yangzi river system allowed the state to lure and coerce buyers and sellers into an ever-tighter relationship. It also provided them with a base from which to expand the system into neighboring provinces. Just as the Nationalist government as a whole began with strong control over a few provinces in 1928 and gradually added more, once the Yangzi route had been secured the opium system could be expanded to other provinces, and in many cases the two processes were linked.

INSPECTORS AND BUREAUCRATIZATION
OF THE OPIUM TRADE

Although there had been an opium control office at Hankou since before the Northern Expedition, the Nationalists did more than just expand their control of the On December 1, 1932, the Anti-Communist Headquarters decreed that poppy planting was to be suppressed at once in ten provinces, these being Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hubei, Henan, Hunan, Jiangxi, Fujian, Shaanxi, and Gansu.⁶⁷ These were the only provinces which could be said to be under Nanjing's control at this point. To ensure that this was being carried out the head of the Military Affairs Commission would appoint *cha jin tepai yuan* (Suppression-Inspection Special Commissioners) for each province.⁶⁸ It is not clear if any of these were actually appointed at this time, but they were to be the basis of the later *jinyan tepaiyuan* (Special Commissioner) system.

The Inspectorate's anti-smuggling teams were headed by Qiu Kaiji, who had responsibility for the Yangzi river and north, and Dai Li, who had responsibility for the area south of the river. Dai Li was also the head of the *juntong*, Chiang's secret police, and his anti-opium activities served as a cover for his more political tasks.⁶⁹ The central government also appointed *jinyan tepaiyuan*. The chief responsibility of these officers at first was to eliminate poppy growing, as described below. They also began to serve as agents of Chiang Kai-shek. Like the antismuggling teams they were hard to keep out of a province; Chen Guofu tried to keep them out of Jiangsu by claiming that the province had no opium, but to no avail. Once established new responsibilities were added to the office, including coordinating anti-opium propaganda and keeping track of the local opium trade. Not only was the presence of all these central government operatives useful, but they also gave the center the power to take action against local power holders. Local warlords caught smuggling opium were threatened with exposure, as could larger militarists.⁷⁰ Through the anti-smuggling teams and the Special Commissioners the central government was superimposing a new bureaucracy over the provinces existing systems and then gradually co-opting or eliminating local power.

CO-OPTING THE EXISTING OPIUM SYSTEM IN HUNAN

In more remote areas and those where local resistance was stronger, the government pursued an accommodationist strategy. Hunan had an active opium trade with nearby Yunnan and Guizhou up until 1933, when the Inspectorate began to close down the Hong river route, the main source of income for local garrisons.⁷¹ In theory, this should have put the entire trade under the control of the central government, but Nationalist troops began dealing in opium independently. In 1933, the 10th Army of Xu Yuanquan was stationed in Changsha, the capital and main city of Hunan province, ostensibly to conduct anti-Communist operations. But Xu and his men proved to be more interested in buying opium in the western part of the province and selling it in Changsha and Hankou. West Hunan had long been a producer of low-quality opium, and the government had usually ignored this, but when the opium began to move into more important markets the government took action.⁷² Chiang Kai-shek's Headquarters received news of Xu's actions and in August of 1933, Chiang dispatched troops to help the Anti-Opium Inspectorate deal with the matter. They set up several inspection stations along the river, but Xu and his men had no trouble avoiding them. Sun Mingzhai, the head of the anti-smuggling detachment, knew shipments were received in Hankou by Yang Qingshan, the head of the Red Gang. Sun joined the Red Gang and became the brother of its leader in Changsha, Zheng Huatang. Zheng was unhappy with the cut he was getting, and was unable to do anything with Xu; so he told Sun what routes Xu's boats and trucks used. Sun wired his superiors in Hankou and received permission to make a seizure, which he was supposed to do with the help of the local anti-smuggling office. They captured one truckload of opium and wired Nanchang for instructions. After first claiming that the truck was the 10th Army's and should not be inspected, Xu and his men began trying to shift blame. It is not clear exactly what sort of a deal Chiang Kai-shek made with Xu, but shortly, orders came down that the 10th Army, the garrison, and the local anti-smuggling office were to handle the case jointly. Xu returned to Changsha and had Zheng Huatang arrested and shot. The three sides then settled down to the business of procuring and shipping opium.⁷³

This system was beneficial to all sides. In the long run, it was easier for local troops to take a cut from the distribution of Hankou opium, especially because prices of official and unofficial opium were about the same. Cooperation was also easier for the central government. Peasants in west Hunan would have continued to grow opium regardless of what the government did; this way, local opium became part of the system, not a rival to it. The central government had been forced to compromise somewhat with local forces but had still managed to take control of the wholesale opium trade without having to commit many resources to the effort. The purpose of inspection for the central government

was not to force compliance but rather to create situations that would make it worthwhile for local figures to come into the central system.

HENAN AND LIMITED GOVERNMENT CONTROL

Henan was more typical of the areas that were not as significant. The province was poor, and because it was in the North, it was not part of Chiang's power base. Henan was one of ten provinces under the Anti-Opium Inspectorate, but before 1935 it received minimal attention.

Henan produced a certain amount of low-quality opium that was sold mainly inside the province. Better-quality opium came from Sichuan and Shaanxi. The main goals of the Inspectorate in Henan were to make sure that the Sichuan opium smoked in the province came via Hankou, and to try to lure as much of the Shaanxi opium as possible to Hankou for sale downriver. The central government was not much interested in the small local retail market. Although they had some success, many areas remained outside central control or were controlled by intermediaries of doubtful loyalty. In some places, the Inspectorate could collect taxes itself; in others it used licensed merchants. Henan also had semi-independent garrisons who also engaged in the trade, and many of the officers of the Inspectorate collected and pocketed extra taxes. Those officers who tried to carry out their duties often found that they had no support from the police or military, and a number of them were beaten or killed by opium smugglers. Although the Inspectorate sold opium, most of the smoking was done in private opium dens, which were not controlled by the government. Despite all this, much of the opium sold in the province probably originated from the Inspectorate: they had a better product at a better price. Even if their control of retailing was limited, they still dominated the market. In 1934, and in a less important province like Henan, this could be tolerated, but the government was already developing methods to put even these areas under fuller control.⁷⁴ By 1935, these new methods would start to be applied, and even in the less important parts of the province there would be efforts to put the trade under control.

The provinces of Hunan and Henan show that the goals of the Inspectorate were the same in each province but that they were carried out differently in each province as conditions warranted. The main goal was winning control of the wholesale and eventually retail opium trades in the most important markets in China. The government would not allow others to control wholesale shipments even in out of the way places like Henan, but attempts to extend control lower than this varied considerably. In Henan, the government would never move beyond a loose control of the wholesale trade. This was acceptable since the policy was aimed at controlling the trade for political and financial

reasons rather than eliminating the trade entirely for moral reasons. The Nationalists' opium policy was extensive and flexible, winning as much control as was possible in given situations. The system, however, had its limitations. Ultimately the system would have to be tied to the goal of suppression in order to be acceptable as a public policy. The Inspectorate was also not very effective in bringing provinces totally outside Nanjing's power under control. The 1935 Six-Year Plan to Eliminate Opium would build on the success of the Inspectorate in controlling the trade and would also win popular support and enable the government to push its control into new areas by giving the system a stronger ideological justification.

RETAILING

Ideally, opium was in the hands of the state all the way to the individual smoker. This reduced profits for local governments and made smuggling more difficult. In practice, the state had only limited success in controlling opium retailing. The bulk of the official opium shipped from Hankou was sold in one province, Jiangsu.⁷⁵ This was no doubt due to the efficiency of Du Yuesheng's opium distribution system.

The state attempted to duplicate this system in other provinces. Opium was shipped by either the state or licensed merchants to state-run warehouses. Local and provincial governments set up systems of *tu gao dian* (opium shops) and *shou xi suo* (opium dens), the former selling opium and the latter providing a place to smoke it. Ideally the government controlled the flow of opium from producer to consumer. As with other parts of the trade, wholesale controls proved easier to set up than retail controls.

The city of Hankou is a good example of how complex opium retailing could be. In the early 1930s, there were three major *hang* (opium wholesalers), the largest of which was run by Chao Dianzhi a *wuchang liumang* (hoodlum from Wuchang), who was also the leader of the city's opium merchants. Each *hang* had a capital of at least one-hundred thousand *yuan* and close connections to a bank. The *hang* would boil and label the opium and distribute it to the opium dens. The higher class places were called *shou xi suo* (smoke selling place). These had a capital of at least one hundred *liang* of prepared opium as well as a stock of aged opium pipes which held flavor better and could cost up to one hundred *yuan*. They also had plenty of servants, furs to lay on cold days, cool drinks on hot days, and sold small porcelain containers of opium to take home. A single session at one of these places could cost ten *yuan*, although one to five *yuan* was more common. These places turned over four to five thousand a month, selling both official opium from the *hang* and a fair amount of smuggled (presumably Sichuan) opium brought in by merchants, military men, or

airmen, as well as a certain amount of local opium, which they would use to adulterate the Sichuan opium. They were at least twenty of these dens, organized into the *Hankou shi yaogao qingli hui* (Hankou Medicinal Paste Organizing Association). A step below this were the *shou xi penghu* (opium sheds), of which there were some seven hundred in the city. These offered no amenities and sold pure local opium as well as at least some official opium.⁷⁶

Outside of major cities like Hankou, and probably inside as well, there were opium retailers who were more independent. The career of Chen Deyuan in Yichang, Hubei, is a good example. Chen was a martial arts expert, opium user and secret society member who's father had fled to Shanghai after being involved in an anti-Manchu uprising. Chen Deyuan himself was supposedly involved in the 1911 Revolution. He discovered that the new regime had little use for the likes of him and, in 1919, at his mother's urging, he opened an opium den. He would remain in this business until 1940. The den was run by Chen, his wife, and two or three employees, usually addicts paid mostly in opium. His den had only five or six pipes, but Chen boiled his own opium. His main asset was the *bian tanzi* (Flat Altar) a specially shaped opium pipe, which was, with the possible exception of the Yan family's *xiao meng cheng* (Little Dream Maker) the best known pipe in Yichang. The Flat Altar gave a particularly powerful smoke, since after cleaning the ashes out each night Chen would put raw opium in the bottom of the bowl. This cost him a little money, but the extra business was worth it.

Chen began as an independent den operator, but in 1924, he moved his den to the *tiande yanghang* (Heavenly Virtue Foreign-style Company), a sort of opium mall with ten dens inside it. Since it was owned by an Italian and had a tattered Italian flag over the door it claimed the right of extraterritoriality, and Chen sold opium there peacefully until his protector fled in 1937. He operated a den in a cellar for a few years, but police harassment and bribe requests and the coming of the Japanese made him close in 1940.⁷⁷

By boiling his own opium Chen was independent of his suppliers and had the opportunity to adulterate his opium (which he supposedly never did) and to work out a mix that appealed to his customers. Opium boiling took a certain amount of capital and it was hard to conceal. In later periods, the state would usually try to centralize opium boiling to restrict the independence of people like Chen Deyuan. Most den owners could not take advantage of extraterritoriality, and had to deal with the state on a regular basis as Chen did in his last years. Chen may have been an opium addict but his wife and comanager refused to use opium and would not let her children use it even as medicine; supposedly most dens were run by opium addicts.

The opium retailing system was far less amenable to state control than wholesaling. Major merchants were easy enough to co-opt, since they needed things the state could provide, such as financing, protection, and market access.

Their operations were large enough that it was difficult for them to avoid state coercion, yet private enough that it was possible for the state to go in with them without exciting much comment. Lower levels of the trade were much more difficult. The state offered den owners very little, and while they feared arrest, they were numerous enough that it would be very expensive for the state to take rigorous action against them. The central government could not even offer den owners respite from official harassment, since the police would provide that in any case. More importantly, much of what local opium dens were selling was difficult to regularize. Chen Deyuan ran a local gathering-place and sold a blend of opium that suited his customers. How could a state-run opium den compete with a “Little Dream Maker”?

In the short run, the solution was to put retailing under an umbrella of state control. In Hankou, the government was willing to be fairly lenient with the merchants in order to get them under control. In 1930, the Hankou opium merchants were organized into the *Hankou teye qingli hui* (Hankou Special Enterprise Administrative Association). The merchants were given six months to sell their existing stocks of opium; after that, the Association would be the marketing arm for official opium in Hankou.⁷⁸ Various levels of opium dens were set up to sell the opium directly to users, ensuring that all levels of the trade, from high-class dens for the rich to *yan hu* (opium sheds) for poor laborers, were brought under government control.⁷⁹

The retail trade was open at both the top and the bottom, with few barriers to entry and little central control. In the mid-1930s the Yunnan warlords managed to set up a fourth opium *hang* in the city, and since they sold at a good price they did quite well.⁸⁰ One family owned dens in several cities along the river, something that would be discouraged later, since it made smuggling too easy and made the den owner harder to control.⁸¹ Besides the official opium sold by the *hang*, much illicit opium flowed through the city, and all the dens sold it. This system was not as tightly controlled as would be needed to either suppress opium or to fully monopolize it, but it did establish a thin layer of knowledge and control which could then be expanded.

PRIVATE ANTI-OPIUM CAMPAIGNS

While the Nanjing government was having success in imposing control on the opium trade, there were limits to how far this mostly secretive policy could go. In order to win international support, take control of opium retailing, and force regional powerholders into a subordinate relationship, the government would have to come up with a plan that could be publicly defended. Nanjing was also abjuring the considerable expansion of state capacity that mass support could give to its policy. In the Late Qing campaigns local elite support had greatly expanded

the power of the state. In the 1930s many groups and individuals were passionate and active in their opposition to the opium trade, but Nanjing gave them no particular reason to support its policies and no role to fulfill if they did.

Whatever Nanjing did about opium it did so in the context of a growing and active public sentiment. Three obscure figures, Mei Gongren, Liu Guangchang, and Cai Bubai, illustrate this internalization.

Mei Gongren was a minor Guomindang functionary who, in 1935, published a book entitled *Wangguo miezhong de yapianyan huo* (*Opium's Destruction of the Nation and the Race*). The book consisted largely of newspaper clippings about the opium situation in China, but also included Mei's justification for its publication. He explained that while as a child, he had been aware that sons of rich families and unemployed hoodlums in his village smoked opium, it was only after he went to school that he learned opium could harm not just the individual but also "the nation, the race, the economy, the government, world morality and the popular will." His education caused him to connect what he had seen as a local and personal problem to China's overall crisis. Because of this he "started crying out against it . . . in the home, in school in society . . . so that public opinion can be mobilized to sweep away the opium plague."⁸²

Liu Guangchang was a Christian pastor from Wuchang who published "Opium: An avoidable evil" in English in 1933. Liu forwarded a copy of the pamphlet to Nanjing and attached a twelve-page letter in which he analyzed the opium problem. The pamphlet begins with stories of opium addicts he had cured in his clinic, and then argues against ignoring the problem or hoping that a state monopoly would eventually be able to eliminate it. In his private letter, he blames the British and Japanese for creating the problem and sympathizes with the state's need for cash, comparing opium taxes to taxes on necessities like firewood and rice. The state realizes these taxes were bad for the people, but felt that the revenue was worth the damage. In the case of opium Liu disagreed. Opium use amounted to self-poisoning and no profit could possibly be worth it.⁸³

Lengthy unsolicited letters and self-published books and pamphlets are today considered the province of political cranks or outright lunatics. Both Mei and Liu were proper revolutionary citizens. Each had internalized the discourse of opium suppression and each connected local problems to a larger national crisis in exactly the way the revolutionary party encouraged. Mei and Liu both looked to the party-state to rectify the situation and took action by speaking, publishing, and, in Liu's case, setting up a clinic.

Another private crusader was Cai Bubai, who published an essay entitled "My views about opium suppression" in 1935. Like Mei, he explained how his education made him realize the dangers of opium. As a child, he had seen no difference between opium and tobacco smoking. He explicitly contrasts opium-smoking with the recreations of foreigners.



FIG. 6.1. Cover of *Opium: An Avoidable Evil*.

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In Europe, America and Japan everyone young and old male and female makes appropriate use of their free time. During the day and at night they have appropriate places to go and things to do. They exercise in gymnasiums, stroll in parks and zoos, swim in swimming pools and drive cars or ride horses to picnic among mountains and streams. In the case of Japan many of these arts and recreations came originally from our country. These things have a good effect on intellectual discipline, tolerance and broad-mindedness and military strategy.⁸⁴

The Chinese, of course, entertain themselves with either opium or gambling, with the expected. Cai concludes that the Chinese government must spend more money on gymnasiums, parks, and swimming pools and the people must dedicate themselves to creating a new atmosphere. Cai's essay was published in a pamphlet issued by the Shanghai Opium Suppression Committee.

Cai's position reflects that of William Lockhart fifty years before. Lockhart had lamented the lack of periodical literature and bourgeois family life in China and pointed to this as the source of the opium problem. Cai was a young modern, educated, Shanghainese who was clearly part of the new Chinese middle-class. He saw opium-smoking as part of the backward China the state was to eliminate by building swimming pools. Middle-class Shanghai looked to the state to solve China's problems. This new elite had reason to distrust the state, however. Few could have failed to notice that Cai's essay was preceded by a piece entitled "Shanghai's opium suppression problem" written by the Committee's chair, Du Yuesheng. Popular support for a strong anti-opium policy existed even before the policy did. These individuals were taking on some of the roles of the revolutionary state, which offered both a chance for Nanjing to make use of them and a threat of what might happen if the government did not come up with solutions.

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Chapter 7

Purifying the People and Defending the State

The Six Year Plan to Eliminate Opium

In the years between 1929 and 1935, the central government made considerable progress in controlling opium trade as a practical matter but almost no progress was made in justifying state involvement. This was a problem for several reasons: It made it difficult for Nanjing to justify its policy internationally. It made it difficult to expand its control much beyond the level reached in 1934. Opium was an issue that could still potentially blow-up in the government's face. Finally, popular opinion in favor of opium suppression was a missed opportunity. There was a great deal of public enthusiasm for opium suppression, but there was no opium suppression campaign for it to be attached to. The solution to all these problems was the Six-Year Plan to Eliminate Opium. At its core was an expansion of the Hankou system to the entire country.

THE SIX-YEAR PLAN

In April 1935, the Nationalist government announced the Six-Year Plan to Eliminate Opium and Drugs. This would be the Nationalists most important and, if judged by its own standards, most successful, anti-opium campaign. In his speech announcing the plan, Chiang Kai-shek declared that the new plan would not merely be paper suppression, as had been so common in the past, but it would be a scientific program, based on closer control of the growing, shipping, sale, and smoking of opium. Every aspect of the trade was to be regulated. "The number of addicts and the amount [they consume], the number of opium shops and amount of poppy production will all be placed under tight

statistical control." The success of the plan was assured because it was based on the successful work of the Anti-Communist Headquarters and the *Liang Hu teshui chu*.¹

Perhaps the most stunning thing about this new campaign was how public it was. Chiang not only announced the plan himself, he made himself the head of the new *Jinyan zonghui* (Central Anti-Opium Commission) that would administer the plan. Chiang also admitted that what they would be selling was *yan du* (opium) not *jie yan yao* (anti-opium medicine) or any of the other euphemisms that had been used in the past. The Anti-Opium Commission, which had been publicly waving the flag of opium suppression while the Inspectorate took control of the trade, was abolished, and the goals of control and suppression were conflated in Chiang himself.

Although the public nature of the plan was a departure, many aspects of it built on previous work. Efforts to take control of the wholesale trade were expanded and extended; the same personnel were kept on, and opium continued to be a source of revenue. The most important changes in the plan were that the state took on the problems of poppy growing and opium smoking, two goals that had only been paid lip service in the past.

What makes the plan interesting, and what made it successful, was how it managed to marry the goals and techniques of control and suppression. The plan seems to have grown out of the natural expansion of the Inspectorate. Opium suppression for the ten provinces had already been put under Chiang's control in July of 1934.² This was done partially because of the recommendations of H. H. Kung.³ Like his brother-in-law T. V. Soong, for Kung him unifying opium taxation was no different from any other tax reform.⁴ To some extent, these actions were part of their jobs, moral considerations were the province of their boss, Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang was apparently sincere in his desire to see China freed of opium, but like all other rulers in China he was unwilling to make the leap from opium control to opium suppression. Given the Six-Year Plan's melding of these two approaches the distinction between the two no longer had to be made, and in fact was best not made.

In February of 1936, Chiang Kai-shek gave a speech outlining the benefits of the new plan. Chiang refused to blame the problem on foreigners, locating the heart of the problem in the Chinese people themselves. The people lacked *jue xin* (determination) because they had lost faith in the government's ability to deal with the problem. Now that the government had found a method of controlling opium the enthusiasm of the people could be re-awakened and prove to the world that the Chinese were a strong race.⁵ This speech neatly tied the suppression approach to opium to the control approach: it was the government's ability to control opium, admittedly for revenue purposes, that would make it possible to purify the nation. Real progress towards purifying the nation would legitimate controlling opium.

The timing suggests a link to the New Life Movement, which was launched in February 1934. Although this movement has not fared well at the hands of later historians, it was a major policy initiative for Nanjing, and a great deal of sweat and ink were spilt over it. The New Life Movement was intended to strengthen China along the line of Nazi Germany by instilling in the Chinese people the virtues of propriety, righteousness, integrity, and sense of shame. They were to practice these by living a hygienic and disciplined life.⁶ New Life would seem to connect quite closely to opium; as Chiang himself put it in a speech to a group of Yunnan schoolteachers "If we want to realize New Life, we must first suppress opium."⁷

In fact, the relationship between New Life and what would become the Six-Year Plan was complex. Each campaign was headed by Chiang personally, and each attempted mass mobilization using similar techniques.⁸ Each also had the same genealogy. Each grew out of the Anti-Communist Encirclement campaigns; the New Life Movement was launched after Chiang saw a disheveled soldier, and the Six-Year Plan was launched after Chiang became aware that some of his encirclement troops were smoking opium.⁹ New Life propaganda singled-out opium as one of the many problems it was intended to solve. Despite this the two campaigns were quite different. Each had its own bureaucracy, the opium control apparatus was never subsumed into the New Life apparatus. The Six-Year Plan was also a success whereas New Life was a failure. The opium plan was successful because it grew out of a successful opium control program with considerable bureaucratic and intellectual support. The New Life Movement was born when Chiang created it, and became moribund when he lost interest.¹⁰ Suppression of opium smoking became a part of opium policy when Chiang took an interest, but it continued because it had become part of a larger set of concerns.

THE NEW OPIUM BUREAUCRACY

A new system called for new institutions, or at least new titles. A new institutional structure was set up, in part to associate opium suppression with Chiang Kai-shek, and in part to centralize planning and control for the new, more rigorous, anti-opium campaign. The old system was swept aside. All licenses and permits for selling or smoking opium that had been issued before were no longer valid, and the old Opium Suppression Commission was abolished (although it would later be reconstituted). The old opium law in the criminal code was also rescinded, thereby avoiding the conflicts over different laws that had interfered with the 1927 opium farm system in the Yangzi delta. As befitted a national campaign a national headquarters was set up, and those parts of the opium suppression structure that were controlled by the Anti-Communist Headquarters were put underneath it.

The head of opium suppression was the *jinyan zong jian* (Supreme Opium Suppression Inspector) who was, of course, Chiang himself.¹¹ Under this office were the Anti-Opium Inspectorate and the new *jinyan zong hui* (Anti-Opium Commission). This had authority over the provincial and local Anti-Opium Commissions as well as the special commissioners. Although there was an office attached to Chiang's post as *jinyan zong jian bu* (Supreme Inspector), it seems to have been a small affair with a few clerks. The real administrative center of the campaign would be the new Anti-Opium Commission.

The old commission was abolished in June 1935, as part of the sweeping away of the old opium suppression structure, but it was soon apparent that an organization of this sort was needed. In January 1936, a new commission was set up.¹² At least three of the original seventeen members, Li Jihong, Zhong Ketuo, and Li Zhonggong, had experience in administering the previous opium program. This was to be a working commission (unlike its ineffective predecessor), that actually accomplished a great deal of work. At the opening meeting of the new commission, Chiang's speech, stressed that the new commission was the last chance for the nation and the race to deal with its opium problem and to establish a position for themselves in international society. The most important activity of the commission at this first meeting was setting up the *jinyan fagui bianshen weiyuanhui* (Anti-Opium Law Drafting Committee). This committee included Li Zhonggong and the ubiquitous Li Jihong, and was responsible for drafting all future opium laws. It was also responsible for drawing up the five-year schedule which would be the detailed blueprint for opium suppression.

Local and provincial Anti-Opium Commissions were also set up, but they were less professional and their role quite vague. Most of the members of these local commissions were concurrently-serving local officials, although at least three were to be designated as a full-time standing committee to deal with day-to-day matters.¹³ This gave the commission the best of both worlds. Having ordinary officials on the Commissions guaranteed that the professional reputations of officials with real power would be dependent on the success of opium suppression. Having a group of full-time opium officials would provide continuity and professionalism to what was often a slapdash affair. The duties of the local commissions were broad and somewhat vague. They propagandized, collected statistics, and assisted in suppressing poppy growing, catching smugglers, and prosecuting opium cases. Together with local governments, they were also responsible for registering and managing opium smokers. In 1935, provincial anti-opium commissions were set up in Hunan, Anhui, Shanghai, Beiping, Sichuan, Jiangsu, Fujian, Chahar, Henan, Jiangxi, Gansu, and Tianjin. Hubei and Guangzhou were added in 1936.¹⁴

The Inspectorate kept its old duties, and had suboffices in Guizhou, Hunan, Hubei, Henan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Shanghai, and Fujian. Sichuan and

Yunnan were to have offices as well, but these were to be run by the provincial governments. Presumably this was a concession to these provinces—with Chiang working out a compromise. The two notable omissions from this list, Guangdong and Guangxi, were not to get offices.¹⁵ The Inspectorate was also given responsibility for dealing with refined drugs.

THE GOALS OF THE NEW PLAN

In March 1935, Chiang was asked by the Anti-Opium Commission to extend the power of the above institutions to the entire country, and on April 1, 1935, he did so. On April 18, Chiang issued the *jinyan shishi banfa* (Plan for Effective Opium Suppression) and the *jindu shishi banfa* (Plan for Effective Drug Suppression). These two documents laid out the goals of the new campaign. At the same time the *jinyan fagui bianzhen weiyuanhui* (Anti-Opium Law Drafting Commission) completed the *jinyan jindu wunian jindu biao* (Five-Year Opium and Drug Suppression Reference Schedule), an internal document that laid out the course opium suppression was supposed to take. The *jinyan shishi banfa* was a summary and extension of the previous laws governing poppy planting, registration of opium users, and wholesale and retail opium sales.¹⁶

With regard to poppy planting, they kept the special commissioner system, as well as the distinction between the ten interior provinces and the rest. For the first time, however, they included details on what was to be done in the exterior provinces, and were much stricter in the interior. In the interior provinces (with the exceptions of Shaanxi and Gansu), poppy suppression was held to be largely accomplished. The goal at that point was to prevent its recrudescence and stomp out the last pockets of resistance, and the educational measures mentioned in the earlier laws were not included. The special commissioners and the local authorities uprooted poppies and turned the growers over to the military courts. Resistance to uprooting was countered with force; magistrates who did not uproot poppies, report poppy growing, or collected opium taxes, were to be executed.

Gansu and Shaanxi were technically part of the ten provinces, but were treated separately, because some poppy was still grown there. But plans to reduce production had already begun, dividing the provinces into opium suppression districts and suppressing district by district. These plans were the model for reduction in the exterior provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ningxia. By the end of 1935, these provinces had to both determine how much poppy land existed and begin a program of gradual reduction. Hebei, Shanxi, and Shandong used strict suppression. All provinces, no matter which suppression schedule they were on, were under a special commissioner.¹⁷

Opium smoking was dealt with by a system that registered users and cured them. This was not a new idea, but now registration was actually carried out all over the country and clinics were set up. By the end of 1935, all provinces had to have completed the registration of smokers, and to have begun a process (not described) of gradually reducing their numbers by one-fifth a year, so that by 1940 opium smoking would be eliminated. Opium continued to be transported by the Anti-Opium Inspectorate, and sold through wholesale and retail shops licensed by the Inspectorate. The amount of opium sold was pegged to the needs of registered users, and the number of shops were gradually reduced over time. The degree to which this was carried out varied from place to place, but in most of the provinces of central and eastern China there was a flurry of activity. Many reminiscences and accounts in the *wenshi ziliao* report active registration campaigns and setting up clinics in 1935 and 1936.

The new rules were also more specifics about how all the Anti-Opium Commissions and the opium clinics would be funded. The plan specified that revenue come from local license fees (for smokers and retailers), opium fines, provincial and local governments, and from the Anti-Opium Inspectorate, which was to remit part of the local opium sales money. Prior to this, clinics usually relied on fees charged to patients, limiting cures to the reasonably wealthy. Now subsidies were available, and the government experimented with new, cheaper ways of curing opium addiction.

There was, as before, a good deal of wishful thinking in all this. As yet plans for reducing smoking and poppy growing were still very vague, it would take considerable development before these got off the ground. The new rules were written to do at least three things, to extend control, win cooperation, and plan for the end of the opium trade. In part, all of this was feasible because the government had already had considerable success establishing a level of control. By 1935, the government was making plans to drive this control deeper. The provisions for funding local anti-opium organizations were very important; continued expansion of the opium control system after 1935 called for more and more help from provincial and local governments. To this end, the central government had to offer practical reasons for cooperation.

At the same time the two new laws were being promulgated, the Anti-Opium Law Drafting Commission was drawing up a detailed plan for carrying them out. Because one year of the Six-Year Plan would have already passed before it could be put into action, the plan was called *jinyan jindu wu nian jindu biao* (Five-Year Opium and Drug Suppression Reference Schedule). This plan laid out detailed schedules for suppression of opium growing and an ambitious plan for bringing the wholesale trade under control. The schedule had elements of both the revenue-oriented approach and strict suppression; the tension between the two had not yet been resolved, but as in the past, whatever the ulti-

mate goal of the policy might have been, the immediate task was more control over the opium trade.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF OPIUM SHIPPING

The schedule's plan for wholesale and retail opium shipments was quite ambitious and never fully realized. The goal was to make the system entirely government-controlled. A large part of the wholesale opium trade was already going through the government's hands in Hankou; strict suppression called for a much stricter system of control. For 1936, the existing shipping system was used. Opium was transported by private merchants under the supervision of the government. These merchants were to buy the opium in the growing districts, transport it along approved routes, and store it in provincial government warehouses—exactly as they were already doing. However, this system was considerably expanded. New producing areas like Gansu and Shaanxi were brought into the system. This opium was brought down by truck from Zhengzhou through Hankou and shipped on to Shanghai and Fujian.¹⁸ The Inspectorate tightened its control of existing opium routes. In September 1935, Xiao Juetian of the Inspectorate's Guizhou office estimated Yunnan's total production at 61,114 *dan* a year, of which approximately half was exported via the three routes supervised by the office. Although some opium was consumed in the province, it could not amount to half of production, and the Inspectorate tightened up controls on Yunnan opium to force this smuggled opium into the official system.¹⁹

The government planned to begin more intrusive control of the opium shipping system starting in 1937. The old system of merchant shipment was to be abolished and private merchants were to be forbidden to transport or process opium. The government would now buy the opium directly in the producing provinces, transport it, boil and package it, shipping it to the provinces in proportion to their stated number of registered addicts. In 1938 shipments from Yunnan, Shaanxi, and Ningxia were to end. By 1939, only four provinces were to be producing opium, and by 1940 the whole trade was to end.

Retail sales of opium were to be brought under control of the center just as quickly as wholesaling. In 1936, the existing system of sales through privately owned, government licensed opium *hang* and dens was continued. By the end of the year, the government was to have accumulated its own equipment for preparing opium, and illegal sales of anti-opium pills were to end. Any non-approved local systems of licensing addicts were also to be abolished. In 1937, official opium *hang* were set up throughout the country, and they provided government-boiled opium to the licensed local merchants. Both production

and sales would be gradually reduced until the trade was ended in 1940.²⁰ In the long run, this system was supposed to lead to elimination of the trade, but it is hard to believe that all this work was done to organize a trade that was to be abolished in three years. More likely, many of those involved in the organizing effort expected the system to continue indefinitely. What the real intentions of the government were is of course impossible to determine, but it is likely that at this point many high-ranking officials were not sure what they could do with this new control once they had it.

THE ANHUI SPECIAL COMMISSIONER AND IMPOSITION OF THE NEW PLAN IN THE PROVINCES

How well was this plan carried out and how effective was it? This varied a great deal from place to place, but there was, at the very least, an expansion of activity and at this point, there was also a clear standard to judge opium work against. The fanfare associated with the launching of the Six-Year Plan made it clear that opium suppression was one of the things that Nanjing and Chiang Kai-shek cared about, and local and provincial governments had to at least pretend to take it seriously. Anti-opium associations were revived, meetings held, and reports written. This burst of enthusiasm was not frittered away, however. It was encouraged and controlled by agents of the central government, specifically the special commissioners. These had originally been sent out to look for poppy growing, but the commissioners usually grew into general representatives of central government opium policy. In a place like Sichuan, where the provincial government already had considerable control over the trade, the commissioner would negotiate acceptable agreements with the province. In provinces like Anhui, where there had been little effective action against opium, he would do almost everything. Provinces were no longer left to decide for themselves if they wanted to participate in the anti-opium campaign; the special commissioners would force them to do so.

The Anhui commissioner was Zhong Baiyi, appointed in 1936. He was appointed by the central government alone, and all members of his staff were chosen by him personally. Although his tasks involved close cooperation with local and provincial authorities, there was no question who he worked for, or whom he reported to. However, at least some of the operating expenses of the office were borne by the provincial government.²¹

The first duty of the Commissioner's office was education. Zhong sent out lecturers to schools, put articles and press releases in the newspapers, and sent out vernacular propaganda for distribution by local governments.²² This propaganda informed people that this campaign, unlike many before, was to be taken seriously. It also emphasized the moral side of opium policy, encouraging the

people to renounce opium as part of their duty to China. The office saw to it that all counties in Anhui organized an anti-opium rally. This was the joint responsibility of the local party, courts, government, military, police, students, merchants, farmers, and workers. By requiring all parts of local government to be involved in planning and organizing the anti-opium effort, the commissioner forced them to associate themselves with its success. Besides assembling the masses to hear anti-opium speeches, teams were sent out to preach the anti-opium message on the street, and *bao jia* heads were given appropriate speeches to deliver to the people.²³ But this was as far as the government was willing to go in creating a mass movement. As in 1928, the government seems to have hoped to encourage mass enthusiasm, but not to the extent that it became hard to control. What effect, if any, all this propaganda had, is hard to say, but certainly after 1935, many more people were exposed to it.

The actual rooting out of opium growing and selling was left to local governments. All magistrates were to purify their districts and then request an inspection by the commissioner's office. Those who failed to act were punished; those who were active could request military support from the commissioner. This prohibition was quite proactive. Prior to planting, *bao jia* heads helped locate and destroy stocks of opium seeds. During planting season, opium was uprooted, and peasants were encouraged to plant other crops. After the opium plant reached maturity, it was uprooted if found, and the planter was punished according to law. His *bao jia* head might also be punished.²⁴

Orders were not merely sent down, the Commissioner was also responsible for assessing the success of these measures. At least ten inspectors and a number of secret inspectors were to be sent out to check on affairs in each of the counties of Anhui.²⁵ The inspectors spent at least five days in each county, and submitted reports on what they found. To avoid slipshod inspections or bribery, the inspectors were given specific lists of the documents they were to inspect, and they filled out detailed forms on the level of anti-opium activity in each county. To deal with border areas, the inspectors coordinated their activities with inspectors in neighboring counties and provinces. Even bandit areas were cleared of opium—by force if necessary. Reports, on all actions taken, were sent to both the provincial government and the commissioner's office.

Smokers were registered in the fourth month (one assumes of 1936).²⁶ This was handled by local officials and carried out in every part of the province. Local governments submitted regular reports on the current number of licensed smokers, the number cured, and the estimated number of nonlicensed smokers in the district. Opium shops were set up and closed in accordance with the national plan. According to Zhong Baiyi, very few users registered in the time allotted.²⁷ Almost everywhere else, there was a series of registration drives before an acceptable number of users were registered. Eventually, a full system of registrations and licensed sales was set up in Anhui.

DISTRIBUTION IN FUJIAN

Closer central supervision created an opium control system in Anhui. Control over wholesale shipments made it possible for the central government to finally place Fujian under control. In April 1934, the Anti-Opium Inspectorate set up a Fujian branch office in Fuzhou, with sub-branches in Xiamen and elsewhere.²⁸ This was more complete coverage than in most of the provinces the Inspectorate was active in, and this was presumably because Fujian was the first province to see an ambitious attempt to centralize control over opium distribution at the lowest level. From the beginning of 1935, the Inspectorate provided good-quality Sichuan opium at the price of one *yuan* per *liang*.²⁹ Licensed merchants brought opium into the province along approved routes and deposited it in official warehouses run by the Anti-Opium Inspectorates in Fuzhou and Xiamen.³⁰ The *Yu min* (Enriching Fujian) company bought the right to set up wholesale *tugao hang* (opium stores), and they distributed the opium to licensed retail shops all over the province. The shops then sold the opium to licensed users. Much opium was doubtlessly sold outside this system, but government opium was legal, high-quality, and it rapidly found a market. This system was quite successful in bringing opium retailing under control, and the Inspectorate began plans to refine the system.

The original goal was to bring everyone currently involved in the trade into the government system. Now, the goal was to reduce the scope of the trade, both for the sake of reducing it and to make it easier to control. After June 1936, the number of opium shops declined, with an eventual goal of only one retail shop per county. During 1936, the number of wholesale shops was reduced from nineteen to six, and the next year it was reduced to four. The number of smaller shops remained steady—at around seventy—but in 1937, they were split into four classes, with different license fees for different levels, presumably to ensure that even poor counties could afford a shop (keeping them from turning to smuggled opium) and to assure that merchants in the richer counties paid high fees.³¹ In April 1937, the wholesale monopoly was taken away from the *Yu min* company. Its manager was eventually arrested.³² Thereafter, wholesaling was the direct responsibility of the Inspectorate.

Control of retailing was based on the registration totals of users. Once the number of users in an area was determined, only the amount of opium needed was sent. Dramatic performances and cross talks were given throughout the province, explaining that opium was illegal but users who were unable to quit would be allowed to register and continue use until they were admitted to a detoxification center to be cured.³³ The process of registration began in 1935, but as in other provinces it was not as quick as had been hoped. As of mid-1936, about half of the counties had completed registration, and a total of 111,482 users were registered. These counties were given quotas of opium

based on the numbers of registered users. Quotas ranged from 0.5 *liang* a month to 1.6 *liang* a month, which indicated that users were assigned to different categories based on their level of addiction.

The point of registering all these opium users was not just to determine the amount of opium needed, but also to begin the process of curing them. In 1935, Fujian had only one specialized anti-opium clinic, but in 1936, seventy-six more were opened. By 1937, there were a total of eighty-four clinics or hospitals, and 17,800 addicts had gone through the clinics.³⁴ Almost every county had a clinic. The smaller ones had as few as ten beds and a budget of as little as twenty *yuan* a month. Most of the clinics were supported largely by fees although almost 90 percent of users qualified for special reduced-rate licenses. Each clinic was supposed to have at least one doctor, although it is likely many had minimal training. The clinics were also supposed to produce regular reports on addicts, ages, and the number cured; most did so fairly regularly.³⁵

After the war started, the situation in Fujian changed. Wartime conditions called for closer supervision of the opium trade. The opium *hang* were taken over by the government, and private merchants were removed from the process entirely. Each locality licensed a local person to set up a *yanmin xian jie guanli suo* (Smoker cure management office) in effect an opium den, which was the only place male smokers were allowed to smoke. Women continued to be allowed to smoke at home.³⁶ All previous laws had forbidden opium dens and required users to buy their opium and take it home to smoke it. This (if enforced) eliminated the opium den as a place to gather for social interaction and presumably helped reduce the number of casual users. Official opium dens had the advantage of putting users under direct government supervision.

With all legal opium in the province in government hands, illegal opium was easier to distinguish. Various fines were set for den owners who allowed nonregistered people to smoke or who allowed registered smokers to exceed their ration. The fines, and the detailed reporting system, show that these dens were not like those in Jiangsu, which, despite talk of registration, would sell to anyone. The relatively small amounts of the fines suggest they were actually intended to be collected.³⁷

In 1938, regulations were issued to allow opium shops to revert to selling small containers of take-home opium, presumably because it had proved impossible to restrict opium smoking entirely to legal dens.³⁸ Fujian, by this point, had exactly what both prorevenue and suppression forces wanted, a small, fully-controlled opium trade. No doubt there was still a good amount of private growing and smoking, and the greater central control over the official system meant that this was now entirely outside the government system, but that was probably unavoidable.

Fujian was a success from all points of view. The power of the local garrisons had been broken, opium users were rehabilitated, and only opium which

paid central government taxes could be sold in Fujian. This last point was the most important. It did not matter if Yunnanese warlords managed to smuggle opium into Fujian. By 1938, the entire retailing system was controlled by the government. Even if outside opium did come, it would have to establish an entire new distribution network in order to compete with official opium. In 1929 the central government's opium control system consisted of Hankou. From the producer to Hankou, and from Hankou to the consumer, the trade was wide open, and avoiding the special tax office in Hankou was not difficult. By 1938, at least in Fujian, the entire trade, from one end of the province to the other, was under control. This control was not perfect, and attaining it took more resources than the government wanted to commit in most provinces, but Fujian was a model and an example of how effective the new system could be, if run properly.

GUANGDONG AND THE SPREAD OF THE PLAN TO NEW AREAS

The central government's newfound control over the opium system made it much easier to expand control into new areas, the best example of this was Guangdong. Although Guangdong was the first province controlled by the Guomindang, after the Northern Expedition, it slipped out of Chiang's control. The party leaders in Guangdong were a constant annoyance to Chiang. They controlled a wealthy, economically independent province, and many of them, especially Hu Hanmin, were longtime party veterans with nationalist and party credentials at least as good as Chiang's.

Throughout the Nanjing decade, Canton was the center of vaguely leftist resistance to Chiang and its leaders were connected to most of the plots against Chiang during this period. The failure of Chen Qitang's revolt in 1936 and Hu Hanmin's retirement to Hong Kong in 1935 (followed by his death a year later), greatly weakened the Canton group, and in July 1936, Chiang appointed the reliable Huang Musong governor of the province. The central government's takeover in Guangdong was primarily political, but it offered an immediate opportunity to take over the opium trade in the province. Opium profits was one of the keys to Guangdong's independence. Once these profits were in Chiang's hands, it was impossible for the province to slip out of control again.

The province produced very little opium, and imported most of its stocks from Yunnan and Guizhou via Guangxi. It was one of the few provinces to bring in substantial amounts of opium from outside China, with significant amounts coming in from Hong Kong (Persian opium) and from French Indochina via Guangzhouwan (probably Yunnan opium).³⁹ This made the Guangdong market more difficult for Nanjing to take over, but at the same

time made it more attractive, as it was one of the most important outlets for Guangxi opium, the key to the financial independence of the Guangxi clique.⁴⁰

Prior to the Northern Expedition, the Guomindang organized an opium monopoly for Canton, and this was continued and expanded by the new government. The government licensed merchants and set up official opium shops, although sales were still allowed outside these shops as long as taxes were paid. Financially, this was a great success. In 1926, the government made a little over five million *yuan* in opium profits. This rose steadily. By 1932, they made 8.6 million *yuan*.⁴¹ As the central government took control of the province, it took control of the opium system. By 1936, Nanjing's methods were sophisticated enough that this was done quickly and easily.

Chiang Kai-shek had been quite careful to keep the Anti-Opium Inspectorate entirely under his own control, but in Guangdong, he faced a struggle. In 1936, the Anti-Opium Inspectorate set up a branch office in Guangdong with the intention of extending its opium control system to the province. The office was headed by Huang Qicong, younger brother of Huang Weicun, the head of the Inspectorate. At the same time T. V. Soong took control of the Guangdong trade by setting up an opium suppression office headed by his brother Song Ziliang.⁴² These two rivals, each to some extent representing the central government, faced a province in which opium smoking was all but open. This was a considerable embarrassment, but it was also a potential source of profit. Almost immediately the province began remitting five-hundred thousand *yuan* in opium money a month to the central government.⁴³

The money was of course welcome, but the Soong family presence was not. The entire opium control system was aimed at preventing other power groups from controlling the trade. In February 1937, all opium matters were put under the control of a Special Commissioner, Li Jihong, who was once head of the Anti-Opium Inspectorate and a member of the Anti-Opium Commission. Li was one of the government's top opium man, and sending him was a sign of how seriously Nanjing took this project. If Guangdong could be controlled, all the important outlets for Southwestern opium would be under Nanjing's control.

Together with Wu Tiecheng, the governor after 1937, Li moved to take control of opium retailing. The province was divided into nine parts, each of which had a licensed opium *hang*, which was to be the only legal place for the opium shops to purchase opium. Once registration was complete, the shops themselves would sell only to registered users. Boiling of opium was closely controlled⁴⁴ and the imposition of a new opium control system on the province was quite gradual. Most of the old opium merchants were allowed to keep their positions, and most of the members of the province's previous opium control office were also kept on.⁴⁵ Although the *hang* were now to be licensed, they were free to get their opium from anywhere as long as taxes were paid. Seventy to eighty percent of the opium sold came from Guangxi, with the rest from Hunan.⁴⁶

Much of the opium was thus not paying taxes in Hankou, but at this point the chief goal was taking control of the retail trade, not eliminating the Yunnan-Guangxi-Guangdong opium route. Merchants were given assistance in shipping opium ashes from Guangxi, and were allowed to sell of existing stocks at favorable prices.⁴⁷ The point was to take over the trade gradually, co-opting the existing merchants rather than driving them underground. In this it was a success. By early 1938 the government was making a million *yuan* a month from opium sales in Canton alone.⁴⁸ The system was also effective outside the city of Canton, with the city only accounting for 40 percent of total sales.⁴⁹

Once the Special Commissioner had taken control of the trade, it could be handed over to the regular opium suppression system. At the end of 1938, the Commissioner's office was abolished, and its responsibilities handed over to the Inspectorate and the provincial government. At this point, the same policies used elsewhere were enforced in Guangdong. Now that the *hang* were under control, the government could force them to only sell official opium, and to limit their sales to the amounts needed for the registered addicts. A system of clinics to cure addicts was set up, and a workhouse for the reform of opium addicts was set up and paid for by the province.⁵⁰ The goal of all this was the eventual elimination of the trade, which was already underway. In 1938, the number of licensed opium merchants was reduced from twenty-two to fifteen, with further reductions planned. The eight hundred eighty-six opium shops were also reduced. In the meantime, the system provided the government with money, one million *yuan* a month until the Japanese took Canton, and half a million a month thereafter.⁵¹

GUIZHOU AND YUNNAN AND THE SUCCESS OF THE PLAN IN WINNING THE WEST

At the same time Nanjing was putting opium in the central areas under firmer control, Chiang was bringing the western provinces to heel and forcing them into his opium system. This destroyed their financial independence. In part, Chiang was able to do this because the Long March allowed him to spread his military power into the west, and because the warlords suffered a series of defeats in their struggles with Chiang. Another factor was the growing crisis with Japan that forced more and more Chinese to rally around Chiang as the only possible national leader. Equally important was Chiang's opium control system, which locked up the most important opium markets. If warlords wanted to sell, they had to do so on Chiang's terms.

The least important of the major opium producing provinces were Gansu and Shaanxi in the northwest, both produced low-quality opium. Given the remoteness of these provinces, it was one of the few things they could export.

Traditionally, they had marketed their opium in Beijing and Tianjin, but the Japanese were cutting into that trade with Manchurian opium and refined drugs. The northwestern warlords needed a new market, and Chiang was willing to provide it. Buying a warlord's opium made them dependent on Chiang; the more sources of opium Chiang had, the less Chiang was dependent on any one warlord. In 1934, the Inspectorate began trying to divert Northwestern opium through Hankou, entrusting this mission to Li Jihong.⁵² They arranged for the bulk of northwestern opium to be shipped to Hankou via Zhengzhou, even though the route was always fairly disorganized. The trade was entirely in the hands of private merchants who were not controlled either by their provincial governments or by the inspectorate. They evaded taxes, bribed officials, and sold at least some opium directly to local dens.⁵³ Still, Hankou was the market, and most of the opium ended up there.

Much more important were Guizhou and Yunnan, the two most important opium producing areas outside Chiang's control. The Guangxi clique supported itself with revenue from shipping opium from Guizhou and Yunnan to Canton.⁵⁴ None of the four provinces involved were under Nanjing's control in 1935; Guangdong, was under control by 1938. Ultimately, if Chiang could control their markets, he could control these provinces.

The southwestern provinces had three major routes they used to bring opium to market—via French Indochina, overland through Guangxi to Guangdong, and through Hankou. The French route was an attractive smuggling route, with opium in small amounts moved from Yunnan to French Indochina and then back to China through Guangzhouwan or, directly to Hong Kong or Shanghai. There was at least one attempt to turn this into a major opium route, but that would have taken high-level cooperation from the French government. The French route would always remain a minor irritant for Chiang.

By the mid-1930s, Yunnan had put its opium trade under government control, and both the government and merchants it worked with were quite sensitive to tax changes, shifting routes as taxes changed. Hankou and Guangxi were aware of this problem and tried to lure as much of the trade as possible. The Hankou Special Tax Office and later the Anti-Opium Inspectorate set tax rates for Guizhou and Yunnan opium that was based on current relationships between the provinces and the central government and on what was necessary to keep the opium from going through Guangxi.⁵⁵

From the beginning Hankou had certain advantages. Opium was shipped largely by water via the Hankou route (which was cheaper), but more importantly, it gave access to a larger market. If Yunnan and Guizhou sent all their opium to Guangdong then it would have flooded the market, and made them dependent on the goodwill of the Guangxi clique. Thus, they were semidependent on Chiang from the beginning, and were forced to go along with his opium suppression plans. Like all the other provinces, Yunnan and Guizhou

approved of the (1935) Six-Year Plan when it was announced, and like other provinces, they announced plans to meet or exceed its targets.⁵⁶ Since the plan called for them to put the opium trade under tighter control, this was not much of a sacrifice, but all the same, it served Chiang's interests. Now Chiang could negotiate with large opium suppliers rather than trying to control a horde of small merchants.

After 1936, the troublesome southwestern warlords simply folded up. Sichuan was the first province to be absorbed; Yunnan was the last, and the most successful at retaining independence. But the process was the same, and opium was the key element.⁵⁷ The province began by putting opium exports under close control, partially to increase profits, a motive that would have been important even without pressure from Chiang, but partially also to ensure that more of the limited profits the province was making ended up in the hands of the provincial government. Attempts to exploit internal markets were made, but the nature of the internal trade, made this ineffective. The only solution was to concentrate production in a few easily controlled areas and send it to Chiang Kai-shek. In both Sichuan and Guizhou, this eventually led to Chiang's own people being sent into the province to take over the trade directly.⁵⁸ Chiang was not interested, in 1936 at least, in completely eliminating the power of the southwestern warlords. Once they were under control, he turned his attention to the Communists.

Chiang Kai-shek signaled his approval of the opium situation in the southwest in a May 1936 speech.

I feel that in the three provinces [Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan] the most outstanding political advance was in opium prohibition. In both cultivation and consumption, it has been possible to take rapid prohibition measures, and well within the previous limit. Many people have given up smoking of their own accord. . . . As far as the prohibition of cultivation is concerned, the chairmen of the three provinces have worked together. As a result of changing over to the cultivation of grains, there has been an increase in the production of foodstuffs in comparison with the recent past.⁵⁹

Chiang's statement needs to be read carefully. It was published in *Zhongyang ribao* (Central Daily News) and was intended for general consumption, but, besides the public meaning aimed at newspaper readers all over China, the statement had a specific meaning for the governments of the three provinces. Chiang was expressing his general satisfaction with the opium situation in the southwest.

The provincial governments were not entirely under central control, and they were not as much eliminating poppy as limiting it to the major production areas and thus making it easier to control exports.

Sichuan was integrated into the government opium system more directly than the other two, but even Yunnan lost a considerable amount of financial independence. The Six-Year Plan aimed at increasing government control and its revenues. It denied control to rivals and in this respect, the plan was considered a success. The southwestern provinces had not made much progress at this point, but Chiang was apparently less worried about this—policy towards remote areas was governed more by desire for control than for suppression.

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Chapter 8

Defining Drugs

The southwestern warlords were brought under control because the central government controlled market access. They were also put in a bad position because Nanjing's opium control system legitimately claimed to be taking successful action against opium smoking, which was the chief way opium threatened the Chinese nation. Nanjing was formally committed to the totalizing views of the anti-opium crusaders. Opium smoking was not acceptable, and the state would not compromise in any way. In some contexts, such as morphine, this position would still be taken. The system of registration, licensing, and cures established under the plan allowed the state to sort users into different categories so that they could be dealt with appropriately.

In the Nanjing period, there was a clear division between opium and *dupin* (drugs). Similar to the modern American distinction between soft and hard drugs, this was a clear cultural distinction. Official publications on drugs were divided into two parts, the first on opium and the second on everything else, which in practice meant morphine, heroin, and the red and golden pills that contained them.¹ Usually the first sentence of the second section explained that these drugs were much worse than opium.²

This distinction was reflected in the law as well—both in code and application. The legal punishments for involvement in the drug trade were always harsher than those for involvement with opium, and, unlike in the case of opium, these penalties were enforced.³ In 1937, local and provincial governments reported dealing with over thirty thousand cases involving opium. Five people were executed. Of the almost forty-five hundred tried for refined drug offenses, three hundred fifty were executed. Refined drug criminals who were not executed received longer prison terms.⁴ These numbers may not be very accurate, but the ratio probably is,

and it is typical of statistics on punishment of opium and drug criminals. This distinction was clear even at the very top level of state policy.

The best-known nationalist antidrug campaign was the 1935 plan known as the Six-Year Plan. In fact, however, the Six Year Plan to eliminate opium was coupled with a two-year plan to eliminate drugs. The time difference is explained by the fact that drugs were to be treated far more strictly than opium. Each of the four parts of the opium trade was given a schedule for elimination, based on the state's ability to control it and its moral importance. Opium users were given time to cure themselves and avoid punishment; opium sellers were given time to move their capital to other trades; and poppy growers were to be encouraged to gradually shift to other crops. None of these concessions were offered to those who were involved in the drug trade.⁵

Why were refined drugs considered so much worse than opium? The standard explanation was medical. These drugs were more addictive and more dangerous than opium.⁶ This was not based on scientific understanding of these drugs, because morphine, the most important of them, was the active ingredient in opium. Although antidrug discourse was frequently presented as medical discourse, it was based on a number of associations made between the drug, its users, and the genealogy of the drug in Chinese society. Although such discourses were always medicalized, neither medical nor public health concerns explain the development of attitudes and policy. Refined drug use had a number of connotations that opium did not, and lacked some connotations that opium had. It was possible for connections to opium to be acceptable, if not very respectable, or at least be considered a minor crime worth only minor attention from the state. Refined drug production, sale, and use were quite different.

The distinction between opium and other drugs was not universal. In Japanese-controlled territories, especially Manchukuo, the distinction between refined drugs and opium was a minor matter. In China they were quite different, as the various drugs had established different genealogies and associations. The most important distinction was that, despite the attempts of reformers after 1900, opium remained an acculturated substance—refined drugs were not. An acculturated drug was not necessarily acceptable in all contexts but it could be tolerated in at least some. This was most clear at the two poles of the discourse, the reprehensible heroin addict and the innocent peasant poppy grower.

THE ASH-HEAPS OF MUKDEN

The narrative of addiction proposed a gradual decline of the user until he or she was stripped of all identity save that of the addict. They lost their jobs, family money, and mind until there was nothing left but the *yan gui* (opium devil). Addiction caused people to become opium, and nothing but opium. The pro-

totypical opium wreck was the physical manifestation of the problem, but for most purposes, drug users worked better for this purpose than opium users.

A good example of this comes from Tianjin. As the ice broke up on the Hai River in the spring of 1937, some one hundred bodies were discovered. Japanese narcotic den operators were accused of having shoved the bodies of overdosed customers under the ice. Japanese den operators in Harbin and Mukden had been accused of dumping dead (or nearly dead) customers on the cities garbage heaps.⁷ These addicts typified the decline and collapse of China so well that the drug-den area of Tianjin became a tourist attraction for foreigners.⁸

The dead heroin users were literally human garbage, the perfect endpoint of the narrative of addiction. They had been stripped of all human characteristics and were tossed out with trash. They had no name, family, or occupation. Being dead they obviously could not be interviewed, but there were lots of living drug users in Harbin and Tianjin who could. This was never done however, since any interview would probably focus on the path that the addict took to this point, which would of course humanize them. Heroin users were attached only to narratives of subjugation and destruction. The two main things that subjugated them were modernity and Japanese imperialism.

In Chinese rhetoric, refined drugs were always associated with the Japanese.⁹ Morphine and heroin were the agents of the Japanese *dubua zhengci*—policies to intoxicate that were intended to “narcotize the population with a view to keeping it in continuous torpor and submission.”¹⁰ Refined drugs tied the user to China’s semicolonial status more clearly than opium did.

Refined drugs were also modern. Although they spread into the countryside, especially in the North, in the 1930s, they were mostly an urban phenomenon and overwhelmingly lower-class. The chemical process by which they were made broke the connection between the final product and the labor of virtuous peasants. They were the essence of the dangers of modernity, produced in a lab and used by urban ner-do-wells for a quick high. Morphine and heroin were popular because they were cheap and easy to take. They needed none of the connoisseurship and social interaction opium smoking required. Thus, they were not linked to any of the forms of refined consumption opium was linked to. Refined drugs were not linked to China’s past. Opium smoking by one’s grandfather, for example, could be linked to an old China that was passing out of existence. It was not a very progressive habit, but it was familiar and, in that context, harmless. Heroin use was very different.

All sources of discontent with refined drugs were general factors connected to its history in China and the groups it was associated with. These factors also connected to the political needs of 1937 and the failures of the state to deal with drugs. Because of their close association with the Japanese, trade in these drugs was effectively untouchable. Refined drugs were easier to smuggle than opium, especially because they were not usually used in semipublic places like

opium dens, were not grown in poppy fields, and in general gave the state very little that it could get hold of. Because of this and greater hostility to those involved in refined drugs, Chinese regimes were both much less involved and less financially interested in them. Opium was part of China's political economy, morphine was not. In fact, refined drugs spread most rapidly in the wake of successful opium suppression. To the extent that the state was able to eliminate opium smoking the cheaper and easier to smuggle refined drugs replaced it, effortlessly reversing any successes of the Chinese state.¹¹

The Tianjin cases received more attention because of the needs of political rhetoric. Drug addicts had been dying in China for years; and even for Tianjin this was not a very large crop; three hundred had been found at ice-off in 1936. What made them worthy of notice was that in the summer of 1937 there were a string of opium and drug related executions across China as the Six-Year Plan went into effect. China was also trying to use the drug issue to encourage American support in their struggle with Japan.¹² For their part, the Japanese government was supposedly cleaning up the drug situation in both Tianjin and Manchukuo. Dealers were arrested, addicts executed, and three Japanese policemen in Tianjin were wounded in antidrug raids.¹³ Antidrug actions of any sort always had a discursive purpose, either proving the morality of one government or attacking that of another. Being considered soft on opium was always a serious political matter.

The dead heroin users of Mukden and Tianjin were perfect symbols of what drug use in China was supposed to be; a habit dangerous to the individual and society with a host of bad associations and no good ones. It was a trade almost impossible for the state to control or to shape, and which was rejected by most Chinese as alien and unacceptable. To the extent China treated any part of the drug trade in an uncompromising fashion suggested by political rhetoric, refined drugs were it.

SMOKING OPIUM IN THE 1930s

Opium smoking was a different matter. While users of refined drugs could be dealt with as "other," opium smokers were far too familiar for this to be possible. Although opium smoking became less and less acceptable after 1906, it still had acceptable associations. Opium was commonly used as a medicine, a practice the state ignored.¹⁴ Opium was also commonly used by "backwards" people, and while this was one of the signs of their backwardness it did not read them out of the Chinese nation. During the war with Japan, university students fleeing to the interior commented on the prevalence of opium among the peasants of West China. For the students, opium use was a marker of a feudal, rural, peripheral China, as opposed to the modern, urban, coastal China that they

and their universities represented. But this did not lessen their sympathy for the peasants.¹⁵ In his memoirs, Li Zongren reminisced about the lessons in Chinese history he learned at the foot of his grandfather's opium couch.¹⁶ In each of these contexts, old people, peasants, and medicinal use, opium smoking was regrettable, but it was also understandable and forgivable. It was even an acceptable form of social rebellion. The Lianda literary scholar Liu Wendian spent the wartime years ridiculing the utterly worthless "new literature" and becoming familiar with the various types of Yunnan opium; "he would lie on his couch dictating scholarly articles while students filled his pipes or composing verses while his economist friend, Qin Zan, wrote them down."¹⁷ In this context it was obvious that Liu was not really an opium addict or an enemy of China. He was merely an eccentric. Had he chosen to express his disdain for modern literature by injecting morphine or embracing Japanese Pan-Asianism, however, reaction to his behavior would have been quite different.

DEFINING *YAN MIN*

Defining and changing the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable opium use was the purpose of the Six-Year Plan. The key category were the *yan min*. This is a word often translated as "opium addict," but usually meant someone who's opium use had crossed the bounds of acceptable behavior. How that was defined varied, of course, especially given the haphazard enforcement of opium laws. Usually it seems to have meant obvious opium wrecks plus anyone actually caught in the process of committing an opium crime. Under the Six-Year-Plan it took on a much more specific meaning. A *yan min* was someone who was, or should be, registered in the state opium suppression system. Registration gave them the right to purchase government opium and the right and responsibility to eventually be cured in a state-run opium clinic.

THE SCOPE OF REGISTRATION

Registration of opium smokers (and growers) was a common part of opium policy both in China and overseas. The Geneva system required states to compile statistics on the trade, and a state could not possibly claim to be running a modern, suppression-based opium policy without a firm statistical grasp on the nature and extent of the trade. A revenue-based policy could be run quite well without knowing who was smoking the opium, of course, and making this distinction was part of the purpose of collecting statistics. Chinese governments collected and published statistics partially to give the impression of success when nothing was happening. The central government published statistics on

drug seizures at customs, on the railways, and by the postal service every year, although they were aware that none of these was an important part of the trade. Nanjing and the Anti-Opium Association had both opposed the League of Nations 1929 attempt to inspect China and compile its own statistics on the opium trade, since this would have made the League the definer of China's opium problem.¹⁸

Licensing of smokers had been part of the Late Qing anti-opium campaigns, and was frequently decreed by the warlord governments. The warlord registrations were usually a dead letter, an excuse for collecting bribes, or a way of allowing wealthy smokers to buy out of the opium laws, sometimes all three. The new registrations were really intended to register all of the opium smokers in China as the first part of making the problem legible and thus making it possible to control and eliminate it.

This does not mean, of course, that local officials did not take advantage of registration to enrich themselves. In Jinshi city, Hunan, the local policed chief began enforcing registration in 1935. As elsewhere, registrants were divided into three classes, with the goal of encouraging even the poorest to register. In Jinshi, the cheapest license cost ten yuan a month. (The most expensive was thirty yuan.) Users under fifty were eventually required to spend ten days in a clinic at a cost of ten yuan, which would result in their being given a certificate of cure. The whole scheme was clearly intended to bring a substantial profit to the local government. Regardless, however, opium smokers were being herded into a government controlled system and smoking government opium. While lower-level officials were enriching themselves they were not perverting the purpose of registration.¹⁹

Registration was slow at first for a number of reasons. Previous registrations had turned out to be meaningless, the process required one to publicly identify oneself as a *yan min*, and for many both the small registration fee and the price of government opium were too high. As a result registration, originally conceived as a one-time event, had to be repeated several times in most areas. How this was carried out varied from province to province, but in almost every province statistics on numbers of *yan min* start to appear in 1935 and 1936.

HOW MANY *YAN MIN* WERE THERE?

In 1937 there were more than four million registered *yan min* in China.²⁰ In 1937 111,482 people in Fujian were registered as *yan min*, out of a total population of about twelve million, or just under 1 percent of the population. In Sichuan the total of registered users in 1939 was 732,983 out of a population of about forty-six million, a bit under 2 percent. This is down by half from the peak number in 1937.²¹ These figures are low even for addicts. Of the sixty-

three counties in Fujian, twenty-six reported that at least some opium was being grown, and presumably smoked, locally. Fifty-one counties reported smuggling of opium outside the official distribution system. Twenty-one reported having discovered groups of opium smokers (*kai deng ju xi*) outside the official system. Twelve admitted at least some use of other drugs. Fujian province had been trying to push the opium trade into a government-controlled system for years at this point, and probably had less illegal drug activity than most provinces, but assuming that licensed users were not major buyers of all this nonofficial opium, there were probably significantly more addicts than the statistics reveal. An average of 2 percent *yan min* over the whole country is probably the lowest possible. This would give a total *yan min* population of ten million.

GENDER

Data on the gender of *yan min* is limited. Fujian province reported curing 12,755 addicts in 1936. Two hundred ninety-five of these were women, or 2.3 percent. This figure is probably very low, because women were far less likely to publicly register as opium addicts and go to a clinic. In an eight-county area around Hangzhou 9.1 percent of 1934 addicts were women.²² This was because Zhejiang was particularly rigorous in locating addicts or because the area was suburban. In urban areas the number of females registered was higher. Between July and December of 1935, Shanghai registered 17,995 *yan min*, of whom 5054 were women, or 28 percent.²³ The Manchukuo government registered 506,938 opium and drug users in 1942, of whom 156,288 or 30 percent were women.²⁴ This is a significant discrepancy. Shanghai women would probably be more likely to register as *yan min* than those in rural Fujian, but it is probably also the case that more women in Shanghai smoked opium. This may be in part because of greater disposable income, but also in part because urban women were more likely to defy gender roles and smoke. The frontier society of Manchuria may also have been more willing to accept female opium use. Still, if we accept the Zhejiang data as typical, there were a significant number of female addicts. Almost all areas that reported on gender reported at least a few female addicts.

AGE

Opium registrations often kept track of age, and Sichuan province kept data for each county. Opium users were divided into age cohorts, twenty and under, sixty and over, and ten-year increments in between. The twentieth-century western image of the drug addict is that of a young man, but in Sichuan, as

elsewhere in China, most addicts were middle-aged. Under 1 percent of the users in any area would be under twenty. This is not too surprising, given that it was unlikely that anyone much under eighteen would present themselves as a candidate for an opium license. The twenty-one to thirty cohort, however, represented only about 15 percent of users. The thirty-one to forty and forty-one to fifty groups each represented about 30 percent of the total users. The typical opium smoker, therefore, was a middle-aged man. There are many possible reasons for the small number of users under thirty. It is possible this group is underrepresented; a smaller percentage of the addicts in this group may have registered. Registering guaranteed access to opium, but smuggled opium was cheaper, and less financially secure young people may have eschewed registration. There may also have been fewer addicts in this group. Opium was a luxury good, and it is possible that younger family members might not be able to buy enough. Younger people would also have been exposed to anti-opium propaganda their entire lives. Whatever the cause of the lack of younger addicts, opium use was obviously a long-established habit in Chinese society.

WHAT WAS A *YAN MIN*?

As opium smokers these people were supposed to be the equivalent of the heroin victims on the ash-heaps of Mukden, but they were not. Heroin addiction was associated with the urban lower class, opium smokers came from everywhere. *Yan min* also did not smoke a great deal of opium. It is not clear how the government determined the amount of opium a particular user was allowed, but it appears to have been based on their accustomed dose. Fujian sold 152,386 ounces of opium a month in 1936, giving an average ration of 1.36 ounces per user. The city of Wuxi in Jiangsu province kept statistics in even more detail. Seven thousand ten of the city's 9807 registered *yan min* used under one *chien* of opium a day. Another 1289 used between one and two *chien*. One heroic soul managed to smoke between eight *chien* and one *liang* a day.²⁵ This was not a great deal of opium. One *chien*, one tenth of an ounce, of opium was enough for one pipe. The average *yan min* in Fujian was thus able to smoke about once every other day, and given that an experienced opium user could smoke up to twenty pipes at a sitting, they were not getting very much. The vast bulk of *yan min* were not opium derelicts, but were they opium addicts?

Officially the Six-Year Plan was committed to the view that anyone who had smoked opium was a *yan min*. Once an individual has taken their first dose of opium decline and collapse are inevitable. An example of this comes from a 1936 anti-opium story. The dialogue begins at the decisive moment where the protagonist (Zilin) is going to smoke his first opium:

Ahmei smiled.

"Have a smoke," she said.

With her most charming smile she irresistibly brought the pipe closer.

"I'll give you a good pipefull, if you don't smoke, how will you relax?"

"I . . . I'm . . . I"

He took the pipe in his hands.

"A real man shouldn't shilly-shally so, indecisively" she said, pursing her lips. Her face, although pale, was delicate and pretty.

The young Zilin did not know how to use the pipe, but he reached up with his inexperienced hands and took a puff. From that moment, in the eyes of his wife and the mouths of his neighbors, Zilin changed.²⁶

After this Zilin is launched on a predictable downward trajectory ending in his own death. Even his apparent education, middle-class status and modern wife are unable to save him. This view of opium addiction was obviously influenced by the temperance movement and the Christian concept of sin. Once one had crossed the line there was no coming back. This view of opium as an unstoppable moral plague that would destroy the user from the first puff was




FIG. 8.1. Zilin and Ahmei

common in both public and private anti-opium propaganda, and it helped to provide much of the moral fervor of the campaigns. In practice, however, this view was unworkable. If everyone who had ever smoked opium was inevitably destroyed by it, then China was doomed. Although the state accepted the narrative of addiction, there were at least some people who could be removed from it. Picking out these people and treating them appropriately was the ultimate purpose of licensing. At the end of the Zilin story his wife laments the fact that she had never taken him to an anti-opium clinic, which presumably could have cured him.

OPIUM AND THE ELITE

Although officially committed to the view that opium use could not be cured by an act of will, the state and its representatives in fact assumed that there were some people who could do just that. When Yang Yongtai, one of Sichuan province's top opium suppression officials, was found by a friend to be an opium smoker he defended his own opium use this way:

Opium has many dangers. If you get addicted to it you become a good-for-nothing. Harm and benefit are two sides of the same coin however, and even the most harmful thing has its good side. Opium is good for curing minor sickness, for dealing with boredom, and for helping you think . . . when you are bored or feeling glum, or it's a rainy night and none of your friends have come, just light a pipe and you will be happy. If you want to use your mind or have a problem to research and your thoughts are sluggish, just smoke a bit of opium. Your intellect will surge, your mind will open like a flower, and you will be able to clearly distinguish things. These are the uses of opium, but the uses are much smaller than the harm it causes, and so it must be suppressed.²⁷

Yang was an opium suppression official, and so finding him smoking might well be taken as proof that he was either a hypocrite or rejected the goal of opium suppression. Yang denies both. Yang obviously saw himself as an educated man who was able to resist the dangers of opium and reap its benefits. Nevertheless, he favored continuation of the massive anti-opium program that he was part of. Most people were not capable of his level of self-control. In Yang Yongtai, speaking in 1940, we see a combination of some of Zhang Chengjia's views of opium as a tonic and the modern discourse of addiction. Although the new discourse would come to drive state policy, it would not entirely displace other views.

The registration system specifically did not apply to people like Yang. Students, members of the government, party and military and residents of Nanjing and Xiangshan (Sun Yat-sen's home county) were forbidden to register. These people were considered to be particularly important to the Chinese state, and were to cure themselves at once.²⁸ The Late Qing campaigns had made the same demands on officials, and like the Qing, the Nationalists assumed that for any in these positions opium smoking could be easily abandoned. To be unable to control one's opium use was to show that one lacked the moral character to be a member of the elite.

In some cases, elite status could cancel the effects of opium smoking. Li Ren, an opium suppression official in Jiaying, Zhejiang, was arrested for opium smoking in 1934. He denied he was addicted, an assertion backed by the jailer and the clinic that tested him. His superior sent a representative who reported that Li did not look like an opium addict (*yi mian wu yan rong*), and that he had not shown any withdrawal symptoms while in prison.²⁹ Li did not look like an addict because he was not disheveled and sickly and he had a job. For people like Li Ren the narrative of addiction did not apply.

PROPAGANDA AND THE LOWER CLASSES

While members of the elite were assumed to innately have the ability to control or eliminate their opium use, it was at least possible for members of the lower classes to do the same, as demonstrated in a story about Feng Yuxiang's parents. Feng's parents were both opium addicts, but as their family grew they could no longer afford it and decided to quit. Feng gives a moving description of nursing them through their withdrawal, but within four days they were over it and apparently never took it up again.³⁰ The Fengs were in charge of their actions from the beginning, saw opium as a financial drain rather than a destroyer of the self, and for them at least quitting opium was fairly simple. Causing other members of the lower classes to behave like the Fengs was one of the goals of the Six-Year Plan. While opium smokers could register, they were encouraged to simply quit. Once registered, they were encouraged to quit before they were placed in a clinic. Partially this was a financial matter. Clinic stays cost money, and anything that would lessen the financial burden on the system was of course good.³¹ Clinics were not always necessary; some would be capable of transforming themselves without being institutionalized. Part of what took place in the clinics was medical, and this could be done through outpatient drug treatments. The state continued its search for a magic bullet opium cure pill, although of course one was never found. There were various drug treatments that could be used in the home, and in Sichuan


at least these were distributed to poor users by the state. The state also continued all of the methods of propaganda that had been pioneered in the previous decade. Anti-Opium Day continued to be a national holiday, but it was only the peak of anti-opium activities. Speech and essay contests for students, posters, plays and songs were poured out. The state aimed to reform the user's character and medically purge them of their addiction. Although it was assumed that the bulk of *yan min* would have to go to a clinic to have this done to them there were a significant number of people who could be cured outside the clinics.

THE CLINICS

The centerpiece of the plan were the clinics. In 1931, there were forty-one recognized anti-opium hospitals in China, and they treated 3,024 men and 256 women.³² Under the Six-Year Plan, all opium smokers were eventually to pass through a clinic and be cured; in 1936, there were 1,499 clinics nationwide which treated 315,750 addicts.³³ By 1939, the government was claiming that 80 percent of China's opium smokers had been treated.³⁴ This figure was obviously exaggerated, but hundreds of thousands of Chinese did pass through the clinics during the Nationalist period.

For the entire period, 1,556,377 people were officially cured, which is only about a third of the number registered.³⁵ Jiang and Zhu attribute this to

TABLE 8.1
Registered *Yan Min*






FIG. 8.2. "Put down your opium pipe (*yan qiang*) and pick up your rifle (*bu qiang*).” Cartoon from 1945 Tianjin anti-opium day.
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a lack of money on the part of the state, too many poor *yan min* who could not afford a clinic stay, and the problem of recidivism after they left the clinic. They also point out that provincial governments put very different levels of resources into the plan, and in many places the execution of the plan was “lots of thunder and no rain.”³⁶ While all of these were problems, the more fundamental difficulty was determining exactly what these clinics were supposed to do and how they were to accomplish it. Like the anti-opium pill that would magically cure users the magic clinic was a frequent image in discussions of opium.

Jie yan suo (anti-opium clinics) were commonly called for throughout the warlord period, and like licensing systems they were often simply fraudulent. A clinic might be no more than a sign erected by the local government, it might be a thinly disguised opium den, or it might be a few beds in a local hospital. Even when a good faith effort was made the clinics were usually desperately short of money, supplies and above all trained personnel. On top of this they were not entirely sure what the nature of the problem they were dealing with was or how to cure it.

It was not clear if the problem was a medical one, meaning that medicines would have to be administered, one of access, in which case keeping the patients away from the drug was the key, or one of moral weakness, in which case they would have to be morally reformed. These were the same sorts of problems that had faced the missionary anti-opium refuges, and unlike the missionaries Chinese doctors did not have the power of God's grace as the ultimate curative to fall back on. As the clinics were expected to be temporary and it was difficult to get qualified personnel the running of the clinics does not seem to have been very standardized.

Opium clinics seem to have followed all of these models in treating their patients. The fundamental reason for herding users into clinics was to make it impossible for them to get opium. Although corruptible clinic attendants could make it possible to get drugs while in the clinic in general this was not supposed to be possible. The clinic might give the patients opium or opium derivatives to wean them off the drug gradually. They might also be given other drugs to help with their withdrawal symptoms or to cure them directly.

More interesting are the efforts at reforming the character of the smoker. Was addiction caused by the weak will of the addict or by the chemical nature of the drug, which would affect anyone in the same way? Most treatment plans drew on both models. Strengthening the will of the user was divided into two parts, indoctrination and physical labor. Patients would often hear lectures on the dangers of opium to the individual and society, as well as receiving general political indoctrination. Patients would also do calisthenics and physical labor. Labor was intended to create items for sale to support the clinic, improve the character of the patient and teach them a skill that would make it less likely for them to relapse into social marginality after release.

Ideally clinic patients were expected to pay a fee for attending, usually intended to cover their medical treatment and food. Many of course could not pay, and this left the clinics chronically under funded. In the early 1930s clinics were the poor relation of the opium suppression family, as there was no possibility of their becoming self-financing, which registration campaigns and anti-smuggling campaigns could. Various methods were used to generate money to pay for these clinics, and Jiangsu managed to bring in enough that it could cure addicts for a cost to the state of only \$1.99 a head.³⁷ Even this was too expensive, however, until the national campaign made money available. Some provinces called their clinics *xinsheng gongchang* (new life factories), with the word factory emphasizing both the remade people who were supposed to come out of them and the fact that the labor of the patients was expected to generate much of the revenue to pay for them.³⁸ Nantong, Jiangsu, set up an *Yanmin xiyi gongchang* (Opium Smoker's Vocational Factory) in 1935. It was intended for *yan min* under the age of fifty who would be cured of their addiction but also taught weaving, the use of a sewing machine, dying, printing, tan-

ning or hemp processing. The organizers of the clinic realized that opium use was only one of the problems facing the poor *yan min* and that training would “provide the basis for rejoining everyday life.” It would also provide money to finance the factory’s operation.³⁹

CURING WITH BULLETS

Some groups were not to be cured at all. Those over sixty were allowed to register, but they were to be allowed to keep smoking indefinitely, since their age and presumed ill-health made them unnecessary to the nation and in any case unlikely to survive quitting opium (which was assumed to be quite stressful). Women were apparently less likely to register, but increasing registration among women does not seem to have been important to state policy. Users of refined drugs were not to be registered, and there seems to have been no effort to register non-Han peoples. All of these were people who were outside the core of the Chinese people, and while they were encouraged to cure themselves it was not required.

The final level were those who had managed to sink beyond redemption. In 1939, the government announced decisive new measures to complete the Six-Year Plan. After January 1940, anyone who tested positive for opium addiction was to be shot. Early in the month, at the Liyang, Hubei, police station, Tao Jian, a public health official, confronted an opium addict named Ma Jizhi. Here is the exchange, as recorded years later by Tao:

TAO: “Ma Jizhi! Are you under the effects of opium addiction?”

MA: “Yes.”

TAO: “How long have you been addicted to opium?”

MA: “Over thirty years.”

TAO: “Are you aware that the provincial government has ordered that beginning from the first day of the first month all those who test positive for opium addiction are to be shot?”

MA: “I know.”

TAO: “Why have you not cured yourself before this?”

MA: no reply.

TAO: “Would it be an injustice (*yuanwang*) if I report that you are addicted?”

MA: “It would not be an injustice.”

TAO: “If the execution is carried out, will you hate me?”

MA: “I will not hate you, I will only hate my opium addiction.”

Ma was shown a copy of his statement and said “No mistakes.” Tao Jian gave the guards Ma’s certificate of opium addiction and they returned him to the jail. Three days later, notice of the execution was posted in the marketplace.⁴⁰

Ma Jizhi had been subject to state opium campaigns his entire life. Propaganda had failed to convince him to quit and the embarrassment of public registration had failed to make him quit. Ma would only have been liable for execution if he had been to an opium clinic at least once, and so he had presumably been exposed to various attempts to reform him, and these had failed. Yang Yongtai, the Fengs, and Li Ren had all demonstrated to the state that they did not belong in the same category as the heroin users of Tianjin. Ma Jizhi had failed to do so, despite the fact that he had been given repeated opportunities. The system had sorted opium smokers into various categories and dealt with them according to the nature of their relationship with opium. When the first round of executions of opium smokers began in 1937 there was a good deal of surprise in the foreign press. Killing harmless opium smokers seemed excessive to the Shanghai Municipal Council.⁴¹ This was because for the SMC many of these users might be pathetic wrecks in need of sympathy and cure rather than criminals in need of bullets. This was the same debate about the nature of drug users that had bedeviled policy elsewhere, but in this case the Chinese state felt that this had been resolved. Had Ma Jizhi been capable of cure, he would have been cured, in a legal sense anyway, by the same methods that had cured thousands of others.

To a certain extent, executions were intended to be symbolic, but by 1936 the government was willing to make executions a central part of its policy, as shown by the case of Nanjing. As the capital city Nanjing had always been stricter on opium suppression than other places. No users were licensed there, and wholesale and retail sale of opium were forbidden. Late in 1934, and early in 1935, the government began a more strict policy of actively trying to eliminate all parts of the opium trade in the city. The police were given the power to search private homes for opium and several thousand opium users were arrested and confined in two commandeered hotels for a forced cure. This level of activity was impressive, but despite the fact that Nanjing had supposedly been a strict suppression area since 1931, there were still thousands of opium smokers in the city. This sweep was carried out because of a handwritten order from Chiang Kai-shek, that is, because Chiang took a personal interest in eliminating opium in Nanjing.⁴² Late in 1936, this more active approach began to be extended to other cities as a precursor to extending it all over the country. In December of 1936, the government burnt opium pipes at the temple of Confucius in Nanjing and announced that, starting from the first of the year, all opium addicts not in a treatment program would be shot. Those in a program would be given three tries to cure themselves, and then shot.⁴³ This was supposed to be a national policy, and it was in fact announced and propagandized in the major cities. Nanjing had parades and dramatic performances, and in Shanghai, the Public Security Bureau dressed up some of its officers as opium addicts and went around town shooting them in the streets.⁴⁴ There was some

objection that this new policy was too harsh, and Nanjing probably would have had trouble enforcing this policy even in the cities.⁴⁵

CURING CHINA

The system of licensing and registration allowed the state to differentiate types of opium smokers, and locate them inside or outside the Chinese nation. It was also intended to cure them, and this worked in a series of ways, being based partially on propaganda, partially on medical treatment, and partially on firing squads, as Ma Jizhi discovered. Like the colonial opium systems, this was based on a view of a differentiated citizenry. Although the Nationalist state was officially committed to the view that its citizens were a unified whole, and that the narrative of addiction applied equally to all, in fact the plan laid out a series of types of people, who's nature could be sorted out by the workings of the plan. Was an individual a casual opium smoker? Then the inconvenience and embarrassment of registration would make them quit. Those who, for whatever reason, were less able to cure themselves would be registered and eventually sent to a clinic. The great majority of *yan min* would be cured by this, but those who were not could be executed. The plan was effective despite, or perhaps because it was not based on a consistent understanding of the nature of opium addiction.

WINNING CONVERTS

One of the critics who was won over was Ma Yinqu. Ma had been and important critic of the Nationalists' opium suppression efforts, but the new plan won his approval despite the fact that it involved open opium sales. In a radio broadcast on June 3, 1935, Anti-Opium Day, Ma explained why he supported the new plan. He mentioned the new spirit that had supposedly infused the government and made them serious about opium, but most of the speech discussed the success the government had in taking control of the opium trade before 1935, and described how the new system would extend this success to the whole country. He stressed the orderliness of the new plan and the fact that it would be successful.⁴⁶ Ma at least was more interested in success than purity, and he linked the potential success of the plan at suppression to its connection to a successful system of opium control.

Ma's attitude seems to have been typical of most other potential critics as well. The Anti-Opium Association could not entirely endorse the plan, but also could not denounce it. In a statement in response to the announcement of the plan the Association claimed credit for having created and sustained the anti-opium movement, and claimed the Nanjing government had, ever since 1927,

had the *jue xin* (proper determination) but they lacked *juti banfa* (a concrete method) for dealing with the problem. The Association did not claim that the current plan was that method, they simply listed the details of the plan in a way that would have been quite acceptable to Chiang Kai-shek. They stressed that the money raised by the plan would be used for education and inspections, that the gradualism of the plan was eminently practical, and that some aspects of the problem were outside the government's control, such as the smuggling from the Japanese areas.⁴⁷ Soon after this the Association wound-up its affairs without either denouncing or explicitly endorsing the plan. The plan involved the state selling opium to the Chinese people, and thus could be considered "a sad and retrogressive step in the morals of this modern government."⁴⁸ It was exactly the type of thing the Anti-Opium Association could be expected to vigorously oppose and had opposed in the past. This time, however, the Association was unable to muster any public enthusiasm to resist the plan, or any donations from the groups that in the past had thought the Association's work worthwhile.⁴⁹

Cynicism probably played a part here. Many intellectuals had much lower expectations for Chiang's government than in 1928, and were willing to accept anything. The Six-Year Plan was better than just anything, however. The government was showing real interest in curing users; it was bringing growing and shipping under control, and it had pledged to end the trade fairly quickly. None of these things in themselves was terribly new, but together they added up to a comprehensive plan to deal with the opium problem. It was also a plan that would rise above the old moral interpretation of opium without abandoning it. Accepting the plan meant accepting the fundamental idea behind it, that opium control and opium suppression were compatible goals that Nanjing was already having success in reaching. Once this was accepted, the impossible task of opium suppression became reasonable, and faith in the government's motives no longer required absolute faith in its morality. When Nanjing said that this was a plan that the government would stick to, it did not require great faith in the government's morality to believe this. Nanjing was getting important financial and political benefits from this plan: simple self-interest would keep them to it.

Acceptance of the Six-Year Plan also helped Nanjing to position itself in relation to its domestic and international rivals. Yunnan province was one of the most independent in China largely because of its opium revenues. Chiang had already begun to force Yunnan's opium into his distribution system, but the new plan gave him a position from which to criticize what Long Yun was doing inside Yunnan, and eventually to force Long to accept Chiang's control over his opium policy. Prior to this, Chiang had not criticized the opium policies of the warlords, since that would draw attention to his own involvement in the trade. Now that Chiang had a more successful opium control system in place, he could afford to criticize the policies of others. In a May 9, 1935 speech, with

Long Yun in attendance, Chiang attacked Yunnan's record on opium. Long pointed out that the province was reliant on opium revenues, and asked for a subsidy from the central treasury to help defray the costs of suppression.⁵⁰ Long could not hope to defend his opium system in the face of a government that was simultaneously attacking his legitimacy and denying him markets. Long began encouraging tin exports as an alternate to opium, and eventually was forced to reduce his opium exports and become a part of Chiang's opium system.⁵¹ Long did not actually allow central government opium officials to work in Yunnan, the work was carried out by his own people. In the past, this would have given Long an opportunity to pretend to suppress opium while profiting from it, but now he was caught in an ideological hammerlock. Even if he administered the plan himself, Long had no choice but to follow the course laid out by Chiang. Although Yunnan experimented with shipping opium through French Indochina and with flying it to the coast, the Yunnanese could not surmount Chiang's monopoly of their markets and the legitimacy that the Six-Year Plan gave to his opium policy.

Foreigners and foreign governments were also impressed with the new plan. Both the British and the Americans, who had been becoming more critical of Chiang and his opium and drug policies, were convinced that the new campaign was sincere. They were not as sanguine about its chances for success, but since their view of the problem was primarily moral, this was not as important.⁵² The League of Nations also praised China's efforts.⁵³ Public opinion in foreign countries was also changing. Chiang's government convinced Madame Toussad's Wax Museum, in London, to remove a display of a Chinese opium den, because opium dens were no longer representative of China.⁵⁴ This international acceptance of the plan was not only beneficial for Nanjing domestically, it was also part of China's campaign to win support against Japan. At the outbreak of war with Japan, the state legitimately claimed that the opium problem was under control.

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Chapter 9

War, Poppies, and the Completion of the Plan

The outbreak of war with Japan in 1937 changed everything in the short term, but very little in the long term. The occupation of almost the entire coastal area profoundly disrupted the flow of opium across China, and made the Nationalist's entire opium strategy unworkable. The considerable progress that had been made in eliminating poppy growing, controlling distribution and registering and 'curing' users in the occupied areas vanished immediately once the Japanese arrived. The Japanese regimes were interested in opium as a source of profit and to the extent the Japanese could control the trade they integrated their areas into the existing systems of the Japanese empire. To the very considerable extent that the Japanese could not control the trade it fell into the hands of local militarists and gangsters. In unoccupied China, the Communists continued their tight control over the opium trade while the Nationalists faced a dilemma.¹

What was the purpose of the Six-Year Plan after the war started? Some of its old purposes were no longer valid. Chiang's system of opium marketing in the coastal cities no longer existed and no longer provided leverage in dealing with producers. The plan had already had considerable success in reducing the power of the western warlords, and in any case with the capital now in Chongqing the dynamic of the relationship between them and Chiang was quite different. The plan had also been part of an attempt to convince the Americans in particular that China was a victim of Japanese imperialism, but that goal was now fulfilled by the invasion. Moral improvement of the Chinese people was still a worthwhile goal, but should it be a priority at this point? The Chinese state still needed revenue, but in the new wartime economy, opium revenue was somewhat different than it had been before.

The state was now attempting to extract every resource it possibly could out of the limited population of west China, and trades in consumer luxuries did not fit well. Critics had always claimed that opium sales were economically counterproductive for the state, but this became much more apparent in the war years.


In the initial period of the war some assumed that opium suppression would be deemphasized as one of the many noble causes that would have to be subordinated to the war effort. Chiang Kai-shek gave up his opium responsibilities to focus on the war, placing He Jian in charge. He denounced the idea that opium suppression had been put on the back burner, and stated that the struggle against opium and drugs was an integral part of the struggle with Japan. In fact, now that Japan was openly at war with China the problems of Japanese opium smuggling and attempts to drug China could be dealt with more effectively.²

Chiang Kai-shek himself stated that opium suppression was as important as resistance to Japan, and this was reflected in policy.³ There were several motivations for this. As in the past, local commanders were selling opium to raise money and thus becoming more independent.⁴ Revenue was still important, and the state would still get money from opium. Although Free China was never crushed under a tidal wave of Japanese opium there was a real fear that this might happen, and controlling the opium system was seen as a way of preventing it.⁵ Most important, the goals of opium suppression fit at least as well with the goals of China at war as they had during the Nanjing decade. The Six-Year Plan had included provisions for controlling poppy growing, and while these had not been totally ignored the state seems to have been less interested in controlling the behavior of peasants in remote parts of China. Now that these were all China had left they became much more significant. Purification of China also became more important. The original plan had called for getting rid of opium because smoking the drug weakened the people and selling it gave them too much financial power. The focus of the problem of controlling China's finances shifted from controlling provincial-level warlords to controlling lower-level militarists and aboriginal tribes, but it became all the more intense because of that. Purifying the people also became more important. The process of registration and clinical treatment continued and expanded. The state also adopted a policy that would have been unthinkable before the war. Once poppy growing was on the way to elimination there was still the problem of the considerable amounts of opium in the hands of peasants and others. The solution was for the state to buy all this opium for cash. This was a surprising policy in that the state had always aimed at an opium policy that would bring money in rather than take it out. Elimination of the opium trade had always been a real goal of policy, however, and in the context of the war it at last became predominant over revenue.

CONTINUING ATTEMPTS TO PROFIT FROM OPIUM

While the Japanese had taken over the most lucrative of Chiang Kai-shek's opium markets, this did not mean that Chinese governments would give up on opium revenue. The central government continued trying to move opium into occupied China, and also continued with local sales. In 1939, the two province area of Sichuan and Xikang was selling five-hundred thousand *yuan* of opium a month internally, and making another quarter million on exports.⁶ It is not clear if these exports went to other provinces or to the Japanese controlled areas, but at least some opium did make it to the occupied areas. The Inspectorate's *Jianyunshuo* continued to ship opium even after Hankou fell, and given the amounts at least some of it must have been going into the traditional markets. While these figures show that opium shipping along the traditional routes declined rapidly after the war started, they did not decline as rapidly as one would expect if the Japanese had made it impossible to ship opium into their areas. Opium profits were still important to the central government, the state collected eighteen million *yuan* from opium in 1938, and continued these profits even though Chiang Kai-shek felt that tighter controls over opium were needed. With the loss of the downstream markets, the Hankou model of controlling distribution from a central point was no longer feasible and direct control over the producing areas seemed the best option.⁷

TABLE 9.1
Opium Shipped by *Jianyunshuo*. (in *liang*).



Data from Jiang and Zhu *Zhongguo jindu licheng*

THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TAKEOVER IN SICHUAN

The war did not change the trend towards greater central control of the opium trade, but accelerated it. Part of the new system involved much closer central government control over the trade and suppression, taking a great deal of administrative authority away from provincial governments. This takeover was completed, in Sichuan, in 1938. The central government had been working closely with Liu and, in effect, infiltrating his system for years. Now that the central government was actually in Sichuan it could exert much more power. Liu had lost most of his power by 1937, and after his death in January 1938, there was nothing to stop the central government from taking over the whole province. In February 1938, the *Sichuan jinyan zong ju* was abolished, and a branch office of the Anti-Opium Inspectorate and the provincial Civil Affairs Bureau took over its duties, exactly as it had in all the other provinces. This seems to have made little practical difference at first, since they were doing the same things Sichuan had been trying to do. To starve Long Yun out, the central government set very high taxes on Yunnan opium sold in Sichuan, but other than that, there was little initial change.

In the long run central government control did result in drastic changes in the Sichuan opium trade. By the end of 1938, Hankou was in Japanese hands, and before that most of Hankou's downstream markets had been taken. The entire export system was largely shut down. Opium policy now focused on two things, getting even more profit out of the Sichuan opium market in the short term, and ending a trade that did nothing to help the war effort in the longer term. Since the formal opium trade was more or less under control, the government focused on eliminating smuggling and reducing the number of users through stricter licensing and control.

Greater control over the opium trade led to more smuggling. One of the effects of government control and reduction of opium growing in East Sichuan was to draw large amounts of aboriginal-grown opium into the market.⁸ Aborigines (and remote Han villages) all over southwest China seem to have grown opium throughout the Republican period, but smoked most of it themselves. Only right after the Late Qing-Early republic suppression drive, and again when the Guomindang's suppression finally started to have effect was it worthwhile for Han merchants to go up into the hills and buy up opium. Shipping costs were high, and there was no way for the government to force these people to grow opium, so when the lowlands were producing opium in bulk, exporting from the remote areas was not worthwhile. After about 1936, it was worthwhile, and both in Xikang and in the western and southern parts of Sichuan merchants and soldiers began buying and selling this opium. Chongqing of course opposed this, in part because it undercut their own opium sales and made local garrisons more financially independent, but also because the abo-

rigines would only trade their opium for silver or guns. Silver was in short supply, so guns and ammunition were the main currency used to buy this opium.⁹ Besides the fact that the government desperately needed these guns for the war with Japan, the trade was arming the elements that were already the hardest for the government to control. To deal with this, Chongqing would take steps against smuggling inside the province, and begin sending troops up into the hills to uproot poppies.

In July 1938, the Inspectorate divided the province into five anti-smuggling districts, with a total of thirteen offices.¹⁰ Unlike previous attempts at control, this one was not aimed at controlling the existing flow of legal opium; many of these were areas where the government had little control before. Besides attacking smuggling, each district set up a thorough system of opium marketing and a complex series of regulations to govern the flow of opium. The fifth district, which contained forty-five counties, had eight large *hang* and thirty-five smaller ones, supplying 497 opium shops.¹¹ This was not that different from the system that Liu had tried to set up in 1937, but the greater resources of the central government made it easier to carry out. The new situation also made it more necessary. As long as Liu was making most of his money from exports, he could afford to be fairly lax about retailing. Now most of the profit came from inside the province. For the month of January, 1939 the Inspectorate's Sichuan/Xikang office made a total profit of 755,974 *yuan*, with 118,814 from external sales and 539,456 from internal.¹²

CONTROLLING AND ELIMINATING POPPY GROWING

Suppression of poppy growing had been part of the Six-Year Plan since the 1935 *jinyan shishi banfa* (Plan for Effective Opium Suppression). In the interior provinces, where there was little poppy, it was strictly suppressed, and in the remote areas it was suppressed gradually. In the west, the schedule set up a clear poppy suppression plan for the first time, a plan which would end up being more or less the one followed throughout the six-year period. The plan was realistic enough to make it feasible, and based itself on what was already being accomplished by provincial governments. Shaanxi and Ningxia were to continue the plan of county by county gradual suppression that they had already embarked on, but the rest of the provinces were to follow a schedule set up by the commission. The basic pattern was that growing was to be eliminated at once in the parts of each province with relatively little poppy. In the remaining areas, production was reduced gradually. Following the spring harvest of 1935, growing was suppressed in all but ten counties of Sichuan, thirty-eight counties of Yunnan, and twenty-three counties in Guizhou. (In all of the provinces the counties where suppression was to take place were named in the plan, provincial governments were not allowed to

choose). In Gansu, an office was set up in Kangle to supervise suppression in twelve counties. In Suiyuan, an office was set up in Anbei to supervise suppression in sixteen counties. But rather than immediate suppression, each county was divided into five parts and suppression was done gradually. In all of these provinces, the number of counties where planting was allowed was to be gradually reduced until the trade was eliminated entirely in 1939. In Sichuan, Gansu, and Shaanxi, suppression was the joint responsibility of a special commissioner and the provincial government. In Yunnan, Guizhou, and Suiyuan, suppression was entirely the responsibility of the province.¹³ This too was realistic, since the first three provinces were ones where Nanjing had at least some authority, and the second three were not. Most of the provinces promptly began to take action to carry the plan out, although Nanjing had no way of forcing them to do so.

The counties designated to continue growing opium were the most important producing counties, usually the places that the provincial governments got their opium from anyway. The small-scale growing in the other counties was as much an annoyance to them as it was to Nanjing, so the program was very much in their best interest. Consciously or not, Nanjing was encouraging the local militarists to make their opium systems more efficient. In theory this could have made them more independent, but in the end, as they had no choice but to sell the opium to Chiang, it simply made it easier for him to take over their monopolies and integrate them into his own system.

The system was fairly lenient, encouraging reduction of production without pressing hard enough to make peasant revolt likely, and emphasizing education and crop substitution over force. There were two inspection periods, the first at poppy planting time, carried out by the commissioner and his representatives, and the second when the poppies began to sprout.¹⁴ During the planting period, methods were fairly lenient. The Commissioner was to send out representatives to educate the peasants about the law and the dangers opium posed to the nation. *Bao jia* heads were to confiscate poppy seeds, but only to prosecute offenders if they refused to cooperate.¹⁵ During the second period they became stricter. Opium poppies were uprooted by the *bao jia* heads, if need be with the help of the police or the garrison, and those who grew it were prosecuted. The commissioner made regular inspections, and all officials were encouraged to report cases of connivance in the opium trade by officials, military, or local gentry. The most serious of these cases were reported to Chiang personally.¹⁶ Given the reliance on the *bao jia* system these rules probably would not have worked very well, but they put poppy suppression under Chiang's supervision, and laid down a peasant-friendly model of poppy suppression which was to remain the standard. Originally this model was applied by the Special Commissioners, but over time the provincial governments would become more and more involved, first because the central gov-

ernment was putting pressure on them to do so, and because they were participants in the central government's monopoly system.

Long Yun, in Yunnan, provides a good example of how these plans could work. Long was committed to limited opium production to his assigned areas in part because he was ordered to do so by the national government and in part because he was quite interested in limiting poppy production to a handful of easily controlled places. In those areas that were not to grow poppies, responsibility for eliminating it was assigned to the district magistrate. In the past this had been a recipe for inaction since so magistrates had so many other duties. In this case, however, they were told that success in poppy suppression was an important part of their assessment and were required to sign pledges acknowledging their responsibility. Long also pointed out that "the people's obedience towards government orders depends on the attitude of the gentry."¹⁷ The gentry were brought on board by threats of execution and land confiscation, but they were also rewarded (and made responsible) by appointments to various anti-opium commissions.

Vigilant magistrates and upright gentry were traditional tools for enforcing policy in rural areas, but more modern methods were also used. The state trained professional anti-poppy inspectors and sent them out to ensure that poppy was in fact being eliminated. In Yunnan, the training was only three days in each June, but this would later be expanded somewhat. The Yunnan inspectors sent out notices warning the peasants that right after the beans came up central government poppy inspectors would be coming to inspect their fields. These proclamations sometimes mentioned the threat of land confiscation and the fact that suppression was ordered by Chiang Kai-shek himself.¹⁸ The gaze of the state was coming to backward rural areas, but the proclamations were not very threatening. They emphasized duty to the nation over the threat of punishment and made it clear exactly when the inspectors were coming, giving peasants the very easy option of avoiding punishment by not planting poppies. It also helped that it was made clear that these poppy inspectors were in fact part of a national plan rather than yamen runners seeking bribes.

The war also encouraged local governments to extend their efforts to control opium purchasing and shipping. In Sichuan, Liu Xiang set up a unified purchasing system in 1937. Opium was under government supervision before it was harvested, planted by licensed farmers in assigned counties. After the harvest the opium was bought up by one of the ten to twenty companies in each county licensed to do so by the *tongshou chu* (Central Harvesting Office). The harvesting office had a capital of twelve million dollars for buying up the opium, five million from the government and seven million from private merchants. The Chongqing opium market was refounded as a joint merchant-government venture, each side providing half of the ten million *yuan* in capital.¹⁹ After leaving Chongqing the opium was handled by one of forty large

companies with a capital of at least four hundred thousand each. These companies were licensed by the *tongyun chu* (Central Transport Office) to ship the opium to markets both inside and outside the province.²⁰

Liu made extra-provincial sales easier by coming to an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek to unify the opium trade in Sichuan and Hubei. Liu set up six opium warehouses, which were staffed by representatives of both the Sichuan government and the Inspectorate. Opium for export (both Sichuan and non-Sichuan opium) would have to go through these warehouses, where it would pay the taxes for both provinces and then be allowed to travel without further problems.²¹ For Sichuan this was advantageous because it encouraged the Inspectorate to buy Sichuan opium and because the Inspectorate would force merchants caught downstream to pay the Sichuan tax. For the central government, it made it harder for Sichuan to avoid the Inspectorate's taxes and began injecting the central government into Sichuan's opium monopoly.

Sales inside Sichuan were more difficult to control. In theory, each county was to calculate the amount of opium needed for its registered smokers, and was to be issued exactly that amount. The opium would be sold from shops run by government employees.²² The point of having the government sell opium was of course to make money, and local governments were told that it was their responsibility to see to it that all the quota opium was sold.²³

This attempt proved to be too ambitious for Liu's government. Registration of opium users remained perfunctory. Supposedly one million users had been registered in 1936, but in most areas registration did not begin until 1937. In any case, with local governments under great pressure to sell opium, there were no attempts to limit opium smoking to licensed users or to limit licensed users' smoking levels. Opium merchants seem to have been under somewhat greater control than before, but smuggling and corruption were still common, and many of the official merchants were involved in it. The Harvest Office was a complete disaster. Liu lacked the money to buy up the stocks of opium, and the merchants were paid in bonds, which they disliked and sometimes refused to take.²⁴

Liu lacked the resources to simply replace the merchants, and would have to come to terms with them. He removed the unpopular head of the anti-opium office and replaced him with Gao Xianjian, who was to implement a system of merchant-managed taxation to deal with retailing inside Sichuan. Forty or fifty companies, each with capital of at least twenty thousand *yuan*, were licensed, and were required to sell at least fifty *dan* a month. They were free to sell it anywhere in the province. Gao explained that the merchants were much more knowledgeable about the opium market than the government, and they would respond to demand quicker. Gao also reduced taxes to seven hundred *yuan* per *dan* (which would give the government a total profit of at least

16.8 million *yuan* for the year). The opium was still sold in official shops, and was still collected and stored in official warehouses in the old manner. But, on the issue of retailing, Liu admitted partial defeat.²⁵ This was only in relation to retailing in Sichuan, however, not in relation to planting or to the national opium control system. Although Liu had been forced to yield some autonomy to opium merchants, selling the drug inside the province the purchasing of opium had been unified.

POPPIES IN WARTIME

The beginning of the war led to a much increased emphasis on controlling poppy growing. The first step was the appointment of *cha jin zhong yan zhuan yuan* (Inspectors of Poppy Suppression) in March of 1938 and were to take over the poppy suppression work of the old Special Commissioners.²⁶ This project seems to have little effect, and in January of 1939 Chiang himself suggested the establishment of *cha jin zhongyan ducha tuan* (Poppy Suppression Inspection Teams). These were finally set up in October of that year, and do seem to have been sent to most provinces. These teams were not just concerned with planting, they were expected to deal with all parts of the trade, and they did do propaganda work to encourage the people to avoid the trade. In accordance with the late date, the propaganda was quite threatening, often listing specific punishments for crimes rather than making vague requests to “help China” by not using opium.²⁷ Punishment actually was meted out. Despite the harsh punishments provided by law, ordinary smokers and poppy growers had rarely been harshly punished before this, but now this changed. Hunan province executed no poppy growers between 1935 and 1938, one in 1939, twenty-five in 1940 and twenty-four in the first half of 1941.²⁸ This is not a large number for a whole province (although most of the poppy growing was in the West, and so were most of the executions) but it was certainly enough to get the message across that suppression was for real. Many of the *wenshi ziliao* mention a few executions in each county during this period, although they had been rare previously. Suppression was also being extended. Prior to this more remote regions had been left to themselves, now the aborigines of West Sichuan and small growers in other remote areas were also being dealt with.

POPPIES IN DECLINE

In both Sichuan and Yunnan, poppy production declined after the war started. Officially, China had 235,883 hectares of opium land in 1934, which produced

5,855,671 kilos of opium.²⁹ By 1938, this had been reduced to eight hundred ninety-one hectares producing 357,505 kilos. Between 1935 and 1939 the number of counties allowed to grow opium in Sichuan declined from ten to one, and the amount (officially) produced declined from 380,000 *dan* to 220,000 *dan*.³⁰ These statistics are problematic. No province had a thorough system of poppy registration in 1934, so it is not clear where these numbers are coming from. Obviously, there must have been some illegal growing; it is hard to imagine that there was no poppy planted in Sichuan in 1938. Still, there are indications that production was being reduced. Prices were increasing steadily, going up 500 percent between 1930 and 1943 in Sichuan. This indicates that supply was actually reduced.³¹ The League of Nations, which normally looked on Chinese claims with a jaundiced eye, praised the success of Yunnan and Sichuan in reducing production.³² Particularly after the war started food prices went up and that along with government encouragement made switching from opium less painful.³³ Although state statistics about exact amounts of production should be treated with caution, it seems apparent that actual levels of production were declining rapidly in the early war years.

CONSUMPTION AND WAR

As it had before the war, the state continued to emphasize the interconnectedness of all four parts of the opium trade. Shipping and retailing remained under tight control, production was being reduced, but all of this was dependent on reducing consumption. The clinic system remained in place, and anti-opium propaganda, much of it indistinguishable from that before the war continued to be churned out. The effectiveness of the antismoking campaign owed much to the situation created by the war. Anti-opium propaganda had always emphasized the damage opium smoking could do to the individual and the race, but now China was engaged in “a great competition of national strength” and complete mobilization was needed to avoid national extinction.³⁴ Opium propaganda had always raised the specter of national extinction, but for the first time this was a real threat, and opium propaganda fit into a larger propaganda push aimed at creating a wartime citizenry. Recent scholarship has emphasized the importance of the war years in making nationalist state-building a reality. For the first time the lives of ordinary citizens really were vital to China’s survival, and each individual Chinese was encouraged to see themselves as making decisions that would, in a very literal way, save or condemn the nation. “The war with Japan is a competition of *ren li* (human power), *wu li* (material power), and *cai li* (financial power). If we waste our human and financial power on opium and drugs the nation is lost.”³⁵

THE ELIMINATION OF PRIVATE OPIUM

Probably the best proof that opium production was declining was the campaign to buy up private opium. This campaign also reveals how important opium suppression, as contrasted to opium control, had become to the central government. Legal poppy planting ended in 1938, and the final end of the transport and clinic program came in 1939, with the plan as a whole concluding on June 3, 1940. One of the things that made ending the licensing system easier in 1939, was that there was no more opium to buy; production ended the season before. Unfortunately, there was a good deal of opium still available in China. The Six-Year Plan was built on controlling the most profitable and open part of the trade; large shipments on the Yangzi river. It had expanded in the direction of growers and smokers, but always aimed at the most public and easily controlled parts of the trade; opium boiling, opium dens, and poppy fields. The state never made serious attempts to control smoking at home or small plots of poppies because measures to control these would be expensive, unpopular, and not really necessary. Rooting out small amounts of opium from villages all over West China would certainly be expensive. It would also be unpopular, not least because the state had in the past always focused on the least defensible parts of the trade and the most deviant participants. Getting opium out of the hands of peasants was vital however, because the end of the state system of licenses would inevitably lead to increased demand for smuggled opium. Although the state might not be able to pull the opium out of the villages money certainly would.

The solution to this was quite unusual; the government would buy the opium. In July 1939, the *suging si cun yantu gongshu* (Office for the Elimination of Private Opium) was announced. It was responsible for buying up and storing the remaining opium in China. Yunnan was held to have already dealt with the problem of privately held opium stocks, so these offices were set up only in Sichuan, Guizhou, and Xikang. Each was to establish warehouses and after the harvest of 1939 buy up all the opium in the province within five months. These offices were headed by the provincial chairman, so when Chiang made himself Sichuan's chairman in September of 1939 he also became responsible for opium purchasing.

Chinese governments generally did not go in for opium suppression plans that cost a lot of money, which this one did. The plan also gave money to opium hoarders, not a group that the government was eager to reward. The government later came up with plans to sell all this opium outside of Free China, but that was not the chief motivation of the plan. Military units were told to assist the civil authorities in buying up the opium, but this was not to be a forced sale.³⁶ Chiang simply did not have the resources to force people all over Sichuan to give up their opium, but through fair prices and a few threats he did have some success.

In each of the remaining four producing counties of Sichuan a special committee, dominated by representatives of the Anti-Opium Inspectorate but included local people as well, was to meet once a week to set the fair price for opium. For the most part the buy-up was to be managed not by special institutions, however, but by the regular government. *Bao jia* heads were to locate all the opium in their areas and register it, and then report the total amount to the district magistrate. The magistrate would report the amount and the price to special warehouses which were established for this purpose and they would remit the money. Half of the capital for the buy-up was to be provided by the Inspectorate and half by the provincial government.³⁷ The money would be distributed by Chiang's Farmers' Bank.³⁸ Once the magistrate had received the cash he would set a date for the opium to be brought in. He would pay for it, and have it shipped back to the warehouse.³⁹ This system gave the magistrate considerable opportunities for corruption, which the government checked by requiring careful registration of the opium at every stage, by appointing a committee of local officials and notables to oversee the whole thing, and by sending a special representative to each county to observe. Given this apparent lack of trust in the magistrates, it may seem odd at first that they were involved at all. Previous attempts to deal with opium through the regular government had been a failure, and this was part of the rationale behind the special institutions of the Six-Year Plan. According to Chiang Kai-shek part of the point of the opium buy up was that it would force local magistrates to revitalize their *bao-jia* systems and reveal who was willing to carry out orders and who was not.⁴⁰ In order to exploit Sichuan fully, Chiang needed responsive and competent local government. The fact that this was an opium policy that magistrates were being asked to enforce gave Chiang a certain moral advantage which would force them to act.

Besides giving a reasonable price for opium, the government was also threatening those who held it. Magistrates were told that their performance in this matter would be weighed very heavily in evaluations, and gentry and local party members were also urged to cooperate.⁴¹ If this was not enough, it was pointed out that holding opium would become a crime once this buy up was complete, and it was also announced that after the official buy up was over large rewards would be given to those who turned in opium hoarders.

In Xikang, where the Yi minority grew much of the opium, a system suited to the area was planned. Han people who held opium would be registered in the usual manner, but in the Yi areas, opium was not to be bought directly by the government, but by licensed merchants who would go up into the hills and get it. These were mostly small merchants. Their licenses restricted them to a particular area and set a maximum amount of opium they could bring in. Once opium was brought to the official warehouse, they were paid for it. The merchants would thus be under control, and still provide the government with

more reach, penetrating into areas where the government had little control and also provide the cash to buy the opium from the Yi.⁴²

The overall plan was more flexible and realistic than anything the government had done to date, suited to the government's abilities, and neatly balancing reward and coercion. Lots of opium was purchased. The warehouse in Wan county bought up one-hundred twenty thousand ounces of opium, but production was estimated at about two-hundred twenty thousand, so a lot of opium was still out there.⁴³ Province-wide the buy-up amounted to 167,403,153 ounces, an extremely high amount.⁴⁴

Buying all this opium cost a lot, and the government had two ways of defraying these costs, first by selling the opium inside the province, and second by large scale exports. Sales inside Free China were part of the plan from the beginning. Because 1939 was the last year for legal planting, and opium sales continued into 1940, a gap was filled by the opium that was bought. By providing all the opium needed for 1940 without planting any more, the government could force peasants to plant other crops for a season and put the smuggling networks out of business for a full year before unmet demand drove prices up and lured people back into the opium trade. Part of this opium was distributed by the regular system of *hang* and opium shops, which were expanded in 1939 to cover even the most remote parts of Xikang.⁴⁵ After this system wound up early in 1940, addicts who completed a course of treatment could continue to buy opium from the county government until the end of the year.

Even after selling the 1940 allotment of opium to the users in Free China, the government was left with tens of thousands of ounces stored in caves in Sichuan and Guizhou. The solution to this problem was to export it. There was at least some small-scale smuggling into Japanese-held areas, but huge stocks of opium suggested something more ambitious. Du Yuesheng was behind many of these attempts. Du was an ardent patriot, and during the war he put his contacts in Shanghai at the disposal of the government. He also used his knowledge of opium to help them move some of the large stocks they had accumulated. Most of this was moved through Canton, since the Nationalists controlled the entire area around the city. Both Guizhou and Sichuan opium was moved through Canton in large shipments. Some of these went to Hong Kong, others to Shanghai, and some overseas. Although the Japanese were freely selling opium to anyone who wanted it in the occupied area, their Manchurian opium was simply not as popular with consumers as the traditional Sichuan and Yunnan product. Several thousand chests of opium were moved this way, and the government no doubt made a profit, but the point of this trade was to get rid of excess opium, not to establish a new source of revenue.⁴⁶ Once the stock of opium was gone there would be no attempt to grow more opium to supply this market.

DECLARING VICTORY

In April 1940, the Six-Year Plan formally ended, and during the Anti-Opium Day observations that June, the government praised and explained its success. In his own assessment of the plan's success Chiang Kai-shek emphasized the unity of the party, army and the strictness of martial law.⁴⁷ That Chiang emphasized the importance of the party-state's determination (and by extension the strength and determination of its leader) as the source of China's salvation is not surprising. The official propaganda outline for describing the success of the plan was somewhat different and considerably more detailed. Various earlier efforts were described, but their failure was not attributed to lack of moral strength or integrity on the part of those who administered them, but rather on the superior methods of the Nationalists.

The propaganda outline did obscure the haphazard development of opium policy, presenting the period after 1931 as the slow working out of a single plan. It also emphasized the virtues of party control and the unity of the party, army, and government. Previous campaigns had suffered from an overemphasis on revenue, and thus had not had a solid moral basis. The main emphasis, however, was on the structure of the plan as the source of its success. They specifically praised the logic behind the suppression through taxation policies of the past and the Hankou opium suppression office, which had been effective in producing revenue and in denying it to local governments. What distinguished the Six-Year plan was its gradualism.

Why has the gradual plan been successful? It is because its temporal and geographical progress had steps and periods. Having steps and periods made it possible to progressively bring order to the confused political situation in accordance with conditions.⁴⁸

It was not a simple problem of opium but rather a complex fiscal, economic, and political problem. "Issuing laws and orders, imprisoning and fining opium criminals, it is a day dream to think that even after hundreds of years these would clean up the problem."⁴⁹ Issuing laws and carrying them out were signs of the government's sincerity and dedication, but simply being more strict had no effect. An insincere government could not solve China's problems, but sincerity alone was not enough. This was in direct opposition to the position of the National Anti-Opium Association and most of the international anti-opium groups, and was closer to the central government's 1931 claim that scientific methods needed to be used to deal with opium. This method would seem similar to the old warlord opium monopolies, but it was necessary to manage the trade in order to control it.

In first establishing an opium policy, special taxes will be collected. . . . This provides an opportunity to develop methods to control growing, transport, wholesaling and retailing, as well as determining the number of smokers. The revenue can pay for progressive reduction and elimination [of the trade], policies to lift smokers out of the bitter sea. A humane heart and a humane policy originate in taxation.⁵⁰

LIMITS OF ACHIEVEMENT

With the completion of the term of the plan victory had to be declared and a new policy towards China's remaining opium had to be devised. In June 1940, a National Anti-Opium Conference was held in Chongqing. It resolved that the current policy of strict suppression should be continued, but it was to be carried out by the regular government: the inspectorate and the other special organizations were to be disassembled.⁵¹ In December of that year, Chiang Kai-shek issued a statement in which he announced the success of the plan and called it a turning point in the transformation of old China into New China. From 1940, China's four-hundred fifty million comrades would continue to forge ahead along the great road of restoring the manifestly magnificent radiance of their spiritual and physical power. He urged comrades to remain vigilant, however, because demons who would poison the people were still a threat. This threat should be met with the same spirit used to kill the Japanese, and regardless of whether they were involved in growing, shipping, sales, smoking or concealing any of these they would be punished.⁵² Chiang was entitled to a little purple prose on this occasion. His government was announcing its success in dealing with a problem that they claimed had troubled China for a hundred years and had in fact been an important political issue throughout the twentieth century.

On the other hand, his emphasis on the need for vigilance was an admission that opium was still being produced and smoked in China. To some extent the central government was involved in the trade; Chongqing would continue to try and move its substantial stocks of opium to markets in the Japanese-controlled areas. Local officials were still bribed and some were directly involved in opium production.⁵³ Opium smuggling, of course, continued, and *yan bang* continued to operate in remote areas.⁵⁴ Opium smoking also continued, and the government arrested and punished opium smokers down through 1949. In Japanese-occupied areas, opium and refined drugs were sold freely, and after the war the Guomindang would have no more idea how to deal with this than they did with any of the other problems of the newly freed areas. At the Huangshan meeting, an examination of the Ichigo disaster, the failure of the Chinese armies was partially blamed on

opium use among the troops. A scapegoat, Cheng Zerun, was promptly found and executed. Cheng protested that he had done nothing that countless others had not also done, which was true, but not relevant.⁵⁵ His execution was intended to show the continued sincerity of the state in its desire to eliminate opium, but this sincerity now served an entirely different purpose. There was no longer a monopoly system to be justified, and the state was no longer directly involved in the opium trade. The state's commitment to opium suppression was now the same as its commitment to any other important social reform, it was no longer a part of a revolutionary transformation of Chinese politics, it was no longer essential to any of the other projects of the Nationalist government.

Conclusion

In China today, opium is a problem that is presented as one of the perennial issues of modern Chinese history.¹ This is not surprising given that modern Chinese history begins with the First Opium War. The history of the century following that war is often organized around themes of China's exploitation by foreign powers; the disorganization of Chinese society and the failure of Chinese citizens and governments to live up to their roles. Opium fit well into these narratives and, more generally, into the moralizing approach that saw China as a victim of imperialism and feudalism.² This study argues that the grand narrative of China's addiction to opium conceals as much as it explains.

Su Zhiliang identifies three anti-opium campaigns (Lin Zexu, the Late Qing, and the Communists).³ Besides the fact that this formulation leaves out the Nationalist's Six-Year Plan it also obscures the immense differences between these campaigns. The economic and fiscal position of opium, the presumed effect of the drug on the people, the nature of the people, the ideological importance of the trade, the international situation, all of these were quite different in all of the four major anti-opium campaigns.

The figure of Lin Zexu looms large in much of twentieth-century anti-opium propaganda, and while I have argued that his actions are less relevant to the modern situation than the anti-opium crusaders thought, their attraction to him is not surprising. For Lin, opium was a comparatively minor problem that could be eliminated through an act of will. China's opium problem was caused by foreign merchants who could be awed through a display of imperial power and a problem of corrupt officials, which could be dealt with by honest officials. It is not surprising that this view of opium as a problem that could be solved by elite willpower was popular with later elites. It is somewhat surprising: they missed the enormous differences between Lin's views and their own; the scope and intrusiveness of the opium trade was far smaller in 1839; Lin's attempt to gather up and burn all the opium in China in 1839 was a tragic failure; but the attempt to do the same thing in 1919 was a farce.

Lin's view of the problem he faces was radically different from that of the later reformers. Both groups referred to a *guo huò*, which can be translated as national disaster. For Lin, this meant the fall of the Qing dynasty and in the

twentieth century the extinction of the Chinese in Social Darwinian competition. Both were worried about the effects of opium-smoking on the population of China, but Lin's view of this was fundamentally elitist. The modern concept of citizens was, of course alien to him, and while he did worry about the common people and their health his chief concern was with officialdom and the army. To the extent that nineteenth-century thinkers were concerned with the economic effects of opium it was in the context of Confucian ideas of frugality and grain supply rather than modern ideas of economic growth and international competition.

The British position in the first Opium War is superficially understandable from a twentieth century point of view. The British state profited from opium sales, and was willing to go to war to defend those profits. In 1839, the British were not behaving evilly in a modern sense, however. Twentieth-century reformers felt that the wrongness of the opium trade was self-evident and that the only reason a state or individual could participate in it was that they were completely indifferent to moral behavior. In fact in the nineteenth-century opium taxes were just another example of tax farming. Like alcohol or prostitution, it was a disreputable trade that was best limited, and the best way to both limit the trade and profit from it was some form of state control. All over Asia, governments controlled the opium trade as a source of revenue, and dealt with problems of control and regulation. There were those in Britain, most notably the Quakers behind the Society for the Abolition of the Opium Trade, who believed that the trade was innately wrong. Most governments accepted views enshrined in the report of the 1895 Royal Commission on Opium; opium was less dangerous to Asians than to Europeans, and the best way to deal with it was a racially-based hierarchy that would protect the metropolis, isolate the colonial elite from the dangers of opium, and profit appropriately from sales of opium to those Asians it was appropriate to sell it to. It is not a coincidence that this position tied in so well with the needs and capacity of the colonial state.

The absolute productivity of the colonized was less important than an effective method of extracting their surplus. The limits of state penetration made tax-farming attractive, and, even if the state desired to eliminate the opium trade they lacked the level of social control necessary to do so. In China, where the racial issue was different than in the colonial states, opium policy followed the same path. While Li Hongzhang may have sincerely disliked the opium trade, like all other vices it was a great source of revenue. The state's habit of issuing edicts against the trade, while refining ways of taxing it, was not bureaucratic schizophrenia, hypocrisy, or fecklessness, but a rational response to how the state viewed opium-smoking. It was a dangerous, bad habit, but no more dangerous to the state than alcohol or prostitution.

The great change in opium policy came with the appearance of the narrative of addiction in the late nineteenth century. Opium use became a universal

and unstoppable danger. The use of drugs by any individual inevitably led to the destruction of the individual. The presence of drugs in a society would inevitably destroy the society. This position had a number of conceptual problems. It was not clear how this plague spread, it was not clear if the users of opium were criminals or victims, and it was not clear how the state could solve this problem. Regardless, a strong effort, even if misguided, was increasingly necessary.

As this new view of drugs was accepted, it became harder and harder for states to justify their involvement. The slow move away from state opium sales was obscured by its seamless connection to older attempts to control the trade for purposes of revenue. From the 1880s to 1937, there was a general trend all over Asia towards closer state control of opium trade. This trend was formally justified as a gradual movement towards limitation and elimination. Increasing control was motivated by less credible causes as well; fear for diminished colonial productivity, fear of the spread of opium use to the colonizers, desire to give the state closer control of its own finances, and of course desire to maintain and increase revenue. In colonial Asia, this trend was relatively unproblematic. Although accusations of bad faith were leveled at international meetings all states other than Japan were moving in the same direction. The report of the 1929 League of Nations Inquiry into Opium Smoking in the Far East, is interesting not only for the masses of data it provides, but also for its tone of quiet technocratic consultation. Even the Japanese built an opium control system similar to that of other colonial states, but with a different goal.

China's situation was similar enough that it could borrow methods from the colonial systems, and the opium markets of Asia were, actually or potentially, connected enough that China and other states were deeply concerned with other's actions. In the colonial states, opium policy was a set of decisions about how to manage the colonized, and while the opinions of the colonized were increasingly important, the state had the power to enforce whatever policy it wanted. China, from the New Policies period on, was dealing with modern citizens. The situation was ideologically different, in that there were things impossible to justify (when talking about citizens). The situation was also practically different: China needed the active enthusiasm of the citizens for an effective campaign against opium.

In some respects, the New Policies were the most international of the Chinese campaigns. The Qing state was powerful enough to abjure opium profits on behalf of its subordinate units and to devise and carry out nationwide plan. The campaign centered around the 1908 treaty with Great Britain, which made China part of the co-coordinated international movement away from opium sales. Indeed, China was the leader of this international movement, and got important benefits from it. The treaty with the British formalized the new position: it was not possible for modern states to sell opium to people who objected to it. In other words, races could place themselves in different places in the racial

hierarchy of empire. The entire New Policies reform was heavily influenced by the model of Japan, and the purpose of the reform was to make China into Japan, an Asian nation that was accepted as a member of the international community. The anti-opium campaigns, along with the anti-footbinding campaigns, were the most important aspects of reforms that were to quickly transform the Chinese into modern citizens. In the case of the anti-opium campaigns, the value of this modern citizenry was immediately apparent. The willingness of local elite to become actively involved in the campaign provided a great deal of free state capacity, and put China in a much stronger position in its negotiations with Britain. Although the anti-opium campaign was not always as successful as the Chinese would have hoped, popular opposition to the opium trade made it impossible for the British to resume the trade with India.

The New Policies campaigns were far more effective, in terms of changing social conditions in China, than anything that had come before them. The India-China opium trade was ended. Popular attitudes towards opium smoking, especially among the educated, were changed permanently. The campaign resulted in closer state control over the opium trade than the Chinese government had ever had before. This was to some extent a double-edged sword, however. The Qing state profited from opium through the *likin* transit tax, a fairly primitive and inexpensive way for the state to insert itself into the opium economy. In the New Policies period the state became more deeply involved in the opium economy, boiling opium, registering smokers, and running opium dens. All of these were seen as necessary to give the state the control it needed to eliminate the opium trade, but it was an act of political will that made the state use these new powers to eliminate opium and use the money they brought in only for opium suppression.

After 1916, however, the anti-opium campaign collapsed along with China's central government. It was during the warlord era that opium reached its greatest importance in China's political economy. It was also this period's opium economy that would be read back into the past. Although Li Hongzhang's opium policies cannot really be called hypocritical, those of the warlords can, as they all accepted the narrative of addiction but sold opium anyway. The Qing could not attribute poppy growing to the backwardness of peasants, but under the Republic this made perfect sense. Peasants still had not been educated in the new ideas about opium, and continued to treat it as a profitable and enjoyable, if disreputable, substance rather than as a threat to the nation and the race. New ideas had not replaced old ones, but coexisted with them and feudal attitudes towards opium could be found even among educated urbanites. To blame opium for the backwardness of the people and the backwardness of the people for opium would not have made sense to Lin Zexu, who did not see China as backward, but it made perfect sense in the 1920s.

In the 1920s, for the first time, the international opium trade also began to match up with the crusaders' images. The British Empire may not have been consciously trying to poison China as part of a *dubua zhengci*, but at least some parts of the Japanese empire were. Japanese drug sales took a new form—morphine and heroin, which were a better fit with the discourse of national destruction, as they were not associated with peasants or traditional leisure, but only with corruption and national weakness. In the nineteenth century, Chinese opium use was not really an international embarrassment, since Chinese elites did not care what the international community thought and in any case the rest of the world did not issue formal reports on the state of China's opium trade. All of this had changed by the 1920s.

By the 1920s new ideas about the economic danger of opium were coexisting with older ones. Poppy planting was still accused of leading to endemic famine. This survival of traditional ideas about cash crops as an enemy of proper peasant frugality is not surprising, but it was complimented new ideas about opium use as a threat to economic growth. What opium was actually doing to China was aiding in its political disintegration. Opium profits enriched regional warlords at the expense of the center, encouraged corruption through the state and provided that cash that enabled Japanese militarists to pursue and aggressive policy in China without the approval of Tokyo.

The same overlapping of ideas was used to explain opium smoking. The traditional view of opium smoking, disreputable and potentially dangerous to the individual but not a great danger to the race, continued to exist in some contexts. Peasant opium smoking (and growing), use by people over sixty, and medicinal use of opium were all still tolerated. These ideas coexisted with more modern views of opium and drugs and a plague destroying the nation, a discourse which tended to attach itself to warlord opium monopolies and Japanese drug smuggling.

In the 1920s, then, opium really was at the center of all China's problems. The May Fourth intellectuals identified imperialism, warlordism and feudalism as the three great problems facing China, and opium was an integral part of all three. When Sun Yat-sen claimed that opium suppression would have to wait on creation of a true revolutionary government he was trying to push the problem down the road and also trying to cover up for his own regime's involvement in the trade. Although he may not have been aware of it, he was also correct. By 1925, the opium problem in China was no longer a technocratic problem that state could solve with a certain amount of will and money. Opium money was an important part of local finances and a weak central government could not simply order local governments to stop collecting it. While most educated Chinese at least paid lip service to opium suppression in fact even among the elite modern prohibitionary ideas were not fully accepted.

As with so many other problems that faced China in the twentieth century, the state was faced with the need to create radical social change and it had only the most limited resources available to do so. The impossibility of the state's situation was revealed by the problems Nanjing had with its attempts to establish an opium monopoly in 1927. The government found it impossible to impose a centrally managed opium system on the local regimes, and found it impossible to win public acceptance for an open state monopoly on retail sales. States all over Asia found opium a tricky substance to manage, but for a revolutionary Chinese state it was particularly difficult. Nanjing lacked the state capacity to force its will on lower levels of government or on the Chinese people. It also had more need than any other state in Asia to win the approval of its subjects, both as a way of using their enthusiasm to expand the capacity of the state, as had happened in the Late Qing campaigns and because as a national state Nanjing had to have a different relationship with its subjects.

Although official propaganda would eventually claim that the government had come up with a solution to this impasse at once, in fact opium policy drifted for a number of years. The 1931 attempt to justify a national opium monopoly as a scientific borrowing from international opium control models was a failure. The attempt to monopolize the Yangzi opium trade around Hankou had some success, although there were limits to how far a supposedly nationalist state could go in the direction of a warlord-style opium system.

The announcement of Six-Year Plan in 1935 was described as revolutionary, a word that the Nationalist government tossed around a lot, especially as it became increasingly clear that Nanjing was at best a failed revolutionary state. In this case the plan had the rather revolutionary attribute of being an initiative of the Nationalist government that was a success. By 1940, opium had been removed from China's political economy, something that would have seemed impossible only a few years before. The secret to the plan's success was that it embraced rather than concealed the contradiction between opium control and opium suppression. Previous Chinese governments had attempted to disguise opium plans that were aimed at control and revenue by papering them over with moral pronouncements. The Six-Year Plan embraced the fact that the state was selling opium. Opium suppression was made possible by the control of the opium trade, and control of the opium trade was legitimated by suppression. Although the plan compromised revolutionary values it was a successful compromise.

The Six-Year Plan was accepted, if grudgingly, by former critics like the National Anti-Opium Association and Ma Yinchu in part because it recognized that different parts of the trade had to be dealt with differently, both as a practical matter and ideologically. The plan included strict and uncompromising measures against the trade in refined drugs, the aspect of the trade that fit best with the view that opium was an imperialist plot that would destroy the nation. Treatment of peasant poppy growers and old men fond of the occa-

sional pipe was fundamentally different. The plan was thus ideologically palatable to any audience. Tied to this was the fact that the plan was practical, and thus could be effective. To believe in the sincerity of the government in carrying out the plan did not require one to believe in the morality of Chiang Kai-shek, but rather to believe that he would continue to pursue his own interests. The plan also did not rely on the people and lower level of government to do anything they were unwilling to do. Warlords were expected to seek the best market for their opium, which would turn out to be provided by the Anti-Opium Inspectorate. Smokers were to seek out cheap high-quality opium, which was also provided by the Inspectorate. The system harnessed the ordinary activities of the people in the service of the state.

After 1949, the Communists also carried out an anti-opium campaign which was based in most respects on methods that had been developed by the Nationalists. It was fundamentally different, however, in that it was not a revolutionary policy. The Communist's land reform policies were revolutionary in that they transformed local politics all over China. However inaccurate Mao's understanding of rural China may have been, after land reform the structure of local society was fundamentally different. The Communist's anti-opium campaigns had no such effect. After 1940, opium was no longer a substance with a special relevance to China's political system. The only task that faced the new government was to deal with a group of deviant opium users, exactly the same problem that drugs presented Britain or the United States. The Nationalist campaign had succeeded in turning opium into an ordinary social problem.

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Notes

ABBREVIATIONS

CWR—China Weekly Review

EDG—Er Dangan Guan (Second Historical Archives of China).

LNJY—Jiang Junzhang, *Guomin zhengfu liu nian jinyan jibua ji qi chengjiu-minguo ershisi nian zhi minguo ershijiu nian* [The Nationalist government's six-year Opium Suppression Plan and its accomplishments, 1935–1940]. Taibei: Guoshiguan, 1986.

Opium Trade—*The Opium Trade*. 5 vols. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1974.

ZGJDSZL—Guojia jindu weiyuanhui, *Zhongguo jindu shi ziliao*. Tianjin: Tianjin renmin, 1992.

INTRODUCTION

1. Zhang Shenghua and Shi Meiding, eds., *Qingmo minchu de jinyan yundong he wanguo jinyan hui*, pp. 420–452 reprints the newspaper coverage.

2. Under the terms of a 1908 agreement between Britain and China, it had been agreed that this opium would be legal in certain provinces in China until 1917. As it became clear that the opium would never sell in time the merchants approached the Chinese government to offer a payment 3,500 *yuan* for each chest that was sold in return for government help in moving the opium. In October of 1915, a monopoly was set up to market the Shanghai opium, and any other opium that could be acquired, in the provinces of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Guangdong. All monetary amounts (*yuan*) are Mexican dollars to 1933 and National Currency after 1933, unless otherwise stated.

3. Zhu Bowei, *Wangguo yu yanan*, collects much of this criticism.

4. Mary C. Wright, ed., *China In Revolution: The First Phase, 1900–1913*, 14.

5. Kopytoff, Igor, “The cultural biography of things: commoditization as process.” in Arjun Appadurai, ed., *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

6. Yuan, *Opium Trade*, 10:33, from the May 13, 1915 *Government Gazette*; Guo, Zhang Shenghua and Shi Meiding, eds., *Qingmo minchu*, p. 405, from 1917.2.14 *Shenbao*. The first and second revolutions were of course those of 1911 and 1913, which Guo attributed to the strength of specific individuals. Opium suppression was the duty of the whole nation; Sun ZGJDSZL, p. 796, from Tianjin *Dagongbao*, 1924.12.14; Chiang, speech at 1928 National Anti-Opium Conference, from *Quanguo jinyan huiyi huibian*, n.p.
7. Wakeman, Frederic, *Policing Shanghai 1927–1937*, p. 274.
8. Meyer, Kathryn, and Terry Parssinen, *Webs of Smoke: Smugglers, Warlords, Spies and the History of the International Drug Trade*, p. 280.
9. Slack, Edward, *Opium, State and Society: China's Narco-Economy and the Guomindang, 1924–1937*, p. 156.
10. Rush, *Opium To Java*, p. 238.
11. On the concept of legibility, see James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*.

CHAPTER 1

1. The Taiwanese authorities are more interested in cigarette smoking than in illegal drugs, but the link to 1839 is made by Xu Zelin, the hip teenage cartoon character who preaches the virtue of avoiding drugs to young Taiwanese. Joyce Madancy “Everybody’s Icon: The many faces of Lin Zexu from the late Qing to the present.”
2. Even in these cases there were problems of definition, as bandits and sectarians in particular were very flexible categories. As Vivian Ng and Matthew Sommer have shown, the mid-Qing saw the emergence of a number of categories of improper behavior that the state now had a duty to regulate and eliminate. As with opium, these campaigns presented complex problems of definition, state penetration, and popular acceptance. See Vivien Ng, *Madness in Late Imperial China: From Illness to Deviance*; and Matthew Sommer, *Sex, Law and Society in Late Imperial China*.
3. On definitions of corruption see Park, Nancy, “Corruption in Eighteenth-Century China.”
4. Bello has discussed the importance of imports via Central Asia, and there was also significant production in Yunnan as early as the 1830s. Still, the bulk of China’s opium was connected with Canton, and in state discourse the Canton opium trade and the specific problems associated with it were the opium problem. David Bello, “Opium and the Limits of Empire: The Opium Problem in the Chinese Interior, 1729–1850.”
5. Cited in Jonathan Marshall “Opium and the Politics of Gangsterism in Nationalist China, 1927–1945,” p. 25.
6. Zeng Junchen. “Jingying ‘teye’ wunian jilue,” 2:41–55.

7. On the origins of the boycott movement see Wong Sin Kiong, *China's Anti-American Boycott Movement in 1905: A Study in Urban Protest* (New York: Lang, 2002).

8. Merlin, Mark David, *On The Trail of the Ancient Opium Poppy* (London: Fairleigh Dickenson University Press, 1984). Although Merlin is unable to determine where poppies were first cultivated, he does detail some of the early medical uses of poppy heads. All of the later discourses about opium that I will discuss are overlaid on these very old medical discourses, which, although superseded, continue to exist. Medicinal use of opium remained unproblematic and effectively unregulated in China throughout the Republican period.

9. Howard, Paul, "Opium Suppression In Qing China: Responses to a Social Problem, 1729–1906," p. 40.

10. Spence, Jonathan. "Opium Smoking in Qing China," p. 149.

11. Most studies of drug addiction don't bother to define either term, assuming them to be self-evident. For a critique of this assumption see William McAllister *Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History*, pp. xv–xvi and passim). The problem of how to understand nonmedicinal use, or even what to call it, was a serious one in the late nineteenth century. David Courtwright *Dark Paradise: Opiate Addiction in America before 1940*. describes the rise of a category of people called "pleasure users." Berridge and Edwards report that the term "luxurious use" was used to describe the same behavior in Britain.

12. See Mintz, Sidney W. *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History*. Other treatments include Matthee, Rudi. "Exotic Substances: The introduction and global spread of tobacco, coffee, cocoa, tea, and distilled liquor, sixteenth in eighteenth centuries." and Courtwright, David *Forces of Habit: Drugs and the Making of the Modern World*.

13. On the specific case of opium see Carl Trocki, *Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A study of the Asian opium trade 1750–1950*.

14. In fact, the tea trade in some respects strengthened the dynasty. See Tao Dechen "Lun Qingdai chaye maoi de shehui yinxiang," pp. 90–95.

15. Hattox, Ralph H. *Coffee and Coffee Houses: The Origins of a Social beverage in the Medieval Near East*.

16. See Courtwright, *Forces of Habit*, and Wolfgang Schivelbush *Tastes of Paradise: A Social History of Spices, Stimulants and Intoxicants*.

17. Schivelbush, *Tastes*, chap. 2. Even illegal drugs can be considered acculturated in the sense that they have a defined social position and role. Courtwright points out that *qat* never became an internationally accepted drug of abuse in due to its bulk, slow ingestion and side effects, not because of its chemical properties. Courtwright *Forces of Habit*, p. 55.

18. Howard, *Opium Suppression*, p. 68. See also Berthold Laufer *Tobacco and Its Use in Asia* and L. Carrington Goodrich. "Early Prohibitions of Tobacco in China and Manchuria." Most of this section is based on Howard, although I am not entirely in agreement with his argument.

19. Howard, *Opium Suppression*, p. 7.

20. Drinking alcohol was an important part of the ritual in the early Zhou, and drunkenness was considered appropriate, even encouraged, but “disorderly” behavior was not. This distinction is made clear by comparing the poems “Thick grows the star-thistle” (Mao 209) and “The guests are taking their seats.” (Mao 220) from the *Book of Songs*. Confucius makes a similar distinction in *Analects* 10.6.

21. Although the provenance of many parts of the *Shujing* have been questioned, this document is generally accepted as authentic. Michael Lowe, ed. *Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographic Guide*, p. 379.

22. Rowe, William. *Saving the World: Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century China*, pp. 155–189 summarizes the literature on these concerns.

23. Rowe, *Saving the World*, p. 38.

24. Dunstan, Helen. *Conflicting Counsels to Confuse the Age: A Documentary Study of Political Economy in Qing China, 1644–1840*, p. 228.

25. The bulk of the work in Qing local government was handled by these people who were not officially appointed and were not paid by the state, but rather lived off the money they could extort from the populace. Any proposal to extent their powers was condemned, probably correctly, as a recipe for public unrest. See Bradley W. Reed *Talons and Teeth: County Clerks and Runners in the Qing Dynasty*.

26. Even they, however, were to be allowed to sell of their existing stocks and equipment over a period of time.

27. Dunstan, *Conflicting Counsels*, p. 242.

28. On attempts to control seditious literature in the Qing see R. Kent Guy, *The Emperor's Four Treasuries: Scholars and the State in the Late Ch'ien-lung Era*.

29. I owe this insight to Bin Wong.

30. For an example of this sentiment among foreigners see Baumlér *Opium and Modern China*, p. 60.

31. Phillip Huang, *Civil Justice in China Representaiton and Practice in the Qing*, p. 198–203.

32. Ng, Vivian, *Madness in Late Imperial China*, p. 78.

33. Dunstan, *Conflicting Counsels*, p. 235. This attitude can also be seen in the methods of controlling production. Rather than arresting yeast producers as criminals the state contemplated buying up their stocks or the grain used to produce them.

34. Sommers, *Sex, Law and Society in Late Imperial China*, p. 266.

35. Howard, *Opium Suppression*, p. 73. This statement was made by Fahai, president of the Board of War, in 1726.

36. ZGJDSZL, p. 5.

37. From a 1799 memorial from the Hoppo cited in Morse, H. B. *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834* (Appendix M) pp. 344–46. Howard. *Opium Suppression*, p. 87.

38. Howard, Paul “Opium Suppression in Late-Qing China: The Limits and Possibilities of Social Reform,” p. 7.

39. Canton imports hovered around 4000–5000 chests from 1800 to 1820, and escalated to 40,000 by 1839. Trocki, *Opium, Empire, and the Global Political Economy*, p. 95.

40. Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy On the China Coast*, p. 65.

41. Faribank, *Trade and Diplomacy On the China Coast*, p. 51.

42. Opium dens are given prominent mention in the very first prohibitions against opium. ZGJDSZL, p. 4.

43. On the trope of awakening see Fitzgerald, John, *Awakening China: politics, culture and class in the Nationalist Revolution*.

44. There are those who would disagree. For a summary of the historiography on the two wars see J.Y. Wong, *Deadly Dreams: Opium and the Arrow War (1856–1860) in China*, pp. 3–43; and Li Shuyuan “Ping xifang xuezhe de yapian zhanzheng ‘wenhua chongtu’ lun.” For the molasses position see Chang Hsin-pao *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War*.

45. The importance of Indian opium production, and sales to China in particular, grew rapidly through the early nineteenth century. From 1821 to 1838, opium revenue averaged 7.8 percent of the gross revenues of British India, far more than any other item besides the land tax. Opium taxes were also quite cheap to collect. Wong, *Deadly Dreams*, p. 397. Wong claims that the overwhelming majority of this exported opium ended up in China. I suspect that he underestimates the amounts than were consumed in the Straits Settlements and the Dutch East Indies, but certainly the bulk of it did go to China. On the development of the opium trade in Asia see Carl Trocki *Opium, Empire, and the Global Political Economy: A study of the Asian opium trade 1750–1950*.

46. Howard, *Opium Suppression*, p. 81–83. There was a brief flurry of activity after the prohibitions were repeated in 1796.

47. Huang Shaoxiong “Xin gui xi yu yapian yan,” p. 176. This is true of any trade good of course, but it is particularly true of high-value goods like opium, whose high margins of profit allowed it to flow over many obstacles.

48. Hevia, James “The Archive State and the Fear of Pollution: From the Opium Wars to Fu-Manchu.”

49. *Zhongguo jindu shi ziliao* (Materials on the history of drug suppression in China, hereafter ZGJDSZL) Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin, 1999, pp. 27–44.

50. ZGJDSZL, p. 42.

51. ZGJDSZL, p. 45. Opium-addled troops had been blamed for the failure to defeat the Yao rebels in 1832. Baumbler, *Opium and Modern China*, p. 19.

52. On the silver drain, see Wong, *Deadly Dreams*, p. 374.

53. For a summary of Chinese scholarship on this debate, see Xiao Zhizhi *Yapian zhanzheng yu Lin Zexu yanjiu beilan* Wuhan: Hubei Renmin, 1995, p. 84–86.

54. See the memorial from Xu Naiji in Alan Baumler, *Modern China and Opium: A Reader*, p. 6.

55. This point has not always been clearly understood. According to Chen Qi the traditional view of this debate is to divide officials into strict and lax based on their willingness to execute people. Chen Qi “Qi Shan ‘chi jin’ wenti fu yi,” p. 11.

56. Polachek, James, *The Inner Opium War*, p. 112.

57. Wang Hongbin, *Jindu shijian*, p. 95.

58. Many of the documents from this debate can be found in ZGJDSZL. Some of the more important ones can be found in English in Baumler, *Modern China and Opium*. See also S. Murao, Susumu, “The Canton Xuehuitang and the Discussions on the Opium Laws,” which deals with the debate between two Cantonese intellectuals Wu Lanxiu and Wen Xun. For these two as well the main debate was about the practicality of “strict suppression” (*ying jin*) policies, strictness being defined primarily as the executions of users. Later concepts of racial destruction were not present.

59. *Yapian zhanzheng zai Min, Tai shike xuanbian*, pp. 298–302.

60. Baumler, *Modern China and Opium*, p. 19.

61. Wang Jinxiang, *Zhongguo jindu jian shi*, p. 2.

62. Polachek, *Inner Opium War*, p. 325, citing Wei Yuan *Sheng-wu chi* 14:31a.

63. On Tan, see Baumler, *Modern China and Opium*, pp. 22–27. Success at opium suppression could win recognition for an official. ZGJDSZL, p. 280. Suppressing opium was potentially risky; in Xuzhou Tan was forced to call on the garrison to suppress the unrest his anti-opium measures led to.

64. Lin Manhong, “Qingmou benguo yapian zhi tidai jinkou yapian,” pp. 391, 440.

65. Under the various licensing systems used under the republic, two ounces a month was a fairly standard ration for an individual user.

66. Newman, R. K., “Opium-Smoking in Late Imperial China: A Reconsideration.” p. 787. I would refer to what Newman calls ceremonial use as festive use.

67. This was a common process for all the drug foods. Minz points out that the drop in price in sugar created an entirely new system of distribution and consumption in seventeenth-century Europe. Minz, *Sweetness and Power*, p. 38.

68. Spence, Jonathan, “Opium Smoking in Qing China.” p. 168. Opium also had the advantage of being the only form of money that would appreciate in value as one traveled from a remote area into a city. Wu Shuping “Manhua yapian,” pp. 193–198.

69. Hao Yen-p'ing. *The Commercial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century China: The Rise of Sino-Western Merchantile Capitalism*, pp. 55–71.

70. Trocki. *Opium, Empire*. chap. 6.

71. Lin Man-houng, “The National Opium Market within China, 1820–1906.”

72. Wong, R. Bin, *China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience*, p. 133, citing Wei Guangqi “Qingdai houqi zhongyang jiquan caizeng tizhi di waijie” *Jindashi yanjiu* 1986, p. 227.

73. Pommeranz. *Making of a Hinterland*, p. 164.
74. Qin Heping. *Yunnan yapian wenti yu jinyan yundong*, p. 135.
75. Riens, Thomas, "Reform, Nationalism and Internationalism: The Opium Suppression Movement in China and the Anglo-American Response." p. 130.
76. Madancy, Joyce. *Ambitious Interlude: the Anti-Opium Campaign in China's Fujian Province, 1906–1917*, p. 122.
77. Jordan to Grey in *Correspondence Respecting the Opium Question in China*, p. 32.
78. Lu Zijian, *Qingdai Sichuan caizheng shike*, 1988. 2:577; In 1903, the Hubu pointed out that Sichuan province was bringing in three to four million *liang* per annum from opium. Xuzhou prefecture in the same province was bringing in about three million. They attributed this discrepancy to massive smuggling, and recommended a state-controlled system of opium marketing, which would produce enough revenue to finance the entire modern army. ZGJDSZL, p. 372.
79. Wang Jinxiang, *Zhongguo jindu jian shi*. 50–55; ZGJDSZL, p. 308 The *likin* tax was an ad valorem transit tax that was a mainstay of local finance after the Taiping rebellion.
80. Data from Wang Hongbin *Jindu shijian*, p. 267. In Haiguan Taels.
81. Butel, Paul. *L'Opium: Histoire d'une fascination*, pp. 223–25.
82. Lodwick, Kathleen. *Crusaders Against Opium*, pp. 28, 59.
83. Walker. *Opium and Foreign Policy*, p. 12; ZGJDSZL, p. 287.

CHAPTER 2

1. On *Hui hui yao fang* see Gong Yingyan, *Yapian de chuanbo yu duihua yapian maoyi*, chap. 6, and Paul Howard *Opium Suppression*, pp. 54–64. "Self-medication by lay people" is of course an anachronism at this point.
2. Gong Yingyan, *Yapian de chuanbo*, p. 109.
3. McMahon, Keith, *The Fall of the God of Money: Opium Smoking in Nineteenth-Century China*, p. 22.
4. Baumler, *Modern China and Opium*, pp. 35–43.
5. *Dianshizhai huabao*, 8:52.
6. ZGJDSZL, p. 320.
7. Des Forges, Alexander, "Opium/Leisure/Shanghai: Urban Economies of Consumption," p. 170.
8. The translation, "opium den" for *yan guan*, is not very accurate at this point. In English "den" has bad connotations that do not fit many of the opium-smoking establishments of this period, a fact that nineteenth century authors recognized when they translated the term as "opium divan." Den becomes a much better translation in the

twentieth century, when opium smoking and the places where it was done became much less acceptable.

9. This section is drawn from Judith Zeitlin. *Historian of the Strange: Pu Songling and the Chinese Classical Tale*, esp. chap. 3.

10. Zeitlin, *Historian of the Strange*, p. 70.

11. See the story of Liu Wendian in Isreal, John. *Lianda: A Chinese University in War and Revolution*, p. 144.

12. Cohn, Don, ed. *Vignettes From The Chinese: Lithographs from Shanghai in the Late Nineteenth Century*, p. 93. Mr. B is a Bannerman, a member of the Eight Banners, the Manchu elite of the Qing dynasty.

13. McMahon, Keith. *The Fall of the God of Money: Opium Smoking in Nineteenth-Century China*. Although McMahon's translation and many of his observations are invaluable, as this section shows I disagree with his attempts to fit Zhang into the modern discourse of addiction.

14. McMahon, *Fall*, p. 201.

15. McMahon, *Fall*, p. 206.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 201. Using sex to increase one's vital essence was a common theme in Daoist writings.

17. This is an especially significant point since Zhang's work deals entirely with the upper-class user and implies that it is self-cultivation that is crucial to the ability to resist opium. (McMahon, *Fall*, p. 201) This would of course make a addiction inevitable for the lower classes. This class division in view of addiction was common in the West, but it was one of the things that modern addiction theory worked against. If addiction is a biological process the education of the user cannot be relevant.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 208. The only obsession that really compares to opium is sex, and even that is less powerful and more dangerous. Unlike sex, the desire for opium is unnatural. Like many of the writers on drug foods discussed in Chapter 1, Zhang's discomfort with opium goes beyond the specific problems he states.

19. McMahon disagrees, but he admits that Zhang's entire text has only one rather doubtful reference to this theme. McMahon, *Fall*, p. 109. McMahon is reading the later discourse of addiction back into Zhang's text. This is particularly apparent in his treatment of Peng Yang'ou's *Heiji Yuanbun* (Souls from the Land of Darkness). Peng's text, written in 1909, contains a number of elements not found in Zhang's 1878 text. I attribute this change to the adaptation of new ideas. McMahon sees Peng and Zhang as interchangeable. See Des Forges, Alexander, "Opium/Leisure/Shanghai: Urban Economies of Consumption," pp. 180.

20. McMahon. *Fall*, p. 207. For a younger brother to upbraid an elder in this fashion is a clear inversion of proper social roles.

21. The classic study is Berridge, Virginia and Griffith Edwards, *Opium and the People: Opiate Use in Nineteenth-Century England*. London: Allen Lane, 1981. The most recent study is David Courtwright. *Forces of Habit: Drugs and the Making of the Modern World*, Harvard University Press, 2001.

22. In the late 19th century the germ model of disease was almost universal, and other categories, like deficiency diseases, were accepted only slowly. One epidemiologist administered the excreta of patients with pellagra (a deficiency disease) to himself and his wife in an attempt to refute the position that the disease much be caused by a microbe. Courtwright, *Dark Paradise*, p. 131.

23. Berridge and Edwards. *Opium and the People*, chap. 9.

24. The development of subcutaneous morphine injections would help the opiates regain some of their position by reprofessionalizing administration and making more precise doses possible. See Frank Dikotter "A Cultural History of the Syringe In Modern China."

25. Courtwright. *Forces of Habit*, p. 181.

26. Mulhall, Sarah Graham. *Opium: the demon flower* (New York: H. Vinal, 1926).

27. Berridge and Edwards. *Opium and the People*, p. 155.

28. Courtwright. *Dark Paradise*, p. 124.

29. Strengthening character was a complex matter since this discourse was strongly class based. Most of the early rhetoric about cure by building character was based on middle-class males. It was not clear if women or lower class males were capable of this improvement, an important issue in later campaigns. See Valverde, Mariana. "Slavery from within: the invention of alcoholism and the question of free will."

30. The influence of Christianity is most obvious in De Quincey's *Confessions of an English Opium Eater*.

31. Berridge, Virginia, and Griffith Edwards. *Opium and the People* chap. 13. Berridge and Edwards refer to this as the disease model, but I prefer to call it a narrative of addiction since although it is clearly based on medical rhetoric it was not really a medical discourse. It drew at least as much on moral condemnation and legal categories as on a description of the physical or even psychological effects of drugs. For a critique of the disease model, see Fingarette, Herbert, *Heavy Drinking: The Myth of Alcoholism as a Disease*.

32. *Graphic* October 20, 1883.

33. Wu Liande. *Plague Fighter: The autobiography of a modern Chinese physician*, p. 128.

34. Berridge and Edwards, *Opium and the People*, p. 195.

35. On the development of this bureaucracy in China see Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*.

36. Arthur Conan Doyle's story, "The Man With the Twisted Lip," first published in 1891, is a classic example. One of Dr. Watson's old friends has become an opium addict after a single ill-advised experiment with the drug. Note however that although Watson's classmate has been destroyed by opium he is still apparently maintaining a middle-class household. Sherlock Holmes, of course, maintained his mental and moral character despite frequent cocaine use. (Holmes is called a "self-poisoner" rather than an addict). The story thus occupies a transitional place in the evolution of ideas about drugs and addiction, on the one hand showing that opium would destroy the lives of any who touched it, and on the other retaining part of the old idea that these drugs were relatively ordinary substances.

37. Courtwright, *Dark Paradise*, chap. 5. Also Musto, *The American Disease*.
38. Lodwick, Katharine, *Crusaders against opium: Protestant missionaries in China, 1874–1917* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1996).
39. Howard, Paul, *Opium Supression*, p. 128. He Shuntien asserted that foreigners had superior knowledge about opium, and this remained a standard belief.
40. Howard, *Opium Supression*, p. 131 on tracts.
41. Baumler, *Opium and Modern China*, p. 40.
42. Howard, *Opium Supression*, p. 160.
43. Valverde, “Slavery from Within” discusses refuges for those who drank too much (later to be called alcoholics).
44. Having run an opium clinic in China gave one the scientific standing to contribute to the debate on addiction in the West, which would then generate new theories to be tried out in the East. The classic document of this position is William H. Park’s *Opinions of Over 100 Physicians on the Use of Opium In China* (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1899).
45. Lockhart, William, *The Medical Missionary in China: A Narrative of Twenty Years’ Experience*, p. 392. This view was shared by the Philippine Commission. Lodwick, p. 113.
46. See McMahon, *Fall*, chap. 4 for a summary of some of this literature.
47. Doolittle, in Baumler, *Modern China and Opium: A Reader*, p. 39. Although Doolittle claims that opium use was spreading this is probably an outgrowth of the disease model rather than an empirical observation.
48. Louis T. Sigel, “T’ang Shao-yi (1860–1938): The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism” p. 30.
49. ZGJDSZL, p. 281; Wang Jinxiang, *Zhongguo jindu jian shi*, p. 49 Guo referred to China’s situation as a *guo chi*, national humiliation.
50. The emphasis on the need for unity between the ruler and the people does fit in well with the ideas of Wei Yuan and Feng Guifen. See Kuhn, *Origins of the Modern Chinese State*, p. 57.
51. ZGJDSZL, p. 283.
52. Wang Hongbin, *Zhongguo jindu*, p. 48.
53. ZGJDSZL, p. 285.
54. ZGJDSZL, p. 303.
55. ZGJDSZL, p. 327.
56. On Yan in general see Benjamin Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yan Fu and the West* (Harvard University Press, 1964). For a more detailed analysis of his thoughts on citizenship, see Li Hsiao-t’i, “Making a Name and a Culture for the Masses in Modern China,” pp. 29–68.
57. Li Hsiao-t’i, “Making a Name,” p. 33.

58. Yan Fu, "Yuan Qiang" reprinted in Wang Shi, ed. *Yanfu ji*, 1:18.
59. Ibid p. 25.
60. Ibid p. 28.
61. Wang Jinxiang, *Zhongguo jindu jianshi*, p. 36. This comparison between opium smoking and footbinding apparently became standard. Tang Qiyu claimed in a memorial that foot-binding was even worse than opium. Shibao 1909.11.1.
62. Fitzgerald, John, *Awakening China: Politics Culture and Class in the Nationalist Revolution*, p. 134.
63. Wang Jinxiang, *Zhongguo jindu jianshi*, p. 38. One set of regulations for one of these societies is reproduced in *Wuxu bianfa*, vol. 4, pp. 461–5.
64. ZGJDSZL, p. 335.
65. *Guofu Quanji*, 1965, 9:8.
66. Wang Jinxiang, *Zhongguo jindu jianshi*, p. 42.
67. Sun Xiufu, "Sun Zhongshan jinyan sixiang zhe yanbian" *Beijing dangan shiliao*, p. 50.
68. Shenbao, 10.6–7.1906. Reprinted in Baumler, *Modern China and Opium*, p. 64.
69. Ibid., p. 66.

CHAPTER 3

1. A very thorough recent book on the evolution of international drug control is William McAllister, *Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An international history* (Routledge, 2000).
2. League of Nations Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium-Smoking in the Far East, *Report to the Council* (Geneva, 1930).
3. Om Prakash, "Opium monopoly in India and Indonesia in the eighteenth century," p. 65.
4. I use these two examples because India was the major opium producing area, with some competition from Persian and Turkish opium and the Dutch opium monopoly on Java was one of the oldest (and most studied,) in Asia. The situations in other producing and consuming areas seem to have been similar. On India see Emdad-ul Haq, M., *Drugs in South Asia: From the Opium Trade to the Present Day*, p. 19.
5. Trocki "The Internationalization of Chinese Revenue Farming Networks," p. 160.
6. Ibid., p. 161.
7. A regie for Madura, in eastern Java, was set up in 1893, and for the rest of Java in 1896. Rush, *Opium to Java*, p. 214.

8. Butel, Paul, *L'Opium Historie D'une Fascination*, pp. 316, 326. The French system was extended to cover all of French Indochina in 1897.

9. Rush, *Opium To Java*, p. 219.

10. Rush, *Opium To Java*, p. 198.

11. Proschan, Frank, "Syphilis, Opiomania and Pederasty': Colonial Constructions of Vietnamese (and French) Social Diseases," p. 609. See also Foster, Anne L., "Prohibition as Superiority: Policing Opium in South-East Asia, 1898–1925," p. 255.

12. Levine, Philippa, "Modernity, Medicine and Colonialism: The Contagious Diseases Ordinances in Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements." p. 676.

13. Paul Butel, *L'opium Historie d'une Fascination*, p. 336.

14. Lodwick, *Crusaders Against Opium*, p. 99; Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, p. 116.

15. Attacks, Lodwick, p. 101; Royal Commission Richards "Opium and the British Indian Empire: The Royal Commission of 1895."

16. Lodwick, *Crusaders Against Opium*, p. 99.

17. League of Nations Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium-Smoking in the Far East, *Report to the Council*, vol. 2, p. 17–21.

18. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 204.

19. Chantal Descours-Gatin, *Quand L'Opium Financait La Colonisation en Indochine*, p. 212.

20. Carl Trocki, *Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800–1910*, esp. chap. 3. Burma allowed employers of labor to purchase opium for distribution to their non-Burmese laborers.

21. This was one of the standard questions that all states were asked to respond to by the League commission on opium smoking in 1929–1930.

22. Harold Traver, "Opium to Heroin: Restrictive Opium Legislation and the Rise of Heroin Consumption in Hong Kong."

23. This was obviously in part to protect revenue, but opium use inside the system was at least in theory part of a gradual progress towards a cure.

24. See Lodwick, *Crusaders*, chap. 2–3.

25. Ibid., p. 87.

26. Richards, John, "Opium and the British Indian Empire: The Royal Commission of 1895."

27. Richards, "Opium and the British Indian Empire," p. 407; Park, William, *Opinions of Over 100 Physicians*.

28. Cheng U Wen "Opium in the Straits Settlements, 1867–1910," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 2 (1961):52–75.

29. Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948), 188.

30. *Report of the Committee Appointed by the Philippine Commission to Investigate the Use of Opium and the Traffic Therein* (Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department Washington DC, 1905).

31. The process of suppression did not follow exactly the recommendations of the Committee. See Foster, "Prohibition as Superiority," p. 259.

32. Foster, "Prohibition as Superiority," p. 260.

33. McAllister and Walker in particular seem amused by the antics of the American delegations. McAllister includes character sketches of some of the major figures and says that Brent "possessed the strengths and weaknesses of a moral crusader." (p. 28) Porter's "own government considered him a loose cannon." (p. 68) The American Hamilton Wright is portrayed as "Abrasively enthusiastic, his outspoken dedication caused irritation even among allies" (p. 29). His wife, Elizabeth Washburn Wright is called "Master of the unaimed broadside . . . A stranger to subtlety, even her handwriting assaulted correspondents" (p. 65). On the other side the British representatives are presented as practical people with a better grasp on reality. When defeated at the conference table they could "take comfort in their intimate knowledge of the Asian situation." Walker, p. 39. In other words, they were to be consoled by the fact that unlike the Americans they knew what they were talking about.

34. Chinese and Japanese governments in particular were often accused of insincerity on opium and drugs. This was not just an extra-diplomatic insult, it was a fundamental disagreement with policy.

35. MacAllister, *Drug Diplomacy*, p. 53.

36. Chang Li, *Guoji hezuo zai zhongguo*, p. 197.

37. League of Nations, *Commission of Enquiry Into the Production of Opium In Persia* (Geneva, 1927, p. 2).

38. Elizabeth MacCallum, *Twenty Years of Persian Opium* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1929, p. 27).

39. League of Nations, *Commission of Enquiry into the production of opium in Persia: Report of the Fifth Committee to the Assembly* (Geneva, League of Nations, p. 3).

40. On legibility see James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*.

41. Harumi Goto-Shibata, "The International Opium Conference."

42. Chang Li, *Guoji hezuo*, p. 198.

43. Alston to Curzon, March 20, 1922, *The Opium Trade* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1974, part 17, p. 93); Chang Li, *Guoji hezuo*, p. 200.

44. Clive to Curzon, December 12, 1923. *Opium Trade*, part 19, p. 14. In this case the foreign observers were not representatives of a state, but simply lay foreigners to be supplied by the International Anti-Opium Association in Peking. For Clive, the lack of these foreigners made any data generated by these inspections worthless. In some cases Chinese could be considered honorary foreigners. Ethnic Chinese with foreign degrees

or “duly qualified foreign medical practitioners,” of whatever ethnicity, were considered white for purposes of distributing narcotics in the Concessions. Alston to Curzon May 22, 1922, *Opium Trade*, part 18, p. 1.

45. Chang Li, *Guoji Hezuo*, p. 198.

46. The 1935 Six-Year Plan was an exception, but this required a great deal of practical and discursive preparation before it could be accepted.

47. *New York Times*, Apr. 21, 1929.

48. McAllister, *Drug Diplomacy*, p. 57–58.

49. Madancy, *Ambitious Interlude*, p. 124.

50. Riens, *Reform*, p. 123; ZGJDSZL, p. 375–7.

51. The period of reform after 1900, usually dubbed the New Policies, was one of drastic changes in many aspects of Chinese life. Some reforms were carried out entirely by the state, such as the abolition of the Civil Service exams. Others, most notably the establishment of local schools, were due to the initiative of the local elite.

52. ZGJDSZL, p. 382.

53. Riens, *Reform*, p. 107.

54. Hosie, Alexander, *On the Trail of the Opium Poppy* (London: G. Phillip, 1914).

55. In Fujian, the end of foreign inspections led to a general slaking-off on opium suppression. Joyce Mandancy, “Ambitious Interlude: The Anti-Opium Campaign in China’s Fujian Province, 1906–1917.”

56. Madancy, “Ambitious Interlude,” p. 440.

57. *Opium Trade*, Pratt memo vol. 12 #6, p. 20.

58. Madancy, *Troublesome Legacy*. Madancy tends to see more continuity between the nineteenth-century anti-opium campaigns and the New Policies than I do.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 117.

61. Judge, Joan, “Key Words in the Late Qing Reform Discourse: Classical and Contemporary Sources of Authority,” p. 3.

62. *Shibao*, June 1904 cited in Judge, Joan, “Public Opinion and the New Politics of Contestation in the Late Qing, 1904–1911,” p. 83.

63. Madancy, “Ambitious Interlude,” p. 185; Eykholt, Mark, “Resistance to Opium as a Social Evil in Wartime China”; Baumlér, *Modern China and Opium*, p. 79.

64. On Buddhists, see Baumlér, *Modern China and Opium*, p. 33.

65. Li Hsiao-t’i, *Qingmou de xiaceng shehui qimeng yundong, 1901–1911*, p. 94.

66. Baumlér, *Modern China and Opium*, p. 118.

67. Slack, *Opium, State and Society*, p. 57.

68. Baumlér, *Modern China and Opium*, p. 66.

69. Pratt memo, reprinted in *The Opium Trade*. vol. 12 #6.
70. The Foreign Office documents on both the banks' petition and the Flora case are reprinted in Alan Baumler, *Modern China and Opium: A Reader*, p. 87.
71. Trocki, Carl, *Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A study of the Asian opium trade 1750–1950*, chap. 6. I have no solid evidence about the ethnicity the actual members of the combine, but it was generally reported that the foreigners involved in the trade were mostly Jews and Armenians, and at least two of the leading figures, Ezra and Sasson, were Jewish.
72. *Opium Trade*, Pratt memo vol. 12 #6, p. 20.
73. The well-connected Sasson family was involved in the early attempts to get state support for the opium merchants, but they drop out of the documents by 1913, presumably because they had sold their opium and left the trade to the likes of Edward Ezra.
74. *Opium Trade*, v.12, no. 18.
75. *Opium Trade*, v. 11, no. 41.
76. *Opium Trade*, v. 12, no. 17.
77. *Opium Trade*, v. 11, no. 20.
78. Madancy, *Ambitious Interlude*, p. 353.
79. *Opium Trade*, v. 12, no. 21.
80. Zhang Shenghua, Shi Meiding, eds *Qingmo minchu de jinyan yundong he wanguo jinyan hui*, p. 391.
81. Zhu Bowei, *Wang guo yu yanan*.
82. Ibid., p. 12.
83. Ibid., p. 14.
84. ZGJDSZL, pp. 690–691.
85. “Semi-colonial, semi-feudal” is the official Chinese Communist classification of the Republican regime.

CHAPTER 4

1. Although recent work has provided a more nuanced view of the warlord period the opium trade was central to those parts of the period that were in fact as black as they have been painted.
2. McCord, *The Power Of The Gun*, p. 4.
3. Qin Heping, *Yunnan yapien wenti yu jinyan yundong*, p. 60.
4. Marshall, “Opium and the Politics of Gangsterism,” p. 25.
5. Waldron, “The Warlord: Twentieth-Century Chinese Understandings of Violence, Militarism, and Imperialism,” 1080.

6. Yu Ende, *Zhongguo jinyan faling bianquanshi*, p. 191.
7. Slack, *Opium, State and Society*, p. 11.
8. Wang Hongbin, *Jindu shijian*, p. 373; Bianco, Lucien, "The Responses of Opium Growers to Eradication Campaigns and the Poppy Tax, 1907–1949."
9. Baumler, *Opium and Modern China*, p. 118.
10. Ye Shaohua "Guangdong jinyan," p. 112.
11. Trocki, *Opium, Empire*, pp. 131–2.
12. Lary, *Warlord soliders*.
13. Baumler, *Modern China and Opium*, p. 118.
14. In particular, he emphasized the importance of drill as a means of turning rabble into disciplined soldiers. On the importance of drill, see McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power*, p. 126.
15. Chen Xiong, "Wo zhuban de Guangxi 'jinyan,'" p. 612.
16. Jerome Chen, *Highlanders of Central China*, p. 241; *Chuan Xi geming genju jishi changbian*, pp. 466, 485.
17. Levich, Eugene William, *The Kwangsi Way in Kuomintang China, 1931–1939*, pp. 241–247.
18. Guangxi tongji bu, *Guangxi nianjian*, Nanning, 1933, p. 621. These figures are in Guangxi dollars, which were worth about 0.75 in national currency. In the late 1920s, the British had estimated the Wuzhou opium revenue at twelve million dollars a year. *Opium Trade*, Pratt memo, vol. 12 #6, p. 38.
19. Baumler, *Opium and Modern China*, p. 116. ZGJDSZL, p. 899.
20. Chen Xiong "Wo zhuban de Guangxi 'jinyan,'" p. 616. One shipment that arrived in July of 1934 consisted of 900,000 ounces carried by 590 mules. *CWR*, 7.21.1934.
21. J. C. S. Hall, "The Opium Trade in Yunnan Province 1917–1937."
22. Qin Heping, *Yunnan yapian*, pp. 18–22.
23. Ma Lisheng, "Minguo shiqi Xiaguan de yapian jiaoyi ji jingfang chajin yanguan de qingkuang diandi," pp. 90–98.
24. Overseas opium was marketed under brand names. This seems to have been less common with opium inside China, although apparently more common with refined drugs. See Trocki "The Internationalization of Chinese Revenue Farming Networks," p. 163.
25. Qin Heping, *Yunnan yapian*, p. 23.
26. Qin Heping, *Yunnan yapian*, p. 24.
27. Qin Hepin, *Yunnan yapian*, pp. 120–121.
28. Des Forges, Roger, *Hsi-liang and the Chinese National Revolution*, p. 93.

29. Although opium prices varied a lot, two dollars a liang was a typical price for good opium in Shanghai when the trade was flowing freely. In Yunnan it could drop below fifty cents under the same circumstances.

30. Qin Heping, *Yunnan yapian*, p. 33.

31. Song Guangshou, "Yapian liu du Yunnan gaikuang," pp. 86–88.

32. Zhao Ruiming, "Dali diqu jinyan gaikuang," p. 259.

33. Jonathan Marshall, "Opium and the Politics of Gangsterism in Nationalist China, 1927–1945," p. 26.

34. J. C. S. Hall, "The Opium Trade in Yunnan Province," pp. 10–11.

35. The hoped-for cooperation with French officials never materialized, and the company was limited to minor smuggling, and the company was never a major source of revenue. Song Guangshou, "Yapian liudu Yunnan gaikuang," pp. 79–107.

36. Unless noted, this section is taken from Song Guangshou, "Yapian liudu Yunnan gaikuang."

37. Song Guangshou, "Yapian liu du Yunnan gaikuang," p. 87.

38. Zhao Ruiming, "Dali diqu jinyan gaikuang," p. 259. Qin Heping, p. 39.

39. Song Guangshou, "Yapian liu du Yunnan gaikuang," p. 88.

40. Dai Qilin, "Guomindang jin zhong dayan de shizhi," p. 154.

41. Bianco "Peasant Uprisings," pp. 97–99.

42. Baumlér, *Modern China and Opium*, p. 99.

43. Dai Qilin, "Guomindang jin zhong dayan de shizhi," p. 153.

44. *Yunnan de zheng zhi jing ji gai kuang*, p. 25.

45. Zhao Ruiming, "Dali diqu jinyan gaikuang," pp. 260–261.

46. Huang Shaoxiong, "Xin Gui xi yu yapian yan," p. 182.

47. Li Zihui, "Yunnan jinyan gai kuang," p. 87.

48. J. C. S. Hall, *The Yunnan Provincial Faction*, p. 115.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

50. *Ibid.*, pp. 116–117; *Yunnan sheng nongcun diaocha*, p. 25.

51. ZGJDSZL, p. 901.

52. Song Guangshou, "Yapian liu du Yunnan gaikuang," p. 93.

53. Li Zhiqi, "Yunnan jiefang qian yapian de weihai," p. 69.

54. The province did license opium smokers starting in 1928, but this program was abandoned by 1931, ZGJDSZL, p. 399.

55. Bianco, *Peasants Without the Party*. Appendix 2, 3.

56. Hall, *Yunnan Provincial Faction*, p. 138.

57. Description of this system is from Shi Cilu, "Yunnan yapian tong yun neimu pianduan," pp. 150–159; Shi was an employee of the opium transport office, and its representative in Nanning.

58. Marshall, "Opium and the Politics of Gangsterism," p. 26.

59. Madancy, *Ambitious Interlude*, Li Hsiao-t'i "Qingmou de jinyan yundong."; Wang Shugui. "Jiangsu sheng de yandu yu jinyan yundong."

60. Remick, *Building Local States*, p. 68.

61. Martin, Brian, *The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and Organized Crime 1919–1937*.

62. Meyer, Kathryn, and Terry Parssinen, *Webs of Smoke*, pp. 164–169.

63. Wu Jiayu, "Fujian jinyan yundong" judu she," pp. 15–18.

64. Lin Yuxin and Zhang Dajin, "Tongan yanhua," p. 133; n.a., "Luoyuan yanhai yu jieyan jishi," p. 19.

65. EDG, 2.1462.

66. Zheng Xuechang, "Ximao zao yapian duhai yu jinyan jishi," p. 54.

67. EDG, 2.1464.

68. Mayer and Parssinen, *Webs of Smoke*, p. 161.

69. Fujian jinyan weiyuanhui, *Jin zhong yanmiao baogaoshu*, p. 2. also: ZGJDSZL, p. 963.

70. EDG, 2.1467. This file has all the documents on this case, but no record of what happened after 1933.

71. ZGJDSZL, p. 1011.

72. Meyer and Parssinen, *Webs of Smoke*, pp. 164–167.

73. Fujian jinyan weiyuanhui, *Jin zhong yanmiao baogaoshu*, p. 7, also Fujian jinyan weiyuanhui, *Jinyan huikan*, p. 1.

74. Fujian jinyan weiyuanhui, *Jin zhong yanmiao baogaoshu*, pp. 17–20.

75. Fujian did however have at least a few airplanes designated for this work, a factor that was becoming increasingly common by the 1930's, and presumably made detecting poppies much easier. ZGJDSZL, p. 1072.

76. EDG, 2.1462.

77. EDG, 2.1466.

78. The 19th route was the army that had, without orders, resisted the Japanese advance into the Hongkew district of Shanghai for. This made them national heroes, but the contrast with Nanjing's appeasement made them unpopular with Chiang Kai-shek. They were officially being sent to Fujian to participate in the campaign against the Jiangxi Soviet, but eventually they would revolt against China in the Fujian uprising of 1934. Eastman, *Abortive Revolution*, chap. 3.

79. Meyer and Parssinen, *Webs of Smoke*, p. 162.

80. EDG, 2.1466, p. 1021.

81. ZGJDSZL, p. 742, 745, 746.

82. ZGJDSZL, p. 733, 744. Both from *Dagongbao*.

83. *Minguo Ribao*, 1923.1.29, p. 738.

84. The International Association continued to exist, but gradually lost out to the new, Shanghai-based Chinese Association which was explicitly focused on China and run by Chinese. The difference that this made was clear in an exchange, in October 1927, between W. H. Graham Aspland of the old Association and Bingham Dai of the Chinese Anti-Opium Association. Aspland was defending the Government of India against charges that it was responsible for the smuggling of Indian opium into China by pointing out that the smuggled opium all came from the princely states. Dai was unwilling to accept that this obviated the Indian government's responsibility, and his position was the only one that would have been comprehensible to the Chinese public. Existing anti-opium groups gradually shifted their allegiance from one Association to the other, and by 1926, the old Association had become morbid. *Judu tekan*, Shanxi province's anti-opium newsletter, claimed to be a joint production of both organizations as of October 1926. Its editorial stance clearly came from Shanghai. Opium: *A World Problem*, 1:3 (March 1928), p. 18.

85. Chinese Christians continued to gather data about opium through the 1920s, just as foreign missionaries had done for foreign governments in the past. See *Guomin Ribao*, 1923.5, p. 743.

86. The Association was an official "communicating body" of the League of Nations. *Opium: A World Problem*, vol. 1 no. 2 (November 1927), p. 45.

87. Yu Ende, *Zhongguo jinyan faling bianquanshi*, p. 186; *Opium, A World Problem*, v. 2 no. 2 (January 1929), p. 21; EDG 41.24; Wu Yu, et. al. *Minguo hei shihui*, p. 286.

88. *Dagongbao*, (Changsha), 1924.9.29, p. 790.

89. Wang Hongbin, *Jindu shijian*, p. 380.

90. This statement was given by Sun in response to a question by a member of the Association. Although the statement was originally an answer to a question at a press conference the Association eventually transformed it into a sacred text on par with Sun's Will. See Baumbler, *Modern China and Opium*, p. 125.

91. McCord, *Power of the Gun*, p. 4.

CHAPTER 5

1. Eastman, *Abortive Revolution*, p. 5.

2. Donald Sutton, *Provincial Militarism and the Chinese Republic: The Yunnan Army 1905–1925*, pp. 280–281. At this time that Canton was taking control of all taxes in the province and beginning to pay its troops directly. See Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, p. 161.

3. The phrase, *jiéyan yao*, anti-opium medicine, is used in all official proclamations about opium monopolies in this period. In all cases it is acquired in the same places as ordinary opium, and is never subjected to any treatment other than the boiling that raw opium was always subjected to to turn it into smokable prepared opium. Although there had been problems in earlier periods with druggists selling anti-opium medicine which contained large amounts of opium or heroin, by this period anti-opium medicine was, as the government's critics charged, a transparent cover for opium sales.

4. The purchasers of the monopoly sold local monopoly rights to subcontractors, as would be the case later. See Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, p. 161.

5. *Zhengfu Gongbao*, (hereafter ZFGB) no. 3 1925.7.21, p. 17. This was an important point, since it provided the military with a good reason to be active in opium suppression. This was common in warlord opium schemes.

6. Chen Dayou, "Yijiuyiliu nian dao Yijiusansi nian de Guangdong jinyan," p. 122.

7. *Zhonghua minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian*, (hereafter DAZLHB) vol. 4 pt. 2, p. 1119. Throughout his career Soong would be attempting to rationalize tax collection, and opium was an important part of this effort.

8. On the Canton government's opium monopoly see Chen Dayou and DAZLHB vol. 4, pp. 39–41; 1119–1126; etc.; Wang Zhenghua, *Guomin zhengfu zhi jianli yu chuqi chengjiu*, pp. 215–6.

9. DAZLHB vol. 4 pt. 2, p. 1164.

10. *Opium Trade* vol. 12 #6, Pratt Memo, p. 38.

11. T.V. Soong (Song Ziwen), was Chiang's chief financial wizard and sometime Minister of Finance. He tended to be more independent than Chiang liked, but he was indispensable for keeping the government afloat. He was also Chiang's brother-in-law.

12. Eastman, *Abortive Revolution*, p. 280.

13. The foreigners felt this way too. See Herbert May, *Survey of Opium Conditions in the Far East*, p. 28; Luo Zhitian, "Nan bei xin jiu yu beizhan chenggong de zaiquan shi," claims that the idea of the South as new, vital and reformist was one of the key reasons the smaller Southern armies were able to succeed in the Northern Expedition.

14. See "Yapian yan zai Xinpu," pp. 59–73. There was actual violence against opium dealers on the western (and more radical) branch of the Expedition, see Song Chunqing, "Yapian yan hai zai Yingcheng," p. 131.

15. *China Weekly Review*, (CWR) May 14, 1927, p. 288.

16. Jerome Chen, *Highlanders of Central China*, p. 21. Pu Guoshu, "Jianguo qian fuling de yapian".

17. See Guo Xu, et al., "Guomindang zhengfu 'yu jin yu zheng' she jinyan zhengce neimu," p. 221.

18. On Li's connections see Guo Xu, et.al., "Guomindang zhengfu 'yu jin yu zheng' zhe jinyan zhengce neimu," p. 222. and Li's autobiography, *Bai nian yi meng ji*."

19. *Opium Trade* vol. 25 p. 8, 10, *Shibao* 1927.7.23. Slack, *Opium, State and Society* p. 81, mentions the creation of a *Weijin Wupin Chajichu* (Contraband Substances Inspection Office) at about the same time. It is not clear what this organization did, but it is clear that opium policy was quite chaotic at this point, with a series of overlapping organizations, often with different factional loyalties, being created.
20. *Opium Trade*, vol. 25, p. 9.
21. See *Shibao*, 1927.7.23, *Opium Trade*, vol. 25, p. 39.
22. Shanghai Opium Suppression Bureau regulations, in *Opium Trade*, vol. 25, p. 14.
23. Agreement between government and farmers *Opium Trade*, vol. 25, p. 11.
24. *Zhejiang minzheng yuekan*, #39 February, 1931, p. 89.
25. Frederick Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai*, p. 128. *Shibao*, 1928.8.28.
26. *Shibao*, 1927.11.2.
27. See Brian Martin, "Warlords and Gangsters: The Opium Traffic in Shanghai and the Creation of the Three Prosperities Company to 1926."
28. This happened in November of 1927. *Opium Trade*, vol. 25, p. 7.
29. *Opium Trade*, vol. 25 p. 6.
30. Xu Buwen, "Chen Diaoyuan zai Anqing 'jinyan' ceji."
31. Zhang Wansheng, "Lun Jiang Jieshi zhi zao de Anqing 'san-er san' shi bian," p. 67.
32. On Du as a political entrepreneur see Brian G. Martin, "The Green Gang and the Guomindang State: Du Yuesheng and the Politics of Shanghai, 1927–37."
33. Yu Ende, *Zhongguo jinyan faling bianquanshi*, p. 191.
34. Yu Ende, *Zhongguo jinyan faling bianquanshi*, p. 192.
35. *Shenbao*, 1927.10.4, p. 13.
36. *Opium: A World Problem*, vol. 1 no. 2 (November, 1927), p. 8.
37. On the themes of the various days see *Opium: A World Problem*, vol. 1 no. 2 (November, 1927), p. 6 and the *Shibao* for the appropriate day.
38. *Shibao*, 1927.10.21; *Opium: A World Problem*, vol. 1 no. 2 (November, 1927), p. 13.
39. *Shibao*, 1927.10.5, p. 13.
40. *Judu tekan* #19, October 1926; Published by Shanxi Juduhui; *Yunnan sheng zhengfu neizheng huiyi baogaoshu*, p. 125.
41. Wang Yong, et. al., "Minguo zhengfu chengli chuqi Beipingshi jinyan shike yi zu"; Beijing dang'an shih ke. *Xin Guangxi xunbao* 3.1 1928, p. 1.
42. *Shibao*, 1927.8.30.
43. *Opium: A World Problem*, vol. 1 no. 2 (November 1927), p. 50–52.

44. In fiscal 1928–9, the provincial government got 7.5 million dollars out of a total revenue of 32 million from opium. League of Nations Conference on the Suppression of Opium-Smoking, *Minutes of the Meetings and Documents Submitted to the Conference*, p. 36. In September of 1928 Guangdong returned to the tax-farming system, selling the monopoly for 8.4 million. U.S. State, 329.630.

45. *Shibao*, 1928.11.15.

46. For the final resolutions of some of these cases see ZFGB, no. 63 (May 1928, p. 17; no. 75 (June 1928), p. 35.

47. On outright seizures of official opium see Ma Yinchu, *Ma Yinchu quanji*, vol. 4, p. 3, on disputes over illegal opium see *Shibao*, 1927.10.30.

48. On the type of people who worked for the Anti-Opium Bureau, see Zhu Jianming, “Guomindang fandong tongzhi zui chu shiqi de ‘jinyan’ zhengce”; on disturbances see *Shibao*, 1927.11.2 (Wuxi), 1927.11.1, 11.4 (Suzhou).

49. Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai*, p. 259.

50. Ma Yinchu, *Ma Yinchu quanji*, p. 285.

51. This would mean total sales of almost 3.5 million liang.

52. Ma Yinchu, *Ma Yinchu quanji*, p. 3.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 271, also Zhu Jianming, “Guomindang fandong tongzhi zui chu shiqi de ‘jin yan’ zhengce,” p. 127.

54. For a detailed look at this process see Harold Traver, “Opium to Heroin: Restrictive Opium Legislation and the Rise of Heroin Consumption in Hong Kong.”

55. *Shenbao*, 1927.9.28, p. 14.

56. Ma Yinchu, *Ma Yinchu quanji*, p. 3.

57. *Opium: A World Problem*, vol. 1 no. 4 (June 1928), p. 6. CWR 1928.1.14 gives 8.8 million for 1927; Ministry of Finance figures quoted in *China Year Book*, 1929–1930, p. 650 give a total of 18 million or 9 percent of government revenue. Most of this, however, was attributed to Hubei, Shanxi, and Guangxi, and it is not clear how much of it ended up in the hands of the central government.

58. *Shibao*, 1927.11.4, Yu Ende, *Changes in China's Opium Laws*, p. 192.

59. See Zheng Yingshi, “Chaoji yapianyan shang zai shanghai de huodong ji qi yu Jiang Jieshi zhengquan guanxi”; Byrna Goodman, *Native Place and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai 1853–1937*, pp. 69–70.

60. *Shibao*, 1928.1.9.; In this case the opium was called opium rather than “anti-opium medicine” or some other transparent euphemism. Apparently the Zhejiang government was willing to admit it was selling opium as long as it was in a controlled system.

61. Yu Ende, *Zhongguo jinyan faling bianquanshi*, p. 194.

62. *Opium, A World Problem*, vol. 1 no. 4 (June 1928), p. 12.

63. *Shibao*, 1928.2.15.

64. *Shibao*, 1928.2.26. Yan's original plan ZGJDSZL, p. 733.
65. *Shibao*, 1928.1.1.
66. *Shibao*, 1928.2.8.
67. Fujian, *Shibao*, 1928.8.1; Anhui, *Shibao*, 1928.8.19. Neither of these provinces was part of the original opium monopoly system, but both seem to have set up monopolies like those in Zhejiang and Jiangsu at some point.
68. *Opium: A World Problem*, vol. 1 no. 3 (March 1928), p. 38.
69. *Judu yuekan*, #24, p. 11. This was a very serious accusation. Political leaders were almost never directly accused of smoking opium themselves, although most probably had smoked it at one time or another. Leaders could be accused of laxness, or improper supervision of subordinates, but to directly accuse them of smoking opium was a very direct attack on the sincerity of their opium suppression efforts and their patriotism.
70. *Shibao*, 1928.3.28.
71. *Shibao*, 1928.8.21.
72. *Opium: A World Problem*, vol. 2 no. 2 (January 1929), p. 1.
73. *Shenbao*, 1928.9.4, p. 16.
74. Yu Ende, *Zhongguo jinyan faling bianquanshi*, p. 303.
75. *Opium: A World Problem*, vol. 1 no. 3 (March 1928), p. 29.
76. Jiangxi ordered all local governments and military units in the province to observe Anti-Opium Week. EDG, 14.1405.
77. *Opium: A World Problem*, vol. 2 no. 1 (November 1928), p. 35; JDYK no. 26 (December 1928), pp. 11–13.
78. Zhang Zhijiang continued to be something of a loose cannon, urging greater popular mobilization and praising the spirit that Jiangsu and Zhejiang had shown in opium suppression. *Shenbao*, 1928.9.5, p. 10.
79. Hu was a leader of the Left Guomindang, and thus a key rival of Chiang Kai-shek's, although at this point he seems to be supporting Chiang's policy. See Arif Dirlik, "Mass Movements and the Left Guomindang," p. 58. on Hu's attitude toward mass movements. Text of speech in ZGJDSZL, p. 879.
80. In theory there were supposed to be regular anti-opium conferences after 1928, in which case the group might have had a more advisory role. These later conferences were never held, however. The records of the conference were published, but not usefully paginated. For references to what follows see *Quanguo jinyan huiyi huibian*, and *Opium: A World Problem*, vol. 2 no. 2 (January 1929), pp. 7–20.
81. On Chen's case see *Shenbao*, 1928.9.23, p. 16 and JDYK no. 25 (November 1928), pp. 9–11; On the invasion of the conference by "a southern militarist," presumably Yang, see CWR 1928.12.22, p. 149.
82. See Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai*, p. 129; JDYK no. 28, pp. 9–18.

83. T.V. Song was often said to be personally connected to some of these groups *Opium Trade*, vol. 25, p. 6.

84. Wang Jinxiang, "Nanjing guomin zhengfu chuqi de jinyan," pp. 91–92.

85. EDG, 2.1405, 2.1378.

86. EDG, 2.1379.

87. *Shibao*, 1928.3.1.

88. *Quanguo caizheng huiyi huibien*, p. 125.

89. Peng Guoliang, "Xinan san sheng (Chuan, Dian, Qian) yandu yu jinyan zhi yanjiu yijiuyiyi-yijiusiling," p. 240–241.

90. See the conclusion of So Wai-chor, *The Kuomintang Left in the National Revolution*.

91. *Yan Xishan tongzhi shanxi shishi*, pp. 191–193.

92. EDG, 2.1431 has many examples.

93. EDG, 2.1424.

94. On Liu and his connections to Soong, see Yip Ka-che, *Health and National Reconstruction in Nationalist China: The Development of Modern Health Services, 1928–1937*, pp. 47–51 Although Liu would remain head of the Commission until it was abolished it is not clear how much day-to-day connection he had to the Commission. His name appears on many documents, but he also had a full-time job with the much more active Health Administration.

95. EDG, 2.1435.

96. EDG, 2.1428.

97. The Association claimed four hundred local branches, but given that the Hangzhou branch was only formed when the Association's exhibition arrived in May of 1929 this seems to be an exaggeration. CWR, 1929.3.9, p. 68, 1929.5.4, p. 415.

98. *Zhejiang sheng juduhui zongbaogao*, p. 1.

99. *Opium Trade*, vol. 27, p. 37.

100. In 1929, the President of the Association Zhong Ketao decided that he was too busy with the Christian organizations he was in charge of, and he stepped down in favor of Garfield Huang. *Zhonghua minguo juduhui, Jinyan zhinan*, (1931), p. 177.

101. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 156.

103. *Ibid.*, p. 170.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 191 The tour visited *Nanyang* (The South Seas) which probably meant Southeast Asia.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 189.

106. *Opium Trade*, vol. 27, p. 13.

107. Zhou Yongming, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China*, p. 98.

108. Public associations were required to register with the Social Bureau and the local party branch. This was intended to make it possible for the government to “rationalize and modernize” these organizations. See Bryna Goodman, “Creating Civic Ground: Public Maneuverings and the State in the Nanjing Decade,” p. 169.

109. EDG, 33.96.

110. *China Weekly Review*, 1937.8.14, p. 385.

111. *Zhejiang sheng juduhui zongbaogao*, passim.

112. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

113. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

114. Text of speech, *Ibid.*, p. 70.

115. It is very hard to tell what all these organizations were. At least thirty-one were anti-opium hospitals which administered opium cures. The rest were *jinyansuo*, *jinyan weiyuanhui suo*, or *jinyan weiyuanhui fensuo*. Plain *jinyan suo* could be clinics dispensing opium cures, opium suppression headquarters or, in areas which unlike Zhejiang had an official opium monopoly, official opium dens. A *jinyan weiyuanhui* could be an occasional meeting between the magistrate and the police chief to discuss opium problems, a formal committee with several members and regular meetings, or a mass organization. Even in a province like Zhejiang where there was considerable central control it is hard to tell what the organization really was just from the name. These 208 organizations do not include the local branches of the Anti-Opium Association.

116. *Idem.*, p. 70.

117. EDG, 2.1420.

118. Jinyan weiyuanhui, *Tongji huibao*. These covered the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Fujian, Hunan, Hubei Shandong, Shaanxi, Hebei, Shanxi, Ningxia, and Chahar.

119. Tao Jian, “Jiushehui de yapian liudu he qi jieyan gongzuo,” pp. 185–187 This is the account of a doctor who worked did anti-opium work in Hangzhou, Wuxing and Shaoxing between 1933 and 1938.

120. *Zhejiang sheng juduhui zongbaogao*, pp. 86–95.

121. *Ibid.*, pp. 103–110.

122. *Ibid.*, pp. 112–116.

123. Jiang and Zhu, *Zhongguo jindu licheng*, p. 359–360. This data does not include a breakdown of the destination of the twenty-five million ounces shipped privately but legally through Hankou or the amount that was doubtless smuggled. This is only officially shipped opium.

124. Jiang and Zhu, *Zhongguo jindu licheng*, pp. 401, 430.

125. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

126. EDG, 12.399.

CHAPTER 6

1. Jiang Junzhang ed., *Guomin zhengfu liu nian jinyan jibua ji qi chengjiu-minguo ershi nian zhi minguo ershijiu nian*, Hereafter LNJJH), p. 17.
2. This conference was held in February of 1929, *North China Herald*, 2.4.1929.
3. LNJJH, p. 34.
4. LNJJH, p. 76; Li Jihong, *Bai nian yi meng ji*, p. 259; Li later claimed that Taiwan was the basis of the 1935 Six-Year Plan.
5. Boorman, *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, vol. 3, p. 440.
6. A Chinese translation of the original article, along with some Chinese editorials opposing the plan are in Hatano Kenichi, *Gendai Shina no kiroku*, 7 February 1931, pp. 86–92; 120–125.
7. *Opium Trade*, vol. 28, p. 19.
8. CWR, 1931.3.28, p. 110.
9. *Duli pinglun xuanji*, p. 163 1932.7.10.
10. CWR, 1930.8.30, p. 485.
11. CWR, 1930.10.15.
12. CWR, 1931.2.18.
13. *Shibao* 1928.3.27, 1928.3.31; Yu Ende, *Zhongguo jinyan faling bianquanshi*, p. 291.
14. See Lucian Bianco “Anhui Su xian lingpi nungmin kang yanshui toucheng,” Lucian Bianco “Peasant Resistance to Opium Prohibition (1907–1949)”; and Lucian Bianco “Peasant Uprisings Against Poppy Tax Collection in Su Xian and Lingbi (Anhui) in 1932.”
15. *Shenbao*, 1927.9.1, p. 9.
16. See Lucian Bianco, “Peasant Uprisings Against Poppy Tax Collection in Su Xian and Lingbi (Anhui) in 1932”; *Shibao*, 1928.7.19.
17. Presumably the estimate of two million was for a full year.
18. EDG, 41.752.
19. The Anti-Opium Association denounced the Anhui rules and sent a representative to the province to help organize resistance. *Opium: A World Problem*, vol. 1 no. 3 (March 1928), p. 49. It is not clear if the Association was aware of Nanjing’s close connection to what was happening in Anhui, but had the scheme continued they certainly would have become aware of it.
20. See Bianco, Lucien, “The Responses of Opium Growers to Eradication Campaigns and the Poppy Tax, 1907–1949.”
21. *Fujian sheng jinyan gaikuang*: 22.
22. Su Zhiliang, *Zhongguo dupin shi*, p. 181.

23. Zhu Liqing, "Minguo shiqi jinyan jianwen," p. 184.
24. Liu Jiceng et al., *Wuban guomin zhengfu shi*, p. 209.
25. Guo Xu, Xu Yunju, and Li Peiqing. "Guomindang zhengfu "yu jin yu zheng" zhe jinyan zhengce neimu," p. 221. Much of what follows is based on this article, all three of the authors of which served in opium-related offices continuously from about 1933 to 1942.
26. U.S. State 893.114/729, 9 April 1934.
27. Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hubei, Henan, Hunan, Jiangxi, Fujian, Shaanxi and Gansu.
28. Guo Xu, Xu Yunju, and Li Peiqing. "Guomindang zhengfu "yu jin yu zheng" zhe jinyan zhengce neimu," p. 226.
29. EDG, 3.1012.
30. Chen Li, "Jinyan ducha chu yu zhongguo nongmin yinhang fanmai yapian," p. 54.
31. Zheng Yingshe, "Chaoji yapianshang zai Shanghai de huodong ji qi yu Jiang Jieshi zhengquan de guanxi," p. 17.
32. *Opium Trade* vol. 28: 89.
33. *Judu banyue kan* 1:1 June 1936 table *jia*.
34. EDG, 3.1013.
35. Slack, *Opium, State, and Society*, p. 118.
36. EDG, 41.710.
37. Zeng Junchen, "Jingying 'teye' wunian jilue."
38. EDG, 2.1430 1931.1.6 money is remitted through Central Bank of China; *Opium Trade*, vol. 28: 91; EDG 3.1012. The Farmers Bank became a national bank allowed to issue legal tender in 1935.
39. Chen Li, "Jinyan ducha chu yu zhongguo nongmin yinhang fanmai yapian," p. 55.
40. Xiao Juetian, "Jiang Jieshi de jinyan neimu" 169; Slack, *Opium, State and Society*, p. 139.
41. ZGJDSZL, p. 1119.
42. Slack, *Opium, State and Society*, p. 238.
43. Slack, *Opium, State and Society*, p. 134.
44. Jiang and Zhu, *Zhongguo jindu licheng*, pp. 359–61. It seems as if private shipping was confined to the area North of Hankou.
45. EDG, 41.3.
46. EDG, 33.25.

47. EDG, 33.185. This system of licensing may have been new. The first shipment in June is recorded as shipment number eleven, and the final shipment recorded in this record set is number twenty.

48. Jiang and Zhu, *Zhongguo jindu licheng*, p. 359. This generated 5.8 million *yuan* in transport fees, in addition to taxes.

49. Marshall, "Opium and the Politics of Gangsterism," p. 21.

50. Ch'ien Tuan-Sheng, *The Government and Politics of China, 1912–1949*, p. 212.

51. Shipping total from Jiang and Zhu, *Zhongguo jindu licheng*, p. 359. These crude calculations are intended to indicate the order of magnitude of the trade, rather than to contribute to a serious financial analysis.

52. Slack, *Opium, State, and Society*, p. 148.

53. There are no figures for the budget of the Anti-Communist Headquarters, but it was outside the regular financial system, and opium money financed at least some and probably most of it.

54. *Dagongbao*, 1937.4.3.

55. Remick, *Building Local States*, 119–121.

56. Slack, *Opium, State and Society*, p. 238, gives the details of this complex system.

57. Hall, *Yunnan Provincial Faction*, p. 134.

58. Martin, *The Shanghai Green Gang*, p. 139.

59. It is not clear what the end result of this case was. There is no evidence that the opium ever arrived in Shanghai, and it is likely that Chiang's government was able to stymie the plan, most likely by informing the French of it. EDG, 33.67.

60. Xiao Juetian, "Jiang Jieshi de jinyan neimu," p. 161.

61. Su Zhiliang, *Zhongguo dupin shi*, p. 270.

62. *The Opium Trade*, vol. 28: 90.

63. *The Opium Trade*, vol. 28: 181.

64. CWR, 1930.8.16, p. 428.

65. Chen Jinfan, "Chuanjiang yandu zuo si jian wen," p. 158. The author was a river patrol officer in Sichuan from 1929 to 1938.

66. Zhou Jiamou, "Liu Xiang, Jiang Jieshi zai Sichuan de yapian jinzheng," p. 97.

67. LNJV, p. 390.

68. The Military Affairs Commission (*junshi weiyuanhui*) was set up in January 1932 to be, in effect, the supreme command of the armed forces. It was always headed by Chiang Kai-shek, and he often dealt with matters of a non-military nature (such as opium suppression) through it rather than through regular government channels. Given the morbid state of the party and the government, as well as the problems Chiang had in controlling the government, the Military Affairs Commission was often the chief institution of his regime, a trend that would only increase after the war started.

69. Xiao Juetian, "Jiang Jieshi jinyan de neimu," p. 161–162.
70. Xiao Juetian, "Jiang Jieshi jinyan de neimu," p. 173.
71. Fu Yiguang, "He Jian zhu Xiang," p. 202.
72. Fu Yiguang, "He Jian zhu Xiang," p. 199.
73. Long Congqi, "Xu Yuanquan zai sha."
74. EDG, 33.30.
75. Jiang and Zhu, *Zhongguo jindu licheng*, p. 360.
76. Tian Meicun, "Jiu shehui yapian," pp. 186–7.
77. Baumler, *Modern China and Opium*, p. 99.
78. EDG, 3.934.
79. Tian Meicun, "Jiu shehuiyapian," p. 186. The author was a clerk in a Wuhan opium den from 1933 to 1938.
80. Tian Meicun, "Jiu shehui yapian," p. 187.
81. Wu Shuping, "Manhua Yapian," p. 197.
82. Baumler, *Modern China and Opium*, p. 132.
83. EDG, 2.1458.
84. Shanghai shi jinyan weiyuanhui, *Jinyan zhuankan*, pp. 13–14.

CHAPTER 7

1. Wang Hongbin, *Jindu shijian*, pp. 417–420.
2. ZGJDSZL, p. 1093.
3. EDG, 3.906n #2.
4. "Song Ziwen, Kong Xiangxi yu guomin zhengfu de shui zhe gaige," pp. 81–87.
5. Li and Zheng, *Jinyan wenti*, 1941: 30–34.
6. Zhou Yongming, *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China*, p. 109.
7. Zhang Wansheng, comp. *Jiang zhuxi jinyan yanlunji*, n.p. May 19, 1934; Zhou Yongming, *Anti-Drug Crusades*, p. 111; and Slack, *Opium, State, and Society*, p. 106; also link the New Life Movement to the Six-Year Plan, but as I discuss below I find this link tenuous.
8. On the organization of the New Life movement see Xie Zaojin "Xinshenghui yundong de tuixing."
9. LNJJH, p. 42.
10. Eastman, *Abortive Revolution*, p. 66; Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, pp. 238–9.
11. Chiang appointed himself to this post on June 15, 1935.

12. LNJH, p. 126; The new commission was subordinate to Chiang's office as Supreme Opium Suppression Inspector, and thus to the head of the Military Affairs Commission. It is therefore sometimes referred to as the Military Affairs Commission Supreme Anti-Opium Commission (*junshi weiyuanhui jinyan weiyuan zong hui*). It is also referred to as the Supreme Anti-Opium Commission (*jinyan weiyuan zong hui*) or just the Anti-Opium Commission (*jinyan weiyuanhui*).

13. LNJH, p. 129; ZGJDSZL, p. 1095.

14. LNJH, pp. 131–132.

15. LNJH, p. 123.

16. LNJH, p. 415.

17. The only important provinces not mentioned here are Guangdong and Guangxi. It is not clear if these provinces were intended to get special commissioners or not.

18. ZGJDSZL, p. 1100.

19. ZGJDSZL, p. 1102.

20. LNJH, pp. 90–92.

21. *Anhui sheng yandu san xian jianju baogao shu*, p. 32.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 35–37.

24. *Anhui sheng minzheng ting, Anhui minzheng gongzou jiyao*, p. 283.

25. *Anhui sheng yandu san xian jianju baogao shu*, p. 71.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 52–3.

27. *Jinyan banyue kan*, May, 1936, p. 32.

28. Wang Hongbin, *Jindu shijian*, p. 415.

29. U.S. State 893.114/729, 4 April 1934.

30. EDG, 41.251.

31. EDG, 12.339.

32. CWR, 1937.7.17.

33. *Fujian jinyan likan* 1936.

34. *Jinyan weiyuan hui, Ersihiliu niandu jinyan nianbao*, Table 12.

35. *Fujian sheng tongji nianjian*, pp. 617–626. Like many other sources this one divides users by sex, and like all the others it shows that the vast majority of registered users and clinic patients were men (107,240 registered men vs. 4,242 registered women). This may have been because fewer women used opium, or because women were less likely to register, or most likely both.

36. *Fujian sheng jinyan gaikuang*, p. 26.

37. *Fujian sheng jinyan gaikuang*, p. 92. Warlord opium suppression plans sometimes called for extremely heavy fines and punishments, on the apparent assumption that strictness of the laws would make up for the fact that they were never enforced.

38. *Fujian sheng jinyan gaikuang*, p. 95.

39. Liang Guowu, "Wu Tiecheng tong zhi Guangdong shiqi "jinyan" heimu," p. 129. Liang Guowu was the head of the 9th opium suppression district (Hainan island).

40. Eugene Levich, *The Kwangsi Way in Kuomintang China, 1931–1939*, p. 242.

41. Guangdong sheng caizhengting, *Guangdong sheng caizheng jishi*, pp. 149–167.

42. In July of 1936, Song Ziliang was appointed head of the provincial finance department (*cai zheng ting*).

43. On the takeover in Guangdong see Xiao Juetian, "Jiang Jieshi de jinyan neimu," p. 173; It is not clear if the 500,000 figure is for remittances from both organizations or only one.

44. EDG, 41.2.

45. EDG, 3.903.

46. EDG, 3.903.

47. EDG, 3.960 Opium ashes were added to raw opium as it was boiled down to make prepared opium. Usually the ashes could be obtained locally, but in Guangdong for some reason they could not. The government helped the merchants arrange shipments of ashes and provided them with protection.

48. EDG, 3.903.

49. EDG, 3.914 For the operations of the monopoly on Hainan see Liang Guowu.

50. EDG, 12.733.

51. EDG, 3.914.

52. LNJI, p. 158; Li Jihong, *Bai nian yi meng ji*, p. 263.

53. EDG, 33.30 and others.

54. The Guangxi Clique led by Li Zongren and Bai Zhongxi was one of the most powerful internal opponents Chiang faced and one of the ones he had the most trouble dealing with. Since the province was poor and produced little opium the clique was financially dependent on these shipments. See Diana Lary, *Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics 1925–1937*, and Eugene Levich, *The Kwangsi Way in Kuomintang China, 1931–1939*, esp. pp. 243–247. Levich is more explicit about the role of opium in the clique's finances, although he tries to downplay it.

55. EDG, 33.186.

56. *Zhongyang Ribao*, 1935.6.1.

57. Hall, *The Yunnan Provincial Faction*, and to a lesser extent Levich, *The Kwangsi Way in Kuomintang China*, are explicit about the importance of opium to these two groups and the important role loss of opium profits played in their eventual defeat.

58. Guizhou followed the same pattern as the other two provinces. See “Duhai Guizhou renmin de yapian,” pp. 148–150.

59. Hall, *Yunnan Provincial Faction*, p. 142.

CHAPTER 8

1. A small amount of cocaine came in from Taiwan, and there were also a number of other opium derivatives sold, including codeine, pantopon, papaverin, et cetera. For a brief account see Zhou Xun “A History of Narcotic Consumption in Modern China.”

2. See, for instance, the various editions of the *Jinyan nianbao*.

3. The harsher punishments were specifically justified by the fact that drugs were “many times” more dangerous than opium. ZGJDSZL, p. 716.

4. Jinyan weiyuanhui, *Ersbiliu niandu jinyan nianbao*, pp. 44–45; this ratio is about the same as that in many other sources.

5. LNJJ, pp. 415–420.

6. Dikotter, *Narcotic Culture*, p. 146.

7. *China Weekly Review*, 1937.6.12; 1935.10.12. *Da Gongbao*, 1937.5.8; 1937.5.12.

8. *China Weekly Review*, 1937.7.1.

9. There were good reasons for this, as Japanese and the Japanese state were deeply involved in smuggling refined drugs into China. See John Jennings, *The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking in Asia, 1895–1945*. Li Enhan “Jiuyi-iba shibian qianhou riben dui dongbei (wei Manzhouguo) de duhua zhengci” Li Enan “Ribei zai huazhong de fan du huodong (1937–1945)” Eguchi Keiichi, *Nit-Chu Ahen senso*. At the same time, many of these drugs were produced in China from Chinese opium (although often with the help of Japanese technical knowledge and extraterritoriality). The process of refining broke the connection to Chinese producers, however, and rendered the drug entirely foreign.

10. *China Weekly Review*, 1936.5.23. A *dubua zhengci* is of course what the British had been accused of carrying out.

11. Shanxi province was best known example of this phenomenon, but it happened elsewhere as well. See Traver, Harold, “Opium to Heroin: Restrictive Opium Legislation and the Rise of Heroin Consumption in Hong Kong.”

12. Walker, William O. *Opium and Foreign Policy: The Anglo-American Search for Order in Asia, 1912–1954*. chap. 4.

13. *Dagongbao*, 1937.6.11. This was a notable change from the ordinary attitude towards the drug trade by the Japanese authorities in Tianjin.

14. When opium addicts were asked how they had become opium users they almost all claimed to have first smoked the drug medicinally. Laamann claims that opium use was “popular because it was used primarily to relieve the symptoms of diseases.” Lars P. Laa-

mann “Pain and Pleasure: Opium as Medicine in Late Imperial China” p. 1. While it is true that opium was used as a medicinal, Laaman’s attempt to shove opium use into an entirely medical context is a recreation of the nineteenth century narrative of addiction, under which medical and addictive use were two entirely separate categories. Chinese opium addicts were quite sophisticated in their dealings with the discourse of addiction. When an opium devil claimed that he or she had begun using opium innocently and then been hooked they were trying to place themselves in a discourse of victimization rather than one of deviance. The question of first use itself is a relic of the narrative of addiction, which assumed that the path to destruction began with the first use. Many Chinese were given opium medicinally as children, and this would thus be the beginning of their addiction, according to this view. Drawing this sharp distinction between good medicinal use and bad pleasurable use was obviously beneficial to opium addicts in danger of being executed.

15. Isreal, John, *Lianda: A Chinese University in War and Revolution*, p. 46.

16. Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, p. 6.

17. Isreal, *Lianda*, p. 144.

18. ZGJDSZL, p. 895.

19. Xu Guoguang, “Jiushehui jinshi jinyan.”

20. Some provinces are not included in this data, and for those which are it is hard to tell how accurate the data are. Are users being registered only in the towns, or only in certain parts of the province? How hard did provincial governments encourage registration? A quarter of the total, 1.4 million, came from Sichuan province. Some provinces also report exactly the same numbers of users in two or more years, and most reopened registration at least once on the assumption that there were many unregistered users. Among China’s largest cities Shanghai had 43,020 licensed *yan min*, Beijing, 4,953 and Tianjin, 146. The most complete and useful data come from Fujian in 1936, and Sichuan in 1939. (*Fujian sheng tongji nianjian*, 1937, n.p.; *Minzheng san nian* 1937, 163–9; *Sichuan shengzhengfu minzhengting* 1939, 72–78). Each were the sites of active anti-opium campaigns at the time the data was collected, and had substantial opium bureaucracies to collect this data. The national figure is taken from Jiang Qiuming and Zhu Qingbao, *Zhongguo jindu licheng*, p. 402. Urban figures from *Jinyan nianbao*, 1937.

21. EDG, 12.351.

22. Wu Wangqi, *Xunhui du jin ba xian yandu baogao*, p. 10.

23. *Jinyan zhuankan*, 1935, 2:60.

24. Manshu teikoku seifu, *Manshu kenkoku junenshi*, pp. 274–275.

25. Yan Shenzi, *Wuxi gailan*, n.p.

26. *Jinyan zhuankan*, 1935, 1.1:20.

27. Xie Zaosheng, “Ku yi Sichuan yan huo,” p. 155.

28. The people of Zhongshan county were not to smoke opium because they were not just ordinary people but the leaders of the nation. *Dagongbao*, 1929.6.20.

29. Wu Wangqi, *Xunhui du jin ba xian yandu baogao*, p. 26.

30. Feng Guirong, *Feng Yuxiang zhuanshuo gushi*, p. 7.
31. In its annual report for 1936, the *junshi jinyan weiyuan hui* called for new ways to cure users outside of clinics, since there were far too many of them to be treated in clinics. EDG, 12.331.
32. *Jinyan weiyuan hui tongji*, 1931, n.p.
33. *Jinyan nianbao*, 1937.
34. ZGJDSZL, p. 1232.
35. Jiang and Zhu, *Zhongguo jindu licheng*, pp. 409–412.
36. Jiang and Zhu *Zhongguo jindu licheng*, p. 415. Although I agree with this assessment Jiang and Zhu mention Ningxia, Guizhou, Sichuan and Yunnan as examples of provinces with lax enforcement, as each was a producing province that got money out of opium. This seems to me a misreading of the situation. Sichuan reported having 716,060 *yan min* in 1938, about a third of the national total. Sichuan and Yunnan were also among the leaders in total numbers cured. Jiang and Zhu are assuming that opium suppression was a matter of virtue and that if a government was not eliminating all parts of the trade it was not eliminating any of them. This is contradictory to the entire logic of the Six-Year Plan.
37. *Jiangsu sheng zheng shuyao*, 1936, p. 67.
38. EDG, 3.906 #3. There does not seem to be any direct connection to the New Life Movement, although the names are the same.
39. *Zhongyang ribao*, 1935.5.27.
40. Tao Jian, “Jiu shehui de yapien liudu ji qi jieyan gongzuo.” p. 186–7.
41. CWR, 1937.3.4.
42. CWR, 1934.12.15, p. 81, 96; 1934.12.29, p. 163.
43. CWR, 1937.1.23, p. 264.
44. CWR, 1937.1.2, p. 178.
45. CWR, 1937.1.2, p. 180.
46. *Zhejiang sheng juduhui zong baogao* 1935: 77–81.
47. ZGJDSZL, p. 1112.
48. Garfield Huang of the Anti-Opium Association, cited in Slack, “The National Anti-Opium Association and the Guomindang State, 1924–1937,” p. 265.
49. CWR, 1937.8.14.
50. CWR, 25 May 1935: 421.
51. Hall, *Yunnan Provincial Faction*, p. 143.
52. Walker, William, *Opium and Foreign Policy*, p. 77.
53. CWR, 24 May 1935: 28.
54. CWR, 6 June 1936: 2. The exhibit had been up “for a long time.”

CHAPTER 9

1. On the Communists see Chen Yung-fa, "The Blooming Poppy Under the Red Sun."
2. ZGJDSZL, p. 1173.
3. Zhang Wansheng ed., *Jiang zhubu jinyan yanlun ji*, pp. 27–33.
4. Siu, "Subverting Lineage Power" p. 197.
5. EDG, 12.609.
6. EDG, 41.574.
7. EDG, 3.906.
8. "Aborigines" are the subject of much interest at present, and the interaction between the groups designated "aborigines" and those designated "Han" (ethnic Chinese) is quite complex.
9. See Xie Zaosheng, "Ku yi Sichuan yan huo," and many others.
10. Wang Caiwei, "Sichuan jinyan wenti zhi yanjiu 1937–1945 nian," p. 39.
11. EDG, 41.703.
12. EDG, 41.574. The remaining money came from license fees and other income.
13. Description of poppy suppression plan, LNJH, pp. 83–90.
14. These would be different times in different provinces.
15. The bao jia system divided all residents of an area into five or ten family mutual responsibility groups under one of their number who was named head. It had traditionally been used to control and regulate all sorts of behavior, but since it was unpopular it was usually only active when higher authorities stressed its importance. In Jiangxi, for example, the Anti-Communist Headquarters found it necessary to all but rebuild the system. See William Wei, "Law and Order: The Role of Guomindang Security Forces in the Suppression of the Communist Bases during the Soviet Period," This was probably the case elsewhere as well.
16. LNJH, p. 390.
17. Qin Heping, *Yunnan Yapien*, p. 226–7.
18. Qin Heping, *Yunnan yapien*, p. 224–225.
19. Zhou Jiemou, "Liu Xiang, Jiang Jieshi zai Sichuan de yapien jinzheng," p. 104.
20. EDG, 41.3.
21. EDG, 41.640.
22. Wang Caiwei, "Sichuan jinyan wenti zhi yanjiu 1937–1945 nian," p. 23.
23. Tang Taipei, "Santai xian de yanhuo yu jinyan," p. 78.
24. Pu Guoshu, "Jianguo qian fuling de yapien," p. 192.

25. Zhou Jiemou, "Liu Xiang, Jiang Jieshi zai Sichuan," pp. 105–106; Pu Guoshu, "Jianguo qian fuling de yapian," pp. 192–193.

26. LNJH, p. 183.

27. LNJH, p. 187; There was a distinction between regular teams sent out by provincial governments and temporary ones sent out by the Interior Ministry, but they seem to have done the same things.

28. Hunan sheng tongji ju, *Xiang zheng wu nian tongji*, jin yan, p. 2.

29. Jiang and Zhu, *Zhongguo jindu licheng*, p. 386.

30. Xie Zaosheng, "Ku yi Sichuan yan huo," p. 151.

31. On prices, see Shao Xianshu et al., "Jinyang zhong yan diaocha ji," p. 175. It is very hard to construct a good price series for opium. Shao's data seem particularly useful because he gives the prices paid in silver to (aboriginal) opium growers, therefore avoiding the problem of determining how much of the quoted price is taxes.

32. Qin Heping, *Yunnan Yapian*, p. 247.

33. LNJH, p. 263. One of the things peasants were encouraged to raise, at least before the war started, was silkworms. Encouraging peasants to move from producing opium to silk was common during anti-opium campaigns, since silk was also a high-profit, labor intensive product.

34. Wang Hongbin, *Jindu shijian*, p. 445.

35. Wang Hongbin, *Jindu shijian*, p. 446, citing *Hunan jinyan yuekan*.

36. EDG, 41.570.

37. EDG, 41.567; 41.568; 41.572.

38. *Suqing si du faling*, no. 2 October 1939, p. 35.

39. Ibid., no. 2 October 1939, pp. 6–7.

40. Ibid., no. 1 August 1939, p. 1.

41. Wang Caiwei, "Sichuan jinyan wenti zhi yanjiu 1937–1945 nian," pp. 43–44.

42. EDG, 41.568.

43. Xie Zaosheng, "Ku yi Sichuan yan huo," p. 154.

44. *Sichuan sheng jinyan hui bao*, 1940, p. 233.

45. EDG, 41.568.

46. Shi Cilu, "Yunnan yapian tong yun neimu pianduan," p. 158; Zheng Yingshe, "Guan yu kangre shiqi Jiang, Xu, Li zai Guangdong mai yapian de jishu," pp. 146–155.

47. Wang Hongbin, *Jindu Shijian*, p. 446.

48. ZGJDSZL, p. 1229.

49. ZGJDSZL, p. 1230.

50. ZGJDSZL, p. 1231.

51. *Nanjing guo min zheng fu ji shi*, p. 696.

52. Zhang Wansheng, *Jiang zhuxi jinyan yanlun ji*, pp. 30–31.

53. Han Dezhi, “Yi jiu si si nian ya’an zhongyan qian qian hou hou.” Han recounts the case of a district magistrate named Wang Ruichen who encouraged poppy growing in the county (then in Xikang) in 1944 and 1945. Although there were many other cases of the same thing happening it is worth noting that production ceased after the war as the specific conditions that led Wang to encourage growing no longer applied.

54. The story of one such is Chen Mingxia, “1945 nian ma bian he da yanbang neimu.” Again, while there were many other groups like this, some doubtless larger, this was not a large operation.

55. Xie Zaosheng, “Ku yi Sichuan yan huo,” p. 162.

CONCLUSION

1. Jiang and Zhu, *Zhongguo Jindu Licheng*, Su Zhiliang *Zhongguo dupinshi*, Wang Hongbin, *Jindu shi jian*; Wang Jinxiang *Zhongguo jindu jianshi*. Some of this literature is summarized in Wu Yixiong, “Kai tuo zhongguo jindu shi he dupin shi de yanjiu.” A more focused study is Qin Heping, *Yunnan yapian wenti yu jinyan yundong*.

2. This theme of victimization has not always been central to Chinese historiography on the trade. Brook and Wakabayashi point out that Fan Wenlan and Hu Sheng both presented opium as a strictly economic issue. “Opium’s History in China,” p. 25 no. 6.

3. Su Zhiliang, *Zhongguo dupin shi*, p. 4.

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Index

- Abend, Hallett, 73
Alcohol, 16–19
Anglo Chinese Opium Treaty, 70, 75, 86
Anhui, 103, 119, 154–5, 184
Anti-Communist Headquarters
 (Nanchang), 106, 151, 162, 167
Anti-Opium Association (National), 90,
 105, 108–110, 115, 118, 120–125,
 128, 130–132, 136, 137, 142–146
 1929 campaigns in the provinces,
 142–3
 And Anti-Opium week, 120–123, 132
Anti-Opium Inspectorate, 148, 162, 167,
 180, 186, 189, 219
Anti-opium associations, 54, 145, 146
Anti-Opium Commission, 131, 136,
 140–142, 148, 153
 Re-founding, 180

Bangkok Conference on Opium-Smoking
 in the Far East, 68
Bao Shijie, 155
Bao Tianxiao, 37
Beijing, 1
Bianco, Lucian, 97
Blue, Rupert, 68
Boycott movement, 13
Brent, C., 66
British government, 23, 25, 64, 68, 74,
 81–86, 143, 232
Burma, 62, 96

Cai Bubai, 173
Canton (see Guangzhou)

Chen Diaoyuan, 171
Chen Guofu, 167
Chen Hongmu, 18
Chen Jie, 97
Chen Shaowei, 161
Chao Dianzhi, 170
Chen Qitang, 188
Chiang Kai-shek, 4, 6, 19, 92, 101, 118,
 130, 134, 139, 145, 148, 178, 192,
 216
 On opium in Southwest China, 192
 Statements on opium in 1928, 134
 Statements on opium in 1936, 178
 Statements on opium in 1940, 229
China, Chinese government (see also
 Qing dynasty), 70, 73, 80
Cixi (Empress Dowager), 80
Classic of History, 17
Coffee, 15
Commission of Inquiry Into the Control
 of Opium-Smoking in the Far East,
 71–72
Communists (Chinese), 92
Courtwright, David, 46

Dai Li, 167
Dai Zhuanxian, 151
Des Forges, Alexander, 38
Doolittle, Justus, 47, 49
Drug foods, 14–15, 22
Drugs (morphine and heroin), 14, 138,
 139, 166, 195
Du Yuesheng, 11, 102–103, 118–119,
 129, 159, 165

- Duan Qirui, 1, 86
 Duke of Zhou, 17
 Dutch East Indies, 58, 62, 154

 Fang Bao, 18
 Farmers' Bank of China, 161, 226
 Feng Guozhang, 83, 84–86
 Feng Yuxiang, 92, 130
Flora, 81
 France, 62
 French Indochina, 59, 97, 165, 188
 Fujian, 78, 84, 103–107, 156–7, 186–188
 Fuzhou, 36

 Geneva Opium Conferences, 68–70, 109
 Green Gang, 102
 Guangdong, 94, 96, 124, 188–190,
 188–190
 Guangxi, 91, 93, 99, 115, 151
 Guangzhou, 23, 86, 112–114, 189
 Guo Songdao, 32
 Guo Zhenjun, 4
 Guomindang (GMD), 92, 110, 111–115
 Left Guomindang, 139
 Local party branches, 123–128
 Guomin News Agency, 116

 Hague Anti-Opium Conference, 68
 Hankou, 94, 104, 119, 157–158
 During the War of Resistance, 217,
 218
 Opium smoking in, 170–171
 He Shuntian, 36
 Henan, 141, 169
 Heroin, 2
 Hoise, Alexander, 76
 Hong Kong, 58, 72
 Hong Rencun, 154
 Howard, Paul, 23
 Hu Hanmin, 133, 188
 Huang, Garfield, 115, 143, 154
 Huang Jiamin, 145
 Huang Jinrong, 102
 Huang Musong, 188
 Huang, Phillip, 20

 Huang Shaoxiong, 79, 91
 Huang Zhenxing, 158
 Hubei, 141, 158
 Hunan, 141, 159, 168–169

 Imperialism, 24
 Indian opium, 1, 76, 80, 83

 Japan, 13, 50, 70, 196, 234
 War of Resistance, 215
 Jiangnan case, 136
 Jiangsu, 102–103, 117, 167
 Jiangxi, 137
 Jiaqing emperor, 23
 Jordan, John, 77, 82
 Judge, Joan, 78

 Kang Youwei, 53
 Kerr, Norman, 42
 Kung, H.H., 137, 139, 178

 League of Nations, 63, 68, 109, 144, 233
 Commission on Opium, 144, 200
 Li Chengyi, 113
 Li Hongzhang, 30, 32, 53, 80, 232
 Li Hsiao-t'i, 79, 102
 Li Jihong, 116, 141, 153, 180, 189
 Li Ren, 206
 Li Zonghuang, 97
 Li Zongren, 92
 Liang Qichao, 53–54
Likin, 31, 126, 141
 Lin Manhong, 29, 20
 Lin Zexu, 9–12, 24, 27–28, 52, 56, 231
Liu mang, 22, 99
 Liu Guangchang, 173
 Liu Ruiheng, 141
 Liu Shenyi, 51
 Liu Xiang, 164, 221
 Lockhart, William, 49
 Long Yun, 101, 221

 Ma Yinchu 125–6, 211–212
 Madancy, Joyce, 78, 102
 Martin, Brian, 102

- McMahon, Keith, 39
 Ma Jizhi, 209–210
 Manchu(s), 16–17
 May Fourth, 3
 Mei Gongren, 173
 Meyer, Kathryn, 6
 Maze, F.W., 153
Min sheng, 17
 Missionaries, 46–47, 61
 Mukden, 144
- Narrative of addiction, 5, 42–44, 197–198, 233
 National Anti-Opium Conference, 133–136
 New Life Movement, 19, 179
 New Policies, 55, 74, 80, 233, 234
 Newman, R.K., 29
 Northern Expedition, 115, 152, 156
- Opium, 25
 Addiction, 40, 41–43, 197
 Clinics, 48, 61, 148, 206–209
 Consumption, 24, 29, 37, 49, 55, 91, 170, 182, 185, 198–199, 224–225
 And famine, 21, 235
 Farms, 58, 67, 112, 125, 137
 Legalization, 25–27
 Licensing, 61, 62, 178, 182, 186, 199–200
 Monopoly, 72–73, 100, 112, 115, 117, 128, 153
 1931 plan 153–54
 Poppies, 90, 106, 137, 147, 156–157, 181, 219–221, 223–224
 Licensed growing, 155
 Resistance to poppy control, 156
 Scientific opium suppression, 152
 Taxation, 30–31, 74, 90, 92–93, 97, 99
 Trade, 23, 30, 56, 59, 75, 95, 183, 219
 Hankou and the opium trade, 158–164
 Private opium, 225–227
 Tong yun chu, 162, 164
 Opium Advisory Committee, 71
 Opium War, first (1839–42), 24, 28
- Parssinen, Terry, 6
 Penang Opium Commission, 44, 66
 Persia, 71
 Philippine Commission, 66–68, 71
 Philippines, 60
 Polachek, James, 27
 Public sphere, 108
 Pudong, 1, 2, 9, 10, 13
- Qianlong emperor, 18–19, 20
 Qin Heping, 95
 Qing, Qing dynasty, 14, 16–19, 27, 54, 56, 79
 Qiu Kaiji, 167
Qu du she, 78
- Railway recovery movement, 12
 Roberts, William, 65
 Rowe, William, 18
 Royal Commission on Opium, 62, 64–65, 232
- Shanghai, 1, 11, 82, 102–3, 120, 136, 143, 154–155, 165, 175
 Shen Congwen, 91
 Shi Zilu, 101
 Sichuan, 31, 96, 101, 106, 192, 218, 2210223
 Silver, 28
 Six-Year Plan to Eliminate Opium, 137, 177–194, 196
 Conclusion of plan, 228
 Origins of plan, 152, 178
 Wartime adjustments, 215–217
- Shen Baochen, 28
 Shen Dingyi, 79
Shenbao (Shanghai), 55, 74, 84
 Slack, Edward, 6, 79
 Snow, Edgar, 154
 So Wai-chor, 139
 Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade, 60, 65, 232

- Song Ziliang, 189
 Songshou, 78
 Soong, T.V., 136, 137, 153
 Special Commissioners, 167, 181, 190
 In Anhui, 184–5
 Stillwell, Joseph, 11, 90
 Su Zhiliang, 231
 Sun Jiagan, 18
 Sun Ke, 127
 Sun Yat-sen, 4, 54, 109, 112, 134
 Sun Xiufu, 55
 Suzhou, 79
 Suzhou system, 20

 Taiwan, 9, 14, 22, 59, 71, 104, 114
 Tan Zhunpei, 28
 Tang Jiyao, 97, 99
 Tang Shaoyi, 50
 Tang Tingshu, 50
 Tianjin, 197–198
 Tobacco, 17, 22
 Treaty of Shimonoseki, 52
 Treaty of Tianjin, 31
 Trocki, Carl, 58

 United States, 60, 68

 Wakeman, Frederic, 6
 Wang Hongbin, 91
 Wang Jingwei, 126–127
 Wang Shugui, 102
 Warlordism, 90–92
 Wei Yuan, 28, 50
 Wuhan, 115
 Wu Liande, 44, 153

 Wu Peifu, 108, 157
 Wu Tiecheng, 189

 Xi Liang, 96
 Xikang, 218, 226
 Xu Shucheng, 86
 Xu Yuanquan, 168

yan min, 199–204
 Yan Xishan, 92, 108
 Yang Yongtai, 204
 Yang Zhuzhuang, 135
 Yichang, 171–172
 Yip, Paul, 103
 Yongzheng emperor, 20, 22
Yuan Qiang, 52
 Yuan Shikai, 4
 Yunnan, 2, 31, 91, 94–97, 141, 161, 165,
 172, 183, 191, 212, 221

 Zeitlin, Madaline, 38
 Zhang Chengjia 39–41, 204
 Zhang Yipeng, 1
 Zhang Zhidong, 30, 31, 53, 74, 80
 Zhang Zhizhang, 131, 136, 141
 Zhejiang, 117, 124–126, 129–131, 143,
 146–149
 Zheng Huatang, 168
 Zheng Juchen, 11, 160
 Zhong Baiyi, 184
 Zhou dynasty, 17
 Zhu Bowei, 84–85
Zun xing hui, 51
 Zuo Zongtang, 32

The Chinese and Opium under the Republic

WORSE THAN FLOODS AND WILD BEASTS

Alan Baumler

In the nineteenth century, opium smoking was common throughout China and regarded as a vice no different from any other: pleasurable, potentially dangerous, but not a threat to destroy the nation and the race, and often profitable to the state and individuals. Once Western concepts of addiction came to China in the twentieth century, however, opium came to be seen as a problem “worse than floods and wild beasts.” In this book, Alan Baumler examines how Chinese reformers convinced the people and the state that eliminating opium was one of the crucial tasks facing the new Chinese nation. He analyzes the process by which the government borrowed international models of drug control and modern ideas of citizenship and combined them into a program that successfully transformed opium from a major part of China’s political economy to an ordinary social problem.

“This is an important addition to the literature, contributing not only to our knowledge of the opium issue in particular, but also, more broadly, to the entire history of nation building in modern China. Baumler spends much of the work discussing the political discourse about opium, which is as crucial as the opium trade itself. The strongest feature of his work is that he stands outside of the dialogue and examines it with an objective eye. So much of the discussion about drugs is morally charged that it is difficult to do so, but Baumler is able to show how this discourse developed. Reading this book forces one to make constant reference to our own War on Drugs and ‘Just Say No’ campaigns.”

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